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Abstract 
The post-conflict territories of the Western Balkans have been subjected to an 
unprecedented level of international attention since the mid-1990s. The EU, NATO and 
OSCE in particular converged on the region intent on redefining their image - if not 
purpose - in the first major crisis of the post-Cold War era. Responding to the horrific 
inter-ethnic violence that defined conflict in the region, International Organisations 
continually emphasised the importance of upholding standards regarding the protection of, 
and respect for, ethnic minorities. While literature acknowledges that military forces were 
deployed to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment for post-conflict 
peacebuilding to emerge, few scholars have explored the substance of the military role 
beyond the separation of former warring factions and provision of a secure humanitarian 
space. This research demonstrates that military actors adapted their approaches to 
contribute across the spectrum of the peacebuilding effort, including on rights based issues; 
specifically ethnic minority returns and participation. 
On the basis of case studies in Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina, the thesis adopts an 
empirical approach to exploring the reasons for military engagement on these issues and 
their respective successes and failures. It examines the sources that projected ideas on 
ethnic minority issues – international policy development, peace treaty composition, and 
domestic acceptance – and how they influenced military decision making processes. 
Through post-conflict phases it analyses the domestic footprint of international 
intervention – international administration and civil-military actors – and discusses 
thematically the means of military engagement, the receptiveness of domestic actors at 
multiple levels and the nature of compliance. Acknowledging the overarching civilian 
framework for intervention, where from the outset the prospective of NATO and EU 
membership were held forth as the 'prize' for a successful return to 'a Europe of integration, 
democracy and ethnic pluralism', it establishes the utility of strategic mechanisms – 
conditionality and normative pressure – in military hands acknowledging the potential for 
linkage to enlargement frameworks. It argues that in spite of principled objections, military 
operations can and do have influence in delivering policy on rights based issues. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
…the respective roles of politicians, generals and humanitarian actors 
are not clear anymore.
1
  
 
...it is difficult to get people to trust each other and live together after 
horrendous violence has been done. That is not a new feature of these 
conflicts; it is always true of any conflict.
2
 
 
The appearance of this overtired and destitute procession dampened the 
gaiety on the kapia. The older people remained seated on the stone 
benches, while the younger stood up and formed living walls on both 
sides of the kapia and the procession passed between them. Some of the 
townsmen only looked compassionately at the refugees and remained 
silent, while others greeted them with “merhaba”, tried to stop them and 
offer them something. They paid no attention to the offers and scarcely 
responded to the greetings...
3
 
 
1.1 Exploring the Potential of Military Forces’ Delivery4 of Rights-based Policies 
Post-Cold War military interventions have transformed the roles assigned to, and 
expectations of, military forces. Over 15 years have passed since NATO’s deployment into 
Kosovo effectively brought the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to an end, halting a 
sequence of violent regional power struggles, where ethnic differences were ruthlessly 
exploited for political gain.
5
 It also marked the consolidation of engagement by 
international civilian and military organisations in a manner unseen in the rest of Europe. 
The Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployment in 1999, and that which predated it in 1995, in 
Bosnia,
6
 Implementation Force (IFOR), were essentially designed to establish and maintain 
“safe and secure environments” to allow for post-conflict recovery.7 In achieving that aim, 
both were largely effective. How they achieved it evolved significantly. Whether 
stimulated by the rise of humanitarian intervention – a responsibility to protect; the 
                                                 
1
 Peter Fuchs, the Director General of the ICRC, quoted in Chandler, (2001), p. 698.  
2
 Finnemore, (2000), p.20.  
3
 Andrić, (1959), p. 98. 
4
 Delivery is understood as any form of military engagement on activities relating to rights-based issues. 
5
 The Albanian National Liberation Army insurgency in FYROM commenced a year later, but lacked the 
scale and intensity of previous engagements experienced throughout the region. See also Gow, (2003), p. 
119. 
6
 Throughout the text Bosnia is used in lieu of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
7
 It should be noted that several non-NATO members contributed to these missions. For expediency NATO is 
used throughout. 
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projection of universal values or norms for human rights – rights-based approaches; or 
more pragmatic geo-political logic, sustained demand for interventions in fragile and 
conflict affected states has more often than not placed military forces at the centre of 
international efforts. Alongside the traditionally understood roles of combat, peace 
enforcement, peacekeeping and limited humanitarian support, the last 15 years in particular 
have seen military forces become more closely aligned, influenced and, in some cases, 
integrated with the civilian structures created to meet the challenges of post-conflict 
territories; a non-coercive aspect to the military role in peacebuilding has emerged.  
Within that context, this research aims to enhance our understanding of the military 
role in the delivery of rights-based policies. The empirical goal is to establish the extent to 
which the predominantly NATO-led international military forces in Bosnia and Kosovo 
engaged in activities intended to address the post-conflict ethnic minority issues of returns 
and participation. Considering the military role within the wider international effort, the 
research will identify the main factors that informed and stimulated military engagement: 
external normative influences, the prominence of minority rights rhetoric, relevant policy 
frameworks, multi-level internal socialisation, changes in military culture, adoption and 
adapting of “civilian strategies” (conditional incentives and normative pressure), and the 
evolution of demands on military actors through phases of post-conflict interaction. 
Specifically this research investigates: Why did military actors engage in activities relating 
to ethnic minority issues? And Why were the military successful or unsuccessful in 
achieving compliance with policies for ethnic minority issues in the post-conflict territories 
of Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo? In answering these questions, the research aims to 
highlight the extent and substance of military engagement with ethnic minority issues, and 
thereby offer insight into the transformation of military practice in post-conflict 
intervention and the utility and adaptability of military means for delivering rights-based 
policies. 
Consideration of the impact and effectiveness of military actors on ethnic minority 
issues potentially contributes to a number of bodies of literature, including: international 
institutions, international security, intervention, security-sector reform, enlargement, and 
minority rights. While the importance of international organisational endeavour in post-
conflict settings is well established in that literature, few academics have sought to 
systematically analyse the policy implications of military approaches to ethnic issues.
8
 
                                                 
8
 Smith, (2008), p. 2. 
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From Bosnia to Afghanistan, scholarship on military activity has primarily focused on 
questions concerning the legitimacy of military action, the conduct of combat operations, 
and the propriety of military support for humanitarian activities. Nuanced examinations of 
non-combat operations are rare beyond internal (and generally classified) military 
assessments of their own performance. Underpinned by a cross-disciplinary approach, this 
research identifies and addresses a specific and relatively unexplored gap – a military role 
in delivering rights-based policies. The findings identified add to existing literature on 
peacebuilding, military studies, CIMIC, and SSR while the examination of the utility of 
conditionality, variations in approaches for the delivery of rights-based policies – minority 
rights in particular – deepen understanding of the purpose, function of military forces in 
post-conflict intervention.  
Acknowledging the multi-dimensional character of recent international 
interventions, four arguments are presented in this research. First, that international 
military forces in Bosnia and Kosovo were often actively engaged at multiple levels in 
projecting policy and related standards on ethnic minority issues. Second, through formal, 
informal and at times subconscious means they adapted ‘civilian’ approaches in applying 
non-coercive conditional incentives and normative pressure. Third, that sufficient evidence 
exists to demonstrate that military actors were capable of achieving policy compliant 
outcomes regarding ethnic minority issues. Finally, that the nature and implications of 
these findings raise questions as to whether this is an appropriate role for the military to 
assume: a subject for further research. 
Though military doctrine and approaches such as CIMIC have been seen to evolve 
considerably in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important to stress that the particular 
consideration of the post-conflict experience of the Western Balkans remains a useful and 
appropriate reference point, both for those who consider the role of the military in post-
conflict intervention, and those who advocate specific engagement with rights-based 
issues. The rest of this chapter will briefly introduce the civil-military framework for post-
conflict intervention, the relevance of conditional incentives and normative pressure, the 
nature of ethnic minority issues faced, and the methodological approach taken. It will then 
state the main arguments and findings of the research, and the structure for the remainder of 
the thesis. 
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1.2 Features of the Civilian-military Space: Key Actors and Institutions
9
 
The scale and significance of international engagement in the Western Balkans should not 
be understated: NATO’s first bombing campaign and operational deployment of troops in a 
non-article 5 context; the testing of the EU’s fledging foreign and security policy 
structures, and its first significant deployment of troops; and the largest field missions 
undertaken by the OSCE. Their combined involvement in the former Yugoslavia informs 
contemporary understanding of international interventions, transition and institutional 
enlargement. While the contribution of military actors was primarily overseen and directed 
by NATO, and to a lesser extent the EU, military behaviour was influenced by the policy 
positions and means of engagement of all international organisations. For example, the 
OSCE had “repositioned itself to address some of the variety of ‘security challenges’ 
evident in Europe after 1989”.10  By 1993 it had established itself as “an inclusive pan-
European forum and a key norm-setting agency”11 with clear policies on ethnic minority 
issues and minority rights; continuously articulated by the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities. Similarly, the CE developed specific documents relating to minority rights, 
recommendation 1201 (Additional protocol on the rights of minorities to the European 
Convention on Human Rights) was listed as a ‘commitment’ for members since 1993 in 
addition to two treaties, the 1992 European Charter on the Protection of Minority 
Languages and the 1993 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
Constrained by the political differences of its member states, the EU tended to refer 
to OSCE policy on minority matters as it could not agree a clearly defined position of its 
own, beyond reference to the requirement for “respect for and the protection of minorities” 
in the Copenhagen criteria.
12
 Through the periods analysed, the EU’s influence is seen to 
increase steadily as the post-conflict effort allowed for the application of pre-accession 
instruments. The EU’s awareness of the attractiveness of membership became central to its 
approach as post-conflict engagement progressed. The extent to which military activities 
were influenced by an enlargement narrative is difficult to gauge, though the EU’s 
assumption of a leadership role reflected in the deployment of EUFOR in Bosnia, and the 
                                                 
9
 For the purposes of this research the term civil-military relations is used to refer to the spectrum of activities 
and relationships that take place between military forces and civilian actors. See Rukavishnikov and Pugh, 
(2006), pp. 131-132. CIMIC is understood as the formal means though which militaries attempt to manage 
and influence relationships with civilian actors. 
10
 Smith, M (1996), p. 289.  
11
 Lynch, (2009), p. 140. 
12
 European Council in Copenhagen, (1993), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf 
(accessed 10 April 2013). 
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EULEX mission in Kosovo, consolidated its position as a key reference point for 
international military forces deployed in the region. A further layer of connectivity existed 
through NATO, as many EU member states were prominent TCCs to IFOR, SFOR and 
KFOR. 
An enlargement prospective is also evident in NATO’s engagement with the region 
(if not Kosovo). Similar to the EU, NATO developed its own pre-accession strategy that 
clearly linked conditionality on specific issues to eventual membership, through a series of 
stepping stones from PfP, through the ‘Intensified Dialogue’ process, IPAP, MAPs, to 
eventual membership of the alliance. In considering this, it is worth noting that NATO is a 
political as well as a military alliance, equally concerned that the political structures of 
prospective members are as robust as their military capability. For example, NATO 
expects a “willingness to settle ... ethnic disputes by peaceful means” as a condition for 
fulfilment of a MAP.
13
  The Bucharest Summit of 2008 expanded on this ‘condition’ by 
stating: 
We expect continued full implementation of their commitments to 
standards, especially those related to the rule of law and regarding the 
protection of ethnic minorities and communities, as well as the 
protection of historical and religious sites, and to combating crime and 
corruption.
14
 
 
As shall be demonstrated in the case studies, such pronouncements feature prominently in 
military commanders’ mission analysis, allowing ‘conditional logic’ to permeate to the 
lowest operational levels. Like the EU, NATO had other means at its disposal, such as its 
development of SSR approaches to oversee the complete reorganisation of Bosnia’s armed 
forces – effectively amalgamating “three armies into one” – and the establishment and 
training of the KSF in Kosovo. In turn these activities fostered opportunities for close 
socialisation with domestic elites, allowing for a distinct normative dimension to emerge. 
If one accepts, as Alexandra Gheicu argues, that NATO shares “western values”, 
particularly with the EU, then the potential for normative pressure to be applied on 
minority issues is considerable – particularly where states appear to prioritise their 
relations with the alliance.
15
 
At the operational level, NATO and EU commanders developed extensive 
networks of engagement with local communities, pivoting on the deployment of LOT 
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houses in Bosnia and LMTs in Kosovo. Their use of CIMIC funds is of particular interest 
to this research, as in many cases the release of funding to a community hinged on 
compliance with stated conditions, ranging from simple agreements not to disrupt 
forthcoming ‘go and see’ visits by displaced members of an ethnic minority, to more 
complex agreements seeking the participation of representatives from municipal 
administrations, international organisations such as the OSCE or EU, and domestic 
NGOs.
16
 
The international administration of war-torn territories may be costly 
and imperfect, but less interventionist measures, in some cases, and 
unilateralist measures, in other cases, can be worse alternatives.
17
 
 
Assuming many of the responsibilities of state, international administrations were 
established to be the primary drivers of post-conflict peacebuilding. Both the OHR and 
UNMIK served as focal points for all other actors in their respective territories, including 
the military.  In theory, the presence of such civil-military structures increased the options 
and opportunities to influence domestic policy processes, allowing for more intensive and 
sustained socialisation – international administration staff have direct access to domestic 
political elites – and the ability to deploy a range of ‘area specific’ agencies and 
programmes, such as the European Agency for Reconstruction. Richard Caplan’s research 
demonstrated that that potential was tempered by a range of factors, including: conditions 
on its inception; the clarity and appeal of its operational aims; and the structure and 
authority of the operation (relationship with key institutions).
18
  In Bosnia and Kosovo, 
these factors were compounded by polarised domestic politics that fanned popular 
frustration regarding the efforts of international administration, often exposing the 
credibility of its actions.  
The civil-military structures of post-conflict Bosnia and Kosovo undoubtedly 
provided “opportunities” for innovative engagement with a range of issues – including the 
option of leveraging the appeal of membership. However the long-term legitimacy of both 
the retention of power by internationally-led transitional authorities, and their dictation of 
policy on ethnic minority issues influenced their effectiveness and that of their military 
counterparts. This dynamic is examined in chapter 4 and the cases studies.  
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1.21 Characteristics of the Domestic Sphere 
Due to the international presence, domestic actors were confronted with a bewildering 
range of actors and issues, from economic reform and human trafficking to customs law 
and environmental protection. The complexity of this operating environment placed 
significant pressure on often immature and fragile institutional structures. Such pressure 
manifested itself in a number of ways: frustration at apparent lack of input to decision-
making processes, and questions concerning the credibility, and at times legitimacy, of 
international activity compounded by intra-institutional and domestic competition to avail 
of financial support packages.
19
  
Throughout the periods considered, the political outlook and discourse remained 
predominantly nationalistic, with representatives of all ethnicities apparently reluctant to 
change, in spite of international engagement. For example, domestic cooperation with the 
ICTY persisted as a contentious issue.  Related to this, the common political heritage of 
these territories, and the disposition of many displaced minorities, fostered conditions for 
pronounced kin-state influence on minorities’ issues. Tim Judah’s, generally positive, 
assessment of societal trends in the Western Balkans region identifies key elements that 
combine to influence domestic understanding both of the issues they face and external 
attempts to direct their policy action – acknowledging that it is often “outsiders who hold 
up progress for their own nationalist or electoral reasons...”20 While he rightly points to the 
lethargy of the enlargement process,
21
 it is the persistence of nationalism – the particular 
linkage of ethnicity with politics and power – that most affects the issues addressed in this 
research. In spite of an almost universal desire to achieve membership of NATO and the 
EU, the reality of daily existence for both majority and minority communities in weak 
post-conflict economies, with complex and evolving state structures, is defined by survival. 
However, his premise that networks of regional engagement broken during the 1990s are 
being restored suggests a capacity for change that is perhaps not always appreciated by 
external observers. How this impacts on ethnic minority issues remains to be seen, but the 
potential to depressurise ethnic issues is clearly inherent in his findings, as is the risk that – 
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given their persistence to date – they may be side-lined as the guilty conscious of a 
Yugosphere that seeks to escape aspects of its recent history. 
1.3 Post-conflict Ethnic Minority Issues 
In a short article written in 1997, Mark Mazower presented the idea that the key to 
understanding the causes of the Bosnian war, and the salience of the issue of ethnicity, lay 
not in the relationship of ethnicity to history or society – as is often suggested – but in the 
relationship of ethnicity to politics and power: “it is in the struggle for power following 
Tito's death that ethnicity assumes a central role [...] the fighting has changed people’s 
sense of their identity in remarkable ways. It has, to put it simply, created new realities.”22 
The scale and diversity of international intervention in the former Yugoslavia, both during 
and after the conflict, directly impacted on the political balance of the territories affected, 
and further altered the ‘realities’ created by war – new political boundaries and 
international administrations stand out – but these new realities emerged within an all too 
familiar post-conflict landscape. 
The decision to prioritise ethnic minority returns and political participation is based 
on the view that the ethnic dimension was the defining characteristic of conflict in the 
region, and that changes on ethnic issues are often key indicators of post-conflict 
progression or regression.
23
 At the time of writing, and despite over a decade of exposure 
to various forms of multilateral engagement by international organisations, thousands of 
people remain displaced. Their access to their property often impeded by a myriad of 
obstacles from obtaining citizenship in ‘new’ states, to the questionable application of 
planning laws;  their access to political recourse persistently smothered by conflicting 
local, national and in some cases international political agendas – multi-level power 
struggles. The challenge presented to the actors and institutions examined here was to 
foster stability and constructive ethnic relations, by ensuring that the rights and position of 
the minority populations were secure.  In part, therefore, this research responds to the 
dichotomy between the high rhetorical importance attached by international civilian and 
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military actors to progress on ethnic issues, and the fact that some of the early actions and 
processes initiated by international actors were counterproductive or even complicit – a 
criticism of the Dayton Agreement
24
  – in sustaining the linkage between ethnic issues, 
politics and power and therefore the belligerent stagnation of minority displacement, 
disruption and political detachment. While it is unrealistic to expect a solution to ethnic 
conflict – it is an ‘imperfect process’25 – arguably, were these issues to persist as prominent 
sources of political leverage and instability, then the quality and sustainability of progress 
made in other areas remains vulnerable. 
1.31 Minority Returns 
On the cessation of conflict in Bosnia alone, it is estimated that 2.2 million people, of all 
ethnicities, were displaced either through voluntary evacuation or forcible expulsion.
26
 
Conscious of the fact that borders were, and in some cases still are disputed, and 
acknowledging the definitional distinction that exists, reference here to a “returns process” 
is intended to accommodate both IDP and refugee returns.
27
 While this research does not 
seek to directly engage in a debate on the appropriateness of classification per se, these 
categories of classification point to further layers of complicating factors that may both 
shape domestic understanding of the legal status of various minority groups, and influence 
institutions’ ability to develop and apply policy.28 For example Kosovo raises particular 
questions because its status (currently recognised by 108 UN member states)
29
 is still 
openly questioned.
30
  
Given that international organisations by and large view the returns process as a 
vital step early on in rehabilitation, it is apparent that if they are to effectively address the 
issues involved they must be prepared to deploy a variety of approaches to meet the needs 
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of the various circumstances of the ‘returnees’, while retaining cognisance of the layers of 
complicated issues encountered, such as security and human rights guarantees, property 
rights, domestic agendas, minority rights, economic circumstances, as well as the potential 
for unintended outcomes. For definitional clarity, property rights are understood as “the 
legally defined and enforced rules of ownership, especially as pertaining to land and 
whatever may be situated on, above, and below it...”31 
1.32 Minority Participation 
The power-sharing arrangements put in place under the terms of the Dayton Agreement in 
Bosnia and UNSCR 1244 in Kosovo prioritised the promotion of ‘ethnic diversity’ by 
ensuring proportional representation of minorities in state, entity, county, and municipal 
administrations.
32
 However, as Florian Bieber, Bogdan Ivanisevic and others have noted, 
this ambitious aim greatly restricted the options available to the institutions in the 
immediate aftermath of the conflict, and the initial pride in hosting ‘early elections’ to fill 
representative positions soon gave way, as nationalist parties consolidated their positions 
and minorities were isolated or refused to participate.
33
  
A prominent characteristic of these structures was the decentralisation of power and 
autonomy to regional and local levels. Outcomes have varied significantly, most notably 
with substantial discord between the entities in Bosnia, or the continued existence of 
parallel structures in Kosovo, contrasting with the considered successes of municipalities 
such as Gracanica in Kosovo, or Brčko in Bosnia. As the case studies reveal, unintended 
and counterproductive outcomes have also emerged: for example, in order to consolidate 
their ethno-political powerbase, some nationalist parties in RS attempted to ‘resettle’ 
displaced members of their own ethnicity to localities with which they had no previous 
connection.
34
 Similar divergence is evident when analysing police and military structures, 
and even where ‘diversity successes’ are claimed, such as the KPS in Kosovo or the 
military in Bosnia, the case studies demonstrate that concerns remain over their 
sustainability.   
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1.4 Analytical Approach 
In considering the diversity of engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo, it is clear that potential 
existed for the military to influence policy application on ethnic minority issues. This 
section sets out the analytical framework to evaluate the extent to which that potential was 
realised, outlining why the framework was deemed appropriate for analysis, and how it 
explains the successes and failures of military activity on ethnic minority returns and 
participation. 
The state of play pertaining to the ‘ethnic minority issues’ on the cessation of 
conflict is used as the starting point for analysis, thus Kosovo from 1999 and Bosnia from 
1995.
35
 Drawing from the approach used by Judith Kelley
36
, in her study of ethnic politics 
in Europe, the methodology applied is intended to capture and explain the military 
application of conditional incentives and normative pressure relating to ethnic minority 
returns and participation (See Table 1.1). Acknowledging that the concepts of 
conditionality and normative pressure are closely intertwined, the decision to separate them 
here is based on a desire to break down and evaluate the components of military activities 
in order to test for distinguishing features. It is also based on the assumption that by virtue 
of their role and presence, socialisation by military actors – even in the absence of 
incentives – necessarily involved normative pressure. This approach should shed light on 
the function of liaison teams and key leader engagement in particular.  
Adapting this approach arguably pushes the boundaries of application envisaged by 
Judith Kelley, who contended, “practices that use military threats or other direct 
interventions as coercion to supersede the sovereign nation are […] inconsistent with the 
definition of conditionality”.37 Scholarly consideration of the relationship between 
conditional and coercive means in many ways mirrors that of hard and soft power, with 
potential for various forms of application within that spectrum.
38
 Accepting the argument 
of Philippe Schmitter, that the hallmark of conditionality is “the deliberate use of 
coercion… attaching specific conditions to the distributions of benefits…on the part of 
multilateral institutions”,39 then for the approach applied here context matters.  On one 
level, the deployment of international military forces to post-conflict territories can be 
understood as establishing a coercive presence. At more tactical levels, examples of overtly 
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coercive activity by international military forces can be identified during the periods 
researched.
40
 However as their role evolved from one of stabilisation to that of deterrent 
presence the prevailing character of the military presence in Kosovo and Bosnia became 
predominantly benign; the coercive aspect of their activity becoming less pronounced. The 
methodology applied here is adapted with that transition in mind. 
In considering the extent and nature of compliant outcomes, the approach 
recognises that where international administration is present, policy adoption at state levels 
is not always a useful barometer of change – compliant policies are most often de facto 
imposed by interim constitutional arrangements. Recognising that most military activity 
took place at sub-state levels, the examination of compliant outcomes focuses on identified 
instances of local compliance, most often associated with the decisions of village leaders or 
municipal councils. Quantitatively analysing these outcomes is challenging due to the 
diversity of causal factors, and difficulty in accessing domestic sources in a post-conflict 
context, where institutional structures are weak, and where populations are often slow to 
discuss their experience with external researchers. That challenge is addressed here 
through three interconnected means: a macro-level examination of the external factors 
influencing policy composition (Chapter 3); identification of the features of post-conflict 
territories most likely to impact on the application of policy linked to ethnic minority 
returns and participation (chapter 4); and interviews with domestic actors, such as village 
leaders and politicians (investigating the specific impact of the military) which inform the 
case studies of Chapters 5 to 8. Through these means, this research garnered sufficient 
information to explore the nature of compliance. The findings are further evaluated by 
adapting the External Incentives Model used in research on CEEC and elsewhere, as a 
means to explain the substance of compliant and non-compliant outcomes. 
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Table 1.1 Methodological Framework 
Policy Strategic 
Mechanism & 
Application 
Military 
Delivery 
Domestic 
Factors 
Outcomes 
(Compliance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Returns 
 
 
 
 Participation 
 Normative 
Pressure 
 
 Conditional 
incentives 
 
 
 
 Humanitarian 
Assistance 
 
 CIMIC 
 
 Key Leader 
Engagement 
 
 Defence 
Reform 
 
 Membership 
 
 
 
 
 
 Institutional 
Capacity 
 
 Kin-state 
influence 
 
 Rationalist 
logic 
 
 Socialisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 Full 
 
 Partial 
 
 None 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
o Humanitarian 
Aid 
 
o Development 
finance 
 
o Transfer of 
Power 
 
o Technical 
Support 
 
o Membership 
of EU and 
NATO 
Analysis 
Nature of 
Compliance 
 
 
 
1.41 Conditionality, Normative Pressure and the Military Approach 
For the purposes of this research, conditionality is understood as explicitly linking a 
change advocated to an incentive – a particular benefit provided by the institution.41 
Allowing for the influence of the military to be evaluated, five areas were identified where 
the potential for military contributions coexisted with opportunities for the application of 
conditional incentives, including: humanitarian aid; development finance; incentives 
associated with the transfer of power; the provision of technical support (administrative, 
training, logistical etc.); and incentives linked to membership of either the EU or NATO.
42
 
In the immediate post-conflict response, financial assistance is often closely related 
to humanitarian aid, particularly in the generation of institutional capacity (such as 
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schools) at municipal levels. As the post-conflict effort gathers pace, approaches are seen 
to part into distinct areas of interaction and practice. As demonstrated in chapters 6 and 8, 
the military involvement in these areas divided into the provision of humanitarian 
assistance (including the direct and indirect delivery of humanitarian aid) and then a 
transition to the application of financial incentives predominantly through CIMIC projects. 
The incentivisation of financial aid was not a feature of the former, but was prominent in 
the latter. 
The progression to transfers of power from international administrations to new 
domestic institutions afforded military actors the possibility to link policy compliance on 
identified issues (not just ethnic minority issues) to phased or complete transfers of 
authority and power. In this regard, the provision of technical support by military actors is 
most evident in SSR, where direct military assistance was afforded, incorporating 
temporary capacity-building measures such as support to policing and the rule of law, 
provision of transport assistance, training, information collection for local municipalities, 
elections and educational support. A distinction is drawn between localised initiatives 
agreed in the absence of an overarching policy framework, and centrally coordinated 
approaches linking technical support to more ambitious agendas such as the pre-accession 
processes of NATO and the EU. 
The potential to link incentives to the membership ambitions of the Bosnian and 
Kosovan populations was evident at multiple levels, and across a variety of policy areas. 
With the exception of Kosovan membership of NATO, the prospect of membership was 
implied from the outset, though formal processes did not emerge until the initial phases of 
post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction had been completed. Additionally, when 
considering the military role, the case studies demonstrate that the utility of membership 
incentives emerges in an ad hoc fashion, cross-cutting CIMIC and defence reform 
initiatives often without clear formal linkage to more recognised platforms such as the 
STM in Kosovo or the SAA and PfP processes in Bosnia. This examination of the military 
role in delivering incentives linked to membership is a new departure for literature, which 
has exclusively considered the interaction of civilian institutions. It also facilitates the 
consideration of the military as a normative actor. 
Normative pressure occurs when external institutions rely solely on the use of 
norms to persuade, shame, or praise actors into compliant actions.
43
 For civilian and 
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military actors, such behaviour – linked to ethnic minority policies – was a consistent 
feature of the period analysed. However, this presented a problem for analysis, in that it 
can be difficult to isolate the impact of normative pressure vis a vis the application of 
conditional incentives – compounded in this instance by the additional pressures associated 
with post-conflict environments. Kelley acknowledged this difficulty in her research, 
noting that, “… statistically, I can test if normative pressure is sufficient, but I cannot test 
if it is necessary. Conversely, I can test if conditionality is necessary, but I cannot test if it 
is sufficient…”44 However, for the reasons identified above, this research shifts emphasis 
away from the relative contribution of each mechanism towards a more pragmatic focus on 
the practice of application – in this case by military actors. 
Consideration of military activity in this way allows for the examination of 
alternative means of military influence in instances where incentives may not be present –, 
to see if the military can play a role as a ‘normative intermediary’.45 In this way, the 
present research should also add to the findings of Ikenberry and Kupchan’s examination 
of hegemonic power and the conditions under which socialisation can work most 
effectively, as they specifically identified post-conflict periods as offering opportunities for 
socialisation to take place: 
It is principally in the aftermath of war or colonial penetration that the 
hegemon articulates a new set of norms and that domestic political 
conditions make elites most susceptible to socialization.
46
 
 
In considering the nature of the relationship between conditional incentives and normative 
pressures, this paper concurs with their argument that “socialization comes about 
principally through external inducement or internal reconstruction and that normative 
persuasion is insufficient to drive the socialization process”.47 Given that the prominence 
of rhetoric on ethnic minority policy is observed to decrease over the periods analysed, the 
distinction applied here should also help to clarify the normative basis underpinning the 
incentives employed.  
The application of conditional incentives and normative pressure related to ethnic 
minority issues is examined through five categories of military engagement, including: the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance; the various applications of CIMIC policy; the practice 
of key leader engagement at multiple levels; defence and security sector reform; and 
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delivery of membership conditionality. The first four of these were formally recognised as 
areas for military engagement, reflected in the emergence of military guidance policies and 
doctrine during the period. The latter area – membership conditionality – never has been an 
area where military actors have defined an approach. However, the decision to examine its 
purchase is motivated by both the prominence of military actors in the wider civilian effort 
(most notably in their close relationship to international administrations) and the clear 
emergence of an overarching framework that promoted membership of the EU and 
NATO
48
 (see Appendix II). 
 1.42 Nature of Compliance 
In discussions of compliance related to rights-based policies, the focus in literature – 
transition, europeanisation and enlargement – has tended to be on rule adoption contrasted 
with or complemented by rationalist or constructivist perspectives of behavioural change. 
The application of such models in a post-conflict context is problematic. In the first 
instance, elements or all of a state’s institutional structure may not be in place until a 
significant period after the cessation of conflict. Even where legislative structures are in 
place, consideration of rule adoption linked to legislation can give a false impression of a 
post-conflict territory’s actual recognition of the rights involved. This is particularly true of 
territories with international administrations that play a direct role in developing legislative 
capacity, or in the oversight of parliamentary operation. From an SSR perspective, national 
parliaments and governments do not really ‘own’ their governance structures, resulting in 
the disproportionate influence of international actors on domestic issues. 
Both territories analysed in this research are on record as to their intention to attain 
membership of various international organisations (priority given to the EU and NATO), 
thereby setting the conditions for rationally motivated “logic of consequentialism to apply 
as actors appear to be rational, goal-orientated and purposeful”.49  
We once had a dream, a vision, and it was an independent Kosovo. 
Today, we have another dream, and that is a Kosovo in the EU and 
NATO -  President of Kosovo.
50
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The choice of dependent variable – policy behaviour and implementation – is intended to 
balance the limited scope for quantifiable outcomes with the diversity of qualitative 
information, in order to capture the impact of military activity at multiple levels. It is 
assumed that through the presence of international civilian and military personnel, the 
domestic equilibrium of post-conflict territories is significantly altered by the presence of 
incentives at multiple levels. As new state structures emerge, so too does a form of ‘inter-
institutional bargaining’ with international organisations, potentially including military 
actors – depending on the roles assigned to, or assumed by, the military in the post-conflict 
effort. Consideration is also given to idea of differential empowerment of domestic actors 
and the potential for the military to act as a source of ‘independent incentives’ to those of 
the EU or NATO.
51
In Chapter 9, the outcomes identified with this approach are tested 
against hypothesis adapted from Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier’s external 
incentives model developed for their research on Europeanisation in CEEC. This approach 
is used to explain variation in the effects of incentives, focusing on “the determinacy of the 
conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises, and the 
size of adoption costs”.52  
Additionally outcomes are analysed at the point of interaction by military actors, 
assuming (1) that a clear link can be established between a military action and policy 
related to returns and participation; and (2) that military records of the impact of their 
activity both official and semi-official facilitates an analysis of the outcomes in specific 
locations at specified times. This is particularly relevant for CIMIC projects, where, 
depending on the unit involved, detailed reports were written on the extent and quality of 
compliant outcomes. While the analysis of CIMIC does allow for a certain quantification 
of outcomes, analysis of key leader engagement and defence reform is necessarily more 
qualitative in emphasis, drawing on references to compliance in interviews, in media and, 
where available, from official sources in emerging post-conflict institutions. The responses 
of domestic actors from political parties to village leaders, partly captured through 
interviews, were also analysed in order to provide a domestic perspective of compliance 
relating to military activity. Incorporating these features, the operationalisation of the 
dependent variable is outlined in Appendix III. Finally, this approach also allows for the 
identification of trends in application and compliance through periods of transition. Similar 
temporal analysis – recognising phases of post-conflict transition – has been applied to 
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good effect in research by Iain King and Whit Mason in Kosovo, and is outlined in greater 
detail in Chapter 4.
53
  
The determinacy of conditions is understood here as the clarity of the standard 
identified relating to returns or participation, and the formality of the approach utilised by 
the military, i.e. the terms upon which incentives are delivered to the domestic point of 
contact. The size and speed of rewards refers to the substance and scale of incentives 
offered by military actors, either unilaterally or collectively with a third party, and 
consideration of the timeliness of the incentives (rewards) delivered. In considering the 
military application of threats or promises, the case studies demonstrate that some military 
actors used subtle threats as a tactic to encourage compliance: for example, refusal to assist 
with road repairs, or the withdrawal of support to schools or other community services, 
were a not infrequent feature of military-host nation interaction. That the military might 
use force as a threat to stimulate compliance was not a factor identified in this research. 
However, military promises – formal and informal – delivered through CIMIC, key leader 
engagement or defence reform initiatives, were the predominant feature of engagement and 
the focus for analysis. Finally in considering the explanation of domestic responses, the 
examination of the presence of veto players and adoption costs is intended to capture the 
role of kin-state influence as a determinant in domestic majority and minority compliance 
with policies specified by military actors. 
 
1.43 Evaluating Compliance and Research Hypothesis  
Broadly, the military role is considered in respect of two connected aspects of returns: 
actual returns to locations vacated prior to or during conflict (incorporating access to 
appropriate property rights for returnees) and the extent to which these returns were 
sustained. Acknowledging that military actors were exposed to a myriad of positions, 
policies and programmes on returns issues, the research recognises that military units 
either referenced policies or standards formally articulated by other international actors, or 
set their own standards on returns, which may have correlated with official policy but were 
not recognised or acknowledged as part of any official policy process (see Appendix III). 
Evidence of compliant behaviour is considered against identifiable instances, whereby 
domestic actors either agree to facilitate returns or demonstrate evidence of working to that 
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end, delivering on their part of an agreement either unilaterally with military actors, or as 
part of a civilian-military initiative. Compliant implementation is considered, based on 
instances of actual returns and the sustainability of returns identified. 
The analysis of minority participation focuses on the extent to which state 
government and security institutions – police and armed forces – are designed to 
accommodate ethnic minorities, and the reality of participation in these structures over the 
period under review. Given the prominence of international administrations, it is to be 
expected that governance structures will be largely reflective of externally-accepted norms 
on ethnic minority representation and participation. However, as power is returned to the 
indigenous population, the nature and integrity of participation in those structures, and the 
resources made available to ensure there operation, are open to question. As with returns, 
the evolution of the role played by the military within the wider international civilian effort 
is critical to understanding the nature of compliant policy behaviour and implementation. 
Evidence of compliant behaviour is considered against identifiable instances, whereby 
domestic actors either agree to facilitate minority participation or demonstrate evidence of 
working to that end, delivering on their part of an agreement either unilaterally, with 
military actors, or as part of a civil-military initiative. Compliant implementation is 
considered, based on instances of actual participation and the sustainability of participation 
identified (see Appendix III). 
Acknowledging the approach outlined above, the following hypotheses were 
identified in order to add clarity and depth to the findings regarding military successes and 
failures in achieving compliant outcomes.
54
 They address the nature of engagement and 
compliance over time: First, that the military application of conditionality combined with 
normative pressure enhances the likelihood of compliant policy behaviour and 
implementation. Second, that financial and policy incentives are more effective than 
membership incentives on ethnic minority issues in post-conflict territories. Third, that 
over time international civilian and military organisations were less likely to link 
conditional incentives or apply normative pressure to compliance on ethnic issues. And 
Fourth, that a territorial institution (or actor) will comply with and implement policy if the 
benefits of the reward exceed domestic adoption costs.  
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1.5 Case Studies 
Bosnia and Kosovo provide a rich source of comparable data and the possibility of 
considerable variation in both the independent and dependent variables, thereby facilitating 
the adaptation of existing models of analysis, and in some cases the replication of those 
models in a new (post-conflict) context.
55
 Both shared an experience of conflict that 
entailed the exposure and exploitation of inter-ethnic tension, raising points of contention 
that remained to be effectively addressed over the period of the study. Both were subjected 
to an influx of international civilian and military organisations, including international 
administration. Likewise, over time, both have articulated a popular and official desire to 
attain membership of the international institutions, notably the EU and NATO, but also in 
particular circumstances, the OSCE and CE (See Appendix I). Variations emerge across 
these areas, in terms of their respective experiences of international administration, 
transitional governance, kin-state influence, prospects for accession to EU and/or NATO, 
and the purchase of conditionality as sub-state levels, to name but a few. 
To aid comparison, both case studies focus on the 10 years following conflict in 
each territory and are structured to highlight both the specific role of military actors and 
the significance of the military contribution within the wider international civilian effort. A 
multi-level approach was adopted allowing for the collation of empirical detail on the 
substance of military activity on ethnic minority issues at multiple levels: state, entity and 
municipal, including provision for parliamentary committees or agencies where they have 
a particular responsibility for a given issue: for example the Freedom of Movement Task 
Force in Bosnia. Using this structure, the experiences of minority groups – predominantly 
the Serbian minorities in Kosovo and a cross section of Bosniak, Serbian and Croat 
minorities in Bosnia
56– were tracked on the respective issues of returns and participation.  
Assessment of progress on participation was conducted with reference to 
representative structures and domestic institutions such as Bosnian Armed Forces as the 
unit of analysis at the macro level, while using selected military activities (humanitarian, 
CIMIC, specific defence reform programmes etc.) at the micro level. Acknowledging that 
in both cases domestic-led institutions were slow to emerge, and struggled to develop the 
necessary capacity and capabilities to operate as intended, the examination of the 
development of policing and security structures explores the extent to which policy on 
                                                 
55
 Van Evra, (1997). pp. 89-95. 
56
 It should also be noted that the Brčko district has a significant Croatian minority. 
38 
 
minority participation was adopted and implemented in defence and security reform 
initiatives. Similarly for the assessment of the management of the returns process, the 
approach preferred here is to identify specific “returns” cases at the point of military 
engagement. This analysis of individual military-led projects will add further substance to 
the findings of the research, uncovering micro-level details as to why policy initiatives 
succeeded or failed. These can then be considered alongside other identifiable factors, such 
as access to property rights, domestic politics or kin-state pressure. 
1.6 Sources and Information Management 
1.61 Primary and Secondary Sources 
Many of the sources of information for this research have been identified above, including 
institutional and other official documents, legislation, and policy guidelines for both 
international civilian and military bodies, and their agencies. These include the handbook 
of the EAR, and the field operations guidelines of the OSCE and NATO. The analysis of 
military involvement in humanitarian assistance, CIMIC activity and, to a lesser extent, 
key leader engagement, was compiled based on a review of articles in the respective in-
house magazines of SFOR and KFOR – the SFOR Informer and KFOR Chronicle. 
Relevant material was sourced in domestic institutions (including police and 
military strategy statements) on a variety of issues. However, reports and documents from 
domestic institutions were often difficult to access, though they increasingly became 
available as research progressed; this allowed for a limited examination of processes in 
respect of each issue to be traced through domestic institutions. Conversely, the presence 
of the OHR and UNMIK allowed for easier access to domestic material relevant to ethnic 
issues.
57
 Each of the institutions analysed regularly compiled a wide variety of reports and 
assessments on at least an annual basis. With regard to the availability of statistical data the 
UNHCR was a particularly useful source of information on both returns and participation.   
Complementing analysis of formal institutions, political parties’ statements and 
media material, from newspaper interviews and public surveys to opinion pieces, all 
offered value when considering the resonance of a given issue. This was complemented by 
an array of reports, both statistical data and empirical analysis, compiled by specialist 
organisations such as Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, Transparency 
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International, CEPS, the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, and domestic NGOs such as 
the Kosovo Women’s Network. This research also availed of new sources from each of the 
territories including the Peace Support and Training Centre in Sarajevo, and the Institute 
for Development Policy in Pristina. Finally as seen in Chapter 2, a wide range of academic 
material is available across disciplines, including: history, political science, international 
relations and economics. There is also a growing volume of biographical and 
autobiographical literature that can add insight to both the period and processes in 
question.
58
 
 1.62 Interviews 
In total, 80 interviews and meetings were conducted in Brussels, London, Geneva, Vienna, 
Sarajevo, Pristina, Belgrade and Lebanon.
59
 They were conducted between January 2011 
and April 2014. All interviews were conducted under Chatham House rules on the 
understanding of anonymity. Accordingly, only interview place, status and time are 
outlined in the supporting appendices. Interviews were semi-structured, allowing 
interviewees to expand on their respective experiences. At the same time, in order to 
address gaps in the quantitative analysis, interview questions were cross-referenced with 
the findings of the analysis of military activities on humanitarian, CIMIC and defence 
reform. Notes were taken during the interviews and subsequently typed transcripts were 
produced. With four exceptions, where a translator was used, all interviews were 
conducted in English. The purpose of the interviews was to add value to the existing 
sources of information, and in particular to investigate approaches to implementation from 
both international and domestic perspectives. Interview assertions were cross-checked with 
the quantitative sample compiled for this research and with other official sources as 
deemed appropriate. Acknowledging the author’s military background, the interview set 
was balanced to accommodate views from multiple sources: civilian and military, domestic 
and international in order to limit the potential for biased outcomes. Additionally domestic 
sources were balanced according to ethnic background.
60
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1.7 Structure 
Chapter 2 will analyse the scholarship that informs the spheres of engagement outlined 
above, marking the areas to which this research seeks to contribute. Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively will consider the questions and hypotheses posed at the macro level, by 
analysing the evolution of international civil-military engagement in the post-conflict 
territories of Bosnia and Kosovo, the parallel development of domestic institutions, and the 
development of incentivised approaches for policy delivery. The case studies, Chapters 5 
through 8, present the details of research conducted on Bosnia and Kosovo respectively. It 
is intended that these chapters will present original material and analysis to complement 
and develop the findings of Chapters 3 and 4. The final chapter draws conclusions on the 
nature of compliance, the factors motivating military engagement, and the utility of 
military forces in delivering policy on ethnic minority issues. It also discusses the 
importance of the research in the light of existing literature, and the findings’ implications 
for future research. 
1.8 Summary: Research Parameters 
Broadly, the analytical model developed for this research marries the approaches used by 
Kelley, and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier in CEEC, underpinned, where relevant, by 
SSR concepts. The decision to adapt Judith Kelley’s independent and dependent variables 
has two key advantages: first, it allows for a tested approach, designed to address similar 
ethnic minority issues, to be adapted for use in a new context; and second its design is 
flexible enough to accommodate the distinctive military aspect of this research. The 
context selected (post-conflict Western Balkans) extends the application of their 
approaches to post-conflict states accommodating the internalised presence of international 
civilian and military representatives, and focusing on a specific set of minority issues, 
rather than on the broader theme of minority rights. The size of the samples analysed in 
Chapters 6 and 8 offers sufficient quantitative material which, together with an extensive 
interview set, provides for a reasonable basis for comparison with other works in the area. 
For the purposes of this study, notably the isolation of the means and impact of 
international military actors, this model is best suited to provide the required analysis.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Post-Conflict Intervention and the Rise of Military Utility 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to explore scholarly understanding of the utility of military actors and 
the application of conditionality and normative pressure in post-conflict territories. It will 
also consider the theoretical and empirical literature on minority rights policy, and the 
extent to which analysis has addressed policy delivery in all its applications to date. 
Drawing from relevant literature on international intervention, development, peacebuilding 
and minority rights, it will demonstrate that scholarship, in addressing rights-based issues 
in post-conflict contexts, has not fully considered the utility of military actors or the 
adaptability of strategic mechanisms. 
2.2 Understanding the Military Position in Post-conflict Intervention 
Within a contemporary international context characterised by “the end of the Cold War; 
the process of globalisation; and the challenge to the Westphalia state system represented 
by the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (le droit d’ingérence)”,61 the events in the 
former Yugoslavia, and subsequent events in Iraq and Afghanistan, have stretched both the 
conceptual and practical application of military forces. Broadly, the academic response can 
be divided into two streams of analysis: one concerned with the justification and legality of 
international military intervention epitomised by the debate on humanitarian intervention; 
the other concerned with the practice of intervention, from peace enforcement to peace 
building. 
The debates associated with the motives stimulating predominantly western 
intervention in the Balkans and ‘whether intervention can ever be justified’ provides a 
continual source from which to question the credibility of military deployments. This 
research does not seek to add its voice to that debate per se, but it recognises its impact on 
perceptions of military activity at multiple levels, from sovereign states to village councils. 
The dichotomy between what James Mayall describes as pluralist and solidarist divisions 
on international order, and the justification of intervention, leave scholars and practitioners, 
alike, struggling to respond in situations where “people’s allegedly fundamental rights are 
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systematically abused not by other states but by their own government”.62 This was and 
remains relevant in territories such as Kosovo, as it provides one base (others will be 
addressed below) from which external and internal actors can question the legality and 
credibility of international civilian and military efforts. This dynamic is often compounded 
by political expedience; despite their recent citing of the ‘Kosovo precedent’ to justify their 
actions in Crimea, Russia was initially opposed to international intervention in Kosovo, 
questioning, among other things, its legality in international law.
63
 That position appeased 
Kosovo Serbian disquiet at the time and emboldened the Serbian population of Mitrovica, 
in particular, to pursue a path of resistance to intervention. Over time, the credibility of 
intervention was also seized upon by Kosovo Albanian groups such as the Vetëvendosje! 
Party, who argued that the international presence impeded Kosovo’s (referring to the 
Kosovo Albanian population) right to self-determination. Similar arguments emerged in 
Bosnia, most notably in Republika Srpska.  
Related to these events, scholars, such as Michael Pugh, have questioned the 
manner in which liberal norms and values have greatly expanded the complexity of ‘peace 
operations’ imposing standards and conditions relating to a wide variety of western 
agendas; a perspective that offers a compelling perspective on the emergence of a 
‘minority rights agenda’ for the former Yugoslavia.64 At best, this questioning of the 
legitimacy of international presence, and the credibility of international actors, served to 
agitate the discursive framework within which conditionality and normative pressure were 
applied; what might be viewed as an attempt (albeit somewhat diffuse) to keep the actors 
involved honest.
65
 At worst, it could be combined with other lacunae in the international 
approach – such as the insistence on minority rights’ standards over and beyond those 
applied elsewhere (most notably in the EU) – to attack a particular policy stance,  or 
simply be used as a zero sum tactic to halt interaction on a given issue. Within that 
spectrum, this research has found that space nonetheless existed for international civilian 
and military actors to distance their actions (though never fully detach) from questions of 
legitimacy. The practical realities of day-to-day interaction between international and 
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domestic actors on a variety of post-conflict issues often left little room for such debate. 
For example, military engagement with local actors initially prioritised basic issues of 
concern from refuse collection to freedom of movement. Questions regarding the 
legitimacy of military activity became more prevalent as domestic recovery progressed. 
In this context, it is therefore important to make the distinction between the point of 
intervention, where the use of force is often essential and therefore most contentious (as it 
was in Bosnia and Kosovo at the outset), and the conduct of the intervening presence – 
civilian and military – thereafter. Finnemore presents the idea that questions of legitimacy 
extend both to domestic institutions in terms of the “demands” placed on them by 
interveners, and alternatively to the tension found in ‘the kinds of legitimate responses we 
as outsiders feel we can take – tensions between self-determination and humanitarianism, 
between self-determination and intervention, between peace and justice, between 
humanitarianism and accountability.’66 If Finnemore identified a “new array of political 
options for outsiders (and potential interveners)”,67 this thesis adds a further layer to her 
analysis by exploring the new options developed by the military within that spectrum of 
“demands”. 
If the premise of humanitarian intervention in the former Yugoslavia (fuelled by 
media focus on displacement and genocide)
68
 was predominantly based on a desire to 
address the ethnic minority dimension, it was not the sole stimulus. Related to the views 
noted above that intervention was driven by western liberal concepts, strong arguments 
have been presented that humanitarian intervention also amounted to a conceptual vehicle, 
“a new cooperative approach” that international organisations used to revitalise their 
purpose in post-Cold War international society.
69
 In his examination of military purpose, 
Timothy Edmunds identified a post-Cold War process, whereby European militaries in 
particular have “increasingly identified and taken on new roles in order to legitimate their 
institutional existence and budgetary demands”.70 Regardless of their motives, the 
reconceptualisation of the limits of sovereignty and intervention in third states required 
international civilian and military organisations to rethink their purpose, structure and 
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modus operandi amidst significant uncertainty as to what shape international order was 
assuming.
71
 
That dynamic helps to explain the spirit of experimentation that characterised much 
of their respective efforts during the period. The idea that international forces operating 
under a UN mandate had a responsibility to protect – later known as R2P – stimulated 
discussions within militaries as to how missions could be achieved through ‘non-kinetic’ 
(non-violent) means. While such discussions primarily focused on the importance of robust 
mandates and appropriate military capabilities, they also provided for more expansionist 
views as to how security could be delivered by military actors. The experience of Dutch 
UNPROFOR peacekeepers at Srebrenica underlined a determination among NATO staff 
that their personnel would not find themselves impotent in similar situations. However, in 
both Kosovo and Bosnia, NATO forces were in a position to establish a secure space 
relatively quickly, with the result that commanders’ attention quickly turned to supporting 
the civilian effort. Within that effort, the conceptual boundaries of R2P were pushed even 
further to allow a more expansive role for the military.  
2.3 Perspectives on Civilian and Military Activity in Post-conflict Territories 
Disagreement concerning the justification of military intervention based on humanitarian 
principles was symptomatic of much broader discord within the humanitarian community 
during the 1990s. In examining the humanitarian ‘identity crisis’, Thomas Weiss identified 
two broad groups. On one side, “classicists” such as the ICRC, who advocated that 
humanitarian activity should be completely insulated from politics, upholding the 
traditional principles of neutrality, impartiality and operating procedures based on consent. 
Opposing the classicist view, he identified various groups of “political humanitarians”, 
including ‘“minimalists,” who “aim to do no harm” in delivering relief; “maximalists,” 
who have a more ambitious agenda of employing humanitarian action as part of a 
comprehensive strategy to transform conflict, including many proponents of military 
intervention; and the “solidarists”, exemplified by MSF, who choose sides and abandon 
neutrality and impartiality as well as rejecting consent as a prerequisite for intervention.
72
 
Weiss’s argument that debate needed to move to consider “how this intersection of 
humanitarian perspectives can be managed to ensure more humanized politics and more 
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effective humanitarian action” opens the door for a more nuanced examination of the 
military role. 
2.31 The ‘Humanitarian’ Perspective: Military ‘Aid’ and Rights-based Approaches 
For many within the humanitarian community, the idea that the military should play a role 
in delivering humanitarian aid or rights-based policies is paradoxical.
73
  Nonetheless, that 
the military do play a role is acknowledged. For example, Hugo Slim suggests that 
militaries “can operate as humanitarian agencies if they pursue humanitarian activities as 
prescribed in international law in an impartial manner”.74 Indeed this paradoxically 
‘classicist’ interpretation of the military role is not without substance, with evidence in 
both Kosovo and Bosnia of military units acting in a manner consistent with his description 
(see Chapters 5 and 7). Slim creates the conceptual space for this interpretation by drawing 
a distinction between organisations which are “by nature” humanitarian, such as the ICRC, 
and those, including the military, which are capable of “being humanitarian”. This logic 
can be extended to allow for a military role in delivering conditional incentives, thereby 
moving military behaviour towards the realm of “political humanitarians”. This distinction 
is both helpful and appropriate in accounting for military activity in Bosnia and Kosovo, as 
it can be used to chart various kinds of military activity, and their effectiveness within the 
collective international effort.  
While it could be argued that military “humanitarian” activity in the earliest stages 
of intervention was selective in its exclusion of certain armed groups and their supporters, 
in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, this was seen to quickly dissipate, as the domestic armed 
forces within Bosnia, and the KLA in Kosovo, moved to general compliance with the 
respective peace agreements. This is significant in that it marks the point at which the 
coercive actions of NATO forces starts to diminish in favour of ‘softer’ approaches to 
community engagement. 
For those humanitarian agencies which were open to cooperation with the military, 
this also created opportunities for joint or at least coordinated approaches to addressing 
humanitarian issues, including engagement in delivering or reinforcing policy on rights-
based issues.
75
 Though not addressing or examining the specific contribution of the 
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military in this regard, several scholars have noted the tension caused by military efforts in 
this area. For example, Abbey Stoddard noted that, “during the Kosovo campaign, MSF 
USA was so concerned by the blurring of the lines between the military and humanitarian 
spheres, and the seeming acquiescence of their counterparts, that it quit InterAction’s 
Disaster Response Committee in protest.”76 However, the question as to how far the 
military ventured into the ‘humanitarian sphere’ remains to be fully explored.  
Stoddard considered three roles for military forces in humanitarian intervention. 
First, providing a secure space for humanitarians to operate; second, the passage of 
information for the purposes of protection, in order to facilitate humanitarian logistics; and 
third, the provision of direct assistance to populations themselves, in parallel with 
humanitarian groups.
77
 Taylor B. Seybolt argues for four roles: providing logistical 
assistance, protecting aid operations, protecting the population and defeating the 
perpetrators of violence.
78
 Neither extends the analysis to the military as a rights actor, 
though arguably Stoddard allows for the possibility through the provision of direct military 
assistance, and Seybolt’s assertion that “aid has always been more political than 
humanitarian practitioners care to admit”, as it is “valuable and therefore has a political 
and economic impact in zones of conflict”, can be interpreted as creating the space for 
ideas on conditional linkage to develop.
79
 However, his argument that militaries cannot do 
certain things perhaps underestimates the complexity, diversity and professional dexterity 
that military personnel can demonstrate in post-conflict contexts. 
Soldiers are not trained to provide police services: on patrol they are 
inclined to use deadly violence; they cannot investigate a crime scene; 
and they have very limited capacity to hold suspects in custody… In 
non-security areas it is readily obvious that neither military actors nor 
emergency relief organizations are prepared to deliver what is needed: 
consider the diverse, non-military skills needed for civil administration, 
reconstruction of political institutions, and economic reconstruction and 
development.
80
 
 
More importantly, it also fails to take account of the resource deficits that affect many, if 
not all, international interventions, to the extent that though military actors might not want 
to fulfil policing or humanitarian type roles, in the absence of sufficient appropriate civil 
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assets, they often find themselves in a position of interim support. Furthermore, the 
provision of such support in the early stages of a post-conflict intervention is vital for 
creating the conditions for organisations such as the UN to “pull together and coordinate 
civil and military experts to help local actors to rebuild, or build for the first time, stable 
political, social and economic institutions”.81 
In part, this lacuna of understanding regarding the potential of military 
contributions in post-conflict territories can be explained by Timothy Edmund’s view, that 
realist and means-based ideas on military purpose “fail to capture the sheer diversity of 
military roles as they have evolved under different circumstances in different parts of the 
world”.82 It is important to emphasise that, though the military may find themselves in 
positions where they are fulfilling ‘civilian’ tasks and functions, this thesis does not argue 
that they should. However, in adapting Dag Hammarskjöld’s view, that “peacekeeping is 
not a job for soldiers but only soldiers can do it”, it is equally true to say that, though 
humanitarian and rights-based activities are not jobs for soldiers, there are times when they 
are the only ones there to do it, with both successful and unsuccessful outcomes. 
2.32  Rights-based Approach 
Given the central importance of the ethnic dimension during the conflict, reflected in the 
content of both the Dayton Agreement and UNSCR 1244, it is unsurprising that rights-
based approaches would emerge as a prominent part of the post-conflict effort. Reflective 
of the coming together of development and human rights thinking, there is no agreed 
definition of what constitutes a rights-based approach. The OHCHR describes it as a 
conceptual framework that allows for “a process of human development that is normatively 
based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and 
protecting human rights…”83 Central to this understanding is the idea that a “rights-based 
approach identifies rights holders and their entitlements and corresponding duty-bearers 
and their obligations, and works towards strengthening the capacities of rights-holders to 
make their claims and of duty-bearers to meet their obligations”.84 Peter Uvin synopsises 
the convergence of human rights and development, and its value for “development 
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specialists”, as combining thought regarding the claims and processes of rights and 
development, and the ends and means of engagement.85 
Once again the literature does not tend to consider the role of the military beyond 
that of helping to secure the environment within which rights-based engagement takes 
place. That the military could assume a role as a “duty-bearer” is not considered. In terms 
of understanding the extent to which military actors engaged in or adopted rights-based 
approaches in Bosnia and Kosovo, the post-conflict context was influenced by a number of 
factors. Firstly, moves towards rights-based approaches were just one of a number of 
significant push factors that placed specific emphasis on ethnic minority issues: others such 
as media attention, and minority rights policy development, are considered in greater detail 
in Chapter 3. Secondly, as noted in the introduction, all international organisations were 
experimenting with concepts and approaches for a variety of reasons. For many 
humanitarian organisations, adopting rights-based approaches marked an expansion of 
their mandate and a move away from ‘needs based’ models, while for more human rights-
based organisations, it allowed them to ‘participate’ in more practical arguably less 
legalistic ways.
86
 Thirdly, and related to the above, it is also true to say – particularly of the 
military – that while they may have been involved in the practice of rights-based 
approaches, many were unaware of the theory. Instead drawing on the rights rhetoric 
(particularly regarding minorities) they were exposed to, and individual ideas of ‘what was 
the right thing to do’, military actors often stumbled into rights-based approaches.  
However, as the case studies demonstrate, evidence of military application of 
rights-based approaches to policy delivery is closely correlated to the delivery of CIMIC 
programmes, which suggests that in instances where military and civilian actors cooperated 
within an understood structure, such as CIMIC, rights-based approached were more likely 
to occur. In their examination of rights-based approaches, Lisa VeneKlasen et al. argue 
that the defining feature of the rights-based approach is the convergence “between strands 
of rights and participation”.87 Certainly, their assertion that rights do not come in “neat 
packages, but rather are part of dynamic, sometimes messy, processes of resistance and 
change that work to engage and transform relations of power”, captures many of the 
features associated with military engagement observed in this research. Their (VeneKlasen 
et al’s) broad understanding of ‘participation’ is also relevant in that it contributes to our 
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understanding of multi-level decision-making, in this case involving military actors. Of the 
ten areas they identify as contributing to participation “that advances more equitable 
development”, this research provides grounds to suggest that the military can contribute to 
some degree or other in almost all areas: from their ability to influence and transform 
power dynamics at local levels, to linking rights efforts to “concrete, relevant problems and 
solutions”.88  Furthermore their contention that ‘rights’ should be understood beyond 
legalistic assumptions to capture “the dynamic aspect of the political process that shapes 
the extent to which rights are enforced and realised in people’s daily lives”89 can be 
adapted to post-conflict contexts where military forces closely interact with domestic 
political processes. 
Abby Stoddard identifies the relevance of the rights-based approach as signifying:  
… concurrence among a growing number of NGOs that the motives of 
humanitarian aid – an attempt to protect people’s fundamental rights, 
rather than a voluntary act of charity – matter a great deal to its 
success.
90
 
 
This is relevant in Bosnia and Kosovo, as not only did various international agencies 
evolve their operations to reconceive the situation from one of minority protection to 
minority rights projection, but they were facilitated, if not prompted, to do so by the 
Dayton Agreement and the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo. That rights issues held 
such prominence in ‘international thinking’ was not without contention, and is closely 
linked to the discussion of humanitarian intervention identified at the outset of this chapter. 
For example, David Chandler, Thomas Weiss and David Rieff have argued that “rights-
based strategic ends” jeopardise the very concept of humanitarianism.91 Focusing on the 
role of humanitarians and the justification of humanitarian intervention, Chandler observes 
that the lobbying by the ICG and others for economics aid to be conditioned “on the 
implementation of Dayton Accords and utilised as the main source of leverage for the 
international community […] challenged every principle that demarcated the traditional 
framework of humanitarian action”.92 In what he described in 2002 as a “grand illusion”, 
Rieff cites a number of issues with humanitarian/military cooperation based on 
humanitarian – and one assumes military – “wishful thinking”: 
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Soldiers who are competent enough to fight the Taliban, the Yugoslav 
federal army, or Somali warlords are not going to do what relief workers 
want. Rather, they will expect that relief workers listen to them. For all 
the talk of improved coordination, joint exercises, and declarations of 
mutual respect, the history of humanitarian military interventions from 
Kurdistan in 1991 to Afghanistan in 2001-2 has demonstrated just that. 
93
 
 
Acknowledging that there is evidence to substantiate his claim – most notably in 
Afghanistan – Rieff does not accommodate the more positive aspects of civil-military 
engagement with humanitarian issues – when soldiers do listen. This undermines the 
conclusiveness of his argument: soldiers do not always make humanitarian situations 
worse. While this research would support his view that in some cases, “instead of seeing 
warriors, relief workers too often see little more than armed humanitarian logisticians in 
the field”,94 a reconsideration of why Bosnia and Kosovo ‘have not produced 
consequences terrible enough’ to give many activists pause for thought might well find that 
the military (at least in those instances) had a more positive, immediate and diverse impact 
on humanitarian and rights-based issues than envisaged at the time.
95
 
2.33 CIMIC 
Accepting their respective mandates to establish and provide safe and secure environments, 
this research has found that the international military interaction with domestic and 
international civilian groups in Bosnia and Kosovo can be divided into two spheres of 
engagement: ‘needs based’ humanitarian assistance and CIMIC. As concepts of state and 
nation-building developed, the initial focus on ‘needs based’ humanitarian provision 
gradually gave way to rights-based approaches, as the attention shifted to achieving 
sustainable outcomes. However, neither IFOR, SFOR, KFOR nor the individual military 
units that comprised them formally adopted a rights-based approach to engaging in ethnic 
minority issues. Rather ‘military rights-based activities’ developed within the emerging 
framework of CIMIC.  
The concept of CIMIC evolved in western militaries during the early 1990s; 
initially as an attempt to address coordination issues experienced when working with 
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civilian actors.
96
 However there is no agreed definition on what CIMIC is or should be. 
Christopher Ankersen captured many of the attributes of CIMIC when describing it as: 
… a military label used to describe those occasions that see elements of 
armed forces engaging, and even collaborating, with civilian entities 
(such as local authorities or other government agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations, or international/intergovernmental 
organizations). This collaboration usually takes place during some form 
of crisis situation […]. It can take the form of abstract contingency 
planning or the high level coordination of resources and objectives, but 
can also manifest itself as aid delivery or reconstruction activity by 
military forces.
97
 
 
It is worth noting that definitions and understanding of CIMIC practice within militaries 
vary significantly from country to country. For some, normally larger ‘war-fighting’ 
militaries,
98
 CIMIC cells operate as an quasi-extension of military intelligence and a means 
for generating force protection; for others, most notably the Scandinavian militaries, 
CIMIC practice is more rooted in an adaptation by the military of the humanitarian concept 
of neutrality.
99
 Less developed models were also identified that equated to no more than ad 
hoc attempts to place some form of structure on what was generally understood as 
‘winning hearts and minds’, while others still viewed CIMIC activity as a means to simply 
coordinate space with international NGOs.  
Traditionally, the armed forces of countries such as Sweden, Finland, and Ireland 
deployed on UN missions frequently engaged in ‘winning hearts and minds’ through ‘soft’ 
humanitarian projects. Such activities were not only intended to address humanitarian 
issues in local communities, but were also viewed by commanders as a good way to 
maintain troop morale, and as a source of positive press both in their country of origin and 
in the host community. NATO did not formally adopt CIMIC doctrine until the publication 
of AJP-9 in 2003. Prior to that, NATO policy on CIMIC was based on an understanding of 
CIMIC as “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the 
NATO commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as 
well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies”.100  
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That such diversity existed can be attributed to both the challenges faced, and the 
uncertainty and disagreement among military and civilian actors as to how best to address 
them. J. W. Rollins, drawing on research in Bosnia and Kosovo on NATO CIMIC, 
observed a further layer of complication when noting that the coordination of CIMIC 
activity across theatres was difficult, not just because of complicated relations with civilian 
agencies, but also because ‘full transparency’ had not been achieved in respect of the 
CIMIC activities conducted by NATO members outside of the NATO CIMIC 
framework.
101
 This research has found that that division between NATO ‘theatre level 
CIMIC planning’ and various ‘national’ CIMIC policies remained a feature throughout the 
period. Rollins’s hope that the NATO policy document on CIMIC, AJP-9102 would 
alleviate the issue was not fully realised in either Bosnia or Kosovo.
103
  
Taking a broader perspective, Hugo Slim viewed the context within which these 
competing strands of CIMIC arose as being epitomised by tension around humanitarian 
roles and responsibilities and, in the particular case of the Balkans, the apparent 
encroachment by international military forces “directly in the traditional activities of 
humanitarian agencies…”. Slim suggested that the idea of a military encroachment raised 
questions concerning quality, competition and collaboration for humanitarian agencies.
104
 
Stuart Gordon contextualised that ‘encroachment’ by highlighting the ‘general rejection of 
an essentially linear model of crisis intervention and its implicit division of responses into 
essentially civilian and military phases’.105 Gordon identified a range of factors driving the 
increased demand for civilian-military cooperation, including the rise of more ambitious 
political objectives, complex interventions, the convergence of human and state-centric 
concepts of security, and the rise of political economy approaches and multi-dimensional 
missions.
106
  
Accepting this, it would appear that the pressure for more diverse and expansive 
military roles was predominantly coming from ‘civilian’ sources, with the military reacting 
to, rather than attempting (as was suggested by some) to set the agenda.
107
 The existence of 
such pressures helps to explain why confusion and uncertainty were prominent features of 
engagement; complementing the argument developed by Raj Rana and others of ‘CIMIC at 
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random’.108  For this thesis it also provides one explanation for how military actors came to 
adopt – intentionally or otherwise – conditional and rights-based approaches for CIMIC 
activity, regarding ethnic minority communities. Others also hint at this potential. For 
example, Slim’s assertion that “professional agencies also feel it important to add the value 
of their expertise in any situation where the military are engaging directly in relief work to 
ensure a level of quality in both the process and product of military efforts”109 suggests that 
as a civilian-military dynamic developed, civilian actors became more active in attempting 
to shape military activity. This is substantiated by the actions of groups such as Irish Aid or 
DFID, which came to directly advise the military in the conduct of ‘CIMIC’ activity 
related to ethnic minority communities (see Chapters 6 and 8).  
That such interaction led to military engagement in the delivery of rights-based 
policies regarding ethnic minority issues remains to be fully explored. For example, 
Bernhard Voget’s comprehensive analysis of German CIMIC activity in Kosovo captures 
many of the features of CIMIC understanding and activity during the period – from a 
recognition by the German military of the need to develop operational procedures in “close 
cooperation with other governmental institutions and civil-relief organisations”, to the 
initial practice of CIMIC as a “multitude of uncoordinated actions”.110 Voget observes that 
the German military adopted a novel, but by no means unique, view of CIMIC as a means 
to force protection and as a force multiplier, due to its potential to generate good will with 
the domestic population “winning hearts and minds”, and a preparedness to assume non-
military roles where civil institutions and structures were deficient.
111
 
Voget identifies a number of features of military activity stopping short of an 
examination of the normative basis of military projects. For example, he notes that 
coordination was important in instances where civil agencies required NATO to secure 
space to allow for resettlement projects; how German military practice evolved to allow for 
short-term CIMIC activities such as ‘Quick Impact Projects’; and long-term projects that 
often involved infrastructural reconstruction, such as the renovation of a school;
112
 that the 
tensions created by the various sources of funding for military CIMIC activity often placed 
them in competition with civilian NGOs; and how from 2001, German CIMIC efforts to 
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reconstruct housing in Kosovo were motivated primarily by domestic pressure for Kosovan 
Albanian refugees in Germany to return home.
113
  
His analysis of German CIMIC practice between May and December 2004 
correlates with many of the findings identified in this research, including the rise of 
cooperation with local municipalities and government agencies, and various forms of joint 
funding approaches. However, even though he acknowledges a power asymmetry between 
domestic and international actors, citing Ignatieff’s argument that “the essential paradox of 
nation-building is that temporary imperialism – empire lite – has become the necessary 
condition for democracy in countries torn apart by civil-war”,114 he does not consider the 
normative framework of these activities, and therefore the potential for conditionality and 
normative pressure to be linked to rights-based or other issues. In part therefore, and 
accepting the difficulties involved in conducting such research on post-conflict territories, 
this research is an attempt to address his call for a deeper exploration of the explanatory 
variables that account for civil-military practice in Kosovo and Bosnia.
115
 It is also an 
attempt to redress the – at times – ‘antagonistic and narrowly focused’ narrative on military 
involvement in humanitarian and peace building affairs.
116
 
2.34 International Governance, Defence and Security Reform, and Rights Diffusion 
While not without precedence, the contemporary practice of international protectorates or 
administrations is seen as part of ‘states attaching increased importance to human rights 
and humanitarian norms as matters of regional and international concern’ – a new era of 
interventionism.
117
 These themes have emerged in literature charting the experience of 
international administrations in the former Yugoslavia over the past fifteen years: once 
again questions arise concerning the legitimacy and credibility of interim structures, the 
intrusiveness and accountability of their authority, and their perception of an end-state.
118
 
Scholarly consideration of the relationship between international administrations and their 
military ‘partners’ have, in keeping with the trends identified above, tended to focus on the 
role of the military as a security guarantor. 
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Taking Richard Caplan’s categorisation of international engagement as existing 
along a spectrum with international supervision at one end, and governance at the other, 
both the OHR and UNMIK administrations can be considered to be at the governance end 
of the spectrum. In spite of the prominence of the issue – Gay McDougall, UN 
Independent Expert on Minority Rights, argued in 2006 that minority rights formed the 
core of the mandate for international administrations in Kosovo
119
 – minority rights were 
but one of an array of issues international administrators had to address within the full 
spectrum of governance responsibilities.
120
 The difficulties associated with this were 
manifest and persistent. Clive Baldwin’s damning assessment of UNMIK’s and KFOR’s 
performance on minority rights, or David Chandler’s more general criticism of the OHR in 
Bosnia, are just two of many such criticisms of international administration.
121
  
Common themes to emerge in their respective assessments include: the lack of 
accountability of international and civilian actors; short-term approaches to policy 
development and delivery; a failure to learn the lessons from previous interventions; and in 
the case of the UN, a failure to progress its own policy on minority rights and draw on 
minority rights expertise from within its organisation. Though addressing Kosovo, 
Baldwin’s observation of military structural deficiencies that saw five different armed 
brigades, each with its own territory, led by different countries and with very different 
policies for security and minorities, could equally be applied in Bosnia.
122
  
In considering such ‘failures’, it should be acknowledged that international 
administrations were in part compromised by inexperience, the fragmented nature of the 
international civil-military presence, and as a consequence, “their responses were often 
highly improvised and sometimes ill-considered”.123 These pressures were further 
compounded by the weight of international and domestic expectation that was at once 
universal, impatient and at times unreasonable, given the capabilities and capacities at their 
disposal. From this context, two aspects of the roles of international administrations and 
their interaction with international military forces are identified as being of particular 
relevance for this research. First, the role of international administrations as agenda setters 
and shapers on rights issues; and second the related impact of elite-level interaction 
between the leadership of international administrations and their military counterparts. 
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It is evident from much of the scholarship on the function of international 
administrations on minority issues that the prioritisation of security limited the scope for 
the application of rights-based approaches. Both Katie Nobbs and Clive Baldwin argue that 
the ‘securitisation’ of minority issues led to outcomes characterised by segregation rather 
than integration, and policies towards minorities that were often “haphazard, confused, and 
rarely rights-based”.124 As post-conflict domestic institutions developed, this dynamic was 
often compounded, or at least complicated, by domestic political practice that in both cases 
rarely moved beyond a segregationist discourse. For military forces primarily tasked with 
ensuring “a safe and secure environment” it is therefore unsurprising that a securitised 
narrative prevailed over others that existed. 
Whether the application of rights-based approaches on minority issues – 
particularly in the early stages of intervention – would have been more successful is 
questionable. For example, Baldwin’s rights-based criticism that KFOR’s attempts to 
‘control’ and in some cases ‘oppose’ returns, were “a serious violation of the rights of all 
persons to determine when they wished to access and return to their homes”, fails to 
consider the legitimacy of military concerns.
125
 His expectation that the military should 
have intervened to “deal with the disturbances”, in order to allow for returns, greatly 
underestimates the nature of the threats posed and the operating restrictions on NATO 
personnel – their rules of engagement – that limited their ability to engage in the manner 
suggested. To put it another way, were KFOR to have intervened to effectively force 
returns in the situation described by Baldwin, the outcome could have been infinitely 
worse both for returnees and KFOR itself.
126
 
However, while authors such as Chandler, Bose, King, Mason, Nobbs and Baldwin 
make a number of assumptions as to the quality of international intervention and 
administration, one feature that their research identifies, but that they do not fully explore, 
is the nature of interaction between international civilian and military actors. To various 
degrees, all recognised the fact that IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, and to a lesser extent EUFOR, 
were formally engaged with international administrations across a range of issues, 
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including those related to ethnic minority communities. For example, KFOR’s presence on 
the Inter Agency Ad Hoc Task Force on Minorities, or the Joint Committee on the Return 
of Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo,
127
 or SFOR and then IFOR’s participation in the various 
commissions in Bosnia, including the Joint Civilian Commission established by Dayton, 
which afforded the commanders of SFOR and IFOR direct and frequent access to the High 
Representative. As Chapters 5 and 7 will demonstrate, military units did experiment with 
various options regarding ethnic minority issues, including the application of conditional 
incentives. Where their ideas came from in that regard is less clear, though the diffusion of 
ideas through these multi-level interactions on minority issues provides one source from 
which to chart how military ideas evolved during the period.  
One area where international administrations cooperated more formally with their 
military colleagues was in post-conflict defence and security reform: the creation of a 
Bosnian Armed Forces from the three ethnically-defined armies that remained after 
conflict, and the transition in Kosovo from the KLA through the KPC to the KSF.
128
 The 
conditional application of policy is implicit in much of the analysis of defence reform. 
Vetschera and Damian note that Bosnian participation in the OSCE’s politico-military 
dimension and NATO’s PfP were clearly established as bench marks by the international 
community from quite early in the post-conflict effort.
129
 In acknowledging the partial 
success of defence reform, they caution that deficiencies in defence laws allowed for the 
“persistence of old, pre-democratic thinking in the entities… that was  incompatible with 
basic human rights, fundamental freedoms and international humanitarian law”, which in 
turn contributed to a situation whereby the OSCEs Code of Conduct remained unfulfilled, 
including the requirement for the armed forces to be politically neutral (the entities’ forces 
were still ‘ethnic’ forces).130 Their findings are reflected in reports such as the Bosnian 
Defence Reform Commission’s report of 2003, which failed to acknowledge the ethnic 
dimensions of defence reform.
131
 Consideration of why this happened, despite intensive 
international engagement with the issue, and clear options for the application of 
conditional incentives, will be explored in Chapters 5 and 7 below.  
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In Kosovo, the military role in SSR was broader than that seen in Bosnia, with a 
much more pronounced involvement in policing: joint KPS-KFOR patrols were a feature 
of daily life in Kosovo for almost a decade.
132
 The options for conditional incentives in 
Kosovo were more complicated than Bosnia, and were most often linked to internal 
dynamics (as opposed to external ambitions such as PfP), including the transfer of 
authority from international to domestic institutions, or various other options within the 
wider framework of UNSCR 1244. SSR literature on Kosovo highlights similar themes to 
those identified in Bosnia, though there is a more widely articulated concern as to the 
credibility of international civilian and military actors in delivering reforms, and their 
relative failure to constitute “meaningful and accountable self-governance that risked 
turning the mantra ‘standards before status’ into self-entrapment”.133 
One of the central premises of SSR is the necessity for establishing local ownership 
of the reform process. What is not immediately clear from the literature on the subject is 
whether this ownership is better achieved in a conditional or normative framework. David 
Law noted both the conditionality of the EU enlargement process and the norm-setting 
capacities of the OSCE and CE as being particularly useful for the delivery of SSR in areas 
of civilian oversight, policing, military and judicial institutions.
  SSR’s emphasis on 
interaction with domestic actors – at project level134 – as a means of fostering 
accountability in transitional structures, allows for the cultivation of the legitimacy at sub-
state levels.
135
 In this way it has the potential to address domestic questioning of the 
credibility and legitimacy of international institutions actions, thereby empowering 
international actors, including the military.
 
It also offers an alternative perspective from 
which to explain security-related aspects of the normative basis for engagement, and how 
they relate to military effectiveness.
136
 
 
Critics of the concept have argued that the holistic approach of SSR has struggled 
to replace established practices of ‘institutional engineering’.137 While this is a valid 
assessment, it is somewhat impatient, as the physical application of SSR has only really 
gathered purchase with international institutions in the past ten years. Nonetheless, insofar 
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as it attempts to bridge the gap between military intervention and the sustainable 
establishment of the rule of law, SSR provides a useful framework for understanding 
military activities in Kosovo and Bosnia, even if it was not fully understood at the time, 
and the formal application of SSR programmes did not emerge until the latter parts of the 
periods analysed.
138
 Timothy Edmunds highlights its potential relevance for this research 
when noting that: 
Its [SSR] linkage with issues of political and economic transformation – 
and the willingness of ‘donor’ governments to apply political and 
economic conditionality in its promotion – means that at its widest it 
can amount to an intrusive, transformative and explicitly normative 
programme … For this reason, the security sector reform agenda is of 
great significance to the current redefinition of military roles in 
Europe.
139
 
 
While SSR literature and practice goes further than either institutionalist, development or 
even some military specific scholarship on the utility of military forces, it has tended to 
focus on the importance of multi-actor cohesion and the mutual recognition of civilian and 
military roles in building sustainable governance and security structures. Broadly, it 
adheres to the predominant argument in development literature that civilian and military 
activities should be separate albeit with an enhanced awareness of how they impact on 
each other and on domestic populations. Therefore, the findings presented regarding a 
military role in delivering rights-based policy will add depth to that literature. 
 
2.4 Conditionality, Norms and Compliance in Post-conflict Contexts 
2.41 Conditionality: Concepts and Impact 
As noted above, this research identifies military application of conditionality linked to 
humanitarian aid, finance, technical support measures, enlargement and transfers of power. 
The potential of such engagement is not considered in literature on international 
institutions which is theoretically defined by the dialectic between rationalist and 
constructivist institutional theory; practically defined by the effectiveness of conditional 
incentives vis a vis compliance, or change resulting from the socialisation of norms.  
However, in seeking to “build on mutual theoretical concessions that constructivists and 
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rationalists have recently hinted at, but have not fully developed”,140 it is worth noting that 
rationalist arguments – that emphasise the use of positive and negative incentives in a 
bargaining process between institutions and third parties where outcomes reflect decision-
making processes that balance the costs and benefits of compliance – correlate with much 
of the military activity analysed in the case studies.
141
 The contrasting constructivist 
arguments that emphasise the socialisation of third states, notably their elites, and the 
associated impact on domestic behaviour and identity, also have purchase here. Two recent 
developments in this literature are worth highlighting: the move towards addressing 
questions of effectiveness and compliance, and the emergence of inclusive scholarship that 
seeks to move beyond the polarised debates that existed heretofore.
142
 
Other academics have presented the view that insofar as the act of humanitarian 
intervention delivered institutional presence – military and civilian – direct to post-conflict 
societies, it altered the normative basis for their engagement through increased 
opportunities for socialisation and persuasion.
143
 As the case studies demonstrate, 
international military forces were not impervious to the norms articulated regarding ethnic 
minority issues in Bosnia and Kosovo. Furthermore, for much of the period analysed they 
were at the forefront of multi-level engagement with the domestic populations. 
2.42 Development and Membership Conditionality 
 
Mirroring the narrative identified above, scholarship on development conditionality has 
generally not explored the potential for military involvement. For example, James K. 
Boyce’s examination of ‘peace conditionality’ – formal performance criteria or informal 
policy dialogue that makes aid conditional on efforts by recipients to implement peace 
accords and consolidate the peace – 144 identified peacekeeping as a military contribution 
without seeking to investigate the nuances of military activity.
145
 While Boyce chose not to 
explore the military role, his findings do point to the potential for military application of 
‘peace conditionality’. On one level, his observation that once a peace agreement is 
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established, space can be created for “mini-bargains, whereby specific types of aid are tied 
to specific steps to build peace”, co-relates with military activity at local/municipal levels 
identified in this research. Boyce’s findings also allow for the linkage of this activity to 
“key issues such as protecting human rights” or “as in Bosnia […] ensuring that displaced 
people are free to return to their homes and that they secure equitable access to 
employment, schools, housing, and personal safety”.146 
Though not primarily concerned with conditionality, scholarship on state and 
nation-building identifies alternative factors that affect the influence of international 
actors.
147
 The predominant trend of scholarship suggests that international administration 
was generally improvised and ill-considered; neatly surmised by Simon Chesterman, in the 
opening line to his analysis of Kosovo: “Two presidents, a presidency, a prime minister, 
and an assembly, but not a country?”148 One interesting exception is the work of Alex 
Jeffery in Brčko, where intensive intervention – including the application of conditionality 
– by international organisations produced notable results in terms of ethnic minority 
returns and participation in local institutions.
149
 While Jeffery does not consider the 
military role, his research demonstrates that the types of policy delivery identified as being 
utilised by the military in this research could be effective on ethnic minority and other 
issues:  
As long as enlargement continues, the issue of minority protection will 
remain on the EU’s agenda through the regular monitoring of candidate 
countries.
150
  
 
If reluctance summed up NATO, and particularly EU engagement with the CEECs, then 
their early efforts to forestall the emerging territories of the former Yugoslavia – the 
extension of formal recognition and attempts to mediate the conflict – were incoherent, 
bordering on reckless.
151
 James Mayall highlights “the failure of the then European 
Community (EC) to accompany its recognition of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with 
credible conditions that would have reassured the minorities and deterred the various 
groups of Serbs from pressing their claim for a united Serbia.”152 Its relevance here is that 
it fostered a legacy of suspicion and distrust among domestic actors in their dealings with 
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international civil-military organisations that tempered their enthusiasm for membership 
and, by association, their receptiveness to incentives and norms.  
Despite these concerns, the process of enlargement has become the overarching 
approach to the region. All the states of the region, including Kosovo, have been given 
assurances as to their membership of the European Union, if not NATO.
153
 Yet 
surprisingly little scholarship has sought to investigate the application of membership 
incentives or the transfer of norms to these territories.
154
 The early literature on the 
enlargement of the EU and NATO was understandably centripetal in its focus. Given the 
scale, uncertainty and novelty surrounding enlargement to CEEC, academics and 
institutions alike prioritised the examination of issues concerning security, and the 
institutional challenge of accommodating ten and more new members.
155
 As the process of 
enlargement progressed, attention shifted to questions of compliance and the effectiveness 
of conditional incentives and norm adoption. More recently, in the case of the EU, there 
has been the application of theoretical approaches, such as Europeanization, to investigate 
the domestic impact of the enlargement process in pre- and post-candidate countries, 
including examinations of [EU] ‘internal’ preferences and processes for dealing with 
‘problem-ridden countries’.156  
The subset of literature on membership conditionality is mostly CEEC-centric
157
 
and focused on the application of the EU’s acquis communataire or NATO’s application of 
democratic conditionality.
158
 That such policies were generally not relevant in post-conflict 
SEE helps to explain why the consideration of the application of conditionality and 
compliance in Kosovo and Bosnia has, for the most part, failed to materialise. Rather, as 
Gergana Noutcheva has noted, the emphasis of research on post-conflict SEE is on 
domestic resistance to the presence of protectorates and semi-protectorates and aggravation 
at the encroachment of their sovereignty and statehood structures.
159
 However, recent 
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exceptions such as George Vasilev’s work on Bosnia, point to a growing interest. Vasilev 
presents a convincing argument that the application of conditionality is particularly 
challenging in Bosnia, as domestic institutions were not just challenged with adopting EU 
standards, but also with concurrently developing “procedural standards”.160   
The potential role of the military in this effort was identified but not developed by 
Celeste Wallander, who observed that the role NATO came to play in the region afforded 
considerable advantages to the other institutions (particularly the EU and UN) in terms of 
‘reduced transaction costs and increased access to information; combining to create the 
incentives to conform to international standards necessary for multilateral action’.161 In 
spite of this, and the “high rhetorical prominence” given by all institutions to the minority 
issues in general, it remains surprising that the linkage of conditionality to ethnic minority 
issues has generally not been considered. Accordingly, this research seeks to complement 
existing literature, “to test established findings in a new context and check some new 
variables”.162 
2.43 Projecting Norms on Ethnic Minority Issues 
While the EU recognised that the ‘minority issue’ on its border was too significant to 
ignore, it was equally unwilling to address the issue formally within its own borders, “a 
case of the EU setting conditions for outsiders which it could not set internally”.163 Sjursen 
and Smith suggest that stimulated by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the inclusion of 
a minority standard in the Copenhagen criteria can be interpreted as representative of both 
a logic of consequences to counter “the danger of importing ethnic conflict into the 
Union”, and reflective of “a logic of moral justification, or reference to more universal 
principles motivating individuals.”164  
That neither the EU nor NATO has a formal position on minority rights raises 
questions concerning the feasibility, legitimacy and credibility of norms, particularly in 
territories exhibiting prominent ethno-nationalism. This inability to ‘successfully 
demonstrate the norms they project in practice’165 exposed their efforts to criticism and 
resistance. Yet, even when conditions are more favourable, such as in CEEC, 
Schimmelfennig found that with “the presence of positive identity, high legitimacy, and at 
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least neutral resonance, compliance did not follow.”166 How the substantial civil-military 
presence in post-conflict territories alters that dynamic is one of the areas this research 
seeks to uncover. In taking this approach, parallels can be drawn with the research of 
Bruce Cronin on the OSCE. While Cronin arguably overstates the OSCE’s influence on 
minority rights issues in Eastern Europe, his argument is worthy in that it clearly 
demonstrates the potential of socialisation approaches to achieve compliance, albeit in a 
less complicated context than post-conflict SEE.
167
 In considering such findings, this 
research considers the role of the military as a norm promoter and the extent to which that 
role contributed to its successes and failures regarding policies related to ethnic minority 
issues. 
2.44 Compliance 
Acknowledging that the accession standards of NATO and the EU regarding respect for 
minorities were relatively modest, Will Kymlicka, identified domestic factors as the key 
obstacles to compliance: the persistence of minority nationalism and the securitization of 
ethnic politics.
168
 Others have pointed to the rise of enlargement fatigue (or waiting for 
enlargement fatigue) and confusion over the respective roles of international actors; the 
unsuitability of means such as the acquis, and the persistence of nationalist themes in 
political discourse.
169
 
Much of the research conducted on political elites in the Balkans has emphasised 
their application of nationalistic politics for the consolidation of local power, and their 
general reluctance to change in the face of external pressure, particularly on issues 
concerning ethnic minorities.
170
 While some scholars have identified the emergence of new 
elite groups in the Western Balkans, ‘euro elites’171 the general consensus of the literature 
that focuses on the post-conflict territories is one of continued intransigence and reluctance 
to change.
172
 In CEEC, Kelley found that strong participation of minorities in national 
parliaments generally resulted in low domestic opposition to compliance with ethnic 
policies and vice versa. What does not emerge so clearly in her research is the potential of 
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opposition to emerge from within ethnic minority groups themselves.
173
 This is significant 
for the present study, in that it would appear, particularly with the Serbian minority 
population of Mitrovica, Kosovo, that minorities cannot be discounted as sources of 
opposition.  Of further relevance, Caspersen’s examination of the Serbian minority in 
Croatia both before and after the war noted that internal division and personal rivalry 
played an important role in the position of the Krajina Serbs during the war, fuelling 
intransigence and resulting in deadlock when important decisions were needed.
174
 
Similarly, this research should add to Kymlicka’s and Malloy’s examinations of kin-state 
impact, noting that the kin-state dimension can work a number of ways, and need not 
always be an obstructive influence.
175
 
In considering the nature of the outcomes resulting from such intensive engagement 
– where compliant policy behaviour and implementation occurred – March and Olsen’s 
idea of a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness help to explain the quality 
and motives for compliance.
176
 Yet, academics have been reluctant to take this line of 
research to SEE in general: avoiding the post-conflict territories of the former 
Yugoslavia.
177
 It would appear that the one of the reasons for this was that insufficient time 
had passed since the cessation of conflict in the Western Balkans for research of this nature 
to have purchase. The ‘time’ factor is emphasised by March and Olsen (in their follow-on 
research), but it is clear that in terms of the nature of interaction between institutions and 
domestic actors in post-conflict Western Balkans, “the long tenure of international 
presence, frequent interaction and shared experiences and information; the gradual 
emergence of shared accounts and institutionalized memories; and crucially that in all 
cases political environments are fairly stable”, it is not overly ambitious to seek to extend 
this kind of analysis – in a limited application – to  Kosovo and Bosnia over 15  and 20 
years since their respective conflicts ended.
178
 
2.5 Minority Rights: Theory and Practice in International Intervention 
Many of the debates that are referenced in this work have their roots in scholarship on the 
role of the UN. When the energies of the continent were contained by the Cold War 
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balance of power,
179
 what post-conflict intervention existed was either provided through 
bilateral engagements or assigned to the UN, which was itself the second coming of the 
first major institutional attempt to promote world peace; the League of Nations. 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the League of Nations attempted to address 
ethnic disputes through the application of a minority protection system (MPS) of “detailed 
procedures, based on the principles of reciprocity and subsidiarity”.180 Some disputes with 
a definite ethnic narrative such as the Åland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland 
were successfully resolved. However, others, such as the dispute between Poland and 
Germany over the German minority of Upper Silesia, dragged on – despite partial 
successes – largely unresolved, as the principal allied powers “rejected the protests of the 
small powers [...] Fearing a political mobilisation of their own, mostly ignored 
minorities...”181  That the MPS approach did not carry through to the early efforts of a UN 
that preferred “a greater focus on individual rights”182 is reflective of both a loss of faith 
among the principal powers in the feasibility of the concept of minority protection and the 
ability of the system to deliver sustainable or satisfactory settlements, and a renewed belief 
in the 1940s that ‘population transfers’ were more effective in dealing with minority 
questions.
183
 This shift is reflected in the post-cold war behaviour of the UN, most notably 
in its initial approach to international administration and peacekeeping missions that 
prioritised separation of warring parties without notable attempts to proactively engage 
communities or issues that are more apparent today.
184
  
For the territories analysed, the progress of minority rights and the nature of 
international governance were inseparable, with both the OHR and UNMIK, rhetorically at 
least, placing harmony and cooperation between the different ethnic groups at the top of 
their agendas. Unsurprisingly, the potential of military contributions is not considered in 
literature on minority rights, including works that focus on conflict affected territories. 
However, an understanding of minority rights theory and practice helps explain certain 
aspects of military behaviour identified in this research, while also framing a consideration 
of the potential of military actors in certain circumstances. Three debates prominent in 
literature on minority rights stand out in this regard: communitarianism versus 
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individualism; multi-ethnic power-sharing arrangements; and security versus 
empowerment. 
The apparent intractability of the individualist-communitarian divide within the EU 
– between prioritising the rights of the individual and the rule of law as opposed to seeking 
to protect and accommodate differing ethnic communities, often by affording them special 
rights and protection
185
  – appears to dissipate somewhat in post-conflict intervention. In 
part this can be explained by another division – that between consociationalist and 
integrationist approaches to power-sharing. The principle assumption underlying power-
sharing theory is the belief that appropriate political engineering can help construct a 
democratic political system capable of withstanding the centrifugal tendencies that tear 
deeply divided societies apart.
186
 Consociationalists argue that conflict settlements need to 
recognise the reality of ethnic division through provision for ethnic self-governance, 
including grand coalitions, proportional representation, segmental (territorial or non-
territorial) autonomy, and veto rights. Integrationists argue for more inclusive approaches 
that attempt to temper ethnic division through “incentives to elites to moderate their 
stances and offer political platforms that have broad appeal beyond one’s own ethnic 
group”.187 
The relevance of this for military activity is threefold: first the division between 
individualists and communitarians, particularly in Europe, fragmented the sources of 
policy guidance on minority issues for all actors, including the military. While the OSCE 
and CE attempted to provide clarity,
188
 the cases studies reveal that they were two of many 
sources that military commanders considered when addressing ethnic minority issues. 
While this imparted a certain freedom to the military to follow their own path, it also 
resulted in a variety of outcomes, intended and unintended. Second, though 
consociationalists and integrationists both viewed the military as essentially a guarantor of 
security, the impact of their ideas on the nature of power-sharing arrangements devised for 
Bosnia and Kosovo pushed military commanders and their troops into situations where 
they applied either segregationist or incentivised means, often associated with engagement 
with minority participation issues. Third, as power-sharing structures formalise the basis 
for ethnic minority representation in a territory, they alter the means of domestic policy 
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making and political interaction, impacting on the effectiveness of international approaches 
and the nature of compliance.
189
  
Regarding the impact of these approaches, Clive Baldwin argues that a failure to 
progress minority rights in Kosovo is attributable to an internationally imposed mind-set of 
segregation, compounded by short-term politics and a lack of clear and accountable 
governance, reflected in a lack of any real protection of human rights and weak civil 
society.
190
 Complementing this view, Katherine Nobbs suggests that a securitised approach 
to minority issues is problematic, actively exacerbating the very tensions they seek to 
resolve through negative discourse of ‘problems to be fixed’ and ‘threats to be monitored’ 
arguing instead for an alternative emphasis on the development and enhancement of legal 
foundations for the protection of minority rights and ultimately in a move towards ‘more 
inclusive laws of diversity’.191  
However, it is difficult to escape the fact that the issues examined here are 
intrinsically linked to armed ethnic conflict, and thereby in a much more implicit way to 
questions of security: put simply, minority families displaced by conflict are reluctant to 
return because they do not feel it is safe to do so. However, the emergence of a security 
versus empowerment debate in respect of international intervention in the Western Balkans 
does suggest a certain progress on ethnic issues in the region. While there is considerable 
merit in the position of Marc Weller, that “considering minority issues as security 
problems stigmatizes minorities or states facing difficult ethnic issues”192, it would be 
(arguably) extremely difficult for any organisation examined in this work to decouple 
minority issues for special treatment in a post-conflict context that present a myriad of ‘live 
security problems’. Arguably Gwendolyn Sasse strikes an appropriate balance with her 
idea of a “security – rights nexus”, intended “to break through the either/or approaches 
characterizing the formulation and interpretation of policies and norms.”193 Accordingly 
the findings of this research should add to this debate by indicating potential transition 
points in a post-conflict setting between security and empowerment priorities and therein 
the influence of the military actors. 
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2.51 Ethnic Minority Issues: Returns and Participation 
If the debates informing policy on ethnic minority issues shaped military engagement in a 
number of ways, specific engagement with returns and participation introduced further 
complicating factors: the appropriateness of military engagement; minority interpretations 
of their situations, the politicisation of returns, and participation and opportunities for ad 
hoc interaction. 
Identifying physical, material and legal safety as the requirement for returns in 
Kosovo and Bosnia, Englbrecht observed that facilitating voluntary return in safety and 
dignity was given paramount importance by the international institutions and agencies 
operating in the region.
194
 For most, the military role in supporting that endeavour was to 
provide a secure space to allow returns to proceed. However, Joanna Harvey notes that a 
large security presence did not necessarily equate with enhanced security in the eye of 
returnees, and can, of itself, be a deterrent to returns.
195
 Black and Gent expand on this to 
suggest that returnees’ experiences before the war, their circumstances of exile, and 
circumstances of return, can all impact on a returns process, noting that in both Bosnia and 
Kosovo, returnees themselves took “a staged” approach to decision-making, based on one 
or more of these issues.
196
 Their findings correspond with Dahlman and Ó Tuathail’s view 
that an uneven geography of returns created a new geopolitical landscape, where optimal 
outcomes are highly unlikely.
197
 In both cases, that dynamic was exacerbated by the almost 
bewildering “web of obstacles” that majority populations can develop to hinder both 
returns and related property processes:
198
 obstructive bureaucracy, incomplete citizenship, 
partisan property laws and the conscious manipulation (strategic blocking) of demographic 
circumstances to achieve a particular ethnic result in a given territory.
199
   
This politicisation of ethnic minority issues is most evident in analysis of minority 
access to property rights. Rhodri Williams and Anneke Rachel Smit identified two key 
points of relevance for this research: the growing preference for rule of law-based 
approaches to addressing post-conflict property issues, and the potential impact the 
military can have through the provision of security, the collection of information, and 
support for property reconstruction. In researching issues of property restitution William’s 
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notes a dynamic of property transactions in Bosnia where displaced ‘minorities’ chose to 
resettle in areas other than their original place of origin. He therefore presents the argument 
that this ‘element of choice’ [to settle elsewhere] married to the promotion of the rule of 
law as applicable to the individual, was central to the concept of returns devised for Bosnia 
and that its ‘success’ was hinged on the availability of international commitment and 
resources.
200
 Recognising ‘partial success’, Dahlman and Ó Tuathail arrive at a different 
hypothesis: that it reflects the imposition of a legal system by the international community 
that allowed power to be “tilted from localized ethno nationalists to localized 
internationals”, thereby creating the space for ethnically cleansed Bosnian places to see 
more and more minority returns.
201
 Success is further qualified by the simple fact observed 
by Bogdan Ivanisevic, that some ‘returnees’ simply do not wish to return.202  
The consideration of minority participation in post-conflict governance structures 
incorporates the interrelated strands of power-sharing, peacebuilding (notably SSR) and ad 
hoc interactions between communities and international actors. Making the case for the 
importance of minority participation, Florian Bieber, argues: 
First, other rights and the prevention of discrimination of minorities 
cannot be effectively ensured, unless the minority itself is actively 
partaking in the political decision making processes which govern the 
protection of minority rights. […]. Secondly, minorities run the risk of 
being excluded from the political system without special protective 
measures. Especially in countries with mobilized ethnic nationalism, 
majorities (and minorities) have been unlikely to vote for parties or 
candidates of other nations or ethnic groups.
203
 
 
The challenge associated with progressing participation is significant. In 2004, Carrie 
Manning presented a grim assessment of Bosnia where, in spite of the exceptional control 
– “power of institutional engineering” – exercised by institutions such as the OHR and 
OSCE, “nothing, not even direct intervention, has brought about the eclipse of the wartime 
nationalist parties in favour of more moderate alternatives in post-war Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.”204 An ethnic bias in public policy processes is observed throughout the 
periods examined.
205
 In 2004, Florian Bieber noted that the nature of international 
intervention that prioritised “the restoration of ethnic diversity” meant that there was 
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effectively only one “policy option available to designers of post-conflict institutions in the 
Balkans.”206 Five years later, he observed that the limitations of that approach were all too 
apparent, as the power-sharing systems – in particular the rigid institutions in place in 
Bosnia – were considered to be holding back prospects for EU and NATO integration.207  
In areas associated with SSR, outcomes are more diverse. For example, Vetschera 
and Damian’s examination of Bosnian security architecture post-Dayton noted that, 
though: 
the international community accepted the military division as a fact they 
nevertheless, even in the very early stages, made efforts to surmount 
that division to enable Bosnia to take on as many of the trappings of a 
‘normal’ state as possible, so that it would be able to participate in all 
joint military undertakings, such as the OSCE’s politico-military 
dimension or the NATO PfP programme.
208
   
 
They do not discuss the implications of this for international military forces, but it is clear 
that for those involved in defence reform and capacity building, it created the space for 
multi-level engagement, the extent of which will be considered in the case studies.  
SSR endeavours in Kosovo were more diverse again with military involvement in 
policing and security reform. KFOR worked closely with UNMIK and the OSCE to make 
“multi-ethnic policing on the local level […] one of the successes of UNMIK’s mission, 
particularly if compared to the overwhelming ethnic segregation in most other sectors of 
Kosovar society.
209
 But this success must be contextualised by the fact that the KPS 
operated within a rigid international framework, which meant that the multi-ethnic 
structure was compartmentalised and carefully monitored by the OSCE, NATO (joint 
patrols) and UNMIK-P. When this structure was tested, as it was during the riots of 2004, 
aspects of it were found wanting, reflected in the refusal of Kosovo Serbian KPS members 
to return to work in certain areas.  
Finally, through their role as a guarantor of security and their engagement with 
returns and participation (including SSR tasks) as described above, military personnel were 
imbedded in a post-conflict dynamic of daily interaction with domestic actors on ethnic 
minority issues. While the interaction between civilian and military actors is acknowledged 
across the literature outlined above, the substance and relevance of both formal and 
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particular informal ad hoc interactions is under researched. To this end, the examination of 
CIMIC, liaison and key leader engagement by military personnel in Kosovo and Bosnia 
should add considerably to our understanding of the factors that influence successful and 
unsuccessful outcomes on ethnic minority issues. 
2.6 Conclusions: Consideration of the Military Role on Ethnic Minority Issues 
Broadly, three areas are identified to which this research can add depth and perspective 
regarding the military role. First, by enhancing understanding of the roles and potential of 
military actors in post-conflict intervention. Second, by examining the potential for 
military actors to apply conditional incentives and normative pressures on policies related 
to ethnic minority issues. And third to challenge prevailing themes in minority rights 
literature as to how minority rights policy can and should be delivered. 
In considering the relative success or failure of the military effort, it is clear that 
disagreement on the legality/justification of intervention undermines the credibility of 
military action, including exposing their actions on rights-based issues. Disagreement on 
intervention is compounded by the weak or uncertain positions held on minority rights by 
key international organisations such as the EU and NATO. At the local ‘field’ level there is 
potential for credibility to be further eroded through inconsistent and disjointed practices 
by a multitude of civil-military actors. Conversely, while these factors served to undermine 
the credibility of actors, the domestic political environment and international prominence 
of rhetoric on ethnic minority issues meant that avoiding engagement with issues was not 
an option. Therefore, while military engagement with ethnic issues was contestable from a 
number of perspectives, the pressures requiring engagement insured that the military 
retained a role. 
Analysis of relevant literature reveals that military and civilian actors adapted to the 
operating environment through experimentation with both the concept of security and 
limits of engagement. It is clear that the military engagement in humanitarian activity 
pushed the boundaries of appropriateness and legitimacy at that time. However, with the 
exception of research on the military role in defence reform – which accommodates the 
potential for the military to apply conditional incentives, including those related to 
membership of international organisations or their pre-accession instruments – scholarship 
generally stops short of examining military influencing on rights-based issues. 
Research specific to rights-based approaches mirrors that on humanitarianism, in 
that there are competing calls for the military to do more, or for their role to be carefully 
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restricted. That dichotomy is reflected in a disconnect between policy ambition and 
implementation strategies; a blurred relationship between international organisations, 
international administrations, military and civilian actors characterised by improvisation, 
inexperience and fragmentation. This context helps to explain why the military in certain 
cases applied rights-based logic to ethnic minority issues in isolation, with both positive 
and negative outcomes (See Chapters 6 and 8).  
The character of that interaction evolved within the frameworks of CIMIC, SSR 
and multi-level interaction. In keeping with the themes of experimentation and competition 
identified in much of the literature, these frameworks afforded military actors increased 
opportunities for the socialisation of norms and the formal and informal application of 
conditional incentives. Though some research in these areas considers the interface of 
military means with mostly human rights agendas, the specific examination of military 
influence on ethnic minorities has for the most part not been examined. 
Similarly, literature on conditionality and norm diffusion has not countenanced 
military influence beyond the security of operating space. For literature on conditionality 
linked to development aid there are principled arguments as to why the military should not 
be involved. In discussions on enlargement conditionality, that the military might have a 
role was generally not considered, In considering how a military role could develop, it is 
clear that Kosovo and Bosnia (and Croatia) provided a novel situation, whereby 
enlargement conditionality and aid conditionality could be applied simultaneously in a 
post-conflict context. Therefore, given the prominence of the military role in post-conflict 
intervention, that opportunities arose for the military to engage in the application of 
conditional incentives was always going to be higher, if not probable. 
Minority rights scholars’ concern over securitised approaches and the merits of 
segregationist, power-sharing and consociational arrangements afford little space for 
consideration of a military role beyond the maintenance of a generally safe and secure 
environment. While this research does not argue that they should co-opt the military as 
policy agents – there would undoubtedly be concerns regarding the legitimacy of the 
military role similar to those raised in respect of humanitarianism – it demonstrates that 
they potentially could. The uniqueness of these factors substantiates the merits of 
examining the military role in delivering policy on ethnic minority issues. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Mapping a Moving landscape: External Influences and Policy Development 
In explaining the factors that motivated and shaped international military and civilian 
engagement with ethnic minority issues, two spheres of external pressure are considered: 
the convergence of pressure for action in general – the demand that ‘something must be 
done’ to end conflict – and the pressure for specific action on the ethnic dimension of 
conflict. This chapter explores the developmental features and convergence of these 
‘pressures to act’, and how they influenced the treaty documents and mandates that 
established the terms for the cessation of conflict, thereby informing civil-military 
activities in post-conflict Bosnia and Kosovo. 
3.1 “Something Must be Done”: Experimentation, Exposure and Personalities 
The almost universal demand for ‘something to be done’ in Bosnia, and later Kosovo, 
stimulated a zeitgeist of international experimentation, centred on international 
organisations, and sustained by almost constant exposure to media coverage of the 
respective conflicts. Within that dynamic, the engagement of those international 
organisations with their domestic interlocutors was marked by the complex interaction of 
personalities at mostly elite levels. The outcomes emerging from that context were not 
always productive: shock and fear often stimulated impulses to act that led to hasty and 
short-lived policy reactions.210  However, this was not always the case, and the particular 
determination to achieve progress on the ethnic dimension of the conflict – seen by most as 
the key to sustaining a post-conflict settlement – was observed to persist up to and beyond 
the cessation of conflict. 
3.11 Discourse and Experimentation in International Security 
“The long decades of European division are over.”211 In considering the nature of the 
literature and public discourse to emerge in the aftermath of the Cold War, it is clear that 
significant uncertainty existed as to how international organisations should adapt to the 
new world order, if indeed they (International Organisations) should be retained at all. For 
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some, the fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War were seen as a changing of the 
guard in European Security, with the sui generis supranational power of the EU aided by 
the soft power of the OSCE and CE replacing the inflexible Cold War alliance of NATO.212 
For others, it marked, perhaps rather cynically, the beginning of a period of ‘market 
competition’,213 where the affected organisations sought to re-establish their legitimacy and 
relevance as quickly as possible. 
In the drive towards extended international intervention, it was clear that 
the ‘division of labour’ of international organizations in nation-building 
in Bosnia, had less to do with the problems of Bosnia itself and more to 
do with the search for legitimacy and policy-coherence on the part of 
international organizations.
214
 
 
An analysis of the collective output of international organisations – policy papers, 
statements and proposals – throughout the 1990s reveals a remarkable volume of 
conceptual and operational experimentation. Staffs in the EU, UN, NATO, OSCE and the 
CE appeared determined to transform their respective organisations to meet new post-Cold 
War agendas emerging in CEEC and throughout the Balkans. For example, as early as 
1991, NATO was articulating its core functions in “the New Europe”, based on the 
“common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law...”215 Detailed policies of 
partnership were developed and offered to the CEECs. In a statement released by the NAC 
Ministerial Session, the CEECs were encouraged towards ‘European integration’, and 
adherence with the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Indeed, reference to the 
role of the CSCE is made throughout the NATO document.
216
 
This spirit of inter-organisational harmony carried through to inform aspects of 
international mediation and intervention, including engagement with ethnic minority 
issues. For example, the CSCE figures prominently in statements issued on events in 
Yugoslavia, where NATO clearly deferred to CSCE policy on matters relating to ethnic 
group rights: 
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The right to self-determination of all the peoples in Yugoslavia cannot 
be exercised in isolation from the interests and rights of national or 
ethnic groups within the individual republics. Authorities at all levels 
should respect international norms and international obligations, 
especially those embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of 
Paris, and other CSCE documents.
217
 
 
If one considers this and other documented output of NATO between the years of 1991 and 
1993, it is possible to chart policy developments in areas relating to: the expansion of the 
alliance, to include the CEECs; the active consideration and conceptual readjustment 
towards deploying forces in peacekeeping and peace-enforcing roles; and, through a 
process of inter-organisational dialogue, the expansion and articulation of a broader set of 
norms and values for the alliance, including the implicit reference to policy on ethnic 
minority rights.
218
 What is also clear in statements released during this period is that the 
alliance was initially satisfied to allow the EC, CSCE and the UN to assume the lead for 
the international response to the deteriorating situation in the Western Balkans. 
In considering these inter-organisational exchanges, it is evident that the 
differences that existed to varying degrees concerning minority rights – particularly within 
NATO and the EU – were overcome by a willingness to discover new inter-organisational 
approaches, cross-cutting NATO, EU, CSCE, CE, and to some extent the UN. The 
significance of this is that it created a policy-making space within which mechanisms 
could be linked to ethnic minority issues without impeding (perhaps in some cases 
confronting)
219
 member states ‘internal requirements’. Equally, therefore, while it 
facilitated progress in policy development, over time, it also exposed the credibility of their 
respective endeavours to accusations of hypocrisy, as policies proposed to the states of the 
Western Balkans were not representative of norms within certain member states of NATO 
and the EU. 
3.12 Personalities Matter 
The ethnic cleansing was left to continue in the country while moral 
standards were upheld in the outside world.
220
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From Richard Holbrooke and Slobodan Milosevic, through to Javier Solana and Agim 
Çeku, a number of individuals have played highly significant roles in shaping the post-
conflict realities of the Western Balkans. Their interpretation of events, along with the 
deals and decisions they concluded, often served to directly influence the daily reality of 
majority and minority populations throughout the region, with a variety of implications for 
the subsequent efforts of civilian and military organisations to encourage compliance on a 
range of post-conflict issues, including those relating to ethnic minorities. 
In his analysis of conflict mediation in Bosnia, Brendan Simms, argues forcibly that 
British government interlocutors and the EU mediator, Lord Owen, reached “an implicit 
understanding at Dayton in November 1995 that Milosevic would not be prosecuted”, and 
that this “understanding” explained “Milosevic’s cavalier recognition of the [International 
War Crimes] Tribunal at Dayton”. Interestingly, Simms also suggests that it “was only in 
1998-9 that the penny finally dropped that Milosevic was the principal cause of instability 
in the Balkans, not part of the solution”.221 For his part, Lord Owen, though not 
specifically addressing the issues raised by Simms, has highlighted the complexity of the 
meditation process during the period and the difficulties caused by the initial refusal by 
almost all states including the US and collectively the EU to countenance the break-up of 
Yugoslavia.
222
 From these initial intransigent positions, the key interlocutors found 
themselves in a position where they relied on Milosevic to impose a settlement on the 
Bosnian Serbs.
223
  
As a snapshot of the exchanges that ultimately delivered the Dayton peace 
agreement, such perspectives are revealing for this research in that they highlight the 
complexity of interactions and constraints between those representing international 
organisations, and those whom they sought to compel or coerce to a desired course of 
action. Considering the broader thrust of Simm’s argument, it is also clear that individual 
personalities matter in these interactions, particularly the degree to which pre-conceived – 
and sometimes ill-informed – notions can influence the positions of representatives of 
individual states and organisations, including military representatives, in their dealings 
with domestic parties; shaping processes of engagement in various ways, including the 
potential to influence the design, and application of conditional incentives and normative 
pressure.  
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Such approaches to engagement with domestic communities varied. For example, 
staff from the OSCE or EC most often engaged domestic elites within very prescriptive 
and structured parameters. This contrasted with the more ad hoc style of mediation applied 
by certain governments engaging bilaterally or the Contact Group – leaving the detail to be 
sorted out by the technocrats later. Again, Lord Owen’s assessment of the conclusion of 
the conflict in Kosovo underlines the fluidity and fickleness that can at times characterise 
these interactions: 
No one knows exactly what was the crucial pressure that made 
Milosevic anger his own forces by ordering them to leave Kosovo, even 
though they had not been defeated. The probability was that Yeltsin said 
that all gas pipelines to Serbia would be turned off and this was both 
more immediate and crucial than vague hints from Clinton under 
pressure from Blair to intervene with ground troops ...
224
  
 
The impact of personalities is not, however, confined to the elite level strategic 
engagement. It is evident from the case study research that personalities mattered at all 
levels of interaction, with localised power asymmetries between military, civilian and 
domestic actors often proving significant for outcomes on ethnic minority issues. The 
hierarchical structure of military organisation lends itself to an analysis of the impact of 
military personalities at all levels, from the elite-level engagement of the overall 
commanders of military missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, to the behaviour of their 
subordinate commanders. As Chapters 6 and 8 shall demonstrate, NATO was not unaware 
of this dynamic, developing a number of means – such as key leader engagements – for 
capitalising on the ‘personality’ of a commander in a particular area.  
3.13 Media Discourse and Agenda Setting 
Media organisations have tremendous influence in shaping public 
opinion and the views of public officials. The media’s portrayal of 
ethnic conflicts, as well as the steps in their resolution, thus has 
immense consequences for conditioning public attitudes and influencing 
policy responses.
225
 
 
However, “immense consequences” cannot be presumed. Over the duration of the period 
relevant to this research, there is significant variation in media influence, both 
internationally and domestically. This variation can be generally accounted for within two 
strands of analysis. First, the view that the media can directly influence international 
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organisations and their member states to “intervene in crisis situations in exceptional 
situations” only.226 Examples of ‘media outrage’ failing to illicit a ‘meaningful’ response 
are cited in this context, including Rwanda and Darfur, to name but two. Secondly, that 
“by being highly selective in its coverage of conflicts in their most violent manifestations, 
the media helps to shift focus and funds from more cost-effective, long-term efforts 
directed at preventing violent conflict and rebuilding war-torn societies to short-term 
emergency relief”.227 
Both of these strands hold relevance for the ‘international’ coverage of Bosnia and 
Kosovo, in that the violence and in particular the suffering of minorities, was highlighted 
daily in numerous media outlets, thereby serving to keep both the conflicts themselves, and 
the components the media choose to emphasise (such as ethnic cleansing) to the fore of 
public discourse. As events unfolded elsewhere, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
coverage of the post-conflict effort became infrequent. However, while this was very much 
the dynamic of international (mainly western) media coverage of the region, it was not 
mirrored in the behaviour of domestic media outlets, which naturally retained their focus 
on local issues, reflecting and projecting various policy perspectives. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that media outlets influence the selection, delivery and 
reception of incentives and norms relating to ethnic issues in two ways:  external sources 
pushing for international intervention and internal sources that shape and influence 
domestic perspectives and opinion; thereby potentially contributing to variations in 
compliance. Finally, it should also be noted that military actors, in this instance NATO, 
were not unaware of the power of domestic media outlets and through PSYOPS 
continuously sought to ‘deliver key messages’ regarding a range of issues.228 
 
 
3.2 The Evolution of the Normative Basis for Intervention: Responding to the New World 
Order 
The disintegration of communist structures in eastern and south-eastern Europe went hand 
in hand with the rise of nationalism and the re-emergence of inter-ethnic tension. In 
response, international organisations attempted to compel newly-emerging states to adhere 
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to fundamental principles: the rule of law, democracy, freedom of movement and respect 
for human rights. As seen above, the treaty basis for their actions was weak when it came 
to addressing issues associated with inter-ethnic tension. A clear movement towards 
addressing that deficit emerged in 1990, when 34 states –including the USSR, USA, 
Yugoslavia and the EC – signed the Charter of Paris, which explicitly sought to establish 
norms and values concerning ethnic issues and minority rights: 
We affirm that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of 
national minorities will be protected and that persons belonging to 
national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and 
develop that identity without any discrimination and in full equality 
before the law.  
 
We will ensure that everyone will enjoy recourse to effective remedies, 
national or international, against any violation of his rights. Full respect 
for these precepts is the bedrock on which we will seek to construct the 
new Europe – Charter of Paris.229 
Within months of the signing of the Charter of Paris Yugoslavia imploded, finally 
succumbing to the pressures of over a decade of extreme nationalistic politics. In the 
international response to the conflict that followed, several key factors emerged with 
implications for the linkage between conditionality, normative pressure and ethnic issues. 
These include: the initial attempt to link policy conditionality to recognition of the 
Yugoslav republics, the subsequent and various attempts of international organisations to 
mediate the conflict and the gradual convergence on policy regarding ethnic minority 
issues.  
3.21 The Recognition of the Yugoslav Republics: EC Conditionality and NATO’s Path to 
Intervention 
While NATO tended to its organisational framework and sphere of influence through its 
Strategic Concept process in 1991 (providing a doctrinal reference point for future military 
commanders by committing to help ensure full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act 
and the Charter of Paris),
230
 the EU sought to lead the mediation efforts to resolve the crisis 
in Yugoslavia. The EU (EC as it was) had significantly expanded its areas of competence 
and interest throughout the 1980s, including significant effort in developing its external 
personality and capabilities, focusing on its ‘neighbourhood’. Broadly, this ambition 
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translated into two streams of policy activity: first, like NATO, the EU gradually moved to 
integrate the newly independent CEECs through a series of bi-lateral arrangements that 
would eventually converge into an enlargement process; secondly, the EU sought to 
assume a leadership role in the Yugoslav crisis, primarily as key mediators, but also with a 
modest field-monitoring mission (EUMM).
231
 Progress in CEEC was steady: the 
experience in the Western Balkans was almost instantly a nightmare:  
The Community and its member States agree to recognise the 
independence of all the Yugoslav Republics fulfilling all the conditions 
set out below... They are therefore inviting all Yugoslav Republics to 
state by 23 December whether: they accept the provision laid down in 
the draft Convention – especially those in Chapter II on human rights 
and rights of national or ethnic groups – under consideration by the 
Conference on Yugoslavia ...
232
 
 
This EPC declaration is notable as it was the EC’s ‘novel’ first attempt to use 
conditionality, in this case linked to recognition, as an instrument of conflict prevention in 
SEE. Following the Charter of Paris, it was also another tangible indication of the rising 
prominence of minority rights in conflict prevention.
233
 In the context of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia, it reflected the difficulties experienced in gaining acceptance on issues relating 
to the protection of minorities.
234
 Acknowledging the various reasons behind the decision 
to go with such an approach, Richard Caplan has suggested that “by insisting on ethnic 
minority rights as a condition for diplomatic recognition, the EC gave new definition to 
what it means to be a state today...”235 Though it failed as a diplomatic approach, it 
succeeded it establishing a minority rights discourse that would persist through and beyond 
the conflicts in the region. 
 While the determination to address ethnic minority issues as part of the 
settlement was laudable, there has been much criticism of the EU’s initial unwillingness to 
effectively address questions of sovereignty, and its refusal “to contemplate any changes in 
the internal boundaries of the three republics – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia – 
within Yugoslavia.”236 The EPC’s statement above was in many ways a rear-guard action 
in response to Germany’s unilateral announcement on 13 November 1991, that it would 
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recognise Croatia and Slovenia by Christmas, thereby “forcing the EC’s hand on the 
issue”, and “internationalising” the conflict.237  
By mid-1992, confidence in the EC’s ability to deliver positive outcomes in the 
region was undermined to the point that EC officials such as Jacques Delors were forced to 
concede that: 
... the chronology of the last year's events – ceasefires that were  
violated,  round-table talks to exchange  views  nobody  took seriously – 
we might wonder what the future holds. Where are we going if 
unheeded warning after unheeded warning and escalation after 
escalation do nothing to quell the flames of war but delay – at what 
human cost!
238
   
 
Through these failures, it was already apparent that the EC was “not sufficiently powerful 
or internally coherent to impose itself as a mediator in a conflict whose tragic effects were 
being felt only two hours away from Brussels”.239 Simply, the EC could not match its 
ambition in terms of contributing to the cessation of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 
ultimately causing it to step back from the international effort to a point where their 
involvement seemed minimal. Such failures, and the absence of capable military force, 
unsurprisingly caused the EC to seek to develop its “conflict prevention” capability with 
more long-term objectives in mind,
240
 a process that would in time allow it to return to the 
post-conflict territories of the Balkans in a more meaningful way. 
 The fallout from the EC’s efforts left three relevant legacies: first, it dealt a 
serious blow to the EC’s credibility as an international actor, at a time when it was 
attempting to assert itself along its eastern frontier. Second, it instigated an internal crisis 
of confidence that effectively reduced its role in the region to that of an observer within a 
year. Finally, it exposed significant weakness in the EC’s ability to devise and implement 
coherent strategies addressing issues in the Western Balkans. Combined, these outcomes 
were significant in propelling NATO to the centre of the international effort to end the 
conflict, with the result that the weight of the responsibility for the initial engagements on 
ethnic minority issues fell on the shoulders of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the OSCE. 
The consequences of this will be considered below. Though the attractiveness of a future in 
the EU remained, and the momentum of the enlargement process in CEEC hinted at future 
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possibilities for the Western Balkans, the full exposure to the various instruments at the 
EU’s disposal would not come until post-1999. 
3.22 UN Intervention: Discourse and experimentation 
The new era has brought new credibility to the United Nations. Along 
with it have come rising expectations that the United Nations will take 
on larger responsibilities and a greater role in overcoming pervasive and 
interrelated obstacles to peace and development.
241
 
 
The evolution, envisaged by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, from traditional 
peacekeeping to more flexible and robust peace-enforcing missions stalled in the midst of 
ineffectual mandates, deficiencies in key areas such as force generation and logistics, and 
conflicts of interest and opinion among key member states. Far from a new era of 
credibility, by the mid-1990s the UN’s reputation was in tatters after the failures in 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR).
242
 Its appetite to engage in further 
missions was diminished to the point that in the view of some, the UN was a reluctant 
participant in the international response to the Kosovo crisis.
243
 For these reasons, and with 
the possible exception of the UNHCR and UNDP, which remained actively engaged on 
ethnic minority issues in both territories, the UN is often notable by its absence in the post-
conflict responses analysed in this research.  
Other aspects of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s vision were more durable. 
Space was created for various international organisations – initially NATO and later the 
EU – to contribute to post-conflict efforts under a UN mandate thereby easing the burden 
on UN structures. The inclusion of formalised approaches to humanitarian issues, and 
closer cooperation with civilian agencies as part of peacekeeping and peace-enforcing 
missions, had a “multiplier effect” in a number of areas, including in specific cases related 
to ethnic minority issues: the initial coordination of UNHCR and KFOR on returns is a 
good example even if the relationship did lose impetus over time. Additionally, an 
increased emphasis on interaction with the civilian population of affected territories 
allowed for more sustainable contributions to the development of new state institutions, 
such as the police, judiciary and civil service.  
The UN’s influence throughout the region can be said to vary from a short but 
reasonably successful intervention in Croatia, through the considered failure in Bosnia, 
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before tentatively remerging in a collaborative framework in Kosovo. By the time the UN 
assumed the lead of the UNMIK administration in Kosovo in 1999, it was becoming 
apparent that many international actors, not just the UN, were indeed “learning to deal 
more effectively with a multiplicity of authorities” in war torn territories.244 The design of 
UNMIK’s structures was in many ways emblematic of both the positive and negative 
experiences of the UN up to that point. Though it was a UN mandated mission and 
nominally at least a UN-led mission, the UN was in many ways the minor partner behind 
the EU and OSCE, while the related roles of the Contact Group and KFOR further reduced 
the UN’s influence in the province. On one level, UNMIK’s structures were representative 
of a more realistic division of labour, intended to capitalise on the respective strengths of 
the various international organisations – and in that way consistent with the UN’s own 
ambitions as a unifying element in post-conflict intervention.  On another level, however, 
the centrality of the UN’s role, though relatively modest when compared to other 
international organisations, exposed it to blame for collective failures, i.e. The Standards of 
Kosovo process. These features will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 through 8.  
Finally, alongside the OSCE and CE, the UN emerged as a policy reference point 
regarding ethnic minority issues. By 1992, an international discourse on minority rights 
was firmly established, driven in tandem by the EU’s efforts and the non-binding 
agreement at the UN for a UN Declaration on the Rights of Person Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. These initiatives informed part of the 
process that produced the mandates which framed NATO’s conduct in post-conflict Bosnia 
and Kosovo, thereby helping to shape and influence the operational culture that developed 
regarding engagement with ethnic minority issues. 
3.3 Articulation of Norms during Conflict in the Western Balkans 
It is evident, for the international organisations considered in this research, that the UN 
Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and Charter of Paris were almost default points of reference 
when articulating positions on minority rights.
245
 Norms regarding minority rights in the 
former Yugoslavia gradually emerged between 1991 and 1995: for example, successive 
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EPC declarations made reference to respect for minorities.
246
  The 1992 Lisbon Report to 
the European Council on the development of CFSP suggested the objective of 
“strengthening democratic principles and institutions, and respect for human and minority 
rights”.247 It also highlighted the need to “encourage” rights of those belonging to national 
minorities in both CEEC and the former Yugoslavia.
248
 In the same year, the CSCE, in a 
conscious effort to “give new impetus” to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, 
announced the creation of a High Commissioner on National Minorities.
249
  
These and other announcements had minimal impact on the course of conflict in 
Bosnia at that time. The apparent consensus on the need to ensure the protection of rights 
regarding national minorities was not reflected in other aspects of the international 
response. By late 1992, the international response to the conflict started to unravel, as first 
the EU and then the UN failed in their respective attempts to resolve the crisis. By early 
1994, the US-led Contact Group assumed de facto leadership of the international effort in 
the region and in March 1994, quickly brokered an agreement between Bosnian Croats and 
Bosniaks that would also see the EU assume responsibility for a modest administration of 
Mostar. Only when the United States finally stepped in, with “a heavy dose of realpolitik”, 
to impose a solution after war-weariness had set in, did the conflict end in the Dayton 
Accords of November 1995.
250
 
However ineffective the norms articulated during the period, they nonetheless 
informed and influenced the decisions of international civilian and military actors during 
the concluding phases of conflict, thereby establishing the parameters for norms regarding 
issues such as returns and participation. For example, though US-led initiatives – delivered 
diplomatically through the Contact Group and militarily through NATO in conjunction 
with UNPROFOR – succeeded in ending the conflict in Bosnia, the manner of that 
intervention, and the subsequent agreement, compromised the post-conflict effort on 
minority issues in a number of ways. First, the international and domestic reputations of 
the UN and the EU were significantly damaged by their inability to effectively address 
conflict issues, encapsulated by the Srebrenica massacre. Second, the rather blunt strategic 
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engagement by US/NATO consciously afforded time and space to Croatia, allowing them 
to expel Krajina Serbs. Regardless of the motives [US/NATO] for pursuing this approach, 
it undoubtedly fostered the view among all parties to the conflict – particularly those in RS 
– that the rights of ethnic minorities would inevitably give way to the higher priority of 
stability; the brinkmanship that followed should therefore not have been a surprise.
251
 
Third, it led to the effective imposition at Dayton of a course solution to conflict that 
neither succeeded in removing some of the key perpetrators of hostility or in addressing the 
issues concerning borders. The significance of the Dayton Agreement will be considered in 
greater detail below.  
Taking the Bosnian experience and the view that the international organisations 
actively engaged in the Western Balkans were ‘learning by doing’, then it would have been 
reasonable to expect that the response to crisis in Kosovo would have demonstrated where 
exactly lessons had been learned. Indeed, with almost five years of post-conflict 
intervention experience to draw from, some conscious decisions were taken to rectify past 
mistakes. For example, international interlocutors demonstrated a clearer grasp of the 
political ‘realities’ of the region: there was no longer any doubt as to the culpability of the 
Milosevic regime.
252
 There was a deliberate attempt to institute a division of labour that 
suited the capabilities of the international organisations involved. The Contact Group was 
effective at the diplomatic level; NATO was more attuned to the military demands of the 
conflict; the OSCE through its KVM observer mission provided valuable information on 
events following the October ceasefire of 1998, and in the crucial days before and after 
NATO deployed; and the EU institutions that could not run in 1992 were at least able to 
walk with some purpose by signalling a willingness to take responsibility for 
reconstruction. The EU also attempted to capitalise on its enlargement experience by 
establishing the Stability Pact for South East Europe, mirrored on the ‘successful’ model 
used in CEECs. Once again the articulation of norms regarding minority issues figured 
prominently in their actions:  
We [the EU] have a duty to ensure the return to their homes of the 
hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons… […] This is 
the way to guarantee our fundamental European values: i.e. respect for 
human rights and the rights of minorities...
253
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Though awareness of ethnic minority issues and how to deal with them was more 
established at the outset in Kosovo, the trajectory of engagement and progress on ethnic 
minority issues was not noticeably different from that experienced in Bosnia. By late 
summer 1998, an estimated 460,000 people were displaced either within Kosovo or in its 
immediate vicinity, by the time the conflict ended that figure reached over 850,000.
254
 
Aided by a huge influx of NGO’s and other international actors – who crossed into Kosovo 
the day after NATO deployed – the speed of returns caught many by surprise with an 
estimated 50,000 Kosovars returning per day in what was described as “the fastest and 
largest ever refugee movement in both directions with a very high public profile…”.255  On 
the surface therefore the intervention in Kosovo – despite the debate concerning the 
legitimacy of the intervention itself– was quite successful; however these successes 
masked a number of issues that would serve to complicate the normative basis for 
engaging on ethnic minority issues for the decade that followed. 
With the Contact Group assuming the lead for mediation, there was greater – but by 
no means universal – cohesion among international actors than was evident in Bosnia. Yet, 
the peculiarities of the Kosovo situation, primarily the questions concerning its future 
status, meant that the international response struggled to meet international and domestic 
expectations. As a result of the talks at Rambouillet in January 1999, and the rapid turn of 
events that followed, the UN found itself parachuted in as the lead organisation for post-
conflict recovery under UNSCR 1244. The relatively small UN team tasked with 
establishing the mission under SRSG Sergio de Mello were thus critically exposed, due to 
insufficient planning time, and deficiencies in both material and personnel recourses: it 
was a start from which UNMIK never really recovered and its reputation in the province 
thereafter deteriorated almost continuously.
256
 
While the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe may be interpreted as a positive 
contribution to the development of relations in the region, its intention to encourage the 
countries of the region to address minority issues through bi-lateral arrangements was too 
ambitious even for those states that had achieved independence. For Kosovo, it was 
practically out of the question.
257
 Arguably, in terms of attaining leverage on ethnic issues, 
and as a means to rebuild its credibility in the province, the EU’s decision to assume 
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responsibility for Pillar IV of the UNMIK administration with responsibility for economic 
reconstruction, rehabilitation and the development of Kosovo, would prove much more 
significant. 
For all the relative speed with which NATO seized control of the province, and the 
evident success of the influx of returning displaced Kosovo Albanians, the initial efforts of 
the international organisations to prevent the predicted backlash against Kosovo Serbs 
created the circumstances with which this research is concerned. While it would be 
unrealistic to have expected Kosovo Serbs to stay en mass in the villages and towns they 
shared with Kosovo Albanians, there can be little doubt but that the KLA exploited its 
privileged position vis a vis NATO forces to pursue its own agenda of ethnic cleansing: 
We had hoped to have concluded an agreement [with the KLA] before 
we went in, but that didn’t happen. So we didn’t have rules telling us 
how to deal with the KLA on entry, as we had with our dealings with 
the Serb armed forces... The issue became more and more pressing as 
each day passed... Many of them [KLA] seemed to imagine that they 
were now free to lord it over the populations. Despite our best efforts 
different KFOR brigades took different national lines with the KLA. 
The British wanted the KLA fighters disarmed, which annoyed them no 
end. The Germans and the Dutch, on the other hand, were somewhat 
cosy with them – too cosy in my opinion. These differences in attitude 
mirrored contrasting views of the KLA within NATO: some regarded 
them as not much better than terrorists, whereas others saw them as 
freedom fighters.
258
 
 
KFOR may have attained respect in the province through force, but the unintended 
outcomes of the manner of their entry devalued their credibility with the Serbian 
population that remained.  KFOR’s attempts to redress that imbalance brought forth 
normative and incentivised approaches to encourage minority returns and participation: the 
implications of those initiatives will be considered in greater detail in the case studies. 
3.4 Founding Treaties and Documents: A Minority Rights Vacuum? 
The purpose of the United Nations... promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion... 
259
  
 
Until the 1990s, the key normative principles articulated by international organisations 
since the end of World War II included: commitments to democracy, the rule of law, 
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individual freedom and human rights. Whether representative of disillusionment with past 
enterprises such as the League of Nations, or the post-World War II bi-polar international 
order, minorities and their rights did not receive prominence in the UN Charter, the North 
Atlantic Treaty, or the Treaty of Rome. Similarly, there was little evidence, in the Statute 
of the Council of Europe, of the future role of the CE concerning minorities’ issues. 
However, the Helsinki Final Act of the then newly established CSCE did at least hint at the 
increasing focus on minorities’ questions, albeit couched in the language of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms: 
The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will 
respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality 
before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this 
manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere – Helsinki Final 
Act.
260
 
 
Therefore insofar as a basis for linkage to conditional incentives existed prior to the 1990s, 
it did not include definite principles on minority rights. For the issues analysed in this 
research, the founding treaties, such as they were, exposed vacuums regarding specific 
ethnic minority issues to emerge in post-conflict contexts. Some areas, such as returns, 
were considered easier to address than others, like political representation, degrees of 
autonomy and specific rights concerning language and education. Nonetheless, over time, 
organisations such as the OSCE and CE moved to fill some of these vacuums, which 
enhanced the normative basis and policy options for all actors engaged in the region.  
In considering the basis for norms relevant to this research, two primary sources are 
considered: The General Framework Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (The Dayton 
Agreement) and UNSCR 1244. While the focus was understandably on bringing hostilities 
to a conclusion, both agreements, to varying degrees, sought to establish clear standards 
relating to ethnic minority issues. While the founding treaties discussed above would 
continually serve as reference points, Dayton and UNSCR 1244 are the first yardsticks 
with which we can reasonably consider the extent and quality of compliant behaviour.  
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3.41 Dayton Agreement and UNSCR 1244 (Including the Rambouillet Accords) 
The peace agreement for Bosnia is the most ambitious document of its 
kind in modern history, perhaps in history as a whole.
261
 
 
While it is tempting to ridicule Carl Bildt’s hyperbole, the Dayton Agreement was 
undoubtedly a remarkable document. In contrast to the brevity of the Erdut Agreement’s 
14-point plan,
262
 the Dayton Agreement was at once a peace treaty, a boundary 
commission, a constitution, a template of state building, and insofar as it prescribed new 
norms of governance and official behaviour on a range of issues, it could be (and was) 
construed as an attempt at identity building. Beyond the (by then) standard requirement for 
adherence to “the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act and other 
documents of the OSCE”,263 the agreement established three separate commissions, 
including  a Commission on Refugees and Displaced Persons.
264
  
Annex 7 of the agreement formed the clearest indication of the ‘standards’ expected 
regarding returns and minority participation at both national and entity levels. Article 1 
deals specifically with the “Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons”, Article II seeks 
suitable conditions for returns to take place, while Article III identifies the UNHCR as the 
key oversight agency. In areas concerning property, the annex provided four articles, 
covering: procedures before the commission, use of vacant property, refugees and 
displaced persons, and general rules and regulations. Furthermore, the inclusion of articles 
establishing the commission provided for repatriation, compensation and funding 
assistance, the composition of new integrated state bodies, and an amnesty scheme. In its 
scope, the document demonstrated both a recognition of the scale of the challenge, and a 
willingness on behalf of the international interlocutors to engage creatively and practically 
with the post-conflict issues that remained.
265
 
While the Dayton Agreement was principally overseen by the Contact Group – 
with the EU acting as one of the witnesses to the signatories – the response to Kosovo four 
years later was more multilateral in its composition. Building on the Rambouillet Accords, 
and driven by the G-8, UNSCR 1244 provided a multi-agency framework for the cessation 
of conflict, including the establishment of a post-conflict international administration 
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authority, UNMIK. However, in contrast to the agreements delivered in Croatia and 
Bosnia, UNSCR 1244 was less prescriptive on ethnic issues. In fact the emphasis is almost 
solely on the provision of a secure environment in order to facilitate returns. There is no 
reference to property issues, and in so far as representative structures are addressed, it is 
clear that the emphasis is on the existence of the Kosovo Albanian community within 
FRY, rather than the Serbian minority within Kosovo.
266
 The FRY did agree to the 
principles outlined in the resolution, but the manner of NATO intervention quickly recast 
the situation on the ground, to the extent that the tone of the resolution – its implied focus 
on the Kosovo Albanian ‘minority’ – was almost instantly made redundant. 
It is also clear, both from the conduct of the negotiations at Rambouillet and from 
the tone of the accords and resolution that eventually emerged, that the international actors 
involved in the process were at best divided, at worst utterly perplexed, as to what the 
future status of the province should be. Though UNSCR 1244 emphasised the need to take 
full account of the Rambouillet accords, its language was notably more conservative than 
the document produced in Paris. Both documents “reaffirmed the commitment of all 
Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and the other States 
of the region”. However, whereas Rambouillet calls for “democratic self-government”, 
complete with a constitution, a judicial system and a president,
267
  UNSCR 1244 limits 
itself to a call for “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for 
Kosovo”.268 
3.5 Conclusion: A New Environment for the Application of Membership Conditionality and 
Normative Pressure? 
In considering the contextual basis for military engagement with ethnic minority issues in 
the Western Balkans, the factors outlined above matter in a number of ways: first, the 
institutional uncertainty in the aftermath of the Cold War gave rise to a period of internal 
soul searching that in turn instigated a willingness to experiment on the part of almost all 
international organisations: the Western Balkans was their testing ground. Second, there is 
clear evidence of the willingness of international organisations to reference each other on 
particular issues: the CSCE (OSCE) and CE come to the fore on questions of minority 
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policy for NATO, the EU and the UN. Third, through their attempts to assume leadership 
roles in the early 1990s, both the UN and particularly the EU damaged their credibility not 
only in the eyes of domestic actors in the Western Balkans, but also in those of other 
international organisations. The EU’s ill-fated attempt to link conditional incentives to 
recognition for former Yugoslav republics not only diminished its credibility as an 
international actor, but instigated an internal crisis of confidence that further affected their 
ability to develop and apply effective incentives and normative pressure. Fourth, the 
media’s influence on international agendas was seen to grow significantly throughout the 
1990s, with the advent of 24-hour news channels and, latterly, the growth of the internet. 
In particular, western media outlets focused on the ethnic aspect of the conflict in the 
Western Balkans, in such a way that international organisations were arguably compelled 
to respond to public demands for action (in spite of a lack of preparedness).
269
 In this way, 
too, a normative discourse on ethnic minority issues was sustained throughout the conflict. 
Fifth, each of these factors combined to influence the treaty negotiations, and a reasonable 
argument can be made for stating that the resulting treaties represented an international 
convergence on ethnic minority issues, if not on the broader questions of minority rights, 
and thereby constituted the basis and subsequent reference point for the initial application 
conditionality and normative pressure.
270
 Sixth, and at the other extreme, the Dayton 
process exposed the divisions between international representatives as to how to address 
and then end the conflict, and underlined the importance of the roles played by individuals 
representing their respective organisations and parties. As evidenced in the introduction to 
this section, there was significant divergence on the nature of the conflict in Bosnia, 
especially: Civil war? Systemic ethnic genocide? Inter-state war? This debate led in turn to 
an uncertain response, perhaps best exemplified in the borders drawn up at Dayton, 
whereby military gains achieved through ethnic cleansing were allowed to stand – all of 
which undermined the basis for the post-conflict application of incentives. As Sumantra 
Bose opined: 
The cold, sinister, yet thoroughly compelling logic of ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
provided the essential framework for the General Framework 
Agreement on Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina.
271
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How this impacted on the ability of the military in particular to apply conditionality and 
normative pressure will be considered in greater detail in the next chapter. The dynamics 
of state and nation-building in Bosnia and Kosovo were quite different. Whereas Dayton 
provided a prescriptive framework for Bosnia, in terms of developing institutional 
capacity, legitimacy and national identity, Kosovo was left largely in suspended animation 
until the question of status was addressed. However, based on the observations above, it is 
clear that the external origins of the strategic mechanisms developed for use in the Western 
Balkans were, on the one hand, both driven and sustained by an appetite for 
experimentation and the dominance of the ethnic narrative (sustained by media interest) 
during the conflict; and on the other hand, undermined and compromised by the many 
imperfect realities of conflict resolution with its inherent human and institutional flaws. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Civil-Military Balance: Examining Post-conflict Transition and Domestic 
Influences  
While there are certainly historic precedents for the exercise of such 
broad power […] no international peacekeeping operation has ever been 
vested with as much executive, legislative, and judicial authority as 
some of the international administrations that have been established in 
the past decade.
272
 
 
4.1 Understanding the Application of Strategic Mechanisms in Post-conflict Western 
Balkans: Opportunities and Challenges 
As noted in chapter 2, given the pre-eminence of western institutions and organisations, 
there is an understandable emphasis in literature on various themes of liberal intervention, 
which varies further according to interpretations of imperial motives, whether based on 
democratic, capitalist, or value based projections.
273
 From the external context and treaty 
basis outlined in Chapter 3, and in spite of deficits in organisational capacities, capabilities 
and confidence, international actors converged on the Western Balkans in staggering 
numbers.
274
 This chapter outlines the key domestic factors that influenced the civil-military 
decision-making on ethnic minority issues contextualised by three phases of post-conflict 
interaction: (1) the initial phase of security and reconstruction, overlapping with (2) the 
follow-on phase of state and nation-building which merges with (3) the final phase: 
normalisation and (re)integration into international society. Taking cognisance of the view 
that “progress from conflict to peace is not linear”, it supports the case studies by 
establishing the potential for variation in the application of conditionality and normative 
pressure within and between each phase.
 275
 
The phased approach to understanding post-conflict engagement (see Table 4.1) 
was developed on the basis of a number of recent contributions to scholarship, and is 
proposed for the following reasons:
276
 first, it elucidates the working environment within 
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which military actors operated. Second, building on the research of Florian Bieber et al, it 
accommodates both the security and civil-political dimensions of post-conflict intervention 
to the point where priorities of state-building become intermeshed with those of 
integration. What Bieber describes in the EU’s case as a dual strategy of state-building and 
integration: 
‘…the tension between state building as EU Foreign Policy and EU 
Member state building can obscure the clarity of purpose and legitimacy 
of external state building’.277 
 
The approach therefore accommodates enlargement/integrationist perspectives that grow in 
significance over time. This also allows for an expansion of the typical post-conflict focus 
on stability and security, to incorporate consideration of ‘identity-building’, and more 
specifically the nation-building aspect of intervention. In particular, it has relevance for the 
application of conditionality and normative pressure related to membership of international 
organisations – raising questions regarding the cohesiveness of policy and the viability of 
instruments used to encourage compliance: in this instance focusing on the military role. 
By extension, it should test the validity of research that argues conventional ‘membership 
conditionality’ does not work in post-conflict societies, where peace-building and state-
building have occurred simultaneously.
278
  
Third, following the example of Grabbe, Knaus and Cox, the approach is flexible 
enough to allow for the identification of variables at multiple levels: international and 
domestic contributions; policy design, coherence and delivery. This facilitates an enhanced 
appreciation of the scale and credibility of military activity through post-conflict phases, 
incorporating a flexible approach that improves our understanding of the application of 
conditionality during intervention and state-building.
279
  
Fourth, it allows the researcher to position to a greater extent the specific impact of 
the military vis a vis interim international administrations. Again, this picks up on recent 
scholarship which argues that many of the post-conflict institutions introduced by 
international organisations were incompatible with enlargement agendas exacerbated by a 
lack of clarity on conditions and, in the EU’s case, an over reliance on its CEEC’s 
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experience.
280
 In summation, the combined value of these factors should significantly 
improve our understanding of the effectiveness of military activity in each phase.
281
  
 
 
Table 4.1: Phases of Post-conflict Transition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Phases of Post-Conflict Interaction: Security and Reconstruction 
 
Creating a Safe and Secure Environment 
4.21 The Price of Stability and Security: Military Intervention and the Humanitarian Rush 
As a logical progression from its role in bringing conflicts to an end – and reflecting the 
desire of the US to keep its hand on the tiller of the international response – NATO forces 
assumed responsibility for post-conflict security in Bosnia and later Kosovo.
282
 In the 
uneasy transitional space between conflict and peace, with a premium on the establishment 
of a secure environment, the initial response of NATO forces in both territories was to 
separate opposing forces and, where necessary, provide protection for isolated minority 
communities. Given the nature of the conflict, this also meant separating heavily-armed 
opposing communities, with associated restrictions on freedom of movement, until such 
time as disarmament and demobilisation programmes could be established and 
implemented. Stabilisation was the priority in all cases, leaving a legacy that would impact 
both positively and negatively on the effectiveness of policies for ethnic minorities. 
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These actions, mostly implemented according to the treaty agreements, but also based on 
detailed military planning processes,
283
 had the effect of freezing for undetermined periods 
of time the demographic disposition of the population in a post-conflict territory, including 
those elements of the population displaced by conflict. At best, this created the secure 
political space necessary for orderly returns to commence; at worst, however, it solidified a 
segregated society that would make future attempts to encourage integration more difficult, 
and gave legitimacy to demographic outcomes that left displaced communities of all ethnic 
backgrounds isolated from their social and political support bases without obvious options 
as to their future.
284
  
Outcomes were often compounded in instances where some communities in 
ethnically mixed towns and villages took advantage of the ‘temporary’ absence of the other 
to consolidate their dominance in an area.
285
 For example, in the village of Slovinje in 
Kosovo, where a Kosovo Albanian villager emphasised:  
We wanted to make sure that they [Serbian neighbours] could never 
come back and to remind us of what they had done. We retained the 
destroyed remains of their homes as monuments, to serve as a warning 
to future generations.
286
 
 
There were numerous other examples across the region, whereby displaced families of one 
ethnicity moved into the property owned and vacated by a family of an alternative 
ethnicity. In Croatia for example, such actions were often officially encouraged by 
domestic governments through both formal and informal means.
287
 In part, the actions 
represented an understandable desire for revenge, but equally they were representative of 
flaws in the treaty processes, particularly Dayton, where the polarising effect of the new 
entities greatly curtailed the reach and impact of international civil-military initiatives, 
including incentives.  
While military initiatives were similarly impacted, military actors adapted 
innovative options for tackling certain post-conflict issues, often incorporating linkage to 
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policies for ethnic minority issues.
288
 Once initial stabilisation was achieved, NATO 
sought to involve local populations in their tactical decision-making processes as much as 
possible, in an attempt to win support and impart local ownership of improvements in the 
security situation. The respective mandates developed for Bosnia and Kosovo encouraged 
the international security presence to “establish liaison networks with local civilian and 
military authorities and other international organisations as necessary for the 
accomplishment of its mission”289 Bodies such as the Joint Military Commissions in 
Bosnia were established at multiple levels – from Battalion level up to the Force 
Commander level – and gave IFOR a distinct advantage in terms of developing an 
understanding of the dynamics of their areas of operations, and perhaps more importantly, 
developing relationships with representatives of all communities at multiple levels.  
Similarly in Kosovo, KFOR moved quickly to check the actions of the KLA and its 
leadership – establishing itself as the primary international interlocutor in the interim – 
creating the space for UNMIK deployment.
290
 These interactions also saw the burgeoning 
development of military concepts for CIMIC as a means to achieve ‘mission-orientated’ 
tasks. Consequently, the NATO forces deployed in both territories were almost instantly in 
a position to apply conditionality and normative pressure, even though practical application 
did not emerge until later, becoming more pronounced during the state-building phase 
examined more comprehensively in the case studies. 
Though the UN assumed responsibility for policing in both territories, the purpose 
of the IPTF in Bosnia and the UNMIK-Police in Kosovo was quite different. Whereas the 
IPTF mostly fulfilled a monitoring role, with a limited advisory and training capacity in 
support of domestic police forces in the Bosnian entities, UNMIK-P was established by 
necessity as the primary law enforcement unit in Kosovo, with the further task of 
overseeing the creation and training of the KPS. Reflective of their modest resources, both 
forces provided ‘policing’ advice to NATO personnel tasked with covering the gaps left by 
insufficient international and domestic police personnel. Nonetheless, like NATO, both 
police missions developed territory-wide networks of offices and teams which afforded 
them the possibility of projecting policy at multiple levels. In particular, UNMIK-P’s 
mandate to raise a police force for Kosovo, the KPS – that “will have representatives of the 
different ethnic communities of the municipalities in which it serves” – gave it significant 
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ability to project norms on ethnic minority participation in the post-conflict policing 
structures of Kosovo.
291
 
The policing environment impacted on the application of strategic mechanisms in 
two ways: first, it was a critical component in re-establishing confidence in individual and 
community security, necessary for the progression of ethnic minority issues. Second, 
through the various reforms processes there was a conscious attempt to achieve ethnically-
representative forces so that all ethnicities could have confidence in domestic policing. In 
this way, the ethnic minority dimension of police reform was both an end of itself and a 
facilitator for progression on other ethnic minority issues. 
Unlike the international military and policing presence, which was clearly 
coordinated and controlled by the UN and NATO respectively, the nature of international 
intervention by civilian actors was notable for its diversity and independence. Broadly, the 
civilian effort can be divided between governmental (including international 
administration, policing and civil administration, and unilateral acts by individual states) 
and nongovernmental organisations, many of which had developed a presence in the region 
during the conflict. In considering the engagement of civilian organisations and agencies in 
the immediate aftermath of conflict, a number of characteristics emerge that would 
significantly impact on the delivery of strategic mechanisms. 
First, almost every NGO based in the region operated on an independent basis, with 
the result that the post-conflict space was overrun with a multitude of uncoordinated 
international agendas often with vast divergence on what conditions, if any, should be 
prioritised. This led to the rapid emergence of multiple networks for interaction with local 
populations which, in many cases, were in competition with each other to secure ‘marquee’ 
projects in the reconstruction effort. Second, as seen in Chapters 2 and 3, institutional 
divergence and incohesion were equally evident at the inter-governmental level – shaping 
the political and strategic structures established to oversee the post-conflict effort. 
International administrations were subject to the voices of many masters from the Contact 
Group, the quint, the PIC, the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE and CE, to the unilateral 
pronouncements of individual member states – complemented and compounded by the 
positions of nongovernmental actors. From this convoluted stratosphere of contrasting and 
often contradictory political opinions, international administrators and military actors 
received guidance on every aspect of their operation, including the application of strategic 
                                                 
291
 Ibid., para 64. 
100 
 
mechanisms, thereby impacting the coherence, credibility and effectiveness of policy 
delivery on a range of post-conflict issues. 
4.22 Complex Division of International Organisation’s Labour: Reconstruction and Donor 
Priorities 
In contrast to the relatively clear delineation of international responsibility on security and 
policing issues, the international engagement with humanitarian and reconstruction issues 
was notable for the diversity of agencies involved. While the World Bank and the EU were 
identified at donor conferences as suitable organisations to lead the international 
reconstruction effort, there was ‘profound disagreement on the mechanisms of aid co-
ordination’, as the diverging agendas of multiple organisations made consensus almost 
impossible to achieve.
292
  
The UN played a prominent role throughout the region in humanitarian issues, 
primarily through the UNHCR, WHO and WFP, yet their contribution was in many cases 
dwarfed by that of multiple NGOs and state aid agencies – in Bosnia alone it was estimated 
that the World Bank’s Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Programme, which set aside 
$5 billion for the post-conflict effort, attracted as many as 500 NGOs to the region.
293
 In 
both territories, but particularly in Bosnia, the NGO response was as much characterised 
by the lack of coordination, competition for limited resources,
294
 and the sense that “donors 
and agencies alike went off and did their own thing”,295 as it was by the significant number 
of valuable contributions made towards the restoration of humane conditions for the local 
populations. 
For the application of strategic mechanisms, the networks created mattered in a 
number of ways. Undoubtedly they increased the opportunities for linking ethnic minority 
issues to various post-conflict projects. Equally they fostered confusion as local 
populations were exposed to an often confusing range of policies and conditions, 
occasionally compounded by the failure of some NGOs to deliver fully on their 
commitments, and a general perception of a lack of oversight and accountability. In a 
relatively short time, numerous cases emerged of “local populations playing NGOs off 
against each other”.296 All these elements combined to impact on the credibility of 
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international civil-military engagement, influencing to varying degrees the effectiveness of 
their intervention.
297
 It did not go unrecognised at the time: 
… all must be aware of the importance of the concept of conditionality, 
as underlined at the London conference. […] Increasingly, tax-payers 
and their representatives will be willing to help only when there is a 
corresponding will to help oneself in doing what needs to be done in 
order to secure the peace and solve the problems. The Peace Agreement 
is not an á la carte menu, where you can pick and choose what happens 
to suit you at the moment. The Peace Agreement is a package deal to be 
respected and implemented in all its parts.
298
 
 
Analysis of the World Bank’s Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Programme (PRRP) 
and the four international donor conferences held for Bosnia between 21 December 1995 
and 7 May 1998, also reveals that policy reform and conditionality relating to ethnic issues 
did not emerge as an prioritised element of the international effort (in that forum at least) 
until the third donor conference on 23 July 1997, a year and a half into the post-conflict 
effort. The focus up to that point was on the restoration of energy supply, transport 
networks, fiscal support for emerging state services and structures, and housing 
programmes. Of these areas, only the housing programmes were conscious of the need to 
accommodate standards relating to ethnic minority communities, most involving NATO 
participation in various capacities. The fourth conference, however, in part responding to 
the success of the physical progress of various housing programmes, set a target of $520 
million for the reintegration of refugees and displaced persons.
299
 
That the EU was allocated lead responsibility for reconstruction and economic 
recovery under Pillar IV of UNMIK, was representative of international donors’ desire to 
apply the lessons of Bosnia more quickly and ensure greater coordination of the 
reconstruction effort. It had the secondary effect of placing the EU in a position where it 
could project ‘European norms’ and link conditions to the reconstruction effort in certain 
areas. Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) 2666/2000 on assistance for Albania, Bosnia, 
Croatia, FRY, FYROM is revealing in this regard, as it demonstrated an early willingness 
to project membership norms, explicitly linking community assistance and participation in 
the SAP to: 
(a) reconstruction, aid for the return of refugees and displaced persons, 
and stabilisation of the region; (b) the creation of an institutional and 
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legislative framework to underpin democracy, the rule of law and 
human and minority rights, reconciliation and the consolidation of civil 
society, the independence of the media and the strengthening of legality 
and of measures to combat organised crime.
300
 
 
Though the STM would not materialise in Kosovo for another year, there was a clear view 
among EU staff in Kosovo that the delivery of aid and assistance as part of the 
reconstruction effort should be consistent with respect for the fundamental principles of the 
EU.  
NATO also worked on infrastructural and reconstruction projects during this phase, 
particularly at local levels, where small projects such as the erection of bridges and the 
repairing of roads (though improving their own mobility as a force) benefited the domestic 
population and the various NGOs who were engaged on humanitarian projects. Though 
there was no formal guidance for attaching conditions to the completion of such work, 
there is significant evidence to show that NATO commanders informally linked their 
reconstruction activity to local compliance on certain issues. For example, road repair and 
small-scale property reconstruction projects were often linked to safe and free passage of 
minority persons through majority areas.
301
 This will be explored further in the case 
studies, but the stimulus for their actions can be traced to their decision-making processes. 
4.23 Operational Planning and the Military Decision-Making Process 
NATO military commanders primarily evaluated ethnic minority issues through their 
respective military decision-making processes. At the highest levels (Operational HQ) 
NATO applied operational planning doctrine that facilitated a detailed analysis of the 
civilian population including the ethnic characteristics of the territories. Through a series 
of phases (see Appendix IV) this process concludes with orders to subordinate 
commanders. In receiving orders, military personnel will be given a mission. Within the 
mission statement, there are always clearly defined tasks which the commander must 
complete in order to achieve the mission, but often there are also implied tasks which the 
commander may extract from the mission, as necessary. In peace support or stabilisation 
operations commanders tended to approach ‘mission analysis’ from the perspective of a 
‘manoeuvrist approach’, which allows for the development of ‘non-kinetic’ options that do 
                                                 
300
 “Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000…”, p. L 306/3. 
301
 For example, between the villages of Dobrotin (Kosovo Serbian) and Slovinje (Kosovo Albanian) in 
Kosovo, where NATO assistance with bridges was linked initially to a demand for the cessation of attacks on 
the local Serbian population and later to their safe passage.  
103 
 
not entail the application or threat of force. Concurrently, many commanders of the period 
also adapted logics of ‘effects-based planning’ for the low intensity post-conflict 
operations required in Bosnia and Kosovo. As the case studies demonstrate, military 
commanders, regardless of their background, continuously sought to adapt conventional 
means and concepts for non-conventional circumstances. Compounded by state and issue-
based NGO-led agendas that competed with NATO operational direction, the resultant 
maze of approaches, interpretations and policy fostered a culture of experimentation or 
‘trial and error’. In part, the combination of these factors – professional intuition 
juxtaposed with competing national, organisational and internal pressures – explain why 
many commanders in Bosnia and Kosovo took it upon themselves to engage in ethnic 
minority and other issues unilaterally. 
4.3. State and Nation-building
302
 
In his critique of scholarship on International Administrations, Ralph Wilde argues 
convincingly that “the legitimacy of current, previous and future international territorial 
administration missions needs to be appraised on a normative as well as a technocratic 
basis”, taking into account both the practical and political implications of their function.303 
Even though this research is not intended as an analysis of international administrations 
per se, the consideration of the influence of international administrations on ethnic issues 
does add depth to our understanding of how conditionality and normative pressure were 
delivered by military actors, and why compliance varied.  
Within the first year of intervention, the prioritisation of security and reconstruction 
tasks started to make way for the state and nation-building tasks that provide the backdrop 
to most of the period analysed. As the humanitarian effort subsided, international focus 
shifted towards delivering on the main components of the respective treaty documents 
which, in all cases, included emphasis on building sustainable outcomes in respect of 
minority issues. In theory, this transition should have privileged the application of strategic 
mechanisms as by and large, domestic populations were moving to a point where they 
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were no longer solely preoccupied with hard security concerns, and should have been more 
receptive to incentives and normative pressure on various issues. Furthermore, as political 
and economic activity recovered, opportunities for the application of incentives and the 
promotion of norms should have increased significantly. The consolidation of international 
activity altered the post-conflict environment in a number of ways: parallel ‘international’ 
economies emerged and became a vital stimulus to local economic activity. However,  
domestic wage and social structures were ‘turned on their head’, as local, mostly young 
Anglophones, flocked to international ranks as interpreters and guides; while a ‘second 
tier’ of local employees sought comparatively well-paid work in the canteens and 
accommodation blocks of military and civilian bases.
304
  
The main engines of this engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo were NATO forces, 
and the interim international administrations established to coordinate and oversee the 
transition back to a ‘peaceful functioning society’. In considering this, and the complexity 
of the division of labour outlined above, four features emerged that influenced the delivery 
of policy by civilian and military actors: the approach to state and nation-building, the 
consolidation of networks of international engagement and interaction, the importance of 
strategic oversight of international activity in post-conflict territories, and domestic 
capacity for institutional and behavioural change. 
4.31 The approach of International Administrations to State and Nation Building 
Established in January 1996, under the leadership of Carl Bildt, the OHR faced all the 
challenges typically associated with a post-conflict environment: security and rule of law, 
economic reconstruction and development, political institution building, civil 
administration, tasks associated with refugees and IDPs, as well as attempts to generate 
sufficient capacity to meet these challenges. In the months that followed, a series of offices 
and departments emerged to address the specifics of each of these areas, reporting to the 
leadership of the administration: the Secretariat with responsibility for planning and policy 
decisions based in Brussels, and the Operational HQ in Sarajevo which focused on the 
immediate implementation of the polices agreed at Dayton.
305
  
Though Bildt and his staff would latterly acknowledge the conceptual ambiguity of 
their mandate, they quickly identified a number of areas worthy of focused attention, 
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creating departments for Political Affairs, including economic policy, Human Rights/Rule 
of Law, Media Development, and a Task Force for Reconstruction and Returns, while also 
establishing regional offices in Banja Luka, Mostar, Brčko and Bratunac. Liaison offices 
were also created to facilitate cooperation with the UN, IFOR and humanitarian 
agencies.
306
 This effort coincided with the expansion of the OSCE mission, which worked 
closely with the OHR (and the UNHCR) on the key issues of returns and the property 
rights of all groups, but especially ethnic minorities. 
In Kosovo, while the tenets of the challenge facing international actors were 
broadly the same as those faced in Bosnia, the dynamic of the immediate post-conflict 
situation was different, as international intervention flipped the demographic map of the 
province on its head – the hitherto Kosovo Albanian “minority” became the de facto 
majority under UNMIK administration, with associated consequences: 
While the first wave of Kosovo Serb departures was prompted by 
security concerns rather than by actual threats, a second wave of 
departures resulted from an increasing number of incidents committed 
by Kosovo Albanians against Kosovo Serbs. In particular, high profile 
killings and abductions, as well as looting, arsons and forced 
expropriation of apartments, have prompted departures.
307
 
 
The four pillar structure of UNMIK was a conscious attempt to learn the lessons from 
Bosnia and allow for a more coordinated and effective international intervention.
308
 
Therefore, the SRSG, Sérgio Vieira de Mello,
309
 who was appointed by and directly 
answerable to UNNY, was supported by the UNHCR, which took responsibility for 
humanitarian assistance in Pillar I. The UN also assumed responsibility for the civil 
administration and policing of the province in Pillar II; the OSCE led Pillar III which 
focused on democratisation, elections and institution building; and the EU managed 
reconstruction and economic development in Pillar IV. Finally, though not formally 
represented in the pillar structure, KFOR would secure the environment within which the 
mission would operate. 
Joint Civilian Commissions similar to those developed in Bosnia were created to 
initiate dialogue with the domestic population, leading within six months to the formation 
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of the multi-ethnic Interim Administrative Council and the Kosovo Transition Council 
respectively. In tandem with that process, UNMIK also sought to install its representatives, 
including staff of the OSCE, at municipal government levels to “give guidance on the 
implementation of sectorial policies”.310 
Understandably, given the scale of their respective mandates, it took time for the 
OHR and UNMIK to generate the necessary capacity to function as de facto governments 
for their respective territories, and to engage with effect. Peculiarities of the respective 
treaty agreements also impacted on their function – the application of incentives and norms 
by UNMIK was complicated by the issue of Kosovo’s future status, which produced its 
own compelling and competing logics that appeared to foster an institutionalised reticence 
to address key issues beyond a certain undefined level. For Bosnia, the boundaries of 
entities had a similarly stifling impact on the effectiveness of strategic mechanisms, as 
nationalist elements within the respective entities moved to consolidate their power within 
new boundaries, often at the expense of minority group returns, property rights and 
willingness to participate in emerging political structures. 
Such ambiguity stimulated diminishing returns in terms of local support for interim 
structures. Indeed, the establishment of international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo 
appeared over time to foster a sense of disenfranchisement among domestic populations 
(and nationalist political parties in particular), whereby responsibility for implementing the 
standards set concerning ethnic issues (and other policy areas) was initially, at least, on the 
shoulders of the very international organisations the set the standards in the first place. 
Arguably, this necessary anomaly – given the general absence of governance and 
administrative structures following conflict – diluted the ‘local ownership’ of the 
commitments enshrined in the agreements.  
4.32 Networks of Interaction 
A key defining characteristic of each phase is the emergence of formal and informal 
networks of interaction within which strategic mechanisms were applied. In both cases, the 
dominant network in the immediate post-conflict phase was the military network 
controlled by NATO. However, capitalising on the creation of a secure environment, 
multiple civilian networks quickly emerged, including the OSCE field missions; the 
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international police networks of IPTF, and UNMIK-P; the agencies and offices of the OHR 
and UNMIK, and the agencies of international organisations such as the European Agency 
for Reconstruction; the UNHCR; and an assortment of diverse GOs and NGOs engaging 
the domestic community in everything from the restoration of mosques (Saudi Aid) to the 
creation of cross community women’s networks (Kosovo Women’s Network).311 
The organisation of these civilian networks generally followed similar formats, 
with centralised “field” HQs, usually located in the capitals, supported by regional offices. 
As such, most of these bodies, including NGOs, had a capacity, to some degree at least, to 
interact with domestic actors and each other, at some if not, all levels.  Though the need for 
the coordination of effort was generally accepted and advanced through the offices of the 
OHR and UNMIK in association with NGO councils, in practice it proved extremely 
difficult to achieve, as agendas, personalities and cultures clashed.
312
   
Domestic ‘points of contact’ were common to many, if not most of, these 
organisations, from village leaders, clergy, medical practitioners, local NGOs, or the 
leaders of political parties and key state agencies. However, in most cases international 
actors preferred to establish independent networks at the outset, rather than seeking to 
rationalise engagement with domestic actors through shared interaction with other 
international partners. This desire for independence of action led to the often ridiculous – 
particularly in rural towns and villages – procession of international representatives to and 
from the homes of various local representatives, in many cases to discuss the same issues. 
At times, international actors did converge and cooperate on specific issues, however the 
intensity and repetitiveness of interaction remained,  at best inducing a culture of 
brinkmanship and bemusement among local populations, at worst fostering a legacy of 
frustration and resentment as international promises went unfulfilled. 
Strategies for engaging the domestic population also varied between those who 
were quite prescriptive in their approach, and those who sought more inclusive interaction, 
encouraging opportunities for enhanced local ownership: both prompted associated 
challenges. For example, writing from the perspective of a practitioner, Béatrice Pouligny, 
observed: 
First, we have difficulty taking into account local knowledge and 
resources as major inputs in rebuilding strategies. Second, we generally 
fail in scheduling outside interventions so that they will reinforce local 
processes. Third, the fact that relationships with local civil societies are 
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very asymmetric and characterized by patronage has concrete 
consequences for those rebuilding, and thus support for these processes 
by local people remains an uncertainty.
313
 
 
In instances where international actors sought to coordinate their activities, military CIMIC 
often provided a facilitating platform.
314
 Both territories provided numerous examples of 
cooperation on minority returns and political participation utilising CIMIC structures. 
Broadly, where cooperation on returns existed, it ranged from multi-lateral cooperation to 
bi-lateral interaction, such as that between the Danish Refugee Council and KFOR
315
, to 
independent initiatives such as those followed by USAID, the US military and others. In 
contrast, the numbers of actors involved with tasks associated with progressing the 
political participation and representation of ethnic minorities was often quite small, as 
organisations which formally assumed primary responsibility for democratic reform and 
elections, such as the OSCE and the UN, were better equipped both in terms of personnel 
and resources to address representative structures and electoral issues. Where smaller 
organisations did seek to participate, they tended to be special interest groups or local 
NGOs, such as those that sought to address Roma rights or women’s issues. The 
implications of this will be considered in the case studies. 
As state-building initiatives developed, new frameworks emerged to formalise 
interaction between domestic and international actors. Key benchmarks and priorities on a 
range of issues were agreed, including goals for addressing ethnic minority returns and 
property restitution.
316
 The SAP which was launched by the EU in 1999 refocused 
international attention away from reconstruction and rehabilitation, towards an emphasis 
on the rule of law and institution-building: 
The rule of law is a fundamental value of the European Union. It is 
essential for economic development, the return of refugees, protection 
of human and minority rights and the fight against organised crime and 
corruption. Progress in the justice and home affairs area is crucial.
 317
 
 
It was at that point that membership conditionality, which had hitherto been an implied 
incentive, was formally introduced to the post-conflict context. The engagement also 
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altered the nature of normative pressure, particularly through mechanisms such as CARDS, 
which allowed for institutional twining programmes that significantly increased the 
socialisation of norms in the new institutional structures of post-conflict territories 
throughout the region. For Kosovo, the SAP programme was repackaged as the STM 
through which the EU emphasised the importance of compliance with EU political and 
economic conditionality (basic principles of democracy, rule of law, human and minority 
rights, reforms in market economy).
318
 
The importance of the MAP, SAAs and STM,
319
 when they emerged, was that they 
assumed domestic capacity for international engagement and constituted a formal 
framework that allowed for progression to international integration: benchmarking beyond 
the confines of the treaty agreements. As a result, ethnic minority issues can be said to 
have been exposed to formal and informal networks that exhibit varying degrees of 
cooperation and coordination among international actors. This transition to a structured 
incentivised process should have empowered international civil-military organisations to 
attain greater compliance on ethnic minority issue: the extent to which it did shall be 
considered below. 
4.33 Strategic Oversight of Interim Administrative Structures 
Few scholars have investigated the composition and functioning of the strategic structures 
that oversee the operations of international administrations. The terms of the Dayton 
agreement saw responsibility for the international oversight and assessment of the OHR 
distributed among the membership (55 states and organisations) of the PIC.
320
 Even at its 
executive level, the steering board of the PIC comprised 11 members, including all 
members of the Contact Group, the EU, the European Commission and the OSCE. In 
effect, the political guidance passed to the HR in Bosnia, who was himself double-hatted, 
as representative of both the international community and the EU,
321
 passed through two 
layers of filtration involving the combined input of 66 different states and organisations. 
From the outset, this posed difficulties for the OHR, best exemplified when Carl Bildt 
noted in his first report as HR that: 
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In spite of the commitment at the Peace Implementation Conference in 
London, the governments represented on my Steering Board have not 
yet been able to agree on a funding key for the expenses of the High 
Representative. I have been able to initiate operations thanks only to 
support from the European Union, which was later supplemented by a 
grant from the Government of Japan.
322
 
 
The emergence of such byzantine structures can be attributed to a number of factors, 
including: disagreements between US and European representatives as to the best approach 
for Bosnia, and the associated lack of confidence in both the EU and UN in particular; the 
fact that the international effort in the latter stages of the conflict was channelled through 
the Contact Group; and the desire of the Contact Group and the Quint specifically to 
involve, but not hand over responsibility for, the post-conflict effort to any one 
international organisation.
323
 In addition to the PIC, strategic guidance was supplied 
independently to field missions from the various main HQs of international organisations: 
the Brussels HQs of NATO and the EU, and the Vienna based OSCE, in addition to the 
unilateral actions of their individual member states.  
As noted in Chapter 3, these HQs were themselves subject to a range of influences 
and geo-political factors that shaped that character of the strategic direction delivered to 
field missions. As a result, though in theory the special representatives and their staff were 
to fulfil a coordinating function, in practice it would prove immensely difficult for SRs to 
gather together the strategic demands of various international bodies into a coherent 
operational concept. Illustrative of this pressure, HR Carl Bildt felt it necessary to write a 
“note of caution” to the foreign ministers of the countries of the PIC Steering Board and 
the EU, addressing their desire for progress on returns, and suggesting that forcing the pace 
of the returns process “risks – simply speaking – to be highly destabilising in a situation 
which from the beginning is far from stable”.324 
In contrast, a generally cohesive international approach is much more evident in 
Kosovo, where the UN was identified as the framework organisation for the coordination 
of the post-conflict effort. The EU, NATO and the OSCE’s roles in the international effort 
were more clearly outlined, and there appeared to be a renewed willingness to trust 
international organisations to provide strategic function and leadership. Therefore, while 
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the Contact Group, which played the lead role at the Rambouillet talks, retained the right to 
intervene, the UNMIK mission did not have to answer to a PIC type body but rather to the 
more traditional points of contact such as the UNSG, and for KFOR, the NAC.
325
 The 
UNMIK structure thus represented an attempt to streamline the strategic and operational 
levels of post-conflict engagement. However, despite this willingness to adapt, other 
difficulties emerged, including the debilitating inability of the international stakeholders to 
progress the question of the future status of Kosovo, which resulted in the degenerative 
outcome of successive UNSRs struggling to maintain the cohesion of the mission, in the 
face of growing Kosovo Albanian frustration and anger. 
Accepting that disagreements existed between members of the PIC, Contact Group 
and UN Security Council on minority rights, often compounded by the willingness of 
various states and organisations to ‘go it alone’ on certain issues, then the potential for 
policy confusion and inertia was evident from the outset. However, the initial emphasis on 
hard security tasks, returns and the creation of democratic electoral process all met with 
some success. Over time, and particularly in Bosnia, the combined effect of some 55 (PIC) 
states and organisations all positing their views on the post-conflict response fostered 
confusion among the international military and civilian staffs, and stoked resentment on 
the part of domestic populations, who increasingly questioned the credibility of the 
international presence in their midst.  
4.34 The Emergence and Evolution of Domestic Institutions 
As state-building processes gathered pace, domestic capacity to respond to pressures for 
institutional and behavioral transformation gradually developed. Interviews in both 
territories revealed trends that help to explain why policy adoption and implementation 
varied across a number of issues, not just those affecting minorities. At the individual 
level, it was acknowledged that while the general educational base of both populations was 
quite good, there were serious deficits in institutional competence and experience that had 
to be addressed by the international organisations involved. The link between individual 
capacities and the applications of new ‘international’ rules is apparent, in that several 
interviewees noted that even where domestic staff in new state institutions had experience, 
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they were often asked to “apply totally new procedures in a totally new culture”.326 A 
KFOR officer who worked closely with the Lipljan municipality observed: 
They were used to doing business in the Yugoslav way, the communist 
way. What the UN, OSCE and we were asking them to do was a real 
culture shock. Also for many of the Albanians it was their first 
experience in a formal government structure so there was a lot of 
bedding-in required…327 
 
While clear rules and information on accountability and good governance were imparted 
by international actors during the state and nation-building phase, disparities emerged 
across the process: from the straight forward refusal of minorities to participate in new 
representative structures, to the inconsistent development of professional aptitudes 
appropriate to the new structures of government. The quality of elite-level engagement in 
new institutions was similarly diverse (as shall be highlighted in the case studies), 
compounded by the demands of domestic politics. 
4.35 Summary 
It is evident that the OHR, UNMIK and the civil-military framework that supported them 
developed significant capacity to address the state and nation-building tasks outlined in 
their mandates. Both had executive power, significant resources for aiding the post-conflict 
effort, and extensive territory-wide networks of staff interacting with military personnel, 
NGOs and other domestic actors at multiple levels – allowing intensive socialisation. It is 
therefore clear that formal and informal networks of interaction mattered as they shaped 
the context, and in many cases defined the credibility of action on ethnic minority issues. 
As interactions transitioned, opportunities emerged for international administrations to 
connect policy frameworks to more ambitious processes, such as the STM, SAP, MAPs. 
Despite the complexity of international strategic oversight, new opportunities for the 
application of conditionality and normative pressure were conceived and presented in a 
variety of formats.
328
 In time, these allowed for more streamlined approaches to 
conditionality and normative socialisation to develop.  
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4.4 International (Re)integration: Peacebuilding and Striving for Sustainable Outcomes 
As demonstrated above, it would be over a year before there was a clear shift in emphasis 
away from stabilisation and reconstruction towards state and nation-building initiatives 
aimed at restoring power, function and identity to the peoples of Bosnia and Kosovo. 
While the linear progress of that transition was relatively apparent, the subsequent 
transition beyond state and nation-building was less so. The continued presence of 
international administrations are representative of the reality that the territories are not 
deemed ready to engage in international relations on their own terms. To some extent, too, 
it reflects that fact that ethnic issues remain to be addressed. Therefore, peacebuilding in 
this context can be considered as an elastic zone between post-conflict intervention 
associated with state and nation-building on the one hand, and ‘normal’ international 
relations primarily associated with membership of the EU and NATO, on the other. As 
such, it is apparent that the integration of post-conflict territories into international 
structures coexists with the continuation of state and nation-building, and if it follows its 
intended course, should eventually be overtaken by it.  
For compliance on policy for ethnic issues, a number of difficulties arise at this 
point: overtime the rhetoric on ethnic minority rights and issues often softens, and can be 
drowned out by the emerging economic and political priorities of external and domestic 
actors alike. Capacities of international organisations, particularly the military, are seen to 
reduce during this phase, due either to substantiated security progress or alternative 
security priorities, i.e. requirement for personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Alternatively, 
Kosovo and Bosnia can be viewed as a unique circumstance, when post-conflict techniques 
can be married with those of integrationist processes. The presence of international civilian 
and military actors need not hinder the progress of membership conditionality and 
associated normative pressure. However, by the end of the period analysed, neither Bosnia 
nor Kosovo can be said to have fully transitioned beyond state and nation-building, or 
meaningfully progressed towards membership of the EU or NATO. 
4.5 Relevant Features of Post-conflict Transition 
In addition to the phases outlined, other features of the post-conflict effort persisted to 
influence the purchase of civil-military engagement with ethnic minority issues, including: 
the relationship between returns and property rights, the purchase of conditional incentives, 
and the balance between incentives and coercion. 
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4.51 Returns and Property Rights 
In keeping with the general interventionist experience of ‘learning by doing’, it is evident 
that international organisations ‘felt their way’ when it came to addressing the property 
concerns of ethnic minority groups. In both cases, the housing stock was greatly reduced in 
the aftermath of conflict. In Kosovo, “up to half of the entire housing stock was damaged 
or destroyed; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 60% of the housing was destroyed…”329, thereby 
creating the demand for a number of related activities that often entailed significant 
military involvement: emergency support for refugee camps, the provision of temporary 
housing, the conduct of surveys of post-conflict housing stocks, and the subsequent moves 
to return those displaced to either their original place of residence, or to sustainable 
alternatives once constructed.  
As the case studies shall demonstrate, the treaty basis for engagement with minority 
property issues was quite strong. However, as the general post-conflict effort transitioned 
to address tasks associated with state and nation-building, numerous and often complex 
difficulties arose, from: the official status of minority groups in new states, the status of 
their properties, their access to a functioning legal process, their ability to return to their 
homes safely, and where they did not wish to return their ability to dispose of their assets 
in a normal commercial fashion.  
4.52 The Evolution of Civil-military Interaction: The Space for Military Contributions  
As noted above, policy on minority issues is wholly developed in a civilian context. 
However, in a post-conflict context that necessitates military intervention over a prolonged 
period, the task of delivering and overseeing policy implementation is shared – formally 
and informally – between civilian and military actors. In the earliest phases, military actors 
can have significant impact – intended and unintended – on minority rights issues. 
Recognition of the evolution and complexity of that dynamic has been slow to emerge. 
It is clear from the initial HR reports in Bosnia, that the roles of the OHR and IFOR 
were formally separated at the start. The HR did not have the authority to task IFOR, but 
rather to work with them and to coordinate activities where possible.
330
 The HR’s prime 
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responsibility was to oversee “civilian implementation activities”.331 In his first report, Carl 
Bildt explained the logic guiding his approach:  
My efforts to coordinate the different aspects of civilian implementation 
take place at two levels. One is concerned with the planning and policy 
decision making process and is carried out by the Secretariat in 
Brussels. The other is concerned with the immediate implementation of 
agreed policies, and is carried out by the Headquarters in Sarajevo.
332
 
A number of points are worth highlighting on this approach. First, the normative approach 
for the operation of the OHR was coming predominantly from the ‘policy planners’ in 
Brussels – he goes on to mention the specific focus on human rights monitoring. Second, 
accepting that Bildt foresaw the expansion of the OHR’s offices to sub-state levels 
(particularly Banja Luka), the OHR positioned itself primarily to work at the elite/political 
level, relying on the success of soon-to-be established commissions and task forces to 
‘implement’ policy through emerging state institutions. Inadvertently, it propelled NATO, 
and to a lesser extent, the OSCE to the forefront of local engagement on a variety of 
‘civilian’ issues.  
The desire for separate civilian and military ‘chains of command’ can be explained 
and accounted for in other ways. At a practical level, sovereign control of the application 
of military assets will always be retained by the TCC. While degrees of operational control 
vary, NATO’s preference was to maintain the integrity of its command structure back to 
SHAPE, and for political oversight to NATO HQ. This contrasts with the UN, where the 
SRSG can, depending on the mission, have a more independent say on the application of 
military assets. That separation did not prevent exchanges of ideas and assistance. In both 
cases, the practical capabilities of the military, along with their willingness to adapt to 
civilian strategies, emerge. From military participation on interim commissions and 
elections boards to the conduct of infrastructural surveys and localised census, the civilian 
apparatus of international organisations relied on military cooperation and support. Over 
time this effort, and recognition of gaps and deficiencies therein, came to be captured 
through concepts developed for civilian-military interaction such as CIMIC and SSR.  
Such ideas gained increasing purchase within civilian-military spheres, gradually 
producing a range of formal and informal incentivised approaches to encourage domestic 
acceptance and implementation of policy. The evolution of that endeavour was not without 
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its flaws: one CIMIC officer involved in SSR planning in Bosnia acknowledged that the 
“consolidation of ideas [on civilian-military interaction with domestic actors] came too late 
for Bosnia: had we appreciated that importance of local ownership [and all that means] at 
the start, we may have acted differently and possibly achieved better outcomes…”333 In 
considering this perspective, it is interesting to note that in an analysis of HR reports from 
Bosnia, the first reference to local ownership – related to minority returns issues – arises in 
2000.
 334
  
The extent to which the coercive options available to civilian and military actors 
impacted on each other is not investigated in this research, though instances did occur 
when the application of coercive measures impacted on concurrent application of 
incentives elsewhere. The requirement for coercive as well as incentivised means was 
identified early in Bosnia. In summarising the still severe human rights situation in Bosnia 
from 1996-1997, Carl Bildt acknowledged that the normative only approach that had been 
applied by the OHR up to that point needed to be reinforced with alternative options: 
Failure to implement the human rights provisions of the Peace 
Agreement should also be addressed by introducing new techniques to 
sanction non-compliance and by strengthening existing mechanisms. 
[…] persons who engage in substantial acts of non-compliance or 
human rights violations be denied visas allowing them to travel abroad. 
[…] Other strategies are being developed, including a more co-
ordinated system for joint demarches to interested Governments and 
intergovernmental institutions, and methods to ensure effective and 
thorough incorporation of human rights considerations into decision-
making relating to economic assistance and reconstruction. 
335
 
 
OHR staff suggested that they tried to balance coercive and incentivised approaches by 
aiming coercive measures at individuals, while applying positive incentives more 
broadly.
336
 Maintaining that balance proved difficult, undermined by approaches that were 
often experimental, ad hoc and inconsistent.
337
  
If coercive actions by the civilian staff of the OHR and UNMIK was not 
uncommon, the military application of coercive measures (primarily delivered in the 
context of the security aspects of their respective mandates based on the use of force) 
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decreased significantly by the end of the stabilisation and reconstruction phase, crucially at 
a time when ideas of CIMIC activity were taking hold among military commanders. 
4.6 Summary 
In taking a phased approach to the analysis of post-conflict intervention, it has been shown 
that opportunities for the application of strategic mechanisms were presented at multiple 
levels in both territories. Variations in the application of conditionality and normative 
pressure are observable throughout this process, as the emphasis on the ethnic minority 
dimension of the post-conflict effort shifted from phase to phase.   
The initial application of strategic mechanisms during stabilisation and 
reconstruction was driven by the requirements of the treaty agreements and largely 
dependent on the ability of intervening military forces to establish a safe and secure 
environment in the areas of operation. This had the dual effect of creating space for 
intervention and freezing the disposition of ethnic minority communities which, in some 
instances, compounded difficulties experienced in the subsequent returns process. The 
intervention by civilian actors had similarly positive and negative connotations, resulting in 
a highly complex and disconnected division of labour, with associated implication for the 
coherence, and credibility of the strategic mechanisms applied for ethnic minority issues at 
multiple levels. New types of incentives related to ethnic minority issues evolved, with 
many of the ideas that would become central to NATO’s understanding of CIMIC 
emerging in the early stages of intervention, including encouraging compliance on issues 
related to returns and participation at local levels. The potential for the diversification of 
application of incentives by military forces is also evident, for example the initiation of 
police and military reforms incorporating linkage to compliance on ethnic issues and ethnic 
minority participation.  
Opportunities increase with the transition to state and nation-building, where the 
emphasis of operation shifts from military to civilian means. The capacity of international 
organisation to project policy on ethnic minority issues is greatly enhanced during this 
phase, where international administrations emerge as the fulcrum of extended networks of 
engagement. Programmes tailored for the requirements of the respective territories were 
introduced, structures of interaction established, and bodies such as interim commissions 
and committees to engage with developing domestic structures emerged. In spite of the 
incoherence of the strategic oversight of their operation, international administrations 
quickly established a wide variety of instruments for both projecting policy on ethnic 
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minority issues and for confirming compliance – over time these policies often became 
formalised in integrationist programmes associated with membership of international 
organisations, such as the IPAP for NATO and STM for the EU.  
Equally, their influence as a socialising presence in post-conflict territories grows 
during this phase and is intensified with the introduction of twining schemes at national 
and municipal levels in the transition to pre-accession aspects of peacebuilding. Over time, 
therefore, we can say that the nature of engagement evolved from an ad hoc interaction, 
typified by an atmosphere of learning by doing, to more formalised and coherent policies 
delivered through various programmes affecting institutional reform and often linked to the 
early stages of an enlargement process through the Standards for Kosovo or STM in 
Kosovo, or the PfP and IPAP in Bosnia. 
Opportunities are observed to diversify and contract as international organisations’ 
ability to influence policy in post-conflict environments in general is subject to diminishing 
returns with co-relating impact on the credibility of its actions. Though membership is 
implied from the outset, and was formalised as a prospect for both territories in the region 
by 2003, it does not appear to necessarily transfer to ethnic minority issues, as they tended 
to lose prominence amidst alternative priorities associated with economic and political 
development. This will be explored in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 7. In summary, this 
chapter reveals that the post-conflict environments of Bosnia and Kosovo presented 
opportunities and challenges in equal measure to civil-military actors. In spite of an official 
desire to keep the international military presence separate from civilian administration, 
military actors found themselves integrated into emerging frameworks, by design and 
accident, the implications of which will be fully considered in the cases studies below. 
Finally, in considering the factors for transition outlined, it is also clear that neither Bosnia 
nor Kosovo have transitioned meaningfully beyond the state and nation-building phase. 
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Case Study 1 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 1995-2005 
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Chapter 5 
 
Military Engagement with Ethnic Minority Issues in Bosnia Herzegovina 1995-2005: 
Framework and Context 
 
5.1 Introduction 
When NATO forces first entered Bosnia on 20 December 1995, under the code-name of 
“Operation Joint Endeavour”, the UNHCR estimated that the numbers of displaced persons 
arising from the conflict was approximately 2.7 million: 1.2 million of whom were 
internally displaced.
338
 Two distinct categories of “returnees” were identifiable within this 
group: the larger group for whom returning to their place of origin was politically 
uncontentious – as they were returning to areas where they were the predominant ethnicity 
– and the smaller group who were not the predominant ethnicity at place of origin; 
categorised as “ethnic minority returnees”. Within a year of the signing of Dayton, 
significant progress was made in respect of the former group. By 2015, several issues 
relating to the latter group remained unresolved. This chapter focuses on key sources of 
influence that shaped the military engagement with ethnic minority issues examined in 
Chapter 6: the position of the military within the international structures created by 
Dayton, the influence of civil-military balance on military behaviour, and the impact of the 
evolution of domestic politics. 
5. 2 The Dayton Framework: Policy on Ethnic Minority Issues 
Dayton makes very few references to minority rights. Annex 4 of Dayton, which sets out 
the constitutional parameters of the settlement, contains one of the few direct references to 
minority rights in the preamble: 
Inspired by… the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, as well as other 
human rights instruments.
339
 
 
This statement is supported by Annex I. 15, which specifically identifies the 1994 
Framework convention for the protection of national minorities as an “agreement to be 
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applied in BiH”.340 Rather, the agreement prioritises the needs of returnees and displaced 
persons, their security and fundamental human rights, some of which correlate with 
minority rights issues. In this regard, it is reflective of the views held by the main 
facilitators of the agreement, most notably the EU, which itself had no common position 
regarding minority rights policy. However, though the document seemed to avoid direct 
references to minority rights, it did not avoid minority rights issues, with Annexes 6 and 7 
in particular addressing key areas of concern.  
Annex 7, which focused on agreement on refugees and displaced persons 
established the conditional framework for returns through a series of “confidence building 
measures” requiring the parties’ compliance. These included measures to address: 
discriminatory legislation, the prevention of incitement and ethnically motivated hate 
speech through the media, warnings against acts of suppression or reprisal, the protection 
of ethnic minority populations “wherever they are found”, and the prosecution of persons 
in state bodies for offences against ethnic minority groups.
341
 The basis for engagement 
with minority property issues was quite strong: 
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their 
homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them 
property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 
1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to 
them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important 
objective of the settlement of the conflict...
342
 
 
While the conditions were established and accepted by the signatories of the agreement, 
they were not initially linked to either incentivised or coercive measures, though it was 
assumed that such measures would emerge as a part of the process.
343
  
In considering this, and looking at the political framework agreed in the 
‘Constitution’, it is clear that insofar as minority issues were considered, it was 
predominantly in the context of a workable division of power between the constituent 
groups, as opposed to the lower level minority issues that were apparent in both entities. 
As such, while Dayton established a framework for addressing certain ethnic minority 
issues, it did not meaningfully address questions on the position and rights of ethnic 
minorities within the entities of RS and the Bosnian Federation. This was further 
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compounded by the decision to freeze the ethnic disposition of the country while post-
conflict order was established. 
In Annex 10, the Agreement on Civilian Implementation was intended to clarify the 
lines of responsibility for “implementing the civilian aspects of the peace settlement”.344 It 
is apparent that the framework established did not appear to envisage the application of 
incentives. Under the title of “Mandate and Methods of Coordination and Liaison”, the HR 
is tasked, among other things, to: ‘Monitor the implementation of the peace settlement; 
Maintain close contact with the Parties to promote their full compliance with all civilian 
aspects of the peace settlement and a high level of cooperation between them and the 
organizations and agencies participating in those aspects; Coordinate the activities of the 
civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the efficient 
implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement…; Participate in meetings of 
donor organizations, particularly on issues of rehabilitation and reconstruction;… and 
Provide guidance to, and receive reports from, the Commissioner of the IPTF established 
in Annex 11 to the General Framework Agreement.”345 The political dynamic to emerge 
from this framework served to confuse issues concerning minorities, as the rights and 
needs of minorities attempting to return and gain a voice in the new institutions were often 
lost amidst the larger inter-ethnic debates on power-sharing. The potential for this dynamic 
to emerge was not unforeseen at the time, but the feeling of OHR staff in particular was 
that the “power sharing aspect of the settlement had to come first. It was the pivot for the 
whole process.”346 
Throughout the period analysed, the Dayton agreement served as the lynchpin for 
engagement with ethnic minority issues. Indeed it is not until 2003, that compliance on 
ethnic minority issues starts to be linked more generally to incentives emerging from 
NATO and EU enlargement programmes. Though the language of minority rights was not 
to the fore in Dayton, sufficient norms were established for effective engagement with 
ethnic minority issues. It is clear too that the weight of responsibility for compliance on all 
aspects of the agreement rested with the domestic institutions at state and entity levels, 
with clear and definite policy direction. However, if this framework could be considered as 
forming the normative hub for ‘civilian’ interaction on a wide range of issues, the 
conditional aspect of that interaction existed largely in the direct ‘one-to-one’ engagement 
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between representatives of international organisations (particularly OHR, NATO and the 
EU) and domestic interlocutors. For this reason, the types of conditionality that would later 
emerge in Bosnia were significantly influenced by the international organisational division 
of labour of the initial post-conflict administration.  Two commissions were central to that 
dynamic: the Joint Civilian Commission headed by the HR for Bosnia, and the Joint 
Military commission headed by COMIFOR.  
5.21 The Evolution of International Administration 1995-2005 
Dayton sought to establish order and the basis for sustainable institutional reform through 
the creation of a series of commissions which afforded direct and frequent engagement 
with domestic political actors. These included the quasi-executive Joint Interim 
Commission, the Joint Military Commission, the Commission on Human Rights, and the 
Commission for Displaced Persons & Refugees. In this way, Dayton provided a broad-
based institutional architecture for interaction on ethnic minority issues at multiple levels, 
incorporating input from several international organisations, most notably ICRC, UNDP, 
the fledgling UNHCHR, OSCE and IFOR. Though the contribution of NATO is not 
specifically identified in either Annex 6 or 7, it was tasked to support the UNHCR in 
aiding returns, and maintained a formal presence in all of the commissions.
347
 
The evolutionary character of this structure was evident from the HR’s 1st Report to 
the UN Secretary General. Supported by the EU, OSCE and CE in particular, Carl Bildt 
prioritised the development of human rights instruments. Interviewees have suggested that 
this was a way to deal with minority rights issues without engaging in a minority rights 
programme per se: “there was an idea that human rights were less contentious or politically 
charged than minority rights”.348 New structures emerged rapidly during this time with the 
creation of a Human Rights Chamber, Ombudsman, and a Human Rights Coordination 
Centre with links to the ICTY. The emergence of new ideas was also a feature of the 
period. For example, the UNHCR assumed a three-phased approach to addressing the 
returns issue: 
First, the movement of refugees to their own home areas where they 
constitute the majority today … Secondly, the repatriation of refugees 
who do not wish to return to their former home areas, where they would 
now be in a minority, and who wish to relocate to new areas within the 
Entity in which they would constitute the majority. The third category, 
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and the most difficult, is the repatriation of refugees wishing to return to 
their areas of origin where their ethnic group now constitute a 
minority.
349
 
 
In aiding this effort, many of IFORs key tasks were prioritised by the OHR. The task of 
securing freedom of movement – jointly allocated to IFOR and the IPTF – was linked to 
the UNHCR’s role on returns. In his first report, HR Bildt continually emphasised the link 
between successful returns and the efforts to establish and maintain of a “safe and secure 
environment” and “freedom of movement”.350 Specifically on cooperation with IFOR, HR 
Bildt highlighted the presence of IFOR personnel in nearly all of his commissions, and the 
fact that he saw IFOR’s Multinational Divisional Headquarters as being key facilitators for 
establishing Joint Civilian Commissions at regional levels – recognising the physical 
capacity of IFOR to progress such developments in the absence of other options.
351
 From 
the outset, therefore, military units were consciously placed at the forefront of engagement 
with rights-based issues in post-conflict Bosnia. 
5.22 IFOR to the Fore 
When considering the military role on ethnic minority issues that was to emerge, the initial 
‘roll out’ of international administration was highly significant. Within 30 days of its 
deployment, IFOR had established a presence throughout the country and had completed 
its initial task of separating “war fighting factions”.352 During this period, IFOR rapidly 
established an extensive network of international and domestic contacts at local/municipal 
levels. This was achieved through the tasking of junior commanders to establish 
“communications with local leaders and international agencies in the AOR”.353 As a result, 
IFOR personnel were immediately engaged on a range of security, humanitarian and 
related post-conflict issues. IFOR press briefings from the period reveal both the diverse 
range of issues that were brought to IFOR staff for consideration, and clear frustration at 
the lack of information on the activities and contribution of the OHR: 
I checked around, tried to find out who’s responsible to try to set them 
straight on the facts, and the best I could hear from the diplomatic 
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community here is that it’s Mr. Bildt, and that’s why I'm curious why 
Mr. Bildt doesn’t seem to be present?354 
 
For most of 1996, and aside from the international NGOs and UNHCR, IFOR was the only 
other representative of the international effort which had daily contact with the domestic 
population at municipal level. Understandably, the OHR was developing its own 
operational capacity during this period and was primarily focused on progressing the 
implementation of the agreement through the Joint Interim Commission and contact with 
entity leadership. This division of labour between the OHR and IFOR was further 
underlined through the respective roles of the Joint Interim Commission and the Joint 
Military Commission. Though the former lacked regional and municipal reach, the latter, 
perhaps unintentionally, achieved a degree of “local penetration” that afforded the HR – a 
constituent member of the military commission – direct and insightful information of 
realities in various localities. 
The ‘minority’ element within the broader returns questions became 
abundantly clear during that time. We were in no doubt about the 
complexity of the challenge facing us.
355
  
 
However, even after the commission network was established, many of the key instruments 
intended to facilitate the implementation of policy were yet to reach “operational 
capacity”. For questions concerning returns, and particularly the property-related aspects of 
same, the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees was 
only reaching a capacity to receive the expected “hundreds of thousands” of claims by the 
end of 1996.
356
 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to argue that the responsibility for 
overseeing and securing the initial conditions for returns disproportionately fell on IFOR in 
the first year as they (along with the UNHCR) were to the forefront of managing day-to-
day issues concerning returnees, while the necessary civilian structures to facilitate returns 
and minority participation were developed. IFOR personnel interviewed for this research 
noted that for many minority groups IFOR was their “first port of call”. Over time, this 
interaction afforded NATO personnel a degree of “corporate knowledge” of the issue that 
would become useful when it came to delivering CIMIC projects, or assisting other 
organisations in the delivery of their policies for minority returns.
357
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5.23 The Role of the OHR: between Conditionality and Coercion 
Within a year of the cessation of conflict, the ethnic pattern of returns crystallised, 
highlighting the need for a fresh approach on the part of an OHR that struggled to ascertain 
the scale of the minority component of returns within the mass movements that followed 
the end of the war. Eight months into the post-conflict effort, the HR summarised progress 
on returns as “unfortunately, disproportionately small…”, while also noting that returns 
were “being obstructed by political blockages as well as acute lack of housing space… 
[and] returns, so far, have been nearly exclusively limited to areas of own ethnic 
dominance.  In numbers, it has even been offset by further post-war movements of 
continued ethnic separation.”358 One OHR official conceded that the political atmosphere 
at the time was “quite poisonous: it was clear the spirit of the agreement was not being 
upheld”.359 OHR staff had particular concerns regarding the acute difficulties caused by 
existing property laws, which entity governments were trying to exploit for political 
advantage. Indeed, throughout 1996, the HR repeated calls for “parties to remove political 
obstacles, cooperate in housing rehabilitation as a step to larger-scale reconstruction, as 
well as in making refugees welcome on the territory under their control.” Supporting this, 
he also sought, “as a priority”, to progress the registration of property ownership claims. 360 
Responding to the direction of the PIC,
361
 the OHR established the RRTF in February 1997 
to address the implementation of property legislation, spontaneous returns, the 
sustainability of returns, and a regional approach to returns.  
Two aspects of the RRTF’s operation were noticeable from its inception. First, it 
was a concerted attempt to take a multi-organisational approach to addressing returns and 
associated issues by integrating the actions of the UNHCR, the European Commission 
(including the European Community Humanitarian Office), the World Bank, the 
International Management Group, the Real Property Claims Commission for Refugees and 
Displaced Persons, and the Economic Task Force. Second, it enunciated as policy, an 
intention to use conditionality to further their objectives in respect of returns. Under the 
heading of ‘Positive conditionality’ the first report of the Task Force stated: 
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In the returns context, the allocation of resources for returnee-related 
economic reconstruction projects should be linked to receptivity to 
minority returns. […] The process of applying conditionality will be an 
iterative one, leaving room to re-allocate resources to encourage 
compliance with the Peace Agreement. Guidelines with criteria for 
acceptable behaviour with regard to human rights, democracy, rule of 
law, the respect for and protection of minorities need to be set and their 
implementation needs to be closely monitored. Input from local and 
regional actors is of paramount importance.
362
 
 
In this way, and in a relatively short period of time, the OHR was at least capable of 
applying conditionality on ethnic issues at political and administrative levels within 
Bosnia. However, even within the first year of this effort, it was clear that the symbiosis 
between the political aspects of Dayton – the arenas of domestic politics at the federal and 
the respective entity levels – and the administrative function as developed and coordinated 
by the OHR, would prove extremely difficult to achieve. Additionally by late 1997, 
shortfalls in the coordination of engagement on returns by international organisations were 
identified as inhibiting the effective delivery of the peace agreement. In noting the 
divergent figures on majority and minority returns, the Office of the UNHCR stated: 
The co-ordinated action of the international community - with the OHR, 
SFOR, the IPTF and the UNHCR working together in the same 
direction - was imperative in order to apply political pressure and 
achieve lasting returns.
363
 
 
Separately, Human Rights Watch was critical of the reluctance of the HR to apply coercive 
means to achieve compliance: “despite the substantial political and economic leverage at 
Bildt’s disposal, he downplayed his authority throughout the year and generally refused to 
use his power to force substantive improvements in the parties’ compliance with the peace 
agreement”.364 
Responding to this lack of progress, the PIC agreed to expand the powers available 
to the OHR. In what came to be known as the Bonn Powers, the OHR was granted the 
authority to adopt binding positions when local agreement was not forthcoming, and 
remove from office officials who violated legal commitments or other terms of the Dayton 
Agreement. On issues related to returns and participation, successive HRs applied these 
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powers to deliver 98 decisions between 1998 and 2005.
365
 Of these, 80 decisions related to 
property, planning or state property issues that impacted on the returns process. While the 
impact of these actions was predominantly felt at the state and entity legislative levels, in 
many cases the adoption of these decisions created the space for progress at lower levels. 
While on the one hand the institution of the Bonn powers can be seen as 
representative of the failure of conditional incentives to induce the desired change, on the 
other hand it should also be acknowledged that, given the extreme difficulties involved in 
operating in a post-conflict environment, coercive measures were always likely to emerge 
as part of the international response. Therefore, from 1998 to 2005, the options of 
conditional incentives existed side by side with the coercive Bonn powers. 
Concurrent with this development, the OHR and others attempted to formalise 
approaches to the delivery of policy on returns through the application of conditionality: 
My Office is actively engaged in establishing a mechanism that will 
allow the limited international funds to be used in a way that will relate 
the notion of conditionality […] to practise on the ground.366 
 
One example of this was the OHR’s support for the UNHCR’s “Open cities” plan, which 
produced compliant outcomes and served to embolden a view among OHR staff that more 
formalised conditional approaches were necessary to progress returns issues.
367
  
It is essential that limited international reconstruction funds be put to 
their optimum use. This also involves conditioning assistance to 
necessary political changes, and rewarding municipalities that support 
the peace process and withdrawing funds from non-compliant 
municipalities.
368
 
 
However, such initiatives were not universally successful. By mid-1998, frustration with 
the pace of returns was clearly evident in OHR reports. In assessing the impact of the 
Sarajevo Declaration – a major initiative supported by the EU and agreed to by all 
parties
369
 –the HR conceded that implementation had been poor highlighting the lack of 
cooperation by local authorities (described as adopting “a burdensome and opaque 
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approach instead of dealing with individual cases one by one”) and the necessary 
suspension of financial assistance as a consequence of non-compliance.
370
 
Such actions undoubtedly underlined and reinforced the credibility of the incentives 
on offer, and the willingness of the OHR supported by the various donors to withdraw the 
incentives on offer where compliance was lacking. However, it is equally apparent that the 
incentives offered were insufficient in the eyes of the domestic actors to induce 
compliance. In explaining this, several sources pointed to the prospect of elections in 
September 1998 as an obstacle, as politicians sought to re-establish their “national ethnic” 
credentials with their respective electorate. It is also noticeable that SFOR did not have a 
defined role in the process. 
From 1999 to 2004, the broad pattern of international engagement utilising 
conditional incentives and coercive means whilst maintaining normative pressure is 
observed to consolidate. During this period, many of the structures developed to address 
minority issues were able to reach their intended operating capacity which, allied to the 
refinement of normative, conditional and coercive means, started to produce more positive 
results for minority issues. For example, the OHR noted the particular success of the RRTF 
Action Plan, and the security space created by “SFOR's development of a detailed tracking 
system allowing for improved return security planning and early warning”, as key drivers 
of progress in 1999.
371
 SFOR commanders have suggested that the statement does not 
capture the full extent of their engagement with returns, as it ignored their daily interface 
with municipal level politicians and their use of military means to incentivise both returns 
and the acceptance of returnees. This contribution will be explored in the next chapter. 
5.24 The Role of the UNHCR 
In considering the international division of labour on returns, it is questionable whether the 
UNHCR was in the best position to provide the leadership required for overseeing the 
returns process. The UNHCR did not have the operational capacity to address or even 
coordinate all aspects of the returns process, given that initially almost all of its resources 
were taken up with administering refugee camps and the myriad of difficulties and 
challenges therein – “in effect they were trying to maintain a refugee state within a 
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state”.372 So while it was not inactive – the bus corridors and open cities projects were 
positive contributions to the returns effort – it relied heavily on the cooperation and 
assistance of other organisations, particularly IFOR and SFOR in the earlier years, 
alongside the larger NGOs, OSCE and emerging domestic institutions. As a manifestation 
of this reality, it is interesting to note that refugees seeking assistance would often contact 
IFOR before the UNHCR, with various outcomes.
373
 
By 1999, in addition to its establishment of the Return Application Database 
System, which effectively covered the gaps and flaws in the emerging domestic systems of 
registration, and provided valuable assistance to the RRTF, the UNHCR highlighted the 
positive impact of “key legislation adopted or amended to deal with amnesty, return, 
citizenship and property.”374 This prompted an increase in its efforts to develop the legal 
aid and expertise available to ethnic minorities, in order to allow them to effectively 
engage with emerging systems. However, from 1999 onwards, the resources and the 
expertise of the UNHCR in Bosnia were increasingly diverted to Kosovo, which slowed 
the pace of developments in Bosnia. 
Evidence of changes to this approach emerges from 2002, with the increased 
linkage of minority returns to human rights, fundamental freedoms and sustainable 
approaches through a regional joint action plan.
375
 This broadening of intervention on 
returns – in support of the UNHCR – was in no small part responding to frustrations on the 
parts of international organisations, which cited continuing disruption to the process of 
minority returns “by discriminatory practices in employment, education and other social 
services”.376 Concomitantly, it expanded the opportunities for the application of 
conditionality and normative pressure. 
Some interesting anomalies arise in the UNHCR’s description of its activities, in 
particular regarding the coordination of returns. Official UNHCR reports account for the 
extent of returns quite well, outlining their role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
effort. However, there are clear deficits regarding the official and unofficial interaction 
with organisations such as SFOR, OSCE etc., which receive only nominal references. This 
contrasts with interviews with UNHCR personnel, who recounted the daily interaction with 
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staff from those organisations: the extent of the collaborative effort “in the field” was 
generally not reflected in UNHCR reporting at the higher levels. 
So, while the UNHCR had lead responsibility, in practical terms implementation 
was subcontracted mostly to international and gradually domestic NGOs. By 2005, it had 
ceded responsibility in most areas to state agencies, but cautioned that “displacement 
continues to be a significant problem in Bosnia… with between 6,000 and 7,000 IDPs still 
living in collective accommodation facilities in BiH.”377 It should also be noted that the 
UNHCR’s framework for dealing with IDPs and refugees was perhaps more expansive 
than the political drivers of international intervention (primarily the PIC) were prepared to 
accede. Underpinned by the right to free choice, the UNHCR’s preferred template afforded 
affected persons the options to return to their former homes, integrate at the location they 
were displaced to, or resettle to another part of the country. However even the UNHCR 
went with the prevailing demand for prioritising returns above reintegration or 
resettlement.
378
  
5.25 The Role of the OSCE and CE 
Analysis suggests that in the period 1998-2004, the international organisations engaged in 
Bosnia moved to delineate a clear and mutually-supporting division of labour. For 
example, while the OHR supported by NATO and UNHCR focused on the practical 
support for returns, the OSCE – while maintaining its profile on elections – shifted its 
focus to addressing the sustainability of returns, particularly stimulating engagement with 
property issues and other issues of relevance, such as, “identification cards, utilities, 
pensions and employment”.379 Though options for “positive incentives” were discussed, 
the general concept applied by those addressing returns was to foster “inter-ethnic dialogue 
and confidence building…” through normative pressure rather than linkage to 
incentives.
380
  
The OSCE engaged with municipalities and cantons on a range of projects and 
programmes aimed at improving infrastructure, governance and administration. It is 
evident from the feedback of OSCE staff, that normative pressure on ethnic minorities’ 
issues and returns, in particular, became an ever-present part of this interactive process. 
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The Municipal Infrastructure and Implementation Project, Cantonal Administration 
Project, Parliamentary Support Project, and Education and Democratisation programmes 
were all utilised in varying ways to encourage minority participation and action on 
returns.
381
 Interestingly, by 2004 the scope of this activity was further extended through the 
monitoring and reporting of the degree of domestic implementation of all policies relating 
to ethnic minorities, for example verifying completion of the Property Return Process.
382
 
Similarly, the CE applied normative pressure by noting the difference between 
commitments given to ensure the protection of minority rights and actual practice: 
… the 2003 Law on the Protection of Rights of Persons belonging to 
National Minorities contains no real incentives for measures to support 
institutions – like cultural or documentation centres – set up by national 
minorities… It finds that discrimination also occurs in the return process 
of refugees and displaced persons particularly at local level, both in the 
Federation and in the Republika Srpska. The Advisory Committee 
considers that the authorities, especially at entity level, should tackle the 
widespread discrimination faced by those not belonging to the dominant 
constituent people more vigorously and to strengthen their action aimed 
at encouraging reconciliation. 
383
 
 
Frustration with kin-state influence is also evident in that regional efforts to encourage 
returns did not sustain the desired levels of success.
384
 The OSCE, in particular, noted with 
regret the inability of those countries with a stake in the issues to take joint action to 
resolve the problem of returns.
385
 
5.26 The Growing Role of the EU and NATO 
While the OHR was primarily answerable to the PIC, its relationship with the EU evolved 
considerably. In 2002, the EU decision to nominate that HR as the EU representative in 
Bosnia afforded him the scope to access enlargement and other EU instruments both 
directly and indirectly.
386
 During this period, NATO also started to discuss the possibility 
of Bosnian membership of PfP. In terms of overseeing the implementation of the civilian 
aspects of the peace settlement, these moves reinforced the OHR’s capacity to “lobby’ 
state and entity parliaments on ‘laws deemed crucial to the country’s transition towards 
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euro-Atlantic integration”.387 Though the PIC continued to provide strategic oversight, the 
emergence of integrationist options arguably ushered the EU and NATO towards assuming 
a more prominent oversight and external leadership function. This evolution of the external 
influences on the OHR was reflected in the rise of socio-economic measures, with 
significant input from the European Commission and programmes such as CARDS.
388
 
Practically, though the Dayton Agreement continued to provide the framework for a multi-
level system of interaction, the desire to provide for sustainable returns increasingly 
prioritised the socio-economic aspects of returns. 
5.3 The Domestic Context for Military Engagement 
From domestic politics to ICTY detention operations and the selection of roads for 
reconstruction, NATOs actions put them at the centre of post-conflict life. IFOR soldiers 
encountered a people traumatised by war – in some cases it would be months before they 
would even engage in conversations with IFOR personnel – 389 but who were rapidly 
adapting to the post-conflict reality. The dynamic this atmosphere fostered created both 
opportunities and impediments for military interaction on minority issues. 
The interim institutional structures (joint commissions and related bodies) 
established following the cessation of conflict recognised and accommodated the existing 
domestic political party apparatus. This was a practical approach intended to facilitate the 
rapid establishment of post-conflict institutions. However, it also afforded a privileged 
position to established (predominantly nationalist) parties prior to elections taking place. 
Along with the demographic settlement of Dayton this resulted in a further manifestation 
of the institutionalisation of the ‘political narrative of conflict’, rather than the ‘intended 
fresh start’. While those indicted by the ICTY were forbidden to run for office or engage in 
the interim institutions, their political parties still broadly functioned as normal. This may 
have been unavoidable, but the political dynamic it fostered is still apparent in terms of 
parallel governance, with key decision been taken among political parties outside of the 
representative structures.
390
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With 60% of the housing stock destroyed, and similar if not greater destruction in 
infrastructure, the reconstruction effort was necessarily prioritised by the OHR and 
domestic actors alike. Complicating the task further was the parallel requirement to address 
related pressures such as emergency support for refugee camps, the provision of temporary 
housing, the conducting of surveys of post-conflict housing stocks, and the subsequent 
moves to return those displaced to either their original place of residence, or to sustainable 
alternatives once constructed. Through its logistics and construction assets, and in the 
space between the end of conflict and the expansion of construction capacity among 
international NGOs and domestic contractors, NATO was initially the key actor in the 
post-conflict reconstruction effort. Throughout the period, NATO commanders were 
intensively lobbied by international NGO staff and domestic politicians for assistance with 
various reconstruction projects from road reconstruction to house building. While NATO 
commanders’ first priority was to ensure that “their own support network and mobility was 
established”, they were also aware of the significant power that their logistic capability 
afforded them, including the potential application of conditional incentives. However, 
IFOR and SFOR staff interviewed as part of this study conceded that their assistance was 
often “poorly thought out” – “all we saw was the humanitarian need and it took us a little 
while to appreciate the implications of our support”.391  
5.31 The Politics of Returns: Intransigence, Agitation and Hope 
If ethnically motivated violence gradually subsided over the period, political intransigence 
and agitation persisted as features of the domestic political process. For much of 1996, 
ethnically-motivated violence went hand in hand with domestic politics. Minority 
properties were destroyed amidst massive post-conflict population transfers, with sufficient 
evidence to suggest that some of this activity was orchestrated by political actors from all 
three affected ethnicities. Serious issues of trust were exposed, as nationalist political 
parties attempted to manipulate the interim structures to achieve their goals. For the Serb 
SDS in RS and Croat HDZ, this involved the continuation of their wartime objectives, 
adapted for post-conflict purposes: 
Government authorities on all sides continued the practice of politically-
motivated resettlement in order to affect the ethnic composition of the 
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resettled areas and to prevent the return of refugees and displaced 
persons.
392
 
 
At the entity level, politicians were continually slow to adopt constitutional changes as 
prescribed by Dayton. Indeed, for a significant period, RS did not participate in the new 
structures at all. Even when all parties did present, they were slow in carrying through 
agreements reached. The political atmosphere created by these practices had a significant 
impact on minority issues. As early as March of 1996, the HR raised particular concern 
regarding the returns of displaced persons to areas where they constituted the minority, 
arguing that were present patterns to persist, “[they] would be faced with a major question 
of de facto non-compliance with the spirit as well as letter of the Peace Agreement”.393 
Qualifying this point, the HR noted that though there was initial “formal compliance” with 
many aspects of Dayton, compliance with the “spirit of the peace agreement was notably 
lacking in several important areas”.394   
By the autumn of 1996, the HR expressed particular concern with institutional 
progress at the municipal level. On the advice of the Steering Board of the Provisional 
Elections Commission, he postponed for the second time proposed municipal elections, on 
the basis that a broad range of conditions had not been met, having been “hampered by a 
segregationist reality on the ground”.395 The HR continued with direct normative pressure 
for such aims to be reversed, and the spirit of the agreement to be applied regarding 
returns: 
Arbitrary practices disrupting many fields relevant to a civic society, 
acute deficits in the rule of law, the prevailing fear of the vast majority 
of citizens to move out of the perceived protection in areas of own 
ethnic dominance, in addition to the lack of housing space and 
employment opportunities, still prevent return. This does not only stand 
against return across the IEBL, but also across the ethnic division lines 
within the territory of the Federation. In violation of the obligation of 
the parties under the Peace Agreement to create political, social and 
economic conditions for return, the continued blocking even of the re-
establishment of telecommunications, railway and commercial bus links 
across the IEBL, constitutes a major deterrent to the exercise of the right 
to return and to economic rehabilitation.
396
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False dawns became a feature of the process at this time. In October of 1996 – a month 
after the first elections were held – the HR noted the normative impact of the JCC, and in 
particular the four regional JCCs, in terms of promoting confidence, easing tensions and 
establishing contacts. However, far from accelerating progress, the situation was 
acknowledged to have deteriorated within a month, reverting to what Human Rights Watch 
described as a: 
precarious human rights situation characterized by frequent arbitrary 
arrests, widespread abuse of ethnic minorities and obstruction of the 
right to return … Harassment of ethnic minorities, including forced 
evictions and intimidation, continues, and the responsible authorities 
have failed to act decisively to address this problem in both entities. The 
destruction of hundreds of minority-owned homes, both in the ZOS and 
in both entities, which began in late October and has continued, presents 
not only a grave challenge to right to return, but also a threat to 
remaining minority residents.
397
 
 
While political non-compliance is often highlighted as the main impediment to progress on 
ethnic minority issues, the realities of the post-conflict political landscape often made it 
very unattractive for domestic politicians to deviate from the main political narrative. In 
part, this can be explained by the governance structures designed by Dayton, which 
privileged the continuation of ethno-nationalist politics. Equally, it must be acknowledged 
that this was not an unfair reflection of popular sentiment, which remained scarred by war 
and predominantly nationalist in outlook. Additionally, and in spite of the efforts to detain 
war crimes suspects, and to remove identified politicians from the political process, the 
somewhat hands-off approach taken by HR Bildt in the first year had the unintended effect 
of emboldening the nationalist narrative. Considering the first election result, one Bosnia 
politician suggested that, “far from embracing the spirit of the agreement, they felt it 
renewed their mandate to pursue their ethnic objectives and consolidate their power”.398  
The year 1997 marked a renewal of the OHRs efforts to bring domestic politics into 
line with Dayton’s requirements. Party officials and supporters of all ethnicities were 
dismissed from official and professional posts (including police positions). Across RS in 
several areas under the control of the hard-line Karadzic supporters, non-SDS members 
were removed from their positions as directors of commercial enterprises.
399
 Though some 
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politicians were seen to adopt the rhetoric of Dayton during this period – expressing their 
commitment to returns and a multi-ethnic society – in practice they often remained 
obstructive. Despite changes in the RS parliament after the November 1997 elections, and 
significant international political and financial support, Milorad Dodik was unable to 
deliver on his promise to ensure the return of 70,000 refugees and displaced persons to the 
Republika Srpksa, or keep his commitment to reform RS property laws by September 
1998.
400
  
Dodik’s power was undermined by a weak coalition, itself representative of a 
chaotic power struggle within RS politics. This pattern of internal political turmoil was 
equally evident in the Federation. The assassination of the Federation Deputy Minister of 
Interior, Jozo Leutar, in a car-bombing on March 16 led to a bitter dispute between 
Bosnian Croat and Bosniak politicians, with the former accusing the latter of involvement 
in the attack, temporarily withdrawing from Federation institutions.
401
 However such 
turmoil can also be understood as the first signs of post-conflict political evolution. With 
the change in rhetoric came a slow but gradual change in voting practices. In the municipal 
elections of 2000, the moderate Social Democratic Party made “significant gains” in 
Bosniak areas of the federation at the expense of the nationalist SDA.
 402
 
However, within months of that result, SFOR was required to intervene when the 
Croat HDZ party, objected to changes in the electoral system that enabled Bosniaks and 
Croats in the federation to vote for candidates from the other ethnic group. Organising an 
ad hoc referendum on Croat self-rule on the same day as general election the HDZ refused 
to cooperate with the implementation of election results. Following the elections and with 
the expected Bosniak gains, the HDZ and its nationalist allies proclaimed self-governance 
in the territory inhabited by a Croat majority. In a response to the declaration of self-rule, 
SFOR troops and OHR officials entered the main branch of the Hercegovacka Bank in 
Mostar and blocked the HDZ's access to funds in the bank, “thereby cutting off the sources 
of funding for the Croat self-governance initiative”.403 Concurrently, and following a 
sustained period of OHR and SFOR engagement, “Croat soldiers who had left the joint 
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federation army at HDZ’s invitation renewed their contracts with the federation army”.404 
While it is unclear whether conditional incentives were utilised by either SFOR or the 
OHR,
405
 the desired outcome was achieved through the application of an admittedly 
innovative coercive measure and through sustained normative pressure. 
Further constitutional amendments in 2002 granted the status of constituent peoples 
on the whole of the territory of Bosnia, thereby enabling the established mechanisms for 
protection of rights to education, religion, language, promotion of tradition and cultural 
heritage, and a public information system that helped to unlock the legislative process. For 
the participation of ethnic minorities in state institutions, these changes provided for 
ethnically-balanced representation in the entity parliaments and in the highest courts. 
While the implementation of enabling policy would remain problematic, it is worth noting 
that the elections of 2002 were among the first to be mainly devoid of the ethnic 
violence.
406
  
While such progress was often dismissed by domestic commentators, it was not 
without its impact on minority issues. For example, an intervention by the HR in January 
2001 on “transparency in the allocation of funds for refugee return in the Entity budgets” 
was initiated by “an application lodged by three (non-Serb) members of the RS 
Constitutional Commission who invoked vital national interest to veto the proposed 2002 
RS budget”.407  
5.32 Characteristics of Domestic Politics 
In considering the politics of returns, it is understandable that much commentary focused 
on ethnically-motivated political intransigence and refusal to embrace the post-conflict 
structures. That ethnic political reality was compounded by the intense localised power 
struggles which emerged across Bosnia during this period. A compelling explanation of 
political behaviour can be found in these internal power struggles and the wider zeitgeist of 
political turmoil that characterised Bosnian politics. In RS, the continued influence of 
Radovan Karadžić both in person (up to 1996) and after his disappearance, constantly 
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stunted engagement with his SDS party. Political infighting became the predominant 
feature of RS politics for much of the period under review. The situation in the Federation 
was not much different, with the addition of violent tensions between Croat and Bosniak 
parties.  
The synergy between returns and freedom of movement provided a constant source 
for political tension, exemplified by impromptu road blocks, and the difficulties presented 
by the organisation of visits for groups of displaced persons to their former residences, 
which in many cases resulted in violent clashes, necessitating the negotiation of a working 
agreement to coordinate the conduct of such visits.
408
 Two points are worth emphasising in 
respect of this effort: first, some “go and see” visits were planned and/or targeted by 
political parties for the purpose of agitation, as they sought to prevent returns and the 
prospect of long-term resettlement. Occasionally this entailed orchestrated “politicised 
returns”, in an attempt to tilt a local balance of power to their advantage; to “stack the 
cards in their favour”, where they could.409 Second, while the HR emphasised the 
coordination of UNHCR and UNIPTF, it was increasingly through cooperation with IFOR 
that control was established over such visits. 
Gradually, new parties emerged from the political upheaval, some of which 
proclaimed their multi-ethnic perspective – a perspective that was nearly always offered in 
tandem with ambition towards membership of the EU. In some cases, minorities did gain 
political footholds, though often without the necessary support to capitalize on the gains. A 
typical example is the experience of towns such as Zepce, Drvar, and Srebrenica: as the 
pre-war ethnic majority (which had been “ethnically cleansed” during the war and unable 
to return to their homes) won the majority of seats in the municipal governments, they 
found themselves unable to act on the results, as the practicalities of having a largely 
external majority run government had not been thought through.
410
  
As early as 1996, the HR noted that support groups such as the Coalition for Return 
were increasingly prominent in political discourse and for the time were a positive 
development, along with other fledgling NGOs, helping to raise and sustain the political 
profile of affected minority groups. By early 1997, despite the generally negative outlook, 
the HR noted that the estimated figure for minority returns then stood at 10,000, which he 
hailed for its symbolic rather than numeric importance. He noted softening of attitudes in 
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the RS areas of Sapna and Doboj. Similar trends were identified in Brčko, on the basis of 
sustained normative pressure. Contributing to this progress was the Freedom of Movement 
Task Force, with representatives of OHR, IPTF and SFOR, which complemented the work 
of the inter-entity bus lines operated by the UNHCR. 
Through the multitude of interactions entailed in these activities, a culture of 
opportunism emerged at all levels among all parties. Faced with the full weight of 
international attention and financial support, local actors became adept at “playing the 
system” to maximise access to funds on various projects. Capitalising on good will, naive 
planning, and the lack of communication between various actors, some domestic 
politicians and local leaders extracted significant amounts of aid, both financial and 
otherwise. As will be seen below, such practices were most clearly evident at municipal 
levels, and transitioned with the post-conflict effort as international civilian and military 
actors became much more aware and conscious of the recipients of money and the 
conditions for its expenditure. Finally, with such intensive engagement over a period of ten 
years, it is evident that all sides tired of both the scale and reciprocity of such post-conflict 
interaction. As one Serbian municipal staff officer put it, “you get tired of saying the same 
thing to the same people day after day”. He also noted that the military propensity to rotate 
their personnel every six months added to their frustration. 
5.4 The Military Role under Dayton 
…we are able to exert pressure on both the local authorities and the 
military forces in this country at every level, across the whole 
country.411 
Broadly, the military contribution to the post-conflict effort in Bosnia involved three 
different forces: the NATO-led forces of IFOR (1995-96) and SFOR (1996-2004), and 
from 2004, the EU-led EUFOR BIH. Taking over from UNPROFOR on 20 December 
1995, IFOR re-established the international military presence throughout the country. 
Though Annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement lists a broad range of specified tasks which 
IFOR were expected to carry out, NATO had been preparing for such a role since 1992 – at 
SHAPE, NATO staff were working on a series of contingency plans throughout the war.
412
 
As such, even before IFOR was constituted and deployed, a detailed CONOPS document 
outlining a five-phased approach to completing the mission was circulated to the key 
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elements of the force, to aid planning and preparation. This document, and the planning 
processes it emerged from, foresaw NATO cooperation with the UNHCR and the necessity 
for comprehensive interaction with international and domestic civilian agencies.
413
 On 
deployment, NATO commanders identified a series of specified tasks necessary for the 
successful completion of the mission, including: “bringing about cessation of hostilities 
among the FWF; ensuring cooperation of the FWF with the IFOR; separating the FWF by 
ensuring their withdrawal; ensuring freedom of movement; supervising the transition of 
control between the elements of FWF in designated areas of transfer; monitoring the status 
of forces (demilitarization, weapons stockpiles, training) throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
and transitioning to peace within 270 days of first deployment (D+270).
414
 
On SACEURs direction, IFOR was also to be prepared to assist the UNHCR and 
other international organisations in the humanitarian effort, and through the establishment 
of the Joint Military Commission, to foster the conditions for negotiations and other 
measures for peaceful conflict settlement. This broad scope for intervention effectively 
gave NATO commanders a “carte blanche” to engage with international and domestic 
civilian actors however they saw fit, so long as it supported the completion of the 
mission.
415
 As a result, and in addition to the specified tasks given to commanders on 
deployment, they were also afforded the space to develop new tasks.  
Following deployment, and while the OHR was establishing its structure, IFOR 
found itself to the fore of the international effort and as a result engaged in issues across 
the civilian-military spectrum. The intention of this approach was to institute a stable 
platform and to create the space for the executive leadership of the OHR to establish itself, 
and ultimately assume lead responsibility. This is significant for two reasons. First, IFOR, 
through simple weight of numbers and resources, had significantly greater capacity than 
any other international organisation or group in the country. The establishment of the Joint 
Military Commission gave IFOR commanders the platform to exercise that power to 
influence decision-making at all levels of society. Second, the wording of Annex 1A was 
viewed by the military as imparting a series of ‘implied tasks’ – on issues such as those 
affecting minority groups – which military commanders at all levels adopted and sought to 
implement in a variety of ways. That perspective was reflected in the IFOR CONOPS and 
in the development and delivery of military humanitarian aid programmes. From the 
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commanders’ perspective, Dayton and the NATO CONOPS justified their engagement in 
what most considered to be civilian tasks. In part, this reflected the practical reality that 
IFOR had resources which others simply could not match, but it also reflected a new 
attitude of military experimentation and a willingness to redeploy military capabilities in 
unconventional ways.  
NATO was able to bring its capabilities to bear in three areas of the initial post-
conflict effort. First, through its significant logistical capability it was immediately able to 
address the most acute reconstruction needs, including route repair, reconstruction of 
essential buildings such as schools, police and medical centres, and temporary provision of 
services such as water, sewage and electricity works. Such work was considered essential 
to stimulate recovery, and prepared the way for more comprehensive reconstructive efforts. 
In time, this capability also proved valuable for sustaining the reconstruction of buildings 
for returns. Second, through its security role, it was able to ensure freedom of movement 
for international and domestic persons, removing road blockages and other unofficial or 
unauthorised impediments to mobility. Third, it was able to use its capability in these areas 
as leverage to gain political support for its activities at municipal and local levels; thereby 
aiding the work of the Joint Military Commission.  
Though the transition from IFOR to SFOR did result in a troop reduction, it had 
relatively limited impact on the day-to-day activities of the force and their mandate 
remained largely unchanged. In fact, SFOR increased both the scale and nature of its 
interaction with international and domestic civilian actors. Predominantly, this was 
achieved through widespread engagement in CIMIC activities, and later though the 
constitution of LOT houses. By the time of SFOR’s transition to EUFOR, the total force 
numbered approximately 7,000 personnel, a figure that would steadily decline in the years 
that followed. While EUFOR continued with the LOT house concept, CIMIC activity was 
seen to fall off significantly from 2004 onwards. 
5.5 Summary 
Military engagement with ethnic minority returns and participation rarely occurred in 
isolation. It was shaped and influenced – formally and informally – by the key 
international civilian actors they worked alongside. Whether through OHR pressure on 
legislative compliance and the application of Bonn powers, OSCE, UNHCR and CE 
monitoring, or the increasing purchase of the emerging enlargement processes of the EU 
and NATO, military actors were exposed to and incorporated into almost the full spectrum 
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of post-conflict responses to ethnic minority issues. From the military perspective that they 
engaged in that manner was no accident, indeed military planners anticipated much of the 
civil-military interaction that emerged, as reflected in the NATO CONOPS. The domestic 
political context that faced the civil-military framework continually challenged its 
legitimacy and effectiveness necessitating flexible responses from civil-military actors. 
The specific military response will be analysed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
 
The Military Application of Conditionality and Normative Pressure on Ethnic 
Minority Issues in Bosnia Herzegovina 1995-2005 
 
This chapter analyses in detail the nature of military engagement with the issues of ethnic 
minority returns and participation in new state institutions and processes. In considering 
the success or otherwise of that effort, it also maps the reaction of domestic actors to the 
military effort and the resultant degree of compliant or non-compliant behaviour and policy 
implementation. 
6.1. Application of Conditionality and Normative Pressure by Military Forces on Ethnic 
Minority Returns: 1995-2005 
6.11 Stabilisation and Reconstruction 1995-1997: Humanitarian Aid 
Given the significant scale of inter-ethnic violence encountered on deployment, IFOR was 
not initially engaged on either returns or participation issues; priority went to separating 
the former warring factions and the segregation of communities. However, progressively 
from early 1996, IFOR personnel participated in extensive humanitarian activities, both 
unilaterally and in cooperation with the UNHCR and international NGOs; NATOs support 
for their efforts became a feature of their engagement throughout the period under analysis. 
NATO aided the humanitarian effort in a variety of ways. Of the 19 humanitarian 
aid actions completed by IFOR and SFOR between 1996 and 2003 (see Appendix VI), it 
was found that NATO assisted with returns, reconstruction, education, agricultural, and 
transportation tasks. In general, it was found that this assistance was delivered without 
either the application of conditional incentives or normative pressure; only four of the 19 
activities examined were relevant to minority participation; all four involved the 
application of normative pressure relating to returns policy. More typical of the 
engagement with returns was the provision of containers as temporary housing, where 
returnees had moved to be closer to their original residences. However, though NATO 
humanitarian aid activities did not specifically seek to apply conditional incentives or 
normative pressure on returns or participation, a number of features emerged that are 
worthy of note.  
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All but three of the activities analysed were organised unilaterally by individual 
contingents rather than by IFOR or SFOR higher HQ. Of these, only one involved the 
promotion of policy on minority participation: a Norwegian funded and implemented 
bridge reconstruction project in 2001, which secured cross-community support through the 
presence of minorities at planning meetings as well as representatives from the respective 
entities.
416
 In most cases, funding either came formally from ‘national capitals’ or 
informally through various charity efforts, typically organised by the soldiers themselves. 
Such activities ranged from the collection and delivery of children’s toys, the provision of 
educational items such as stationery and computers, to winter provisions, and building 
reconstruction efforts. Most activities were modest in scale with budgets of less than 
€50,000. A notable exception to this was an effort undertaken by Spanish IFOR, in 1997, 
to reconstruct 140 houses in the “abandoned Bosnian Serb” village of Bacevici in a 
predominantly Bosnian Croat area near Mostar.
417
  
The scale of this unilateral activity was unusual for the time, and quickly ran into 
difficulties. One Spanish officer reflecting on the project suggested that in their eagerness 
to assist the population they made a number of mistakes: “we never questioned the fact that 
it was only the Serbian community we were dealing with. Not long into the project we 
realised that Croats had lived in the village too. We tried to adapt our plans but it was not 
easy, commitments had been given…”418 Over time many of these issues would be 
addressed, but the Spanish experience was more the rule than the exception at that time. 
Underlining this feature of engagement, the sample reveals that cooperation with the 
UNHCR, municipal institutions, and NGOs is seen to gradually increase.  
Due the fact that so many of these activities were organised on a unilateral basis, 
and were not typically recorded by either IFOR or SFOR, it is difficult to deduce the exact 
number of humanitarian activities carried out by NATO personnel during the period. The 
sample suggests that NATO assistance was at its highest between 1996 and 1998. Though 
activities classified as humanitarian continued up to 2003, from 1998 onwards they gave 
way to more ambitious and complex CIMIC projects. However, it is clear from the sample 
that humanitarian aid activities were a common feature of operations in all three Multi-
National Divisions, until CIMIC programmes became the preferred means of engagement. 
More importantly, they created the foundation for a network of interaction, if not between 
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NATO and other international organisations then definitely, with majority and minority 
communities across the country. 
6.12 State and Nation-building 1997-2003: CIMIC 
While assistance with humanitarian aid was often understood as a ‘hearts and minds’ 
approach, the development of CIMIC was viewed as a distinct military tool to aid 
commanders in pursuit of their mission. Once introduced to the concept, NATO 
commanders were keen to communicate its value. Through continuous Information 
Operations, they presented the concept of CIMIC to the population as: 
the means by which the military command establishes formal relations 
with national and local authorities, the civilian population, international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations within its Area of 
Responsibility.
419
 
 
The earliest CIMIC projects to emerge during this time overlapped with humanitarian aid 
projects and were unconditional in design and delivery: “the initial focus was on 
stabilisation, anything more, just wasn’t practical”.420 However, in the years that followed, 
the practice of CIMIC evolved significantly, with varying impacts on the delivery of policy 
on minority returns. Analysis of a sample of 131 CIMIC projects completed by SFOR 
between 1997 and 2003 (see Appendix VI) reveals multi-level interactions characterised 
by experimentation with conditional incentives, variation in project design and ownership 
initiatives, increasing awareness of the complexity of returns issues, and a gradual 
progression towards more formalised and cohesive military engagements on returns issues. 
The sample shows that 37% or 48 of the CIMIC activities engaged in by NATO 
were directly relevant to the delivery of returns policy. Normative pressure connected to 
minority returns policy was a feature of all but three activities. An example of an exception 
was the Italian SFOR project that organised a substantial food and clothing convoy for 
refugee camps through the G5 (NATO planning cell). This project was typical of the 
earliest efforts of NATO planners to formalise SFOR engagement with such matters. 
While not entailing the application of normative pressure or conditionality, the project was 
carefully planned and directed to the area of greatest need. One refugee emphasised that: 
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The aid just arrived at the right time. We have had no help since 
December, and the government only gives us $8 per month per each 
person and that makes life very difficult to manage.
421
 
 
If SFOR personnel were ‘entrepreneurial’ in their attempts to address the ‘humanitarian 
situation’, the application of CIMIC was intended to provide a framework for formal, 
better informed and more effective engagement. However, progress was slow. Almost 
every contingent sought to contribute to the effort which was often executed in parallel to 
SFOR’s main operational tasks. The situation was confused for a period by the fact that 
SFOR had distinct cells for humanitarian aid and CIMIC, even though their respective 
activities overlapped significantly. In rectifying that anomaly, SFOR planners also 
acknowledged that SFOR had neither the financial assets nor the administrative capacity to 
assume direct responsibility for all CIMIC activities. Accordingly, they took the view that 
SFOR CIMIC should primarily operate as an information-gathering and coordinating 
platform in support to the CIMIC activities of TCCs. While this was a practical 
‘management solution’ SFOR, staff acknowledged that it left questions concerning 
oversight and regulation of TCC CIMIC activity somewhat exposed.
422
 Nonetheless, as the 
concept took hold among TCCs, many innovative practices emerged with varying impact 
on returns policy. 
On taking over from IFOR, the commander of SFOR, Gen. William Crouch, 
identified the return of refugees and displaced persons as one of six key priorities in his 
‘Commander’s Intent’ issued to his subordinates.423 Such prioritisation was significant for 
military planners, as linking the issue to the commander’s intent afforded greater flexibility 
in the allocation of SFOR assets to address returns issues. In civilian terms, they had 
received a clear order, and it was their responsibility to devise ways to fulfil it. For TCCs 
planning individual CIMIC projects it meant that their requests for ‘heavy SFOR’ assets to 
assist in reconstruction or transportation were positively considered. For example, the 
Austrian SFOR contingent, in cooperation with the Austrian humanitarian NGO 
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CARITAS, designated Fojnica
424
 as a “Peace Village – a place where two entities can live 
together” – targeting the rebuilding of 300 houses and providing over 150 tonnes of related 
medical, educational and other materials. An alternative approach pioneered by French and 
Italian SFOR was to inform a village that they were being considered for an “Action 
Column”, whereby a CIMIC battalion utilising SFOR assets would move to their area for a 
dedicated period of two to three weeks, establish a base, and address a range of local 
issues. These operations overtly applied conditional incentives on returns issues: 
For a town or village to benefit from such an operation, indications must 
be favourable for refugee returns. The operation is a gesture towards the 
opstinas that cooperate. The operations are carefully balanced between 
the Brigade’s Areas of Responsibilities (AOR) and, also the Entities.425 
 
From 2000, SFOR became increasingly active in the delivery of small business projects 
with aid conditionality attached: 
We explain to them it is not just a handout, it's also a hand-up, and they 
are expected to employ people - mostly returnees, and ideally, a mix of 
ethnic groups.
426
 
 
Further variation was evident by the end of 2000, when SFOR CIMIC teams started to 
target local authorities and municipal institutions with various incentives options: 
We let them have winter time to work out a schedule of conditions. As 
soon as spring is here, we will carry out their plans under some 
conditions. The plans should include all minorities, and have the local 
Parliament’s agreement. This way we can improve our collaboration 
with the civilian authorities.
427
 
 
A seasonal dimension to returns was also recognised at this time: by 1999-2000 it was 
noted that returns generally did not happen during the winter months due to restricted 
mobility and often the lack of amenities. Quantifying the combined impact of this activity 
is difficult, but there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the combined impact of SFOR 
on minority returns, in tandem with the ongoing work of civilian actors such as the OHR, 
was having a real impact. By May of 2000, it was clear that 1999 had been a largely 
successful year for returns, though the role played by SFOR in facilitating and coordinating 
the returns process was not apparent in the HRs review: 
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Security incidents are now the exception and not the rule and there is an 
encouraging shift in many areas from SFOR to the local police as the 
first port of call for returnee security.
428
 
 
In a sample of 12 CIMIC projects conducted in 1999, five contributed to minority returns, 
with four projects involving the application of conditional incentives. Former SFOR 
officers interviewed suggested that these figures would have been broadly representative of 
SFOR activity across the country.
429
 Most prominent of these was the launch of a 
collaborative initiative with the ECs OBNOVA fund for the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of post-conflict areas of South Eastern Europe. This partnership involved 
the delivery of a series of ‘Micro-Projects’ which SFOR would identify and deliver on 
behalf of the fund: 
To be considered as a Micro-Project, a project normally cannot be more 
than 50,000 Euros (97000 DM approx.). The SFOR units submit the 
proposals to SFOR Headquarters (HQ) and after co-ordination, we send 
them to the Representation Office of the EC (ROEC) in Sarajevo for 
approval.
430
 
 
Critically, this entailed not only SFOR’s ideas of conditional incentives, but firmly linked 
compliance to conditions established by the EU. The normative impact of SFOR is also 
apparent during this period. In areas such as Grapska Gornja, the SFOR CIMIC presence 
fostered conditions for changes in inter-ethnic behaviour: 
“People help each other a lot,” he explained, “the Bosniak inhabitants 
are concentrated on re-building their houses and they lend their fields to 
the Bosnian-Serbs that never left the village. In return, Bosnian-Serbs 
lend them their tools and their vehicles.”431 
 
Though still the exception, such inter-ethnic interaction, where it occurred in the samples 
analysed for this research, was always within the framework of intensive SFOR 
engagement with both sides of the community. However, given the scale of 
experimentation it is unsurprising that not all such initiatives worked as intended. 
Depending on their areas of operations, most TCCs made every effort to ensure that 
their Locally Employed Contractors (LECs) were representative of the ethnic balance of 
the community within which they operated. Generally TCCs offered pay significantly 
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above the average for the recovering Bosnian economy, with the result that such jobs were 
highly valued within domestic communities. Recognising this, some commanders started 
to link job offers to ‘compliance’ with issues on minority returns and participation. While 
occasionally this approach yielded results, in the main it was not seen as sustainable way of 
engaging with the community on minority issues: while it was a feature it was not a 
common or accepted practice.
432
 
A more common difficulty to emerge in this period concerned the timing of the 
delivery of conditional incentives on returns issues. In four of the cases analysed, 
incentives were delivered to a majority community prior to returns taking place. Such 
incentives included the reconstruction of roads and civic buildings, but also the 
reconstruction of minority-owned property. The logic guiding this practice was that 
minorities were unprepared to return until the structures were in place to accommodate 
them. However in three of the four cases it was found that returns did not take place even 
after the incentives were delivered. The other case had more success, as a portion of 
incentives were withheld pending compliance after the initial delivery of the first phase of 
incentives.  
As CIMIC projects on returns gained momentum, coordination with the UNHCR 
and RRTF was seen to increase. For the most part, this was as a result of the growing 
awareness among military CIMIC staffs of the wider dimensions of the work they were 
doing, and their recognition that a comprehensive and inclusive approach was necessary if 
their work was to be sustained. 
A CIMIC project does not end just because the physical implementation 
is done, because it’s directly linked to the return process. We have 
started a close co-operation with UNHCR and OHR because they know 
where the funding gaps are and when they do not find any donor, we 
want to assist as and when we can.
433
 
 
This coming together on CIMIC projects served to streamline many aspects of the military 
approach. Specified pre-established criteria for CIMIC projects became the norm and often 
entailed a period of cultivation, whereby SFOR CIMIC personnel and civilian staff of an 
NGO or international organisation would engage a community over a period of time in 
order to ensure understanding and support for a forthcoming project. Increasingly, these 
approaches also involved a post-implementation plan in order to support a given project’s 
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sustainability.
434
 Furthermore, as UN resources were diverted elsewhere, and the rate of 
returns increased, the UNHCR often turned to SFOR to fill the gaps. One UNHCR official 
in Zvornik emphasised that, “SFOR’s involvement is extremely important. We don't have 
the resources they have, and would not have been able to get the information we needed 
without their help”.435  
However, if military and civilian cooperation and interaction on returns issues was 
increasingly evident, it was by no means a linear development. Many civilian actors, 
particularly humanitarian NGOs, had serious conceptual issues regarding cooperating with 
military units on issues they understood to be civilian issues.
436
 Some NGOs simply 
refused to work with military CIMIC teams, primarily on the view that they (SFOR) 
compromised their impartiality in the eyes of the domestic population.
437
 While military 
officers interviewed acknowledged that they were only beginning to consider the 
implications of their CIMIC actions on civilian actors, many added the proviso that some 
NGOs simply “did not like the competition that military units provided”.438 Such tensions 
were a regular feature of the military experience, often impacting on the cohesiveness of 
the overall effort on returns. 
Finally, as the post-conflict reconstruction effort gained momentum, there was an 
increasing preference among CIMIC teams for ‘joint projects’ with government, mostly 
municipal, institutions. Driving this effort was the idea that joint projects pooled and 
expanded financial resources available for projects, stimulated domestic capacity to plan 
and execute such projects, and encouraged local ownership and therefore the sustainability 
of project outcomes. On minority returns, various joint approaches emerged during the 
period under review including the application of trial returns, where minorities were given 
the opportunity to demonstrate that they “wanted to come back”, by returning temporarily 
to “clean and repair the house…”.439 In the sample analysed, of the 48 returns-related 
CIMIC projects 23 were ‘joint projects’ run with municipal support. Of these, four projects 
failed to achieve their intended outcomes due to the unavailability of municipal funds or 
for lack of municipal support for returns.  
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6.13 The Impact of Military CIMIC on Returns 
Given their relatively modest scale and ambition, most CIMIC projects were completed 
successfully and therefore the argument can be made the local compliance with the policies 
identified by SFOR was high. Of the projects examined, only seven completely failed to 
achieve their objectives, while partially compliant outcomes of varying degrees were 
evident in all other cases. However, interviews suggest that gains were not always retained, 
and instances of ‘sustainable’ compliance were somewhat lower. Of the 48 returns-related 
projects, 20 were unilaterally run by NATO TCCs, without the input of an international or 
domestic organisation. Though a preference for joint projects did emerge, at no point did 
they completely replace unilateral projects as the preferred means of engagement. 
However, what is apparent is that medium- to large-scale projects with budgets in excess 
of €100,000 were increasingly delivered jointly with funding organisations such as the 
UNHCR, DFID (UK) and domestic institutions. 
It is estimated that over the period in question, NATO CIMIC projects comfortably 
exceeded 1,000. However, the extent of SFOR’s involvement in delivering policy on 
ethnic minority issues, particularly returns, is understated in official NATO documents.
440
 
While NATO did make an effort to record CIMIC activities, it is clear that many TCCs did 
not report the full extent of their activities. In part this can be explained by a NATO 
hierarchy who were anxious to emphasise the security aspects of their role, and the fact 
that much of the activity carried out by TCCs, though sanctioned by SFOR leadership, was 
independent of SFOR planning or operational control. It also represented the fact that 
NATO planners themselves were still not sure of the best way to approach their 
‘civilian/soft’ role which was seen to continually evolve during the period in question.  
Finally, it should be acknowledged that though independent and joint CIMIC 
activities became increasingly formalised, the ongoing ‘military operational’ effort of 
patrols, searches, village liaison etc. continued as a vital source of information for all 
activities. As one Danish officer noted: 
We are the guys who are gathering information about the area and about 
the people who are living here. So when we get back, we make reports 
and send them forward to the CIMIC and the Battle Group. If there is 
something interesting out here we'll tell the CIMIC and they can 
respond.
441
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6.14 Liaison Networks and Military Leadership 2003-2005: LOT Houses  
The LOT concept emerged in response to shrinking financial and human resources and the 
need to maintain an information-gathering network capable of daily interaction with 
populations at the municipal level. From a military perspective, they were also viewed as 
having evolved from the CIMIC house concept that was developed by SFOR post-2000. 
Their establishment marked the reversal of the pattern of SFOR personnel engaging with 
populations in their respective community areas: “they were designed to be a one stop shop 
as we didn’t have the resources to go out into the community as before”.442 Where present, 
CIMIC houses were instrumental in connecting military CIMIC projects with municipal 
activity and were prominent in the delivery of some of the larger joint projects. However, 
as they transitioned to a LOT house network, SFOR’s and EUFOR’s application of 
conditional incentives on minority returns was seen to reduce significantly.  
The EU formally launched Operation ALTHEA on 2 December 2004. While 
politically – seen in the context of the Thessaloniki Summit – it was viewed as a signal that 
the EU was beginning to formally reembrace the region, in practical terms the EU military 
force that replaced SFOR was largely the same – 7,000 approximately in strength, with 
80% of SFOR personnel simply ‘changing hats’.443 EUFOR’s mission was more restrained 
than that of SFOR. While the commitment to maintaining a ‘Safe and Secure Environment’ 
remained, it was the provision of capacity building and training support to the Bosnian 
Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces that would be its raison d‘être. NATO did however 
maintain a military HQ in Sarajevo which played a prominent role in the transformation of 
the Bosnian Armed Forces, and subsequent progression towards membership of PfP. 
In inheriting the LOT House network from SFOR, EUFOR reconstituted their 
purpose to one of information gathering, through monitoring and community liaison. The 
byword for those who staffed these houses was ‘situational awareness’. Regarding CIMIC 
related activities, one former LOT house member noted: “we had neither the capacity or 
the mandate to engage in CIMIC-style projects”.444  In some cases, particular during and 
immediately after the transition period, LOT houses were seen to push the boundaries of 
their mandates, with some attempting to establish themselves as de facto coordinators for 
CIMIC activities. However, by the end of 2004, this practice was petering out. 
Commenting on that transition at the time, one Canadian officer noted that: 
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The EUFOR mandate does not permit us to rebuild schools or roads, or 
to provide any monetary assistance. We have no budget for such 
endeavours. The LO Teams are not the Civil-Military Cooperation 
Teams (CIMIC) of the past, who were perceived by the local populace 
to be roaming the country with large sums of money to dispense.
445
 
 
That distinction was often lost on local populations, who had grown accustomed to 
negotiating with CIMIC team, posing difficulties for LOT houses in the initial ‘start-up’ 
phase. As a result, quantifying the role of LOT houses in comparison to CIMIC teams is 
difficult. This research has found that they were not substantially engaged in returns 
activities beyond monitoring returns and relaying information to international 
organisations in their area. By the end of 2004, the military involvement in delivering 
minority returns policy effectively came to an end. Returns assistance continued primarily 
through EC funded integrated returns projects in partnership with various NGOs, but 
military participation was no longer a feature of these efforts. The potential of LOT’s 
houses to participate in that ‘civilian’ process was not seriously considered by the actors 
involved. 
6.15 Liaison Networks and Military Leadership 1995-2005: The role of Military 
Commanders 
Through the Joint Military Commission at the highest level, and at various levels down to 
battalion commander level, senior military officers were involved in daily formal and 
informal dialogue with international and domestic civilian actors. Interviews revealed that 
at all levels, commanders attempted to link various aspects of military activity to incentives 
on minority returns. As with the evolution of CIMIC practices, SFOR commanders were 
seen to become increasingly sophisticated in engaging domestic actors on minority returns 
issues. Commenting on the transition from IFOR to SFOR, commanders noted that there 
was a gradual move away from the coercive measures that were initially deemed 
necessary, towards incentivised approaches. In large part, this reflected the reality that 
NATO personnel were less involved in the separation of FWF and more involved with the 
civilian population and the emerging representative structures. Commenting on the 
implication of this change, one UK commander noted that “coercive measures were no 
longer suitable. We needed to engage with the local population on more positive terms and 
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that meant leveraging the advantages we had for their benefit”.446 As such, commanders at 
MND and battalion levels found themselves assuming a semi-political role in the areas 
within which they operated. 
Quantifying the impact military commanders had on returns is difficult, though of 
the eight commanders interviewed, all were active in applying normative pressure on 
domestic politicians and community leaders regarding returns issues. Equally, all 
acknowledged the value of CIMIC, confirming that they had attempted to link the delivery 
of CIMIC projects to domestic compliance on minority returns policy. Outside of the 
CIMIC framework, those present in the period 1997-1999 noted that the economic 
footprint of an SFOR unit was often highly prized by small communities in particular, 
noting that they were frequently approached by politicians requesting the movement of 
posts to their area. Such posts, which could range in size from accommodating a platoon 
(31 personnel) to a company (120 personnel) brought employment to these communities, 
and boosted sales in local cafes and shops. While commanders acknowledged that they 
were able to link post movements to minority returns policy, they agreed that it was not a 
sustainable means of engagement. One noted that the issue became more pronounced as 
posts started to close: “I was able to get compliance on a number of issues including 
returns issues by agreeing to delay a post-closure”.447 The same officer acknowledged that 
such practices were “one off”, and in no way comparable to CIMIC projects, which offered 
a more equitable and sustainable means of community engagement.  
While this type of interaction was common to all commanders, from MND 
commanders down to their subordinates, it did not hold for the actions of the overall 
commanders of NATO forces in Bosnia. Though COMIFOR appointment holders had 
direct and daily access to the HR, leaders of international organisations and the domestic 
political elite, and while they maintained the normative narrative, there is little evidence to 
demonstrate that they sought to apply conditional incentives connected to issues of returns. 
They did, however, provide a valuable link between the military and civilian sides of the 
international effort both in keeping the international administration informed of 
developments at local levels, and in requesting support for political pressure to be applied 
at the highest levels on various issues. Referring to the latter, one MND commander argued 
that “the real value of the COM was that you contact him to let him know you were having 
a particular issue with a municipality or whatever and through his connections with the 
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OHR you would find pressure being applied on the municipality by their own leaders. That 
was a valuable role from our perspective…”448 While the potential existed for the 
commander of NATO forces to orchestrate political pressure at sub-entity levels, of those 
interviewed, such pressure was only once applied to a matter pertaining to minority 
returns. However, as will be seen below, the high-level commanders did have more active 
role on matters pertaining to minority participation. 
6.2 Application of Conditionality and Normative Pressure by Military Forces on Ethnic 
Minority Representation and Participation: 1995-2005 
 6.21 The Dayton Framework for Minority Representation and Participation 
Dayton provided for the design and (re)establishment of representative structures and state 
institutions such as the police and military forces. As such, the external “policy 
requirements”, including those on minority issues, were built into the constitutional fabric 
of the post-conflict settlement, with the OHR there to guide and oversee a transition back 
to normal sovereign state practice. Under Annex 3 of Dayton, the OSCE was tasked to 
oversee the organisation and conduct of elections, while the OHR coordinated the recovery 
of Bosnian state institutions.
449
 Within and between these tasks, NATO and later EU forces 
would play a variety of supporting roles, gradually expanding their influence beyond the 
tasks specified under Dayton. This section explores that dynamic and the impact of 
military forces on domestic compliance with minority participation policy. 
Unsurprisingly, the HR found that the necessary conditions for free and fair 
elections in general (not just regarding the minority aspects) were not present in early 
1996, expressing particular concerns over the media situation.
450
 With responsibility for 
organising elections, the OSCE was to the fore of efforts to ensure that minorities, 
particularly those in the entities and at municipal level, would be fairly represented in new 
state and sub-state assemblies. The Provisional Elections Commission (PEC) was the 
forum through which the OSCE engaged with the OHR, IFOR and domestic 
representatives to outline plans for the first elections. Setting an initial target period for 
elections of between 14 June and 14 September 1996, the OSCE drafted rules and 
regulations for the preparation and conduct of elections. While OSCE staff were generally 
satisfied that the proposed structures of government were broadly representative, there was 
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some concern that displaced minorities would not be in a position exercise their franchise 
in their place of origin, in spite of supporting policies. Articles 10-12 of the PEC rules and 
regulations addressed options and rights available to refugees and displaced persons, 
including the flexibility for persons then unwilling to return to their place of origin, to vote 
in their respective local election, or alternatively to vote in their new area of residence if 
they so wished. Those who were unwilling to return to their area of origin, but who wished 
to vote, were facilitated with and absentee ballot.
451
  
Thus, from the outset, the requirements of ethnic minorities were accommodated 
both in terms of the electoral systems used and the nature of the representatives structures 
devised. In this respect, both entities were de facto compliant with the standards identified 
by the international organisations involved. However, this structure rested on an agreement 
that did not encourage a specific focus on minority rights, choosing instead to focus on 
human rights reinforced by the rule of law. As the subsequent difficulties revealed, the 
unwillingness to engage in a ‘minority rights’ discourse created the space for entity and 
municipal governments in particular to subvert inclusive elections and structures through 
selective interpretation of a range of state laws and practices, from citizenship to property 
rights. As a result, over the period analysed, and acknowledging the technical compliance 
with Dayton and PEC requirements, the quality of minority (and majority) participation in 
these structures remained open to question. 
6.22 Countdown to the First Elections: 1995-1996 
Though some interviewees suggested that the power-sharing arrangement, with its 
emphasis on a national ethnic balance, isolated minority communities, there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that international staffs were at least mindful of the needs of 
minorities, particularly those in isolated positions in the respective entities.
452
 For example, 
the OSCE insisted on the creation of ad hoc election commissions for “divided 
municipalities”, stipulating that elections would not go ahead until they were 
established.
453
 However, incentivising the elections in this way was not a common feature 
of a process of interaction – like returns – that remained predominantly normative in its 
conduct for most of 1996: 
Despite commitments to uphold the highest standards of human rights 
protections, the Parties have not fulfilled their obligations in this 
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regard… the Parties have not taken concrete steps to eliminate 
conditions which threaten the goal of a multi-ethnic society which had 
been envisioned in the Peace Agreement… including adoption of 
amnesty laws, permitting freedom of movement, instructing local 
officials that harassment and intimidation of vulnerable populations will 
not be tolerated, bringing property laws into compliance with the Peace 
Agreement….454 
 
While the proposed institutional structures were not considered overly problematic of 
themselves, it is clear that the political framework within which they were expected to 
work posed serious difficulties for their effective operation. A myriad of legal and 
administrative complications combined or were manipulated to delay or compromise the 
establishment of post-conflict institutions. As a result, the HR became embroiled in 
intensive engagement with Bosnian political representatives, through which he attempted 
to draft a series of agreements to facilitate the revision and implementation of a range of 
laws and practices. One such agreement was that negotiated through the JIC in Sarajevo, 
which covered the “preservation of property rights, freedom of access and continuity of the 
educational system and participation in public life.”455 
During that period, the potential of IFOR assistance for the delivery of policies on 
ethnic minority participation starts to emerge.   
Since the completion of some of the more urgent tasks of military 
implementation IFOR has been in a position to allocate more assets and 
resources to meeting the needs of civilian implementation. Coordination 
meetings are held on a regular basis with participation of major civilian 
implementation agencies to define the practical modalities of the use of 
IFOR assets and resources. Some projects in the field of infrastructure 
restoration, telecommunications, election preparations are already under 
way.
456
 
 
Up to that point, IFOR’s contribution to the election effort was seen as an extension of 
their primary tasks of ensuring freedom of movement and providing security. Their 
involvement in disarming former combatants helped to disestablish the connection between 
combat units and their political supporters. Demining programmes aided freedom of 
movement and returns. In many instances, they provided direct security for the work of the 
OSCE as they developed electoral capacity across the country, vital in areas resistant to 
change. However, from the summer of 1996, it is clear that NATO, through IFOR, not only 
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assisted in the delivery of such policies, but – through a willingness to experiment with 
conditional incentives and normative pressure – gradually started to evolve and adapt its 
own approach to these issues. This will be explored in greater detail below. 
The first post-conflict elections were held on 14 September 1996 at state, entity and 
cantonal levels. Despite significant international effort, a lower than expected number of 
ethnic minorities voted, particularly in RS. Significantly, in terms of the implementation of 
minority policy at municipal levels, municipal elections were postponed due to “evidence 
of manipulation of the voter registration option enabling refugees to vote where they intend 
to live”.457 Once again the role of IFOR is singled out by the HR: 
During this phase, military support to civilian agencies has increased. 
This contribution has been vital to progress in most aspects of civilian 
activity and the support to the OSCE election management has been 
essential and extensive. Without this support the elections could not 
have taken place.
458
 
 
However, in considering the impact of those elections, it is worth noting the HR of the time 
saw them as completing the third phase of peace implementation and setting up the fourth 
phase, which he deemed critical to the success of the state in the future, as it would require 
the newly-elected leaders to embrace the new state structures in the manner intended. OHR 
staff confirmed that the priority at the time was to “run off” the elections as best they 
could, and then try to deal with the acknowledged problems in tandem with the newly 
elected representatives, “warts and all”.459 Within a month, the process was beset with 
difficulties, as many of the state, entity and canton outcomes left subgroups of ethnic 
minorities in positions of uncertainty. This was particularly acute in RS, where from the 
outset there was significant resistance to participation in the Dayton structures. In 
particular, the initial refusal of RS deputies to participate in the newly constituted House of 
Representatives in October 1996 had the effect of placing a further layer of political 
intransigence between the entity-based ethnic minority groups (in this case Bosniaks and 
Croats in RS) and the policies that were intended to accommodate their needs.
460
 
However, the approach by the OHR and OSCE was not without its merits. Within a 
year, municipal elections were conducted, and despite widespread and well-founded 
concerns over boycotts, 80-85% of the electorate responded to the calls of the main 
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political parties (under immense normative and increasing conditional pressure 
themselves) to turn out for the municipal elections.
461
 By 2001, other innovative schemes 
were being piloted, such as a municipality awards scheme to reward municipalities that 
demonstrated “tolerance to other ethnic groups”. Various such schemes emerged during the 
period, including versions run by USAID and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting.
462
 
Recording limited success, the traction they had with communities remains open to 
question. 
6.23 Features of Domestic Politics and Minority Participation: 1997-2004 
By the summer of 1997, flaws in the transposition and adoption of “Dayton laws” were 
manifest in several areas. For example, in the Federation it was noted that “in view of the 
approaching municipal elections and the failure of the Federation Parliament to reach a 
compromise on the Municipality Law, disenfranchisement of 60,000 electorates living in 
divided municipalities in the Federation seems to be unavoidable.”463 Serious political 
disputes in RS also hampered policy adoption and implementation, most notably in June 
1997, when the Republika Srpska President, Biljana Plavšić,464 took the decision to 
suspend the Minister of Interior, owing to corruption allegations. As the Government, 
guided by the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Pale, refused to follow 
both this and her subsequent decision to dissolve the Parliament, a serious constitutional 
and political crisis erupted. Differences on the widespread discrimination against ethnic 
minorities in the field of employment, education and access to government services 
“supporting the trend towards ethnic separation” were at the core of internal power 
struggles within the majority ruling parties on all sides, not just the SDS.
465
  However, they 
were also reflective of a degree of normative traction, due to the sustained pressure of 
international organisations. The OHR, in particular, insisted that entities comply with the 
Dayton requirements, regarding the participation of minorities in all state institutions. 
Commenting on the crisis the HR noted that: 
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This crisis mirrors a growing rift between SDS hardliners and those who 
wish to implement the Peace Agreement, and could potentially have 
serious repercussions on the implementation process.
466
 
 
However, as entities gradually moved into alignment, it became clear that the dynamic of 
the relationship between the OHR and the main political parties at state and entity levels 
was stunting the implementation of policy on ethnic minority issues in other ways. 
Increasingly, political leaders from majority parties pointed towards their structural 
compliance, and complained of undemocratic interference by unelected international 
administrators when queried on policy implementation. Furthermore, minority 
representatives, “frustrated with the game”, either refused to recognise the new structures, 
or became impatient with the limited potential for favourable outcomes in a zero sum 
political arena.
467
 Thus, in all cases, the ironic situation developed, whereby the one area 
where standards for ethnic minority participation were clearly defined and established 
(state and entity representative structures) served to uphold the very ethnic divisions they 
were intended to address, with little evidence of voting across ethnic boundaries, no 
substantial shift in the doctrinal positions of parties where candidates retained their ethnic 
focus, and no meaningful decline in popular support for nationalist hardliners.  
The international presence, led by the High Representative, can still 
intervene in Bosnian politics and annul undesirable decisions, but it is 
significantly less effective in transforming the character of the political 
process…in sum, there is now a broad academic consensus that, in 
terms of long-term peace building, Bosnia today looks much like a 
failure, and it does so specifically because of the across-the-board 
institutionalization of ethnicity that was part of the Dayton 
agreement.
468
 
 
Considering the nature of the international-domestic interaction, the findings suggest that 
the consociational model devised for Bosnia was ill-suited for the particulars of the post-
conflict environment, and representative of a lack of confidence in the domestic potential 
for change and/or the external potential to influence change. It also appears that the OHR 
lacked a willingness or ability to move beyond a rather superficial representative balance 
towards achieving meaningful interaction between majority and minority populations. 
Time and again, issues such as electricity and water supply and other infrastructural 
projects were scuppered by ethnic discord at national and local levels, rather than being 
utilised as conductors for incentivising changes in policy behaviour.  
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Progress was, however, achieved in certain areas, for example the creation of an 
‘Implementation Office’ to oversee the establishment of 12 new municipalities, including 
the symbolically “significant achievement of the implementation of the 1997 election 
results in the municipality of Srebrenica where, in June, a multi-ethnic municipal council 
was finally installed.”469 While it is evident that NATO was not involved in most aspects 
of this process, there were some notable exceptions. Foremost, their contribution at 
municipal levels and secondly their role in the transformation of the Bosnian Armed 
Forces. 
6.24 State and Nation Building: CIMIC 1997-2004 
Beyond the initiation of a network of engagement, there is little evidence to show that 
IFOR’s humanitarian activity had an effect on the delivery of policy regarding ethnic 
minority participation. While military access to funding and the demand for reconstruction 
assistance made returns the main effort for many CIMIC teams, it was by no means their 
only stream of activity. CIMIC teams played a valuable role as interlocutors in their 
respective areas of operation, on issues as diverse as sharing school facilities and market 
space to support for local government structures and returns. Regarding the impact of 
CIMIC activity on minority participation, two features emerge. First, most of SFOR’s 
engagement at municipal and sub-municipal level regarding the participation of minorities 
was informal in nature. Indeed, interviewees suggested that the results of the sample only 
captured part of the interaction, and that informal efforts by SFOR personnel to coordinate 
contact between majority and minority populations was a regular feature of SFOR’s 
activity. Second, accepting the informal character of most engagement, there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that in some cases SFOR successfully linked conditional 
incentives to policies regarding minority participation. While many of these outcomes did 
not correspond with policies laid down by the OHR, or the various levels of domestic 
government, they were nonetheless examples of complaint behaviour. Formally complaint 
outcomes were in evidence but comparatively, less so, perhaps representative of a 
reluctance by SFOR to “go too far into domestic governance structures”.470 Finally, while 
some of the outcomes identified can be considered as compliant outcomes, the quality of 
minority participation at municipal levels varied significantly. 
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Of the 131 CIMIC activities analysed, 15% or 20 activities involved incentives 
directly linked to minority participation. While relatively small in the context of the 
sample, interviews suggest that it does not fully reflect the significant – mostly unrecorded 
– effort made by SFOR to included minority representatives in all aspects of their activity. 
Interviews revealed various means of informal engagement with majority and minority 
groups: for example, the preference of German military CIMIC teams was to engage with 
parties unilaterally before bringing them together for “round table discussions”.471 Through 
such measures, minority participation in discussion on reconstruction, returns, service 
provision etc., became an accepted part of the modus operandi of SFOR. However, that 
dynamic was not necessarily reciprocated or visible in municipal administrations: 
compliant behaviour in ad hoc CIMIC fora for the most part did not transfer to domestic 
institutions. SFOR personnel indicated that they used these meetings to reinforce “key 
messages” regarding returns and the inclusion of minorities.472 This view is supported by 
the sample which found that normative pressure was a feature of all cases, and for five 
activities it was the only strategic mechanism applied. 
Of the conditional incentives applied, financial incentives were applied in 16 cases, 
five of these also involved the delivery of capacity building or technical support (such as 
training). For example, a UK CIMIC project supported by DFID and delivered jointly with 
the Bosanska Gradiška municipality linked conditions to support for a multi-ethnic school: 
Such an initiative is very important, especially in this multi-ethnic 
school that has students and teachers from Bosnian-Serb, Bosnian-Croat 
and Bosniac backgrounds. About 75 of the 800 students (aged 7-15) are 
from ethnic minority families.
473
 
 
The objective of the CIMIC team in that instance was to establish a multi-ethnic forum in 
order to develop mutual trust between parents, teachers and the municipality for delivering 
and maintaining a multi-ethnic school. Such initiatives were not always successful, and 
often compromises were reached, whereby students of the various ethnic groups attended 
the school at different times. In an interview in the SFOR Informer, in 2002, one Spanish 
CIMIC officer admitted: “Almost every school that I know of here is divided by floors 
according to the ethnicity of the children… They follow different studies, with different 
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teachers. There is a long way to go.”474 The wider political support for such schools was 
also open to question and became a problem as the international presence declined. Two 
cases examined involved capacity support only, linking the provision of training for 
municipal “emergency response management” to the condition that municipal teams were 
multi-ethnic in composition.
475
 
On compliance, 24 cases resulted in partially compliant outcomes – evidence of 
participation, but not always in accordance with the standards specified by the OHR. 
However, the sample reveals that such outcomes were predominantly prior to 2003, which 
would suggest that the introduction of ‘CIMIC Houses’ helped to encourage more formally 
compliant outcomes,  bringing minorities more into contact with domestic institutions. As 
SFOR resources reduced, the demand for CIMIC activities relating to returns increased 
during this period. CIMIC houses countered that dynamic providing a means to create a 
‘neutral space’ to bring together majority and minority representatives to discuss a variety 
of issues. In many cases, before minorities were willing to participate in the official local 
structures (though they were afforded representation), CIMIC houses provided a first step 
towards full institutional participation. Acknowledging the participatory gap between 
“round table discussions” and municipal government, CIMIC houses were developed to 
provide a semi-formal but “non-threatening environment for local citizens to interface with 
SFOR and other civil authorities, and function as a routing agency to direct local citizens to 
the assistance they need”.476 A Dutch SFOR CIMIC team describing their function 
suggested that: 
We encourage people to use the government… In doing projects, we 
want the mayors and the ministers to have their role. They are 
responsible … for running this country. The CIMIC team has also had 
success in getting former warring factions to co-operate on projects such 
as road reconstruction and bridge building… 477 
 
The later aspects of that effort reflected the dominant role played by NATO in reforming 
the Bosnian Armed Forces where they were in a position to apply a range of conditional 
incentives. However, they were also representative of the fact that CIMIC liaison officers 
were appointed to the office of the OHR and to the Regional Joint Civilian Commissions in 
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Tuzla and Banja Luka. The information provided by these officers often served to direct 
the more high profile CIMIC activities to the areas of “greatest political return”.478 
Considering the progressive impact of CIMIC houses, it is also worth noting that compliant 
outcomes were most prevalent in the 2002-2003 period. 
In addition to the 24 partially compliant outcomes, two instances of full compliance 
were found (one-off small scale community events) while non-compliant outcomes were 
identified in 26 cases. Of these only two were attributable to the failure of engagement by 
SFOR personnel. However, interviews suggested that instances of complete failure, though 
relatively rare, were more prominent than the sample suggests. Finally, in considering 
these findings, it should be noted that compliance was taken at the end of the project in 
question and does not reflect the sustainability or quality of participation in the years that 
followed, which varied significantly, but was not the focus of this research. In this case, 
most instances of non-compliance were explained by that fact that insufficient time had 
passed for the impact of SFOR actions – as recorded – to be fairly judged.  
6.25 State and Nation Building: LOT Houses, Key Leader Engagement and Defence 
Reform 2003-2005 
SFOR’s strength continually and significantly reduced though this period, from 17,000 
personnel in 2002, to 12,000 in 2003, and 7,000 upon handover to EUFOR in 2004.  
Following the CIMIC house approach, the LOT house system was intended to 
accommodate strength reductions whilst developing SFOR’s understanding of the political 
dynamics at local levels. Established on order of COMSFOR in autumn 2003, in part they 
were the legacy of the considered success of CIMIC houses, and for a period they 
continued to perform many CIMIC tasks: this would diminish rapidly from 2004. It should 
be noted that, while the LOT House programme was new, the concept was not entirely 
novel for the region. Several TCC would have established “platoon houses” as de facto 
bases in the early days of the operation, giving them instant and valuable access to the 
population. Additionally “faction houses” of fewer than five personnel were used to 
provide a presence in isolated areas to gather ‘situational awareness’. JCO (Joint 
Combined Operations) houses were also established for short term periods to support 
specific operations, including CIMIC operations. From these actions the concept developed 
for LOT Houses was that: 
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soldiers live not in a military camp but in civilian accommodation 
among the local population providing the dynamic, responsive and 
locally-based 'public face' of SFOR. The purpose of LOT is to be more 
accessible to citizens and authorities’479 
 
Once the concept was embraced, SFOR established 40 LOT Houses across the country, 
with the objectives of: maintaining direct contact with local population, institutions and 
representatives of international organisations; enhancing local coordination and liaison 
with the international organisations, regional/local civil and police authorities, and the 
populace; monitoring political, economic, and social developments; building trust and 
confidence among international actors and service organizations contributing to the 
development of Bosnia; and evaluating the degree of positive interaction, and identifying 
any problem areas where SFOR could encourage solutions.
480
 
In establishing this network, and in consultation with the EU planning teams, the 
constitution of LOT Houses was also seen as part of the transition to EUFOR operations. 
However, for over a year, SFOR operated the houses and found that they were an excellent 
way to establish a “different presence in the community”: 
We lived among them and gradually came to know and better 
understand the dynamic of the town. This allowed us to identify points 
of entry with local government structures whereby we could progress 
particular issues whether minority related or otherwise’.481  
 
If the characteristics of CIMIC engagement were seen to diminish during this period,  
relatively quickly a new dynamic is seen to emerge whereby the staff of LOT Houses 
became ‘honest brokers’ between citizens, international organisations and the local 
political elite. In this regard, LOT house personnel came to play a significant, though 
mostly informal, role in encouraging ethnic minority participation at local levels. With 
limited funding or military guidance beyond “maintaining situational awareness”, LOT 
House staff often interpreted their mandate in the broadest terms, “each team and each 
individual within the team [having] an immense amount of latitude as to how the mission 
was achieved.”482 
TCCs often – though not always – carefully selected personnel for LOT houses, on 
the basis of language or legal skills. A common theme emerging from interviews with LOT 
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house personnel is that they saw their role as “encouraging trust and cooperation” among 
the local population. They acknowledged that, in most cases, conditional incentives were 
no longer an option (though projects organised through national resources remained a 
feature), but they actively pursued an ‘integration’ agenda to encourage minorities to 
participate and majorities to allow them.
483
 Somewhat paradoxically, the normative 
pressure applied by LOT house staff was not in response to any clear directive from higher 
SFOR HQ: “we assumed it was what they wanted us to do and we saw it as part of our co-
ordinating function…”484 Others were more guarded about the extent to which LOT houses 
impacted on minority participation. A French officer working in the HQ suggested that, 
while LOT houses did their best to encourage minority participation, in some cases they 
became the “first and only port of call” for minority groups themselves. “LOT houses were 
not intended to act as agents for minority groups and we had to be careful to ensure that 
teams did not undermine their neutrality by over exposure to one side or the other; our 
byword was – Bosnian solutions for Bosnian problems.”485 
With the transition to EUFOR, and as the overlap with CIMIC activity effectively 
ended,
486
 the language used by LOT house staff became increasingly calculated. One staff 
officer noted: “because we had nothing tangible to offer we found ourselves playing the 
EU [membership] card. Not just on minority issues but on almost all issues we emphasised 
the importance of complying with EU standards”.487 Once again however it appears that 
this was not an orchestrated or planned response, but rather one assumed by the staff 
themselves. Of the personnel interviewed, none had been directed to emphasise Bosnian 
membership prospects, though many (including non-EU staffed LOT houses such as those 
run by Chile, New Zealand or Canada) admitted to doing so. 
As noted above, at all levels NATO’s command structure afforded IFOR and SFOR 
almost daily contact with the political leadership and staff of Bosnian government. 
Depending on the personalities involved, the nature of the relationships that formed often 
served to stimulate or stall progress on various aspects of IFOR and SFORs missions. As 
the mission progressed, relationships consolidated, the respective parties became more 
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familiar with each other, and NATO became increasingly aware of the power of its 
political influence. Over the period analysed, the application of normative pressure was 
observed to rise continuously, while the application of conditionality was seen to rise and 
then taper from 2004.  
Part of the reason explaining why NATO’s engagement with Bosnian politicians 
and officials became more sophisticated can be attributed to the fact that military personnel 
from most TCCs returned to Bosnia repeatedly. For example, speaking during his third trip 
in 2002 Lt. Gen. John. B Sylvester (COMSFOR) noted the contrast between his first and 
second trips in 1995 and 1998 respectively, and his last trip in 2002; by 2002, “all of the 
nation building things could occur […] done by the international community and by the 
government of BiH, to include the entities, all of the cantons and municipalities”.488 It can 
also be attributed to the fact that, as the concept of civilian-military cooperation evolved 
through the interaction of NATO with international organisations and NGOs, NATO 
personnel become more adept at addressing political, minority and other rights-based 
issues.  
While commanders applied normative pressure at all levels when compared to their 
engagement with returns (acknowledging the overlap), those interviewed stated they were 
less inclined to apply conditional incentives to participation issues. In explaining this 
tendency, many commanders made the point that encouraging inter-ethnic dialogue was 
their primary aim, whilst also expressing the view that this dialogue eventually carried over 
into the representative structures. Those who were there between 1995 and 1999 believed 
that participation was encouraged through sustained dialogue with minority communities 
and local political leaders, in attempts to facilitate their engagement with the electoral 
process and in the representative institutions. In many instances, these actions were carried 
out unilaterally, though more often IFOR personnel worked in conjunction with UNHCR 
or an international NGO. Where unilateral interaction occurred between NATO 
commanders and local leaders, it was predominantly informal in manner, and most often 
linked to the delivery of incentives relating to returns or other issues such as freedom of 
movement, security, education, medical services etc. – “but the details were generally left 
to CIMIC teams to work out.”489 The exception to this predominantly informal normative 
interaction was NATO’s contribution to the transformation of the Bosnian Armed Forces. 
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The contribution of NATO to defence reform in Bosnia was and remains an overtly 
formal process, involving the clear application of membership conditionality and 
normative pressure. By the end of the war, Bosnia had three ‘ethnic’ armed groups: the 
Army of the Federation of Bosnia comprised of the “Bosnian Army”, mostly a 
Muslim/Bosniak national armed component; the Croatian Defence Council (the HVO), an 
armed component of Croats; and the army of Republika Srpska, almost completely 
composed of Serbs from the Republika Srpska. 
Initially, the process of defence reform necessarily overlapped with that of police 
reform as, during the war, the lines between the police and military units were fluid – 
police forces contributed to the protection of cities throughout the conflict but were also 
involved in ethnic cleansing.
490
 However, in contrast with the stunted process of policing 
reform, the constitution and evolution of the Bosnian Armed Forces is generally 
considered to be a success. Nevertheless, given the post-conflict sensitivities, real defence 
reform did not gather momentum until 2003. Up to that point, NATO HQ and SFOR 
maintained pressure on both entities to reform their military structures in line with Dayton, 
and made it explicit that moves to membership of PfP were conditional on convergence 
into a unified military structure: the Joint Military Commission was at the centre of that 
process, continuously encouraging and pushing the work of the ‘Inspectors General’.  
Force restructuring of the Entities is necessary because as long as BiH 
retains its current military system, it will be seen as incapable of 
integrating into the European mainstream and unwilling to develop the 
prosperous democratic society which its citizens want. DCOMOPS 
stressed the importance of explaining that the work towards PfP offers a 
better life for BiH, that the work of the JMC is the key to that better life, 
and that PfP membership is the final destination for the restructuring 
effort.
491
 
 
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was an independent office subordinate to 
COMSFOR, established in February 1999. Its mission was to monitor and investigate 
issues of professionalism and ethical behaviour in the Entity Armed Forces. SFOR used it 
to socialise EAF officers on the standards of military professionalism required for 
progression to PfP. Within a year, behavioural change was evident among those EAF 
officers involved: 
They are guardians of the standards of professional armies. They work 
for and report to their commanders, but their eyes must always be 
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focused on clear standards of conduct, applied with integrity and moral 
courage and without ethnic bias… I would really like to focus a little 
more on the teaching and sending out of different ideas to the 
commands so that they can present what they do to lower level 
commanders, so everyone in their army will understand their 
missions.
492
 
 
Though NATO’s involvement in Kosovo restricted progress on defence reform during the 
period 1999-2000, positive signs continued to emerge: 
In one year the results in the RS range from an uncooperative mood to 
outright civilian violence and demonstrations in places such as Banja 
Luka, Brčko, Bijeljina Zvornik to a co-operative mode. Now we are 
seeing a very co-operative mode and we’re on the right track. The 
swearing in of the new Inspector General, which just happened just a 
few days ago, is a very positive point in the life of the two EAFs. We’re 
now looking to a main change in the mentality of the officers in charge 
of those armies. They are much more like western standards. Their 
generals are now complaining much more to their own politicians, and 
are co-operating with SFOR, and they rely on SFOR much more than 
they do their own politicians.
493
 
 
The success of socialisation vehicles, such as the Joint Military Commission and OIG at 
the operational level, and the joint SFOR/EAF patrolling at the tactical level, became 
increasingly apparent from 2001. The later establishment of the Defence Reform 
Commission by HR Paddy Ashdown added momentum at the political level. Since then, 
much is made of the fact that the Bosnian Armed Forces were one of the few state 
institutions to ‘successfully’ conform to a multi-ethnic format. Indeed, NATO declared 
itself satisfied that all its military/technical criteria were complied with by the end of 
2004.
494
 By 2005, a unified command structure was in place that reflected the inter-ethnic 
standards set by the international organisations involved.  
In considering that success, three aspects of the international effort stand out: first 
the continuing provision of security by SFOR, and EUFOR from 2004, created the time 
and space for reform to take place; second, that the reform process was incentivised by 
linkage to Bosnian ambitions (formally stated in 2005)
495
 to achieve Euro-Atlantic 
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integration through membership of the PfP and ultimately NATO itself and; third the 
harmonisation/coordination function of the Defence Reform Commission, created by the 
OHR under HR Paddy Ashdown.
496
 
While the package of conditions applied by NATO on defence reform emphasised 
the requirement for ethnic balance in the military structures, the ethnic balance that 
emerged did not amount to full minority representation or participation. In many ways, it 
was and remains a superficial success, as the structure put in place was one of segregated 
cooperation rather than integration. Initially, joint exercises were conducted by the Army 
of the Federation and RS. From 2004 onwards inter-ethnic interactions were formalised at 
the HQ levels under close international supervision. By 2006, the structure moved away 
from the entities armies to a more integrated structure composed of the 4
th
, 5
th
 and 6
th
 
Brigades. Though this ‘step by step’ approach to military reform was sensible (more 
integrated structures may emerge in time), it is noticeable in almost all documents 
published at that time, that the ‘ethnic factor’ is down played in favour of an emphasis on 
democratic oversight, jointness, and technical compliance with the standards outlined by 
NATO. Ethnic quotas are defined as follows: Bosniaks 45.90% or 4826 persons; Serbs 
33.60% or 3533 persons; Croats 19.80% or 2084 persons; and other ethnic groups 0.70% 
or 74 persons.
497
 However, integrated participation exists only at the highest levels and 
does not permeate to battalion level, where each brigade is composed of three battalions: 
one of each ethnic group drawn from the former Bosnian Armed Forces, the Armies of the 
Federation and RS.  
Localised incentives were used quite well to encourage inter-ethnic cooperation at 
HQ levels, a process that was considerably aided by the persistent “international 
socialisation” of Bosnian officers on NATO courses, programmes and events. In this 
regard, arguably normative pressure was utilised more successfully to underline the reform 
process through the socialisation of Bosnian officers from all ethnic backgrounds, often in 
overseas contexts. Similarly, Bosnia’s commitment to international PSO should aide this 
socialisation process as they deploy multi-ethnic units overseas. However, while many of 
the NATO personnel interviewed, including those at NATO HQ, suggested that NATO’s 
role in defence reform was an example of the explicit linkage of conditional incentives 
(primarily attached to PfP) to minority representation and participation (and to an extent it 
was), it would also appear that the participation of minorities in the armed forces can be 
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understood as mirroring the consociational aspects of Dayton. Participation was achieved 
but only to the point of reflecting the political balance of the country; work towards a more 
ethnically integrated force continues. 
6.3 Conclusion: Policy Outcomes and the Nature of Compliance 
 
“putting the meat on the bones of the UNHCRs efforts”.498 
 
The application of conditionality was generally not a feature of militaries’ humanitarian 
assistance, and there is little evidence to suggest that humanitarian aid was conditionally 
linked to returns, or the inclusion or participation of ethnic minorities in the emerging state 
structures. Beyond ‘humanitarian assistance’ the picture diversifies. 
The analysis demonstrates that military influence on the delivery of returns policy 
was most evident though CIMIC programmes and Key Leader Engagement with domestic 
politicians and officials. From the sample taken, it was found that aid conditionality or 
technical support conditionality were prominent features of the military interaction on 
returns issues. Where such conditionality was applied, there is evidence of full or partial 
compliance in many cases. Reflecting on his experience during the period, one member of 
the Bratunac municipality noted: “I have only good things to say about CIMIC…others 
promised a lot and then didn’t do anything. The CIMIC team has made no promises, but 
we are very satisfied with the end result”.499 However, non-compliant outcomes are also a 
persistent feature of the interaction due to both poor military planning and delivery and a 
lack of domestic willingness to engage. 
Interviews with domestic groups also revealed that the constant rotation of military 
personnel made the reciprocity of the process very frustrating for all parties, often leading 
to project collapse. Furthermore, it was noticeable, particularly in the early days of CIMIC 
intervention, that promises were made by military units to local actors that were not 
delivered upon: often representative of a lack of knowledge and experience in engaging on 
such issues. A further and more persistent impediment on the impact of NATO activity 
was the range of domestic factors affecting returns: 
Obstacles to return on the political level are compounded by the lack of 
security, administrative obstacles such as refusal of the municipal 
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authorities to register returnees as well as to issue or accept 
identification cards, the shortage of funding for reconstruction in the 
housing, infrastructure, social infrastructure and employment sectors.
500
 
 
This is reflected in several reports of the period, and it is clear that as domestic 
administrative capacity developed, it was often used to hamper and subvert policy 
initiatives on returns, participation and other areas. This supports the findings of Harvey’s 
research in RS, where she noted that Serbian organisations such as ‘Ostanak’ were 
established to actively discourage Serbs from returning to areas within the Bosnian 
federation.
501
 
Normative pressure was universally applied regarding minority returns issues, 
through military-led projects and in support of the UNHCR or other agencies. With the 
advent of LOT houses, and the transfer of authority from SFOR to EUFOR, military 
activity in terms of the application of conditional incentives on minority returns issues was 
observed to fall off considerably; and by 2005 military involvement in such activity had all 
but ended. This coincides with the acceleration of EU schemes such as CARDS, and the 
more active role of the EU mission to Bosnia. While the normative pressure on returns is 
maintained by military actors, and increasingly includes reference to Bosnia’s membership 
prospects, they are typically not involved in the EU returns effort beyond the provision of 
information on regional activity. In short, the period from 2004-2005 marks the 
consolidation of civilian means of engagement with returns issues. 
On participation, it is clear that the networks created by IFOR, and carried on by 
SFOR, established a parallel system of interface often affording ethnic minority groups the 
opportunity to engage on institutional and other issues prior to their actual participation in 
state institutions. Awareness of this dynamic was not universally apparent among NATO 
or civilian persons interviewed. While there is evidence to suggest that CIMIC activity was 
occasionally linked to formal minority participation in state institutions and processes, it is 
modest. Conditionality was most evident in accounts of Key Leader Engagement, whereby 
NATO commanders consistently reinforced the message on minority inclusion, often 
linking majority support to incentives, ranging from various CIMIC projects to the scaling 
down of certain military operational activities which were disliked by the public; traffic 
check points etc. Thus normative pressure for the facilitation of participation is a more 
prominent feature of the process. 
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Overall, military forces operating in humanitarian aid, CIMIC and LOT house roles 
did not typically apply conditional incentives on issues relating to minority participation in 
state representative or other institutions. The exception to this was NATOs facilitation and 
oversight of the development of the Bosnian Armed Forces, where significant emphasis 
was placed on achieving ethnic representativeness. Though hailed as a success, it must be 
noted that ethnic integration does not permeate below Brigade HQ level. Bosnian 
Battalions remained mono-ethnic and were not representative of the minority elements 
within the entities themselves. In this regard, it can be said that in the one area where 
military actors had significant input to the participation of minorities in state institutions, 
the result is one of partial compliance only. However, common to all interviews, it was felt 
that the merits of what had been achieved with the Bosnian Armed Forces should not be 
undermined or underestimated. 
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Case Study 2 
Kosovo 1999-2009 
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Chapter 7 
 
Military Engagement with Ethnic Minority Issues in Kosovo 1999-2009: Framework 
and Context 
7.1 Introduction 
Two days after the ratification of UNSCR 1244, on 10 June 1999, NATO deployed the 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) under the code-name of “Operation Joint Guardian”. Prior to their 
deployment, NATO forces in FYROM were central to the UNHCR’s delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to the estimated 850,000 refugees.
502
 Through the work of various 
international bodies, including the quint, contact group, NAC, ‘Group of 8’, and ultimately 
the UN, the international effort in Kosovo was designed to address seven principles, 
including: the immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression; the withdrawal of 
the military, police and paramilitary forces of the FRY; deployment of effective 
international and security presences; establishment of an interim administration; the safe 
and free return of all refugees; a political process providing for substantial self-
government, as well as the demilitarization of the KLA; and a comprehensive approach to 
the economic development of the crisis region. While comprehensive, the principles were 
established for a narrative that was coming to an end; a narrative based on the view of the 
Kosovo Albanians as “the ethnic minority.”503 
Within a year, and in spite of the widespread destruction of property, the vast 
majority of Kosovo Albanians returned to their places of origin, if not their homes. Inter-
ethnic tension, particularly the intimidation and persecution of the Serbian minority 
community within Kosovo, resulted in the concurrent exodus of an estimated 215,000 
persons.
504
 This chapter considers the role of the military in the international structures 
created by UNSCR 1244, from 1999 to 2009. It will consider how the language and intent 
of UNSCR 1244, and subsequent policy strategies, shaped military operational decisions 
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on minority issues examined in Chapter 8. It shall also explore the potential impact of the 
evolution of domestic politics. 
7.11 The UNSCR 1244 Framework and Policy on Ethnic Minority Issues 
In fact, one might say that towards the end, the talks were less about 
Kosovo and more about relations within the Contact Group.
505
 
 
Though the Rambouillet process ultimately ended in failure, as the respective parties 
refused to compromise,
506
 it had a significant impact on the post-conflict political dynamic 
and therefore the operation of all aspects of the interim administration and security 
apparatus. In particular, the inability of the international actors involved to articulate a 
clear position as to the future of Kosovo – the irreconcilable propositions of self-
determination vs territorial unity
507
 – created a politically ambiguous space for first the 
KLA and then Kosovo Albanian politicians to persistently test the bounds of UNSCR 1244 
in pursuit of their goals. 
UNSCR 1244 did not appear to anticipate the shift in the ‘minorities’, narrative or 
address the internal political dynamic. In the first instance, insofar as it addressed the issue 
of returns, its focus was on the then displaced Kosovo Albanian population, “assuring the 
safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in 
Kosovo”. UNMIK staff interviewed, while acknowledging that UNSCR 1244 was 
“probably not written” with the Kosovo Serbian minority population in mind, argued that 
there was sufficient scope to deal with the escalating problem of Serbian returns.
508
 
Likewise, KFOR personnel spoke of “accepting the new reality on the ground and adapting 
accordingly”, though one officer emphasised the complexity of the situation, wryly 
observing that “the situation was at times farcical as the international community was 
talking about returns even before some Serbian families had made the decision to leave”509 
The reference in the preamble to the resolution, referring to the “right of all” to return, 
would feature prominently in the post-conflict policy initiatives, such as the Constitutional 
Framework and Standards for Kosovo process. 
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If the language of UNSCR 1244 concerning returns was somewhat adaptable, its 
stance on transition to substantial autonomy and self-governance, including the initiation of 
a process to address the status of Kosovo, emboldened Kosovo Albanian politicians – “in 
one way, the stepping stones were all there”.510 For many Kosovo Serbs, the reference to 
“taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, far from assuaging their 
suspicions, were viewed as the imposition of terms they had already rejected.
511
 In terms of 
encouraging the participation of the minority Serbian population in the representative and 
institutional structures that would follow, the framework was overtly weak. 
While these weaknesses can be attributed to UNSCR 1244, they also reflect the fact 
that the institutional vacuum encountered by international organisations upon entry to 
Kosovo meant that options for the application of conditional incentives linked to ethnic 
minority issues were highly restricted for the first 12-18 months of international 
administration. As a result, the informal actions of KFOR on these issues were significant 
in terms of establishing the international position on returns and participation issues. This 
aspect will be explored in greater detail below. 
Though UNSCR 1244 made several references to returns, and the development of 
post-conflict institutions of government, there was no reference to minority rights or 
documents addressing minority rights. Admittedly, it was not intended to serve as a 
constitutional lynchpin like the Dayton agreement, but even in comparison to UNSCR 
1031, it is notable that it did not address questions concerning the relationship between the 
communities in Kosovo; there was no call to “create confidence between the 
communities”.512 UNMIK staff were divided as to the value of the resolution, with some 
arguing that the lack of prescriptiveness afforded them the room to create policies best 
suited to the situation, while others suggested that it undermined subsequent policy 
initiatives, particularly where parties took a conservative position on the text. Over the 
period under review, and considering the policy initiatives that emerged, it would appear 
that UNSCR 1244 did not have an obviously positive or negative influence on the 
application of conditionality or normative pressure. 
Insofar as a legal framework emerged for engagement with returns, it was 
articulated through initiatives such as the Standards for Kosovo process and the institution 
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of the constitutional framework for the PISG.
513
 These and other documents served to 
ground’ policy on IDPs, establishing the right of IDPs and refugees to voluntarily return to 
their place of origin, based on references to UNSCR 1244 and identified international legal 
instruments, thereby expanding on UNMIK’s responsibility of “assuring the safe and 
unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo” in more 
practical terms. While KFOR was initially tasked with establishing the secure environment 
– as shall be highlighted below – it quickly assumed a broad interpretation of security. 
While recognising the extent of the challenge associated with returns was important, 
translating that into effective policies was an often a fraught and fruitless exercise. 
Capturing the complexity of the challenge faced by KFOR, a joint OSCE/UNHCR 
assessment noted: 
… it must be appreciated that the rights and guarantees afforded to 
returnees can only be achieved by addressing the root causes of 
insecurity, discrimination and alienation between ethnic groups. In the 
Kosovo context, creating safe and sustainable conditions requires a 
meaningful process of dialogue and confidence-building measures 
grounded upon a political commitment to such processes by Kosovo’s 
majority and minority communities and their leaders. Creating 
conditions for return cannot be viewed as primarily an exercise of 
physical protection through the allocation of military or police assets to 
“ensure” security. Such an approach, necessary to “ensure” immediate 
physical security in the absence of a fundamental change in social and 
political conditions, simply cannot sustain a significant return process 
for the over 200,000 minorities displaced outside of Kosovo.
514
 
 
Initial post-conflict policy emerged ‘from the ground up’ effort of the UNHCR, OSCE and 
KFOR, rather than through grand policy frameworks. Through 1999 and into 2000, those 
organisations engaged in a series of activities – bus corridors, humanitarian assistance, 
security measures – designed to address the influx of returning Kosovo Albanian’s, while 
attempting to engage effectively with the complex dynamics of the Serbian population who 
were displaced, fleeing or under siege.
515
 More comprehensive programmes to address 
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ethnic minority issues started to emerge by spring 2000. Based on the reports of UNHCR, 
OSCE, and to a lesser extent KFOR, the programmes were the first attempts to provide a 
more comprehensive framework for engaging on ethnic minority issues. For example, 
following the launch of policy to address the situation of the Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptian 
minorities, the UNHCR then sought to get the support of the Kosovo Albanian leaders, 
through the Transitional Council and Interim Administrative Council, for policies aimed at 
“exploring the safe and sustainable return of ethnic Serbs to Kosovo”.516 A Joint 
Committee on Return (JCR) of Kosovo Serbs was established in May 2000, producing the 
“Framework for Return 2001”, which set out the basic principles guiding both organised 
and spontaneous returns of displaced persons to their places of origin, while proposing 
details on how to create conditions conducive to  safe and sustainable return.  
Throughout 2001, the ethnic minority focus of the international effort became more 
pronounced. A UN Security Council Mission travelled to Kosovo in June 2001 with the 
express intention of conveying “a strong message to local leaders and all others concerned 
about the need to reject all violence, ensure public safety and order, promote stability, 
safety and security, inter-ethnic reconciliation and inclusion”.517 It is evident, from their 
report and interviews with UNMIK and KFOR staff of the period that the idea of 
‘promoting multi-ethnicity’ was becoming central to the effort of the international 
administration. The key document to emerge in this period was the ‘Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo’, which provided clarity on the 
standards to be applied to issues concerning minority returns and participation.   
7.2 Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo and Parallel 
System of Serbian Governance 
In establishing a position on ethnic minority issues, the Constitutional Framework 
referenced several key treaties, including the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities.
518
 However, the document stopped short of using the word ‘minority’, 
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substituting ‘community’, partly in an attempt to avoid political sensitivities on both sides, 
regarding the use of the term minority.
519
 On specific issues the standard was clear: 
Reaffirming the commitment to facilitating the safe return of refugees 
and displaced persons to their homes and their exercise of the right to 
recover their property and possessions, and the commitment to creating 
conditions for freedom of movement for all persons; 
Recognizing the importance of creating a free, open and safe 
environment which facilitates the participation of all persons including 
all members of Communities in the process of establishing democratic 
institutions of self-government.
520
 
 
Reflecting the desire to facilitate the institutional participation of ethnic minority 
communities, Chapter 4, the “Rights of Communities and their Members”, emphasised that 
“the Institutions […] shall promote the preservation of Kosovo’s cultural heritage of all 
Communities without discrimination”.521 Unlike the Dayton Agreement, the Chapter 4 
provisions outlined a detailed framework of minority/community rights supported by a 
“committee on rights and interests of communities”, thereby giving significant normative 
scope to those tasked with delivering policies. Chapter 8, which focused on “the Powers 
and Responsibilities reserved for the SRSG”, allowed for the application of external 
coercive measures. Both chapters provided the framework – absent until then – for the 
more explicit application of incentives in the period up to the end of 2003. 
In a somewhat ironic twist to the immediate post-conflict outcome, the operation of 
a parallel system of governance – which had been the hallmark of Kosovo Albanian 
resistance prior to the conflict – became the preferred modus operandi of the Kosovo 
Serbian population. Openly supported by Belgrade, and incorporating the maintenance of 
public salaries, and where possible the continued provision of public services, it facilitated 
an attitude of resistance among the Kosovo Serb population, and more importantly 
imparted responsibility for policy positions to Belgrade, rather than to Kosovo Serbian 
municipal leaders. That the Serbian population responded to the post-conflict outcome in 
that manner was not unexpected. UNMIK staff practically sought to engage with Belgrade 
as well as Kosovo Serbian representatives, and recognised “almost immediately” that 
Belgrade’s input was “one of the key pillars of progress”.522 This strategy was reaffirmed 
by the Security Council Mission, whose members emphasised their preference for 
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“pursuing parallel political and security tracks to improve the situation for all of Kosovo’s 
communities in an effort to encourage participation in the UNMIK-led process […] 
particularly the Kosovo Serb community.”523  
Unsurprisingly, such UNMIK policy initiatives were met with counter demands 
from Belgrade with President Kostunica seeking: 
additional confidence-building measures for the protection of minority 
communities; the immediate commencement of return of refugees and 
IDPs; the need for institutional links between UNMIK and Belgrade, 
particularly in the areas of education, media, the protection of culture 
and historical monuments; establishing cooperation between KFOR, 
UNMIK Police and the Yugoslav police.
524
 
 
While the rhetoric on both sides emphasised the “rights” of minority communities, the 
relationship between Belgrade, the Kosovo Serbian community and UNMIK deteriorated 
steadily throughout the period under review. Frustration with the lack of progress impacted 
ethnic minority policy development and delivery at all levels, impeding implementation 
and fuelling political intransigence, unrest and hostility on all sides. 
7.3 Standards for Kosovo 
These standards reinforce Kosovo’s parallel progress towards European 
standards in the framework of the EU’s Stabilisation and Association 
Process, based inter alia on the Copenhagen criteria. The standards 
describe a multi-ethnic society where there is democracy, tolerance, 
freedom of movement and equal access to justice for all people in 
Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic background.
525
 
 
The Standards for Kosovo process provided an explicit and comprehensive framework for 
the application of normative pressure and conditional incentives on ethnic minority issues. 
Also known as the “Standards before Status” process, it was an open attempt by UNMIK 
and its partners to leverage progress in eight areas, to a commitment to address the future 
status of the province. The eight areas identified for progress were: functioning democratic 
institutions; rule of law; freedom of movement; sustainable returns and the rights of 
communities and their members; Kosovo’s economy; property rights; dialogue with 
Belgrade; and the Kosovo Protection Corps. Through reference to the EU’s Stabilisation 
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Tracking Mechanism (established in 2002), and following from the commitments of the 
Thessaloniki summit of June 2003, the document outlined a path to membership of the EU 
and introduced the means of membership conditionality to the domestic arena. 
As with the Constitutional Framework, the document was explicitly 
“communitarian” and therefore quite specific in its approach to minority issues. For 
example, regarding the PISG, it required that the “interests and needs of all Kosovo 
communities are fully and fairly represented in all branches and institutions of 
government”, and that those communities should “participate fully in government”.526 The 
European prospective is inherent throughout its content, requiring in the first instance, the 
disestablishment of parallel structures and that “the laws and functions of the PISG 
approach European standards”.527 
In an attempt to address the “sustainability” of returns, Chapter IV presents 
standards on returns jointly with those of community rights, insisting that “the laws of 
Kosovo provide a full range of protection for human rights and the rights of communities 
and their members, consistent with European standards”. Concurrently, the PISG was also 
required to provide adequate resources and staff at all levels of government to ensure that 
mechanisms – such as Municipal Community Offices, Municipal Assembly, and 
Communities and Mediation Committees – had the resources and staff, to functioning 
effectively.
528
 Furthermore, the PISG was to participate in the Council of Europe 
implementation process for the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, and fully implement recommendations resulting from that process. The 
prominence of the Council of Europe in the document is representative of the significant 
role that body had in shaping post-conflict policy development, particularly on ethnic 
minority issues, and perhaps more pertinently, recognition of the view of some Kosovo 
Albanian politicians, that Kosovan membership of the Council of Europe was “an 
achievable goal”.529 In an attempt to leverage that position, “the Standards” also sought 
evidence of behavioural change requiring “visible support of the returns process by 
community leaders and public information and education efforts supported by the PISG [in 
order to] create a climate of tolerance and support for the right to return”. Regarding the 
progress of returns, chapter IV also outlined a benchmarking process requiring that “the 
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number of municipalities with sustainable returns increases, […] the pace of returns overall 
accelerates, and the level of unmet demand for return has been substantially reduced”.530 
The Standards process evolved from 2004 and through the PISG’s “Kosovo Action 
Plan” increasingly acquired an EU-centric focus while accommodating the input of NATO, 
the OSCE and CE. As a result of this interaction, the PISG produced compliant legislation 
in a number of areas relating to ethnic minority issues, such as Law No. 2004/3 on anti-
discrimination, and other issues relating to education, planning, property rights and 
heritage. More specifically, the creation of a Ministry for Communities and Returns was 
intended as a signal of intent regarding the PISG’s apparent determination to address 
ethnic minority issues. However, this progress did not correspond with the development of 
implementation strategies and in many cases legislative approval did not occur until the 
period after 2007.
531
 
Such delays reflected the inertia of both international and indigenous institutions, as 
they attempted to address the question of Kosovo’s status. In a negative, but generally 
accepted, critique of the process, the then vice president of the PDK, Professor Dr. 
Hajredin Kuç, observed that: 
the concept of ‘Standards before Status’ psychologically involves 
asymmetric actions of the main actors because political objectives 
substantially differ when dealing with the legal and political status of 
Kosovo. While the Albanian majority wants an independent state and 
the Serbian minority wants to return to the previous status, the 
International Community is occupied with assessments of how to 
measure the implementation of the Standards. In the meantime, 
everyone is following its own direction and the accomplishment of the 
Standards is perceived more and more as a tool to achieve personal 
political objectives.
532
  
 
However, though policy on ethnic minority issues may not have been formally 
operationalised by the PISG, they were nonetheless established “on the books and ready 
for delivery”.533 In this regard, it can be argued that a policy capacity developed through 
close interaction with international organisations, but that compliance was continually 
restrained by the zero sum politics of the status question. While the ‘Comprehensive 
Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement’ drafted by Martti Ahtisaari in March 2007 may 
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have served as a reference point for conditionality, it never got the opportunity to be 
utilised in that manner due to Belgrade’s rejection of the plan and Pristina’s decision to act 
unilaterally. The institutional dynamic changed significantly, from 2007 to 2009, not least 
due to the unilateral declaration of independence in 2007. From that period, the nature of 
interaction between international organisations and the Government of Kosovo changed, 
with the latter’s desire to have its independence recognised, more or less replacing the 
focus on the question of status and therefore bypassing the incentivised structure of the 
Standards for Kosovo process.
534
 Post UDI, policy initiatives were seen to emerge from the 
Government of Kosovo rather than the international administration, leaving the STM as the 
primary framework for conditional reference and oversight of policy compliance.  
7.4 The Evolution of International Administration: 1999-2009 
If the perceived failure of UNPROFOR precluded the UN from a leadership role in Bosnia, 
Kosovo was to mark the beginning of a tentative rehabilitation. In spite of misgivings 
during the Rambouillet process – “a certain unwillingness to get involved in NATO’s 
mess”535 – and deficiencies in communication between the Contact Group, NATO and the 
UN regarding the conduct of the bombing campaign and their respective intentions 
regarding post-conflict strategy, the UN found itself as the preferred choice among Contact 
Group members for the coordination of the post-conflict effort. The UN Security council 
vested UNMIK “with authority over the territory and people of Kosovo, including all 
legislative and executive powers and administration of the judiciary”.536 Recognising the 
considerable political and institutional vacuum that existed in Kosovo, this authority 
extended to responsibility for fulfilling “basic civilian administrative functions; promoting 
the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; [and] 
facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo's future status”. Furthermore, UNMIK 
was also tasked to oversee the “coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief of all 
international agencies; supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure; maintenance of 
civil law and order; promotion of human rights; and assuring the safe and unimpeded 
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo”.537  
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In a collective acknowledgement of the “scale of the task”, and some of the 
“lessons learned” from Bosnia, international administration was delivered to Kosovo 
through a pillar structure (outlined in Chapter 4) incorporating a clear international division 
of labour. Between 1999 and 2009, four phases of governance are identifiable: the initial 
post-conflict period within which NATO established its control, while UNMIK and its 
partners developed their administrative capacity; the second period under the JIAC; the 
third period of the PISG, following the introduction of the Constitutional Framework; and 
the fourth phase, following the UDI, where several powers were transferred to domestic 
institutions that coexisted alongside a significantly scaled down international 
administration.  
7.41 KFOR to the Fore 
It was one of our core tasks to try to retain as many Serbs as possible. If 
too many of the Serbs left, the Western ideal of ethnic balance would 
appear to be hollow. Their security was at the heart of this.
538
 
 
NATO remained outside the pillar structure with responsibility for eight areas, including 
overseeing the withdrawal of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces; 
demilitarising of the KLA; establishing a ‘safe and secure environment in which refugees 
and displaced persons could return home in safety’, and supporting and coordinating 
closely with the work of the international civil presence.
539
With a strength of 50,000 
personnel, KFOR rapidly established its presence and set about fulfilling the tasks. Within 
eight days of KFORs deployment to Kosovo, all Serbian personnel had withdrawn from 
the province. Equally pressing, was the need to deal with a KLA that was involved in 
reprisals across the province and whose leadership actively attempted to exploit the power 
vacuum in Kosovo through efforts to establish a government; in contravention of UNSCR 
1244. KFORs initial primary concern was with demilitarisation, eventually securing the 
KLA’s commitment to an ‘Undertaking’, renouncing the use of force and agreeing to 
demilitarise within 90 days. Acknowledging the calls of the KLA leadership for the 
“special recognition” of the KLAs contribution to the “liberation” of Kosovo, both KFOR 
and UNMIK moved to re-establish the KLA as a civil defence body. Following 92 days of 
often difficult negotiations, agreement was reached that the new body should be formed 
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under the name, Kosovo Protection Corps.
540
 In delivering the policy to the Kosovan 
leadership in particular, both UNMIK but primarily KFOR, insisted on a multi-ethnic 
platform necessitating minority participation. This normative emphasis was clear from 
interviews of the period: 
… not only have they transformed the organisation, but also they are 
transforming their culture and their approach. It [the Kosovo Protection 
Corps] must be multi-ethnic, it is very clear in the documentation. That 
will be difficult, but they have to do it.
541
 
 
As with IFOR, KFOR established an extensive network of international and domestic 
contacts at local/municipal levels. Unlike Bosnia however, where a domestic policing 
capacity (however flawed) remained in place, KFOR was also tasked (within means) to fill 
the policing vacuum while UNMIK-P was developing its capacity, placing KFOR 
personnel on the fault line of inter-ethnic tension for a longer than anticipated period. 
UNMIK’s key failure was its inability to protect Kosovo's non-Albanian 
population from revenge attacks. The U.N.’s civilian police force was 
very slow to deploy, largely because individual countries were remiss in 
providing personnel, leaving KFOR to undertake certain police 
functions.
542
 
 
Through activity in a variety of security, humanitarian and related post-conflict areas, 
KFOR’s junior commanders found themselves in positions of “inordinate power” during 
the initial post-conflict phase.
543
 KFOR commanders controlled and facilitated freedom of 
movement, were central to the reconstruction effort, restrained the activity of the KLA, and 
engaged in intensive “inter-community dialogue”, in an attempt to achieve a “reasonable 
working compromise that allowed the communities to at least co-exist”.544 The initial civil-
military dynamics of international administration in Kosovo also contrasted with Bosnia. 
While a JIC was established to oversee the demilitarisation of the KLA, KFOR did not 
enjoy the access to the civilian administration afforded to IFOR through the JIC and JMC.  
That KFOR’s initial contribution to returns was comparatively modest is 
unsurprising. UNHCR reports acknowledged that the majority of “Kosovo Albanian” 
returns occurred without the direct input of international organisations. KFOR was, 
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however, central to the provision of humanitarian support, freedom of movement and 
security, and in this regard gradually gained the respect if not support of the minority 
Serbian community. Throughout the first 12 months of the mission, KFOR personnel 
engaged on issues concerning participation on a daily basis.  Thereafter it applied most of 
the techniques developed in Bosnia for the delivery of humanitarian and CIMIC assistance; 
the impact of that effort on ethnic minority issues will be analysed below.  
7.42 The Role of UNMIK in Post-conflict Governance: Joint Interim Administrative 
Council, Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence 
Interaction between international and domestic actors, initially ad hoc in nature, was 
gradually formalised from May 2000 with the creation of the Joint Interim Administrative 
Structure. The JIAS incorporated the functions of four bodies: the eight person Interim 
Administrative Council, chaired by the SRSG, that included the Kosovo Albanian leaders 
Ibrahim Rugova, Hashim Taçi and Rexhep Qosja and the Serbian president of the Serbian 
National Council for Kosovo and Metohija, Rada Trajkovic – who participated as an 
observer only; the Kosovo Transitional Council, a 35-member group comprising political 
and civil society leaders including representatives of national minorities, with advisory and 
supervisory powers over the activity of 19 administrative departments; the Administrative 
Departments, jointly headed by Kosovan (almost exclusively Kosovo Albanian)  and 
UNMIK representatives served as de facto ministries guiding the work of; Municipal 
Boards, who oversaw local governance controlled by UNMIK administrators. By the end 
of 2000, the domestic presence within these structures was enhanced by the establishment 
of 27 municipal assemblies.
545
 Though in one sense these structures were representative of 
significant administrative progress in an extremely difficult post-conflict environment, that 
progress was largely unseen regarding minority issues. 
In tracing the evolution of international administration on ethnic minority issues, it 
is clear that the collective administrative response lagged behind the recognition of the 
Serbian population within Kosovo as the “new minority”. For example, similar to the 
OHR’s response in Bosnia, a year passed before a dedicated body was established by 
UNMIK to address the question of minority returns; and it would be another six months 
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before a “Framework for Returns” was agreed in cooperation with the UNHCR. The 
institutional crystallisation of the ethnic minority (Kosovo Serbian) aspect of returns did 
not happen in Kosovo until the tenure of the third SRSG, Michael Steiner, in late 2001, 
almost two and a half years post-conflict.
546
 While to an extent this timespan can be 
explained by the scale of housing reconstruction required throughout the province, and the 
fact that domestic institutions and infrastructure had to be developed from very low levels 
of capacity and capability,  it is also representative of a planning deficit and institutional 
inertia on the part of the UN in particular, which appeared to indulge the idea “of not 
pushing the process too far too soon”, to the point that fewer and fewer Kosovo Serbs 
expressed a desire to return.
547
  
Conversely, UNMIK did establish a “Housing and Property Directorate” and a 
“Property Claims Commission” within five months, to address HLP issues, including the 
adjudication of housing and property rights claims. Serious steps to re-establish a land 
cadastre, and to rebuild the administrative capacity needed to address HLP issues, were 
also taken at that time. Though these initiatives and others developed for representative 
participation did emerge at that time – as early as autumn 1999 in the case of municipal 
elections – without the support of the Serbian community they were slow to produce the 
results intended.
548
 
If progress was slow during that period, UNMIK did provide for greater cohesion 
and cooperation between international organisations, introducing innovative and 
enterprising schemes on returns and related issues. For example, cooperation with the 
Norwegian People’s Aid, Norwegian Refugee Council and KFOR, which jointly engaged 
the Stimlje municipality to fund and guide a programme for the sustainable return of 
Kosovo Serbs to the municipality, or the use of mobile teams working for the Housing and 
Property Claims Commission, which proved effective in registering claims and resolving 
some property disputes. The activities of the commission were complemented by the work 
of the OSCE, which sought to encourage comprehensive and inclusive outcomes, linking 
returns and property issues to normative projects such as the “Minority Voices project”.549 
A joint report published by the OSCE and UN in 2002 highlighted “a slow but 
gradual improvement in the security situation, and stressed that the key problems for 
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minorities were the freedom of movement and a growing entrenchment of parallel 
structures.  They also noted that returns were facilitated by the establishment of the SRSGs 
office for returns and communities”.550 Insofar as the report made recommendations, it is 
notable that they are based on the application of normative pressure rather than incentives. 
Though UNMIK did improve the cohesiveness of efforts relating to broader aspects of the 
returns process, emphasis on conditionality does not appear to have been evenly shared 
across the four pillars until at least 2004. While rhetoric associated with minority returns – 
delivered by high-level visits and the socialisation of domestic institutions and actors – 
peaks during this phase, only the EU and to an extent NATO (at local levels) appeared to 
have pursued conditionality – mostly financial conditionality linked to reconstruction – as 
a formal mechanism to address minority returns.    
With the application of the Constitutional Framework, in May 2001 the JIAS were 
replaced by the PISG. Facilitating the appointments of the President and Prime Minister, 
the PISG were composed of the Assembly of Kosovo and the Government of Kosovo, with 
a judiciary appointed by the SRSG on the recommendation of the Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Council. With an emphasis on developing ‘state’ administrative and 
institutional capacity in advance of the resolution of the status question, the PISG involved 
the close cooperation of international and domestic staffs at all levels of government within 
a broad framework of benchmarking linked to the transfer of competence. As powers were 
transferred, the prominence of the respective international actors involved was observed to 
change, with the EU increasingly assuming a leadership and mentoring role in several 
areas, notably moving beyond the parameters of Pillar IV, as originally designed. For the 
delivery and implementation of ethnic minority policy, this was significant, as it introduced 
the application of membership incentives – later underpinned by the commitments given to 
Kosovo at the Thessaloniki summit of 2003 – to the post-conflict narrative. The nature of 
normative pressure on ethnic minority issues was also observed to change during the 
lifetime of the PISG, as intensive international/domestic socialisation was a prominent 
feature of capacity-building mechanisms such as the EU’s twining initiative.551  
The March riots of 2004 were both a serious setback for Kosovo and a positive 
stimulus, as international actors re-engaged with a stagnant political process. Responding 
to the setback, the main international organisations sought to reinvigorate a “Standards for 
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Kosovo Process” that had struggled to gain momentum since its launch in 2003. Though 
much of the rhetoric associated with the initiative was that of membership conditionality, 
what became known as the “Standards before Status” was primarily designed around the 
application of policy conditionality linked tacitly to membership conditionality through the 
SAP Tracking Mechanism.
552
 In tandem with the relaunch of this process in 2004, a 
number of agencies were also set up to support the process by applying financial 
conditionality at local levels. For example, the Ethnic Communities Sustainability Fund 
(ECSF) sought: 
the reconciliation and integration processes of smaller communities 
through small but effective inter-ethnic and tolerance-building projects 
such as peace-building and social education activities in Gjilan/Gnjilane 
and a bus line offering services to Kosovo Bosniaks and Kosovo Serb 
returnees in Prizren.
553
 
 
Though UNMIK remained as the lead focal point for the international effort in Kosovo, by 
the summer of 2007 it primarily served as a coordinating actor increasingly leaving 
political and policy specific engagement to the EU, OSCE and NATO. By February of 
2008, the balance of international administration evolved once more with a scaling back of 
UNMIK’s remit and role. On 16 February, the EU assumed lead responsibility for judicial 
and policing issues through the deployment of the EULEX Rule of Law mission. The next 
day, the Kosovo government unilaterally declared independence.
554
 At that time, and with 
the exception of the incorporation of a chapter on communities’ rights in the new draft 
constitution, none of the standards outlined in the Standards for Kosovo process were met 
in respect of the ethnic issues analysed in this research. 
7.43 The Role of the UNHCR 
Due to insufficient capacity, the fact that its focus had been on administering camps in 
Macedonia, and also the pace at which events unfolded, the UNHCR found itself 
struggling to respond to the “areas of greatest need” in Kosovo in 1999. In the initial post-
conflict phase, the majority of returns happened without UNHCR input or coordination. 
Within a year however, and following close cooperation with KFOR leadership and 
planners, the UNHCR adapted its field presence to engage in an impressive range of issues. 
Recognising the changes in the internal ethnic dynamic, the UNHCR prioritised protection 
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for refugees, returnees, and displaced persons alongside the initiation of policies intended 
to promote “an environment which allows people to exercise their right to return or to 
remain”.555 As with Bosnia, practical measures such as bus services, community dialogue 
and the provision of legal aid were delivered (often in close cooperation with KFOR) as 
“confidence building” measures. 
By 2001, responsibility for delivering these measures was increasingly transferred 
from the UNHCR to newly-established sections in UNMIK. From that period, the UNHCR 
invested significant time and resources in reconciliation projects such as the establishment 
of six multi-ethnic Regional Women’s Councils within the framework of the Kosovo’s 
Women’s Initiative. However, the impact of such initiatives in encouraging returns was 
“well below what was hoped for”.556 The UNHCR’s records for 2001show that only 200 
Serbian refugees returned from Serbia to Kosovo, while a modest 500 availed of the 
facility for “go and see” visits.557 Though the numbers of returnees increased in 2002, in 
the context of the numbers displaced, it remained at the modest level of 1900 persons.
558
 
From 2002, the UNHCR, scaled down its field engagement with returns, transferring 
chairmanship of the regional and municipal working groups on returns to UNMIK’s Office 
for Returns and Communities, while seeking to establish clear benchmarks on returns and 
minority participation as part of the drafting process for the Standards for Kosovo. In 
keeping with their modus operandi, the UNHCR’s policy was increasingly delivered 
through international and domestic NGOs, which by 2002 numbered 11 international and 
three domestic NGOs. Through the sustained application of normative pressure on 
minority returns, in cooperation with UNMIK, OSCE and KFOR, the UNHCR 
successfully managed to establish a “minority rights rhetoric”, exemplified by an open 
letter issued in July 2003 by all non-Serb leaders of Kosovo appealing to IDPs residing in 
Serbia, Montenegro and refugees in FYR Macedonia to return to their home communities 
in Kosovo.  
However, the degree to which political rhetoric corresponded with behavioural 
compliance is open to question. The Regional Returns Units established by UNMIK during 
the same period did not garner the hoped-for levels of support at municipal levels.
559
 The 
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riots of March 2004 checked progress on minority returns, with an additional 4,200 Serbs 
displaced by the unrest.
560
 Due to the manifest problems of limited freedom of movement, 
unresolved property issues and the persistent lack of economic opportunities, the 
uncertainty regarding the final status of Kosovo continued to paralyse the returns process. 
Acknowledging such difficulties, the UNHCR changed its conceptualisation of minority 
issues in 2005, with an increased emphasis on “durable solutions”, rather than returns.  
Mirroring the CIMIC work of KFOR, the UNHCR part-funded and organised 43 
community development projects aimed at fostering “reconciliation and reintegration”, in 
order to encourage spontaneous minority returnees in their places of origin.
561
 In 
attempting to target Serb returns, the UNHCR also chaired a Belgrade-Pristina Direct 
Dialogue process that culminated with a protocol on voluntary and sustainable returns to 
Kosovo.
562
 Both of these initiatives predominantly involved the application of normative 
pressure, with limited reference to conditional incentives beyond a somewhat cursory link 
to the resolution of the status question. Once again, however, these initiatives were only 
moderately successful,
563
 adding to the frustration of UNHCR staff who were sceptical of 
the value of such initiatives in the absence of certainty regarding status.
564
  
Despite agreeing a Memorandum of Understanding with the provisional authorities 
in Kosovo, to help build the capacity of municipal authorities on returns and reintegration 
issues, by mid-2007, the “returns process stalled”, primarily due to the lack of durable 
options and the continued uncertainty of Kosovo’s future status. Thereafter, while the 
UNHCR continued to transfer components of its programmes to the relevant Kosovo 
authorities and civil society actors, the implementation of its policy on returns continued to 
fall short of expectations. With UDI and the discontinuation of UNMIK’s operational role, 
the UNHCR increasingly adopted an oversight role, applying normative pressure on 
Kosovo authorities – particularly the Ministry for Communities and Returns – to abide by 
the provisions of international conventions related to human rights, and their obligations 
under the Constitution of Kosovo regarding the right of all refugees and displaced persons 
from Kosovo to return to their homes and recover their property and personal 
possessions.
565
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UNHCR reporting during the period appeared to prioritise the needs of the RAE 
(Roma Ashkalia and Egyptian) minorities over those of the Serbian community – it is not 
until 2004 that the Serbian minority population is specifically identified in the UNHCRs 
global reports. Such reports did not reflect the reality of the daily and intensive 
engagement of the UNHCR with the minority Serb community. That this was not reflected 
in UN reports can be explained by an institutional uncertainty regarding the status of the 
Serbian population and the understandable UN policy of continuing to formally deal with 
Kosovo as a province within Serbia. Towards the end of the period, and while several 
issues remained unaddressed, the impact of UNHCR initiatives was observed to decline 
considerably. To an extent this can be explained by the fact that other international 
organisations were more formally involved in addressing areas of the UNHCR remit. The 
EU had moved beyond reconstruction to state-building measures that included policies for 
minority returns and participation. Likewise, the OSCE increasingly addressed returns-
related issues such as property rights and legal access. Finally, there was also a view that 
the efforts of the UNHCR had run their course with the potential for return… “almost 
exhausted.”566 
7.44 The Role of the OSCE 
One discernible leitmotif emerges from this report. Revenge. 
Throughout the region the desire for revenge has created a climate in 
which the vast majority of human rights violations have taken place.
567
 
 
With responsibility for institution building, democratisation (including elections) and the 
monitoring and protection of human rights, the OSCE’s engagement in Kosovo became the 
largest field mission in its history. In taking that role, the OSCE was seen to build on the 
commendable work of its Verification Mission (KVM), which successfully documented 
the scale and nature of human rights violations from 1998 through to the early post-conflict 
phases. In conjunction with the UNHCR, the OSCE produced a series of reports on the 
situation of ethnic minorities, which provided the basis for both the application of 
normative pressure and conditionality. By late 1999, OMIK (OSCE Mission in Kosovo) 
published the findings on human rights violations to show that “the overwhelming weight 
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of evidence points to violations against non-Albanians”.568 Regarding the promotion of 
policy on minority returns and participation, the OSCE highlighted the difficulties caused 
by the “UCK’s dominance of the self-styled municipal administrations”. While the KFOR-
led process of demilitarising the UCK was intended to curtail the coercive power of the 
UCK in Kosovo politics, the OSCE noted that even after the end of the demilitarisation 
process, it was “clear that the UCK stepped in to fill a law and order void, preforming a 
‘policing’ role unrestrained by law and without legitimacy”.569 Therefore, in the initial 
post-conflict phase, it is clear that there was a widespread breakdown in the rule of law 
within which minority issues were but a few of many complicating a volatile situation. 
Through its electoral and institution building roles, the OSCE was the key 
international actor regarding the establishment of standards for minority participation in 
representative assemblies and state institutions. Primarily, its approach was normative in 
its application, with an emphasis on the promotion of dialogue between the communities. 
Drawing on its Bosnian experience, the OSCE moved quickly to engage local media as a 
means to influence discourse that was almost wholly sectarian in nature. Working with the 
UNMIK-appointed Temporary Media Commissioner, OSCE staff consistently highlighted 
instances of hate speech and prejudiced reporting in the local media.
570
 At municipal 
levels, the OSCE focused on local compliance with Regulations and Laws, and the support 
for the establishment and conduct of Community and Mediation Committees. These 
interactions would become highly significant for KFOR commanders deploying LMTs.  
If the OSCE’s engagement was predominantly normative in nature, it was not 
exclusively so: from late 2001, OSCE’s records in Kosovo reveal that the delivery of 
capacity-building projects at municipal levels was generally made “conditional upon the 
inclusion of minority beneficiaries in project objectives”.571 Thus the OSCE’s engagement 
with returns from 2001 onwards can be characterised by a diverse application of normative 
pressure, with the direct or indirect (through a third party) application of conditionality, 
where appropriate, to improve the effectiveness of their measures. 
Through these roles, the OSCE also became a key promoter of socialisation 
initiatives such as specialised training programmes to aid institutional development. Such 
initiatives helped to set the parameters for the newly-elected municipal assemblies, from 
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their constitution to the responsibilities of their members. For example, responding to a 
number of challenges identified in the Kosovo Assembly, a multi-agency support 
programme, the Assembly Support Initiative (ASI) was designed to encourage more 
effective parliamentary work by focusing on developing a competent and representative 
legislature with an emphasis on transparency, ethical conduct, and democratic 
governance.
572
 The OSCE oversight of the Assembly Support Initiative was a key driver of 
minority participation. This initiative allowed for the continuous application of normative 
pressure by the OSCE on Kosovo Assembly members. Though the implementation of 
policy was slow (and can be explained to a degree by deficits in institutional capacity), it is 
clear that the rhetoric on minority issues starts to evolve during this period among Kosovo 
Assembly members. Other examples included the establishment of the Institute for Civil 
Administration (ICA) for “fostering a professional and independent public sector based on 
the rule of law…” or the “Your Municipality - Your Rights” programme to promote 
citizens’ awareness of, and participation in, municipal and central governance structures.573  
Recognising the almost total deficit of a legal and administrative capacity to 
support the regulation and governance of property rights – a situation that impacted 
disproportionately on vulnerable ethnic minority groups – the OSCE promoted reform on a 
variety of levels. Assuming a valuable oversight role, the OSCE recorded illegal evictions 
and occupations, monitored the development and implementation of property legislation, 
access to the Housing and Property Directorate (established by UNMIK to resolve most 
residential property disputes), and the activities of the municipal authorities and the law 
enforcement agencies. Highlighting illegal occupancy, evictions and inconsistencies in 
practice, where they amounted to discrimination, the OSCE also established the Kosovo 
Judicial Institute and the Kosovo Law Centre, providing training on property laws to the 
judicial and legal communities.
574
 
In part due to information gathered by KFOR patrols and liaison teams, the OSCE 
argued forcibly for the imposition of appropriate planning legislation and structures, and 
the regulation of illegal construction, correctly identifying the absence of a cadastre and an 
urban plan, as both facilitating abuses and preventing reform. Noting the nature of abuses, 
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OSCE reports emphasised that the duty to regulate construction fell squarely within the 
competencies of the municipalities.
575
 
The importance attached to minority participation in “political life” was a 
prominent feature of OSCE record and discourse, and considered a key indicator of the 
“normalisation of life” for minority communities. Within a year, however, it was clear that 
the envisaged degree of minority participation in several institutions, ranging from the KPS 
and the judiciary, to the newly formed JIAS, “fell considerably short of expectations”.576 
By late 2000, of the 10% of positions in the KPC reserved for minorities, just 100 
applications were received from Muslim Slavs, Turks and Roma. None were received from 
Kosovo Serbs.
577
 The establishment of the Joint Committee for the Return of Serbs, 
intended to provide a working mechanism for all concerned actors to discuss issues of 
common concern and develop a “comprehensive approach from the international 
community on all the issues affecting minorities…”, did not have the desired impact – 
lacking political investment on all sides and “reaffirming a suspicion among domestic 
politicians that the international community was only prepared to push so far in the 
absence of agreement on the status question”.578 
Considering the potential of KFOR’s activities, the OSCE noted as early as 2000 
that “the modus operandi of KFOR seems to be more oriented towards the protection of 
minorities, and is seen to be so.”579 Reports highlighted examples from the field where: 
successful KFOR operations corresponded with increases in minority 
employment. In Gnjilane/Gjilan, for example, Kosovo Serbs were re-
employed in the Morava and Paralovo quarries as a result of a consistent 
policy both to recruit minorities and to provide security for them. The 
last figures obtained by OSCE indicate that over 60 Kosovo Serbs were 
working in these quarries, and that they were escorted to and from work 
by KFOR.
580
  
 
What is not reflected in the OSCE reports is the degree to which the KFOR commander in 
Gnjilane/Gjilan leveraged the provision of security and related KFOR assistance in the area 
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through CIMIC projects to incentivise Kosovo Albanian support for the proposed 
initiative. The extent of this type of activity will be considered in greater detail below. 
By spring of 2001, the frustration of the lead international organisations engaged 
with minority issues was evident in both the content and tone of their reports: “with the 
passing of time the lack of lasting improvements for minority populations means that we 
are at increasing risk of merely repeating issues, concerns and recommendations addressed 
at length in previous assessments”.581 Recognising a failure in delivering the normative 
message on returns, the OSCE acknowledged that though there was a “general recognition 
of the right to return”, it was not matched by sufficient action on the part of local 
communities to demonstrate their commitment to this principle: 
Against a backdrop of intolerance and ongoing violence there are few 
who have had the courage to take a firm stance and speak out against 
the current situation backing their words with concrete actions.
582
 
 
Through a series of reviews on minority participation and engagement with returns, the 
OSCE identified a number of features of the post-conflict environment that impacted on 
minority communities. First, the importance of addressing the connection between the fair 
resolution of property disputes and the equitable distribution of reconstruction assistance as 
a means to promoting an environment suitable for returns. Second, deficiencies in funding 
for returns and related issues were identified as a key obstacle to progress. For example, an 
OSCE report in February 2001 highlighted insufficient funding as a serious impediment to 
the effectiveness of the Housing and Property Directorate. They also noted the shift in 
emphasis from ensuring that minorities were represented in the post-conflict structures to 
initiatives aimed at encouraging their participation.
583
 This became particularly important 
following the establishment of the PISG, including a Kosovo Assembly and Executive 
branch comprising all ethnic groups. Third, related to the function of the PISG, was the 
impact of the parallel structures operated in Serbian areas. Finally, there was a general 
recognition of the degenerative impact of widespread discrimination, compounded by the 
absence of “clear laws and effective remedies”584:  
fundamental societal problems (such as lack of inter-ethnic dialogue) 
and institutional deficiencies (such as lack of implementation of 
property legislation) continued to be largely neglected. The root causes 
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of insecurity, discrimination and alienation between ethnic groups still 
remain to be addressed.
585
 
 
In response to those challenges, the UNMIK pillars pushed for a more “joined-up 
approach”, through the creation of bodies such as the inter-agency Advisory Board on 
Communities (ABC) and the SRSG’s Office of Return and Communities (ORC).586 These 
bodies served to coordinate minorities’ assessment and activities, giving high prominence 
to inter-agency efforts to facilitate the small-scale return of displaced minorities. For 
example, following a sustained period of “consensus building”, the period of September 
2001-March 2002 marked the first organised returns of Kosovo Serbs to Kosovo, 
facilitated by UNHCR, UNMIK, KFOR and other partners. Through these activities, the 
OSCE and its partners, including KFOR, sought to underline the linkage between respect 
for minority rights (including returns) and the maintenance of a durable peace in Kosovo 
and in the region. There was a noticeable qualitative shift in the political rhetoric during 
the period, specifically, an increasing tendency towards openness in discussing the 
minority situation and increased references made to the causal link between respect for 
minority rights and European integration. 
Following Kosovo-wide elections of November 2001, Kosovar leaders and opinion 
makers from the majority community demonstrated an increasing willingness to publicly 
acknowledge the need for minority stabilisation, integration and minority return; prior to 
the elections, public discourse on returns was largely limited to international actors.
587
 
Recognising the political ambitions of particularly Kosovo Albanian politicians, from 
2002, the OSCE, EU and KFOR increasingly sought to present minority returns and 
participation issues in the context of incentivised human rights linked to the standards 
expected for future integration.
588
 Acknowledging this trend, the OSCE noted that it was 
increasingly important to ensure that policies and practices related to returns were firmly 
grounded in a human rights framework:   
The modalities of returns planning and implementation, while adapted 
to the realities of Kosovo, must uphold fundamental humanitarian 
principles of voluntary return and reintegration through the application 
of a rights-based approach.
589
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On participation, the OSCE’s contribution to the establishment and training of the KPS 
was perhaps the best example of an effective marriage between the requirement for an 
operational police force that adhered to human rights principles in practice and theory, and 
a police force that was a visible manifestation of the multi-ethnic composition of the 
province. While the participation of Kosovo Serbs was below the anticipated numbers, by 
the end of the period under review, there were considerably more Serbs active in the KPS 
than in many other state institutions, including a KSF overseen by KFOR. 
In considering the contribution of the OSCE, it is clear that while its focus did not 
change, its capacity to engage minority issues gradually diminished. Several OSCE staff 
interviewed cited staff shortfalls as having a negative impact on their ability to influence 
policy compliant behaviour, particularly at municipal levels. For a period, KFOR was in a 
position to negate that deficit, but over time the prominence of both returns and 
participation as issues for the OSCE in Kosovo is observed to decline. 
7.45 The Growing Role of the EU 
Within the framework of Pillar IV the EU established itself as the fulcrum of the 
reconstruction and “state-building” effort. Initially the EU operated the European 
Commission Task Force for the Reconstruction of Kosovo which administered the 
OBNOVA fund,
590
 targeting priority areas within the immediate post-conflict effort, 
including support for public utilities, demining, winterisation programmes, and efforts to 
stimulate basic domestic activity such as the Village Employment and Rehabilitation 
programme. Inherent in its operating principles was a commitment to ensuring that the 
projects funded should be consistent not only with UNSCR 1244 but with EU values and 
norms. In early 2000, the task force was replaced by the European Agency for 
Reconstruction,
591
 which openly linked conditional incentives to capacity-building 
measures in several areas, including those affecting minority rights issues. Acknowledging 
the impact of the EU’s effort, the UN Security Council Mission that visited Kosovo in 
2001 noted that the: 
Village Economic Rehabilitation Programme (VERP),
592
 funded by the 
European Union, had proved one of the most effective tools in getting 
ethnic groups working together. The Mission believed that to overcome 
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the stalemate in Mitrovica, all communities must come together in 
social, economic and religious projects.
593
 
 
While the rhetoric linking ethnic minority issues to EU incentives was seen to grow 
throughout the period, it was not necessarily reciprocated in policy implementation or 
behavioural compliance. An independent evaluation of the work of the EAR conducted in 
2004 cautioned that despite the apparent success of the EAR’s efforts, it was clear that the 
framework as defined for the development of the Agency’s annual action programmes, 
varied from being too broad, “providing only limited direction to the Agency for its 
programming”, to “too precise and prescriptive, giving the Agency hardly any flexibility in 
its programming and development of action programmes”.594 In considering those findings, 
the report noted that the strategic framework provided did “not guarantee the political and 
policy dialogue necessary to foster” the SAP tracking mechanism, “especially after the 
acceleration given to the process after Thessaloniki and the introduction of the European 
partnerships”.595 Such difficulties and anomalies were identifiable at numerous levels. For 
example, while the presence of the representative of the Serb National Council – 
Gracenica, on the Kosovo Transition Council was interpreted (by some UNMIK staff) as 
an example of the participation of minorities, from the Kosovo Serb perspective it was 
viewed as “close observation without participation, before reporting to Belgrade”.596  
In the final two years of the EARs activity (2006 – 2008), the nature of interaction 
with the Serbian community was seen to change. A more decentralised approach to local 
governance with increased autonomy was the central element of a PISG reform package 
intended to encourage Serb participation in elections in 2007. Concurrently, the agency 
focused more intently on the “return and reintegration of minorities”, launching a series of 
initiatives with a particular focus on economic stimulation. The response from the Serbian 
community in Gracenica was one of “resigned pragmatism” rather than enthusiastic 
engagement, but nonetheless there was recognition that “participation was becoming 
inevitable”. Mitrovica, however, continued its strategy of non-participation.597  
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If EAR was the figurehead of the EU’s field engagement, it was supported 
incrementally by intensive interaction between senior EU leaders and the domestic 
political elite. High profile and highly publicised visits from the HR Javier Solana and DG 
External Relations, Chris Patten exposed Kosovo’s elite to a continuous cycle of 
‘Europeanisation’. The traction of such engagement by the EU is difficult to gauge. In a 
critical assessment of the PISG response to the riots of 2004, where “there was an attempt 
to blame everyone but themselves for what had happened”, Chris Patten singled out the 
response of PM Rexhepi, for showing the courage to visit trouble-spots, and demonstrating 
an understanding of the role the PISG should be playing to diffuse the situation by setting 
up a reconstruction fund with an initial budget of €5 million. In a speech to the European 
Parliament in March 2004, Patten observed that “he did not come to Pristina to promise 
that European tax payers’ money would be used” to address the situation, stating, “That 
would be unacceptable.” However, acknowledging Rexhepi’s promise that “rapid action 
would be taken to repair damaged property so that people could get back to their homes as 
quickly as possible”, Patten emphasised that “Javier and I promised to come back as soon 
as we could in order to see for ourselves that progress on reconstruction was actually 
occurring”.598 
While discussion of returns and participation formed a prominent part of such 
exchanges, the EU’s lack of credibility on minority rights, and inability to project a 
consensus on what the status of Kosovo should be, served, at times, to undermine EU 
efforts to encourage compliance on minority related policy.  
7.5 The Domestic Context for Military Engagement: Reconstruction and Institutionalising 
the Politics of War 
NATO found itself, as with Bosnia, protecting a population whose security forces were 
NATO’s enemy only weeks before. However, this was but one (temporary) aspect of the 
Kosovo’s post-conflict reality, within which policies on ethnic minority issues were 
assimilated, adapted, distorted or disregarded. Between 1999 and 2009, Kosovo’s body 
politique was faced with a series of challenges from the practical implications of rebuilding 
the physical and institutional capacity of the province; responding to the emergence of 
parallel Serbian structures, independent of PISG; being seen to address the at times 
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competing demands of various international actors, while delivering on the desire of the 
overwhelming majority of Kosovo’s population for a declaration of independence. 
The scale of the requirement for reconstruction in Kosovo presented both practical 
and political challenges. At the cessation of conflict, almost half of Kosovo’s housing 
stock was damaged or destroyed. Transport infrastructure was similarly damaged, with 
several communities isolated due to destroyed bridges, cratered or mined roads. A total of 
50% of the population had access to piped water, while less than 30% were connected to a 
working sewage system. These issues were compounded by a legacy of degenerative rule 
from Belgrade, which resulted in  a range of underfunded and barely operational services 
from local government and health, to the electricity company KEK, that was (and 
continues to be) the epitome of Kosovo’s political and economic dysfunction.599 
Relative to the size of its population, Kosovo received a staggering volume of 
financial support during the period analysed. In 1999 alone, the EU provided €127 million 
for reconstruction.
600
 Since 1999 it is estimated that the EU had provided in excess of €2 
billion in support to Kosovo.
601
 Initially, such donor support was focused on addressing the 
humanitarian crisis. However, as the reconstruction effort evolved, funds increasingly 
came with conditions relating to various issues, in most cases linked to compliant 
behaviour, regarding the rights of ethnic minorities. In this context, KFOR was one of 
many actors attempting to influence policy on minority issues through the conditional 
delivery of CIMIC funding. However, the degree to which international organisations and 
NGOs adhered to their own policies on conditional aid varied greatly, with widespread 
allegations of misspent funds, fraud and corruption: “you need only to question where all 
those hotels around Pristina and on the route to Skopje came from to find where so much 
well intentioned money was spent. Many Kosovar’s did exceptionally well while the 
majority still have to make-do…”602 
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Before even provisional institutions could be established, the international 
organisations operating under UNMIKs umbrella were faced with a KLA/UCK leadership 
intent on leveraging their position “as Kosovo’s liberators”, for political gain. At the 
municipal level, KLA personnel were almost immediately active in establishing 
themselves both as quasi municipal governors and police; the latter aspect being 
particularly problematic in the context of widespread revenge attacks and the general 
harassment of minority communities. While some of the activities of the KLA were 
opportunistic in nature, they were for the most part orchestrated. Gradually, the KLA 
leadership of Taçi and Çeku realised that it could not be sustained, however, for the 
purpose of DDR negotiations with UNMIK and KFOR: it afforded them “a certain capital” 
with which they could bargain and improve their standing opposite moderates such as 
Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK.603 As a strategy, it did not bear the hoped-for results, and the 
municipal elections of October 2000 returned a decisive victory for the LDK with 58% of 
the overall vote, to 27.3% for the PDK and 7.7% for the AAK.
604
 
Kosovo’s Serbian community did not participate in the elections of 2000, in part 
due to directions from Belgrade, but also as a result of sustained and increasingly 
organised attacks on communities across the province.
605
 In that context, calls for 
“minority communities to realize that there was no alternative to establishing a multi-
ethnic society”606 were viewed by many “with scorn” given the failure of UNMIK and 
KFOR to provide the protection they promised in the face of frequent violent attacks.
607
 
While such violence was a feature of daily life for Kosovo Serbian communities, it 
also became a feature of the Kosovo Albanian political dynamic as internal feuding grew 
more pronounced, resulting in numerous murders and attacks on all sides, but particularly 
against the moderates of the LDK.
608
 Rivalry between the two main political parties to 
emerge from the KLA, the PDK led by Hashim Thaçi and the AAK led by Ramush 
Haradinaj, also became increasingly violent. For example, in the summer of 2000, former 
KLA commander, Haradinaj, was wounded in a gun attack; a week later a close aide was 
murdered; while later again that summer the Albanian head of Kosovo’s Housing and 
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Reconstruction department, Rexhep Luci, was murdered in a gun attack. A further element 
to this dynamic was the power and influence of organised criminal gangs – often clan 
based with strong links to the KLA – on the political establishment. The combined impact 
of such actions meant that for many Kosovo Albanian politicians the international calls for 
them to “be more forthcoming with regard to improving the treatment of the minority 
communities…promoting a culture of peace and non-violence” were almost always 
secondary to their daily struggle to establish their post-conflict credentials in a highly 
volatile and dangerous political climate.
 609
 
Within a trend of an upsurge of attacks against minorities and their property, 
ethnically-motivated violence peaked in February 2001, with the targeting of the “Nis 
Express” bus service, in which ten Kosovo Serbs, including a couple and their infant child, 
died. While these attacks compounded the fear of minorities, who felt increasingly 
exposed, they also became a source of considerable frustration to the majority Kosovo 
Albanian population. For KFOR personnel, the Nis attack was a serious setback for what 
many considered to be a mission progressing well. The fact that the convoy was escorted 
by KFOR personnel, and that two KFOR vehicles passed the charge eventually detonated 
under the bus of civilians, served to undermine trust in KFOR’s ability to provide security, 
and equally caused KFOR to question its tactics. 
7.51 The Politics of Minority Participation and Returns: Revenge, Accommodation and 
Benign Attrition 
In part due to the climate of fear and lack of confidence in the international organisations, 
and despite its significant efforts to provide an inclusive format, the constitutional 
framework was rejected by Serbian groups, who were particularly displeased at the 
“inclusion of the judiciary and presidency” in the text.610 As a result, efforts to encourage 
the Kosovo Serbian participation in elections repeatedly failed due both to Kosovo Serbian 
dissatisfaction with the process of post-conflict administration, and clear instructions from 
Belgrade not to participate. By May of 2001, some Kosovo Serbian politicians had 
engaged with the Municipal Elections Committee, though they remained outside the 
process overall. Throughout the period, the Serbian communities across Kosovo 
maintained parallel systems of governance and education. Linking those activities to the 
Belgrade administration was the FRY Committee on Kosovo, chaired by Momcilo 
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Trajkovic, including Alekesandr Simic, the Kosovo Serb representative in the Joint 
Working Group on the Constitutional Framework. 
In considering the nature of interaction between international and domestic actors, a 
number of features emerged during that period which impacted on attempts to address 
ethnic minority issues. One Serbian politician interviewed argued that Serbian frustration 
with the pace of returns had its roots in the decision of the Joint Committee for Return of 
Kosovo Serbs to prioritise “conditions that were conducive to return rather than actual 
returns”.611 The publication of a “Statement of the Principles on Kosovo Serbs Return”, by 
the Interim Administrative Council, linking returns to a willingness to participation in the 
PISG, was “not taken seriously” by the Kosovo Serbian community, as the PISG were 
“just not acceptable as they were”.612 The logic driving the approach taken by UNMIK was 
that unless the physical and institutional capacity was present, an accelerated approached 
to returns might have been counterproductive.
613
 However, by mid-2001, several reports, 
including that of the Security Council Mission, noted that though signs of a transition from 
reconstruction to sustainable institutions were evident in the territory; they were not 
reciprocated by increased minority returns. The gap between creating the domestic 
institutions necessary for minority returns to take place and actual returns was never 
bridged. 
The second feature of the period was the “kin-state” role played by the government 
in Belgrade. Backed by Belgrade, the FRY Committee on Kosovo argued that the process 
of registering Kosovo Serbs should be done through their committee. They also voiced 
concerns that the plight of the missing and the general security situation regarding the 
Serbian community were not being adequately addressed. Over the course of several 
exchanges, UNMIK officials consistently cited the parallel structures of the Serbian 
community, particularly prevalent in places such as Mitrovica, as an impediment to the 
progression of the post-conflict effort on a range of issues, including returns, participation 
and the missing. For the Serbian community, in the absence of certainty as to their future in 
Kosovo, parallel structures were viewed as a necessary comfort and source of income. 
Modest signs of progress regarding political participation were recorded in late 
2001, when a coalition of 20 Kosovo Serb parties and organisations registered for the 
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November election under the name Coalition Return.
614
 This development was reinforced 
by the registration of 170,000 Kosovo Serbs (including 100,000 living outside of Kosovo 
in Serbia and Montenegro) and a turnout of 46% of the registered vote for the election; 
lowered by a minimal turnout in the northern areas around Mitrovica, where voter 
intimidation directly impacted on turnout.
615
 Ultimately 35 seats, including 20 guaranteed 
by the Constitutional Framework, went to the Coalition Return. However, if this was a step 
forward for minority groups in Kosovo, changes to the political balance of power within 
Kosovo Albanian politics, amplified by the failure of the LDK to win an outright majority, 
led to a protracted period of fractious negotiations between the LDK, PDK and the 
Alliance for the Future of Kosova, which eventually culminated almost four months later 
with the election of Rugova as president, and the PDK’s Bajram Rexhepi as the head of 
government. 
In spite of SRSG Steiner’s announcement in 2002, of a series of benchmarks 
(including standards on returns and participation) necessary for attainment before the 
question of status would be considered, the PISGs were seen to “side step many of the 
main requirements”.616 For example, within months of the formation of the PISG, and in an 
attempt to expand their power, Kosovo Albanian dominated institutions began to 
reinterpret the property rights of the Serbian community. Additionally there is reasonable 
evidence to suggest that Kosovo-Albanian dominated municipalities produced a series of 
planning decisions that appeared to encroach on the traditional boundaries of Serbian 
villages, in what they deemed to be a soft form of ethnic cleansing.
617
 This issue was 
substantiated by OSCE reports from as early as 2000, that identified illegal construction as 
“one of the major problems reported across Kosovo”.618 Narratives similar to this were also 
recorded by the OSCE in Croatia and Bosnia alike, but what is striking about the Kosovo 
experience is the alarming lack of progress in subsequent years. For example, as late as 
2009, a report on Kosovo’s property situation noted continuing problems relating to the 
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establishing of rights of ownership to property, the observance of a number of bad 
practices, including, violations of procedural law common to property cases, and the 
circumvention of the requirement for a written contract.
619
 
While the PISG were active in achieving legislative compliance – for example in 
the spring of 2002, the Kosovo Assembly passed a Resolution on Returns, which 
committed the Assembly to create conditions conducive to the return of minorities – 
legislation was rarely followed by any kind of implementation initiative.
620
 UNMIK’s 
attempts to enforce the rule of law through the arrest and prosecution of former KLA 
members for serious crimes were met with negative reaction from the Albanian public, and 
accusations by the main Albanian parties that UNMIK’s actions were politically 
motivated.
621
 In part due to such practices, as well as frustration with the continued slow 
pace of returns, Serbian parties boycotted the municipal elections of October 2002. 
Attempts by the SRSG and UNMIK throughout 2003 to address the governance practices 
of the PISG, by linking UNMIK’s “willingness to transfer further authority within the 
existing legal parameters” to the performance targets, similarly failed to achieve traction 
with Kosovo Albanian political parties.  
In response to their rhetoric on independence, the SRSG also felt compelled to 
“remind the population of Kosovo”, in a publicly televised address, that “external relations, 
the fight against organized crime, security and minority rights would not be transferred and 
that the time for solving Kosovo’s final status would come, but not in 2003”.622 
Complementing this effort in a speech delivered to the Assembly of Kosovo, Chris Pattern, 
underlined the importance of regional cooperation while formalising the prospect of 
membership of the EU when stressing that: 
Implementing the reforms similar to those in the rest of the region will 
bring you closer to Europe. You will be able to benefit from the 
advantages of the regional cooperation that is being established in South 
East Europe. A clear example is the Free Trade Agreement that UNMIK 
has just signed with Albania, under the auspices of the Stability Pact. 
Participating in this network of agreements will improve your market 
access and will make Kosovo more attractive for investors… To that 
end, the EU has launched this year, in cooperation with you, the PISG, 
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and UNMIK, the SAP Tracking Mechanism, […] to guide you closer to 
the EU through a process that will sometimes, frankly, be arduous.
623
 
 
Within six months of Patten’s speech, the province once again descended into violence, 
with the eruption of widespread riots that left over 18 people dead and hundreds injured, 
shattering “the illusion of security for Kosovo’s minority communities and significantly 
undermining confidence in both NATO and UNMIK”.624 Though this was described as yet 
another “back to the drawing board moment” for international organisations in Kosovo, it 
did not result in a substantial change in UNMIK strategy, or in the nature of 
international/domestic interaction. The Standards for Kosovo process that was already in 
existence was effectively relaunched, with a commitment by international organisations to 
address the central issue of status more expediently: until that commitment was delivered 
upon, Kosovan politics remained “a zero sum game”.625  It would take until October 2005 
before the UN Security Council was prepared to approve a decision to start negotiations on 
Kosovo’s final status. 
If “the status question” had been used by all sides as a means to avoid complying 
with policy for various issues, the decision to formally open discussions on Kosovo’s 
future status did not have a noticeable impact on complaint policy behaviour. The Human 
Rights Watch group argued that the negotiations over Kosovo’s final status overshadowed 
its pressing human rights problems during 2006. Shortfalls in the judicial system and the 
failure to bring to justice those responsible for serious crimes added to “a climate of 
impunity” that was keenly felt by minority communities, whose confidence in the systems 
of criminal justice system and rule of law continued to decline.
626
 The indictment of 
Ramush Haradinaj (then Prime Minister of Kosovo) by the ICTY in March of 2005, while 
viewed by some as a sign of progress, did little to alter the political dynamic in the 
province. By the summer of 2006, “the return of refugees and displaced persons to their 
homes had all but come to a halt…”627 A year later, elections to the Kosovo Assembly 
(parliament) were devalued by the large number of Serbs heeding Belgrade’s call to 
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boycott.
628
 The emergence of anti-UNMIK/international administration parties such as the 
Vetevendosje! Self-Determination Movement, led by Albin Kurti, were representative of a 
growing frustration among the majority Albanian community with the failure to deal with 
the status questions, and the related lack of reform across state services. 
The unilateral declaration of independence in February 2007 did little to alter the 
political dynamic, as it failed to clarify Kosovo’s international legal status, and equally 
failed to unlock the multitude of stalled policy initiatives in Kosovo’s governing 
institutions. Attempts by the Kosovo institutions to address returns questions were sporadic 
and often poorly executed. For example, an attempt to return Albanians to reconstructed 
homes in a Serb-controlled neighbourhood in Mitrovica led to numerous violent clashes 
between Albanians and Serbs in the area.
629
 The requirement to appoint an ombudsman for 
human rights-related issues was persistently deferred; indeed it was not until June of 2009, 
three years after the intention to appoint an ombudsman was announced, that, the Kosovo 
Assembly elected Sami Kurteshi as Kosovo’s ombudsperson, with a five-year mandate.630 
7.52 Characteristics of Domestic Politics 
In considering this narrative, it is understandable that much commentary focuses on the 
intransigence of the majority Kosovo Albanian political parties on minority issues. As with 
Bosnia, ethnically-motivated national sentiment was compounded by intense localised 
power struggles. Within and around those struggles, a number of features emerged that 
would impact on the delivery of policy on ethnic minorities and the role of KFOR in the 
effort. The kin-state influence of the Belgrade government also remained a prominent 
feature of Kosovo politics throughout the period analysed. While several new parties 
emerged, some of which proclaimed a multi-ethnic, pro-EU perspective, they found it 
difficult to break the control of the main Albanian parties or the Belgrade-influenced 
Serbian parties.  
The degree to which the Serbian community themselves rejected the minority 
policies intended to help them, cannot be discounted. For many Serbian parties and 
communities, particularly in the years immediately after conflict, to cooperate with 
proposed policies on returns and particularly participation was seen as legitimising what 
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most viewed as an illegal incursion of sovereign Serbian territory. The maintenance of 
parallel structures, including the continued payment of public servants by Belgrade, served 
to sustain that dynamic. However, as the research into KFOR’s impact reveals, more 
pragmatic attitudes did emerge in areas outside of Mitrovica. Meanwhile, reports produced 
by the OSCE and UNHCR repeated the claims that the continued existence and 
entrenchment of parallel structures – notably in the judicial system, education and health – 
were undermining the delivery of policy for a multi-ethnic society; perpetuating the 
isolation of minority communities. Though the suggestion that these services “provided an 
unsustainable second-class service for minorities” proved prescient overtime it did 
however fail to account for the view, prevalent among Kosovo Serbs that the services 
being funded by Belgrade, though localised, were often of a higher standard to those 
offered under the PISG, and in their own way became symbols of Serbian identity and 
resistance.
631
However, regardless of the quality of the service provided, at some point they 
almost always lacked the capacity and scale to adequately cover shortfalls in minority 
access to the courts, hospitals, schools, centres for social welfare and other public services. 
Overtime it would get progressively more difficult for Serbian communities in Kosovo to 
avoid engagement with ‘Kosovo-run’ domestic services. 
While the facility of minority representation was a feature of post-conflict 
representative structures, the concept of minority representatives did not progress beyond 
the political sphere at the pace anticipated by UNMIK. The records of the Kosovo 
assembly show that some Serbs did participate: the Coalition Return and Democratic Party 
of Serbia were active to some degree as early as 2001 with attempts to open dialogue with 
Belgrade forming the stimulus for engagement.
632
 However, ethnic minorities experience 
of state institutions and authorities was more often characterised by widespread 
discrimination, exacerbated by the absence of clear laws and effective remedies and 
sanctions, particularly through the justice system.
633
 Even where authorities engaged in 
returns and participation initiatives, their commitment to the policies advocated was 
questionable. Opportunism emerged at all levels, among all parties, with many seeking “to 
play the system” to maximise access to funds on various projects. As the findings below 
reveal, domestic actors were often in a position to capitalise on the lack of communication 
between various international actors, their good will and naive planning, with some 
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domestic politicians and local leaders extracting significant amounts of aid, both financial 
and otherwise, often with dubious linkage to its intended purpose. Finally, it is also 
apparent that following such intensive engagement over a period of ten years, fatigue, 
related to both the scale and reciprocity of post-conflict interaction, was a further negative 
factor influencing the implementation of policy on minority issues.  
7.6 The Military Role under UNSCR 1244 
KFOR was initially composed of four multi-national brigades, with an approximate 
strength of 50,000 personnel. In 2005, responding to external pressures to reduce the size 
of the force, and the need for a more flexible approach to interaction with the domestic 
institutions and population, the force was reorganised into five multi-national task forces, 
each with an allocated geographical ‘area of operations’. KFOR was somewhat uncertain 
of the operational scope afforded by UNSCR 1244. Considered a vague mandate by 
civilian and military staff alike, KFOR commanders initially “erred towards a minimalist 
interpretation of their role”, which left some minority communities exposed to intimidation 
and revenge attacks.
634
 As the post-conflict character of Kosovo emerged in early 2000, 
KFOR commanders applied a broader interpretation of UNSCR 1244, to allow for the 
appropriate adaptation of operational procedures.
635
 As a result of this interpretation, 
UNSCR 1244 provided the framework for a broadly similar range of tasks to those carried 
out by NATO in Bosnia:  
KFOR is not at all failing. On the contrary, the average number of 
murders per week has fallen from 30 in early June to six in mid-
October. Since our troops arrived in Kosovo, violence has continuously 
and significantly decreased. This development is clearly to be credited 
to KFOR. Our troops have achieved this, not only by using their 
professional military skills, but also by taking over responsibilities that 
go far beyond normal military duty. They were policemen and firemen, 
they ran prisons, they administered towns and villages, and took care of 
people’s social needs. I can only congratulate the soldiers who have 
done all this, and I am proud of them.
 636
  
 
Of foremost importance for KFOR was the deterrence of renewed hostilities, withdrawal of 
Serbian forces and enforcement of the ceasefire. While this task was fulfilled with general 
ease (as seen above), the demilitarisation of the KLA and the establishment and 
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maintenance of a safe and secure environment within “which refugees and displaced 
persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a 
transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered” was 
more problematic.
637
 In establishing the parameters for future civilian-military cooperation, 
KFOR was also tasked to support “and as appropriate, coordinate closely with the work of 
the international civil presence”, to support “the development of a stable, democratic, 
multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo”, while maintaining their primary role, the provision of 
protection and freedom of movement.
638
  
The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo’s PISG did not significantly 
alter either the status or operation of KFOR units, which were committed by the alliance to 
remain in Kosovo on the basis of UNSCR 1244. NATO did, however, seek to alter the 
nature of its contribution in June of 2008, when it formally adopted new tasks, most 
notably assuming lead responsibility for the standing down of the Kosovo Protection 
Corps, while supporting the development of the Kosovo Security Force as “an all-crisis 
voluntary, professional, multi-ethnic, lightly armed force with a mandate encompassing 
crisis response, assistance to civil authorities in responding to natural and other disasters 
and emergencies, Explosive Ordinance Disposal and civil protection”. 639 NATOs impact 
on this transition will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter.  
7.7 Summary 
The structures established for post-conflict Kosovo engendered diverse sources for policy 
on ethnic minority issues, including UNSCR 1244, the constitutional framework and the 
standards for Kosovo process. The pillar structure established a clear division of labour 
among international actors, though arguably lacking some of the civil-military inclusivity 
observed in Bosnia; the framework for military contributions was not as formalised in 
Kosovo. Nonetheless, military actors were socialised and exposed to ideas on ethnic 
minority issues emanating from UNMIK, OSCE, UNHCR, and an EU tentatively 
progressing an enlargement prospective. Once again, military planners anticipated much of 
the civil-military interaction that emerged (reflected in the CONOPS), which not only 
envisaged conditions on deployment, but also identified key transitionary steps in the long-
term state- and nation-building effort. The domestic political context that faced the civil-
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military framework was found to be dominated by three identifiable features: disingenuous 
engagement by PISG on issues affecting the minority Serbian population – where the idea 
of creating the conditions and capacity necessary for returns was rarely followed through 
to policy initiatives, pronounced kin-state influence, and the zero sum politics induced by 
the unresolved status question. Chapter 8 will consider the nature of the international 
military response to emerge within that context. 
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Chapter 8 
 
The Military Application of Conditionality and Normative Pressure on Ethnic 
Minority Issues in Kosovo 1999-2009 
 
This chapter analyses the nature of military interaction on ethnic minority returns and 
participation in new state institutions and processes. In considering the success or 
otherwise of the military effort, it also considers the extent of compliant and non-compliant 
behaviour and policy implementation. 
8.1 Application of Conditionality and Normative Pressure by Military Forces on Ethnic 
Minority Returns 1999-2009 
8.11 Stabilisation and Reconstruction: Humanitarian aid 1999-2000  
As military planners have come to appreciate more clearly the 
relationship between security and reconstruction, they have fudged the 
distinction between the work of soldiers and the work of NGOs. This 
puts aid workers at risk.
640
 
 
With the rapid withdrawal of Serbian forces leaving the KLA unopposed and minority 
communities exposed, KFOR’s initial focus was on the protection of minorities, as 
opposed to the separation of forces that defined much of the early effort in Bosnia. While 
the initial hostility of the Serbian population towards KFOR was unsurprising, KFOR 
personnel were forced to adapt to counter a diverse range of threats to the Serbian 
community, compounded by a destroyed or malfunctioning infrastructure that sustained 
allegations of subterfuge and retaliation: 
In the Serb part of town, personnel from the Dutch support element are 
handing out water to the population, since there is not a single drop in 
the water pipes. A Serb man is angry with KFOR because he believes 
that the reason why the pipelines in the Serb area are empty, is that all 
the water is given to the Albanians.
641
  
In moving to address these concerns (and establish their authority) KFOR was immediately 
engaged at the inter-ethnic interface, developing a range of responses to the problems 
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encountered, from the provision of hard security to the deployment of “twelve female 
military social workers attached to the Moroccan field hospital in MNB North…” within 
the context of a wider humanitarian effort.
642
 In securing minority communities, KFOR 
provided both static and mobile area security, while also securing minority movements to 
and from various locations such as markets, hospitals and financial institutions. Over time, 
the provision of such security was transferred first to the UNMIK-P and later to the KPS, 
though KFOR involvement continued in some locations up to 2007.
643
  
Due to the scale of the violence encountered, and the concomitant fact of Serbs 
fleeing the province, a focus on Serbian returns did not emerge as a feature of KFOR 
operations until late 2000. Securing the participation of Serbian community leaders in local 
initiatives was, however, a feature or KFOR operations from the outset, where KFOR 
personnel found themselves most often in the role of interlocutors between the opposing 
communities. For the most part, such local initiatives revolved around the provision of 
humanitarian aid, both unilaterally and in cooperation with UN agencies and related 
NGOs.  
In a sample of 54 humanitarian aid and civil support actions completed by KFOR, 
between 1999 and 2009 (see Appendix V), it was found that KFOR assisted in 
reconstruction, medical, education, agricultural and transportation tasks. Normative 
pressure was applied by KFOR personnel on issues relating to participation in seven 
activities, with conditional incentives applied in two cases. Normative pressure was 
applied to returns-related issues in just one case, which also involved the application of 
conditional incentives. In considering these findings, two variables are worthy of note. 
First, unlike Bosnia, the demographics of Kosovo (where ethnic Albanians accounted for 
approximately 90% of the population) ensured that the majority of humanitarian aid was 
delivered in a mono-ethnic environment. Second, during the period when the humanitarian 
aid process was at its peak (1999-2002), the return of the Serbian community did not form 
a prominent part of the approach undertaken by KFOR. 
All but two of the activities analysed were organised unilaterally by the troops of 
the TCCs, rather than by KFOR per se. However, the single returns project identified, was 
run by Norwegian KFOR in partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council.  
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These findings reveal that insofar as KFOR was involved in returns issues during 
the period 1999-2002, it was predominantly restricted to questions of security. Efforts to 
encourage the return of the displaced Serbian population did not really gather momentum 
until post-2002, and even then only modestly so. For example, of the NOK 105 million 
spent by the Norwegian government on projects in Kosovo in 2001, most was allocated to 
humanitarian projects, democratisation, infrastructure and institutional strengthening “in 
anticipation of returns”, rather than necessarily progressing returns at that point in time.644 
Funding for humanitarian efforts either came formally from TCCs’ capitals, or 
informally through various charity efforts organised by the soldiers themselves. Such 
activities ranged from the collection and delivery of children’s toys, the provision of 
educational items from stationery and computers to winter provisions, and building 
reconstruction efforts. Similar to Bosnia, most activities were modest in scale, with 
budgets of less than €50,000, and were conducted on a unilateral basis. Once again, the 
activities of Spanish military units stand out through their attempt to encourage returns in 
the Istok area through reconstruction projects in 2002. German units in the Prizren area 
were also quite innovative: 
Since almost all kinds of public administration are missing, it is a part of 
our task to enforce pension entitlements and child benefits. We also 
support them by getting substitute driving licenses from Germany, just 
to give you a few examples of our daily work.
645
 
 
A German Colonel operating in the Prizren CIMIC office in 2002 observed that the KFOR 
office was accessed by all ethnicities and had developed into a firm institution, well known 
beyond the city borders of Prizren; “everybody can come to us - no matter what ethnicity 
they belong to. We set great store on this… “.646 Though KFOR maintained more detailed 
records on CIMIC activities than IFOR or SFOR, with few exceptions,
647
 it did not 
maintain a comprehensive database on humanitarian activities. The sample suggests that 
KFOR’s humanitarian activities peaked in late 2000 and was more or less completely 
replaced by CIMIC activities by mid-2002. However, as the CIMIC sample reveals, 
humanitarian activities featured throughout the period reviewed. 
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8.12 KFOR Policing Role 
During the stabilisation and reconstruction phase, and for a period during the state and 
national building phase, KFOR was the primary provider of policing services in Kosovo. 
In addition to the primary tasks associated with securing minority and other vulnerable 
communities, KFOR assumed de facto responsibility for traffic control, border 
management and at local levels undertook many of the tasks typically associated with 
community policing. For example, one unexpected feature of this effort was the necessity 
for KFOR personnel to provide security for Serbian persons while in hospital, with an 
OSCE/UNHCR report noting that Kosovo Serbs were particularly vulnerable to restricted 
access to medical facilities, resorting in many cases to KFOR military hospitals, where 
security and impartiality of service was effectively guaranteed
 
.
648
  
While UNMIK-P gradually assumed the policing burden, their difficulty reaching 
the levels of staff identified for the mission meant that KFOR maintained an involvement 
in policing activities for significantly longer than anticipated. KFOR personnel interviewed 
were generally positive about their relationship with UNMIK-P, noting that their lack of 
staff was a mutual source of frustration. On issues pertaining to minorities, UNMIK-P and 
KFOR combined effectively to produce statistical information on crime rates, including 
identifying the specific impact on minority groups. In turn, this information was used by 
groups such as the UNHCR to plan bus lines serving minorities, and for the development 
of strategies to allow for the secure movement of the Serbian population. As the situation 
improved, school escorts would also become a feature of the process.
649
 UNMIK-P and 
KFOR also combined to maximise utility of their respective resources: for example, KFOR 
personnel were often brought in to restore power to locations where power lines had been 
cut.
650
 On more technical policing issues such as forensics, KFOR Military Policy also 
provided occasional support (though never formalised) to their UNMIK-P counterparts. 
As state and nation-building activities developed, KFOR increasingly accompanied 
KPS patrols, including on often sensitive search and detention operations. This cooperation 
and support was generally viewed positively by both sides; however, it is notable after 
2004 that KFOR required the KPS to adhere to their multi-ethnic principles by, among 
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other things, requesting that where KFOR provided support in particular areas of the 
province, they be accompanied by KPS Albanian and Serbian officers.
651
 Such approaches 
were, for the most part, informal in application, but effectively complemented the minority 
policy components promoted by the OSCE in the KPS training academy. 
8.2 State and Nation Building 2000-2008: CIMIC 
Within six months of the international intervention in Kosovo, a “Joint Committee on 
Returns (JCR)” was established jointly by the UN and OSCE in May of 2000. 
Incorporating KFOR and EU representatives, the committee was designed as a forum for 
engagement between displaced Serbs and emerging institutions of self-government at both 
national and municipal level. As with other initiatives of the period, the efforts of the JCR 
were not without success. However, in the context of the numbers of displaced Kosovo 
Serbs, it had a negligible impact in proportion to the effort invested by international 
organisations. One such effort, overseen by the JCR, involved the successful return of 50 
Kosovo Serbs to various villages in the Pristina/Gracenica/Lipljan area during 2000. 
However, for a project involving contributions from KFOR, UNHCR, UNMIK, OSCE, 
UNICEF and international NGOs, the number of successful returns was considered 
modest:  “To sustain this small scale return has demanded immense resources, including 
the provision of 24-hour security by KFOR and intensive follow up by an array of 
international organisations to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance and the rebuilding 
of houses and a school”.652 Nonetheless, staff involved argued strongly that such 
investment was vitally important at that time as “it was important to achieve a symbolic 
victory on returns”.653 Under the chairmanship of the SRSG, the forum evolved to 
specifically targeted “the practical realities of Serb return”, which, given the extent of their 
network, brought KFOR to the centre of its efforts: 
Many Kosovo Serb communities in the central area of Kosovo 
encompassing Pristina/Prishtine, Obilic/Obiliq, Lipljan/Lipjan and other 
areas, have benefited from activities carried out by KFOR and others 
within the framework of Operation Trojan.
654
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Though KFOR’s CIMIC capability was not fully established until late 2001, many of the 
characteristics of CIMIC operations were already in evidence through KFOR activities 
carried out under Operation Trojan. Operation Trojan was a multi-faceted programme 
primarily targeted at Kosovo Serb communities, and designed to improve their overall 
quality of life, while also striving to achieve Kosovo Albanian support by delivering 
benefits to them related to progress on Serbian returns and participation. Initially, activities 
tended to focus on security related issues: “escorting arrangements to facilitate school 
attendance; the construction of access roads to improve freedom of movement in 
conditions of security; enhanced security measures during harvest time”.655 In carrying out 
these tasks, KFOR planners recognised that KFOR was in a position “to expand and 
diversify the nature of its actions”. One planning officer involved in the operation noted: 
Relatively quickly we realised that we could get involved in a wide 
range of tasks to support the returns and reconciliation effort so long as 
we were prepared to assume a broad understanding of security.
656
 
 
From this position, KFOR expanded the remit of Operation Trojan to incorporate a more 
explicit application of financial and technical support incentives, such as the promotion of 
minority returns through “income generating activities geared towards improving the self-
sufficiency of communities in meeting certain aspects of their daily needs e.g. flour milling 
and bread production”.657 In time, as concepts of CIMIC evolved, the application of such 
initiatives changed. However, as a first effort by KFOR to engage on such issues, 
Operation Trojan was considered “a successful model for effective civil-military co-
operation, incorporating […] a strong element of close inter-action with local communities 
in the development and implementation of all activities.” 658 
In a sample of 76 CIMIC activities between 1999 and 2009, it was found that 
application of conditional incentives and normative pressure accounted for on average 9% 
of all returns related activity analysed, predominantly in the period 2003-2008. A more 
specific analysis of Serbian areas south of the river Ibar (excluding Mitrovica) reveals that 
KFOR’s effort to encourage compliance on returns predominantly occurred in the 
ethnically-mixed villages and towns of MNTF (C) and in German and Spanish KFOR’s 
area of operations. For most KFOR units in the province returns related activities were 
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therefore not an issue of concern. Of the seven returns-related projects identified in the 
sample, six were delivered by CIMIC teams based in those areas. These findings correlate 
with interviews of KFOR personnel, who agreed that the focus on returns formed a 
comparatively small part of their effort when compared to the efforts on participation, and 
that where KFOR did engage on returns issues it was usually in the area of Gracenica and 
Lipljan, known as the Serbian crescent.
659
 In all but one case, CIMIC projects designed to 
encourage returns were delivered jointly with municipalities or NGOs. These projects 
were, for the most part, focused on housing reconstruction in an attempt to encourage 
returns, in some cases supported by efforts to restore schools and through the application 
of conditional incentives secure agreement from predominantly Albanian staff for Serbian 
access to school facilities. For example, German KFOR-led school reconstruction projects 
in Kijevo and Balince were, in part, delivered to “lay the ground for potential returns”.660  
From late 2002, KFOR’s approach to returns policy, though modest in scale, 
showed signs of increasing sophistication, with attempts to formalise the role played by 
KFOR within the wider international effort: 
As you may already know, our UN partners in Kosovo will put more 
priority on encouraging returns of displaced people to Kosovo during 
2003. If returns are to be successful anywhere, we must carefully 
prepare the groundwork in partnership with UNMIK, local authorities 
and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). From a military 
perspective, this means our operations must be extremely well 
coordinated with UNMIK authorities and we must leverage our civil-
military cooperation to facilitate respect for the rule of law and 
acceptance of civic responsibilities.
661
 
 
Contributing to a returns project in Novo Selo (in cooperation with the Lutheran World 
Federation NGO and the Municipal Working Group) German CIMIC teams specifically 
targeted returns through a process that involved intensive and focused interethnic dialogue 
in order to gain agreement for the phases of the project, which included the rebuilding of 
35 houses in 2003 and an additional 35 houses in 2004. The project also targeted the 
reestablishment of 25 farms, supported by related CIMIC projects on service networks, 
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roads and the provision of a social centre.
662
 This effort recorded the first notable success 
of KFOR CIMIC with the return of 19 Serbs to the Novo Selo area in October 2003.  A 
fact underlined by the visit of outgoing NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, who 
emphasised KFOR’s role in providing the necessary “backdrop for other international 
organisations to fulfil their work”.663 
Adapting methods observed in places such as Novo Selo, a Spanish CIMIC team 
that oversaw a partially successful returns project in 2002 placed a particular emphasis on 
economic based incentives which benefited the Albanian community – “together with the 
NGOs, we are establishing new, small enterprises. And people are really looking forward 
to start working”664 – but which were also used to incentives Serbian returns. Over an 
extended period, potential Serbian returnees were invited to participate in a number of “go 
and see visits”, during which the potential job opportunities were highlighted by KFOR:  
A project called “Go and see” has been ongoing for some time now. It 
includes people from Serbia who will travel back to the valley to find 
out what happened to their houses. Afterwards they decide whether to 
stay or not. About 200 people are back already, and by the end of the 
year KFOR expects 400 more.
 665
   
 
These visits were also used to allow Kosovo Serbs to engage with local (Albanian) 
contractors to discuss the rebuilding of homes and the possibility of return.
666
 However, in 
spite of their significant investment, including the innovative application of conditional 
incentives, and constant normative pressure on the Kosovo Albanian community in the 
area, the Spanish found it difficult to sustain the rate of returns. One officer noted that 
“even when we achieved returns they tended to be of the older generation, more often than 
not where younger people returned they quickly sold-up and moved back to Serbia. They 
had no intention of staying no matter how we tried to encourage them”.667 Over time, the 
Spanish contingent envisaged a local trade network between Kosovo Albanian and Serbian 
villages in the area, “it would be beneficial to have trade relations with the nearest 
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Albanian villages, rather than having to drive 200 kilometres to buy the goods they need. 
To develop that would be a very important step forward, but they will need more time to 
establish such strong relations”.668 
In contrast, the Finnish approach to the economic side of returns was more 
complex, with an investment of €250,000 per annum from 2004 to 2007 on “Small 
Business Enterprise Projects” in their area of operations, centred on Lipljan. Liaising with 
the International Organization for Migration and Pristina University, Finnish CIMIC teams 
monitored the impact of their projects with a specific focus on both returns potential and 
participation impact. Through a qualification process conducted in liaison with local 
municipalities, businesses were identified for investment based on potential in several 
areas, including a willingness to employ people from minority communities in the area: 
The currently active projects are in Lipljan/Lipjan, Pristina/Prishtine, 
Glogovac/Drenas and Shtime/Stimlje. The projects vary from metal 
workshops to dressmaking. It is always a prerequisite that the businesses 
chosen for the program represent a wide range of ethnic groups.
669
 
 
 Recognising that such intensive efforts could not be sustained, KFOR planners (along with 
those from the UN, OSCE and EU) turned their focus to increasing the role of municipal 
administrations. Initially this involved requesting municipalities to provide Local 
Community Officers to assist international staffs in distributing and collecting information 
and applications related to returns initiatives as a means to develop interaction between 
Kosovo Serbs and their respective municipal administrations, but also to encourage inter-
ethnic dialogue. The response of municipalities to such efforts varied from outright refusal 
to cooperate to a tentative willingness to participate. For example, the municipality of 
Lipjan/Lipljan specifically enlisted the assistance of KFOR, a step that was viewed by 
KFOR commanders as a “vote of confidence” in their efforts to engage that particular 
municipality.
670
  
Nevertheless, as highlighted above, sources of municipal intransigence varied, with 
internal political power struggles often pushing issues beyond the reach of KFOR 
proposals. Additionally, as the efforts of international actors evolved, a seasonal pattern of 
returns emerged across Kosovo with various international organisations working through 
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the winter towards specified summer dates for returns. However, the volume of returns 
recorded in the period under review never amounted to more than 3,000 per annum, and 
for the period 2007 to 2009, all but stopped.
671
 As noted above, the rate of returns varied 
according to the location of origin, security available, economic prospects, age profile, and 
political context of those being targeted for returns. Various aspects of these issues were 
identified by CIMIC’s teams and linked to processes of normative pressure and targeted 
financial and technical support incentives – membership-based incentives were not 
identified as a factor in KFOR’s attempts to delivery policy for minority returns. 
Reflecting the conceptual ambiguity within military circles, as to how CIMIC 
should be practiced, and even where minority issues were evident, some CIMIC teams (for 
example those provided by the Czech Armed Forces) did not engage on returns issues at 
any point during the period under review. The reasons explaining this were varied, and 
predominantly reflected a lack of financial commitment on the part of the TCC. However, 
it was also reflective of substantial variations in the TCCs’ perceptions of CIMIC purpose. 
For example, the Czech CIMIC team viewed CIMIC activity as a key component of their 
“finding out intelligence information”. 672 For others, such as the Finnish and Irish, the idea 
of a CIMIC team “doing intelligence” was counterproductive and dangerous; KFOR was 
reluctant to provide clear guidance on the issue, particularly where non-NATO countries 
were “spending their own money”.673 The extent to which these differences impacted on 
the ability of KFOR CIMIC teams to encourage returns is difficult to gauge. However, it is 
notable that the Finnish approach was cited by many KFOR personnel of various ranks and 
nationality as being particularly successful.
674
 This was attributed to their provision of 
substantial financial support to their CIMIC teams and the fact that team members were 
often carefully selected to ensure that the skills and talents of Finnish civilian personnel on 
military service were maximised where possible. As noted above this facilitated 
partnerships with a range of civilian and military actors (such as Pristina University) and 
fostered innovated programmes often with an emphasis on socio-economic issues in their 
area. In the period 2003-2004, Finnish CIMIC teams established 43 enterprise projects, of 
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which approximately one third could be described as indirectly linked to returns initiatives 
including housing reconstruction, and small business development.
675
 
We have supported 43 enterprises in five municipalities including 
Pristina, Lipljan, Kosovo Polje, Stimle and Glogovac. Approximately 
150 people are now employed with our support… The selection of the 
entrepreneurs involved was executed in close co-operation with local 
administrations and UNMIK. In each case, representatives of the local 
municipalities gave recommendations and the CIMIC office made the 
final decisions. Beneficiaries represent all ethnic groups In Kosovo.
676
 
 
In terms of compliant outcomes, Finnish CIMIC initiatives on Serbian minority returns 
were comparatively more successful than any other KFOR TCC. Of the two, Finish returns 
projects analysed in the sample both were partially successful in achieving complaint 
outcomes, while interviews suggest that this was true of other Finnish CIMIC activities not 
captured in the sample. However, Finnish officers admit that the rate of returns achieved 
never matched their levels of ambition. The expectation “that where a small number 
returned more would follow” never really materialised. “Sure, some of the enterprise 
projects failed (we expected that) but then we had houses built for Serbs that they never 
occupied despite agreeing to do so. In some of these cases they just waited until the house 
was built and then moved to sell it. How that fitted with aims of what we were trying to do 
in Kosovo, I’m not sure…”677 In considering the nature of compliance, the Finnish 
experience reveals that the sustainability of compliant outcomes once achieved was 
particularly difficult. The same Finnish officer identified above noted that in some of the 
projects they considered most successful, the returns were reversed in the period after 
2009.
678
 
The Irish approach in many ways mirrored that of the Finnish, in terms of project 
design and ambition. All Irish KFOR projects were delivered in partnership with Irish Aid, 
which provided a civilian framework for project analysis and management. Working from 
an annual budget that varied between €50,000 and €120,000, the Irish specifically targeted 
returns in three of the projects analysed in the sample. The first project, a house 
reconstruction project, failed to achieve any outcome, when municipal support was 
withdrawn close to the end of the construction phase due to a lack of political support for 
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Serbian returns, and an internal municipal dispute as to ownership of the land on which the 
houses were constructed. Following a move by one municipal member to secure one of the 
houses for his own family, a compromise was eventually reached with the Irish to 
accommodate displaced minority families from non-Serbian backgrounds in the house. 
From the Irish perspective, a valuable lesson was learned which was reflected in 
subsequent projects that were more closely managed and less ambitious in their objectives. 
Those projects achieved greater success, with one housing project in Stimlje eventually 
achieving a partially-compliant outcome with the return of two Serbian families, though 
once again it was noted that the age profile of the families in question was high. 
Overall, the sample reveals that KFOR initiatives on returns more or less ceased 
from 2005 onwards, with only one project recorded in 2008, and none in 2009. By 2006, it 
was acknowledged that the KFOR’s capacity (including that of its TCCs) was insufficient 
to deliver the types of returns projects that were prominent from 2001-2005. It is also 
representative of the fact that the numbers expressing a desire to return fell significantly 
during that period, with the OSCE and UNHCR in particular suggesting that the focus 
needed to shift to “sustainable outcomes” for displaced communities, rather than returns, 
even though UNSCR 1244 still prioritised the returns effort. 
8.21 Liaison Monitoring Teams 
Liaison and Monitoring Teams emerged in Kosovo as a result of shrinking financial and 
human resources available for CIMIC-type interaction and initiatives. LMTs were first 
introduced in late 2004 in order to address an identified “information gap” caused by the 
reduced number of KFOR patrols. In a small number of cases, they assumed some of the 
duties performed by CIMIC houses established by individual TCCs: however, unlike in 
Bosnia, CIMIC houses were not as numerous in Kosovo. LMTs did initially forge close 
relationships with CIMIC teams, but operated within their own chain of command that was 
consciously developed to facilitate the passage of information between UNMIK, OSCE, 
IOs and NGOs, and mayors, as well as the heads of public institutions and municipalities.  
LMTs typically operated from civilian houses in identified villages and towns 
throughout Kosovo. They deliberately sought to establish themselves within these areas as 
trusted interlocutors on any issue concerning KFOR, or the delivery of UNSCR 1244. 
From KFOR’s perspective, their primary purpose was to “enhance situational awareness”. 
As a result of this structure and approach, LMTs were not prominent in KFOR activities 
related to returns issues, with the exception of occasionally passing on information to 
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CIMIC teams regarding the potential for returns in a particular area, or more often, reasons 
why CIMIC returns projects were not having the desired impact – the latter aspect 
reflecting the ability of LMTs to become part of local political interaction and dialogue.  
Commenting on their lack of a role on returns-related issues, one LMT officer 
noted, “we did meet NGOs occasionally to discuss the goings on in the area and to see if 
conditions were appropriate for returns, but conversations on returns became less common 
over time”.679 Another officer who was a member of a LMT in late 2007 observed that 
“returns were rarely mentioned: we were primarily focused on improving relations 
between the groups that were there”.680 While one instance of LMT involvement in CIMIC 
activities related to returns was identified, it was ad hoc in nature, and reflected the fact 
that the officer in question had previously served as a CIMIC officer during an earlier tour 
of duty in Kosovo. LMTs were significantly more active on participation areas: this will be 
analysed in greater detail below. 
8.22 Key Leader Engagement and the Role of Military Commanders 
A defining feature of KFOR engagement with both returns and participation issues was the 
role played by its military commanders at all levels. Military leaders in high command 
consciously sought to encourage KFOR personnel to be creative in their dealings with 
Kosovo’s population. Writing in the KFOR Chronicle in 2002, the then COMKFOR 
argued that: 
One of the best ways to stay focused on the mission is to think of unique 
ways to accomplish it. We need to always be looking for creative ways 
to engage with the people of Kosovo and to get them to engage with 
each other. […] This edition is full of examples of KFOR people finding 
a way to engage with the population and make a difference. What are 
you doing to leave this place better than you found it?
681
 
 
On specific issues of concern, KFOR commanders were often more calculating in their 
dealings with local leaders and politicians, applying the strongest of rhetoric on returns and 
participation, while often leveraging the potential benefits of various CIMIC projects. In 
his Christmas message of 2002, the then COMKFOR captured the evolution of the role of 
KFOR noting: 
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Only with UNMIK’s success will our role here continue to diminish. 
Likewise we will continue fostering the capabilities and encouraging the 
local Kosovar institutions to take on responsibilities; especially their 
responsibility to ensure the security, access to services and freedom of 
movement for minority members of their communities. They must come 
to realise that the international community expects them to create an 
environment where displaced peoples can return to their homes without 
fear, and the sooner they assist in the process the sooner Kosovo’s status 
will be resolved – General Fabio Mini.682 
 
References to membership conditionality also emerge in this context, particularly from 
2004 onwards, where almost all COMKFORs highlighted the importance of compliance 
with policies on various issues (including minority issues) for successful progression 
towards EU membership. In January 2004, COMKFOR Gen. Kammerhoff addressed the 
Kosovo public in a televised interview, during which he explicitly linked compliance with 
various policies to a future within Europe: 
The Year 2004 will be a challenge to you all, the citizens of Kosovo. 
You can start on the road to reach the European standards. For the first 
time, the document “Standards for Kosovo” sets out a clear definition of 
the kind of society Kosovo can have. KFOR supports the achievement 
of the standards within means and capabilities. Change is not easy. With 
hard work at all levels the path to Europe will be open for you, your 
families and children. […] I am convinced and we in KFOR feel that 
you can attain these launched standards in the given timeframe. Our 
soldiers are prepared along with UNMIK to assist you and your 
government to reach this goal.
683
 
 
Alongside such public pronouncements, successive COMKFORs actively applied 
normative pressure on Kosovo Albanian and Serbian political elites to address returns 
issues. Responses to these calls varied from reciprocated rhetoric to outright refusals to 
acknowledge KFORs recommendations. In some instances KFORs attempts to promote 
norms on returns were compounded by the somewhat disingenuous responses of the PISG. 
For example, a letter circulated to IDPs by “Kosovo’s leaders” in July 2003, encouraging 
them to return home, had the effect of antagonising Serbs by its continuous reference to 
“Kosova” (the Albanian spelling for the province). KFOR somewhat unwittingly circulated 
this letter, publishing a summary in their monthly newsletter.
684
 While the importance 
attached to returns was prominent in COMKFOR discourse between 1999 and 2003, it is 
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rarely features thereafter, and interviews with senior staff from COMKFOR’s office 
suggest that the returns issue gave way to other priorities from 2003, “somehow it got lost 
in the dialogue on standards before status”.685 
If COMKFORs played a modest role in progressing policy on returns, KFOR 
commanders at Task Force and Battlegroup level demonstrated significantly greater 
degrees of engagement. All four of the former Task Force commanders interviewed 
confirmed that applying normative pressure on returns was a regular part of the work 
between 2002 and 2007. Equally, all attested to leveraging the work of CIMIC teams as a 
means to incentivise compliance. To the extent that they were successful, most were 
unsure, with only two commanders pointing to specific instances where they felt their 
intervention with political leaders at municipal level produced visible progress on returns. 
One commander qualified these findings by noting that: 
It was difficult to measure the extent to which we were having an 
impact on those kinds of issues [returns] however I felt it was important 
to keep the issue on the table. It was part of our remit and I know others 
[Task Force Commanders] felt the same way but it was slow work…686 
 
Of all the commanders analysed, it was found that commanders at Company and Battalion 
level were most likely to be engaged on returns-related issues, and in almost all cases this 
engagement was achieved through their respective CIMIC teams at local levels. To varying 
degrees, military commanders at those levels were involved in all of the CIMIC projects 
analysed in the sample, with some even taking personal responsibility for the management 
of CIMIC projects. As with their superior officers, junior commanders actively applied 
normative pressure on returns issues often in tandem with the local representatives of 
UNHCR, OSCE or various NGOs. The incentivised delivery of CIMIC projects related to 
returns was also most apparent at that level, with evidence of commanders insisting that 
projects would not go ahead until they were supplied with written commitments from local 
political leaders that they would support the initiative, to more complex engagements with 
local municipalities, where commanders insisted that funds for various projects would only 
be released in a phased process when specified returns targets were achieved.
687
 When 
commenting on the nature of that engagement, all commanders noted that they were “only 
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really getting to grips with the situation” just prior to their departure from the mission. One 
commander summarised the frustration generated by military rotations: 
We would push hard to get a deal but increasingly the municipalities 
were aware that if they played for time they could wait for the next 
commander to come along and maybe he would be more amenable to 
their demands. We did our best to ensure that continuity was not lost 
during at handover but inevitably some momentum would be lost and 
depending on the characters involved in some cases progress could stop 
entirely. If you are looking for a reason why so many of these projects 
didn’t achieve all that we wanted, I believe the fact that we all had to 
up-sticks and change around every six months was a big reason…688 
 
For negotiations associated with returns, this dynamic was viewed by all officers 
interviewed as being particularly problematic, and one that was never successfully 
addressed. Consistent with findings for higher level commanders, junior commanders 
present in Kosovo from 2005 to 2009 acknowledged that focus on returns reduced 
significantly, though encouraging the participation of minorities remained an important 
part of their effort.  
Finally it should be acknowledged that though the 6 monthly rotations of NATO 
troops were problematic for all parties, it was mitigated to some degree by KFORs 
importance to the local economy. While troop numbers were falling, (by the end of 2003, 
KFORs strength stood at 20,000) the numbers of local civilians working in and supporting 
KFOR camps had risen significantly. In an interview in late 2003, the then COMKFOR, 
General Kammerhoff, suggested that the net worth of KFOR local employment to the 
Kosovan economy was in the region of €7.2 million: 
Many hundreds of local people are employed by KFOR, thus providing 
them with steady employment and an income to support their families. 
In Film City alone, over 200 local people are either directly employed 
by KFOR or work for one of the many shops and restaurants operating 
on the camp.
689
 
 
KFOR was careful in ensuring that their local workforce was ethnically representative, and 
though a small number of regional commanders admitted to attempts to leverage the 
prospect of employment in KFOR to progress on local issues, it was not common practice 
and was not identified in this research as a means to incentivise returns or participation.
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8.3 Application of Conditionality and Normative Pressure by Military Forces on Ethnic 
Minority Representation and Participation 1999-2009  
If KFOR engagement with returns-related issues varied and ultimately dissipated over the 
period under review, engagement with minority participation remained a prominent feature 
throughout. As with returns, KFOR initiatives on minority participation emerged though 
various humanitarian activities, were developed further in Operation Trojan, and 
consolidated through the mechanisms of CIMIC, LMTs and elite engagement. A further 
element of NATO engagement in this regard was the extent to which NATO contributed 
to, and led, specific aspects of institutional capacity building; policing support and the 
development of the KPC and later the KSF. 
8.31 State and Nation-building 2000-2008: CIMIC 
Of the 76 CIMIC activities identified between 1999 and 2008, it was found that projects 
encouraging compliance on minority participation related issues accounted for on average 
47% of all activity analysed. Unlike returns-related projects, KFOR’s engagement with 
participation remained constant throughout the decade. Variations emerge (as expected) in 
terms of geographical focus, with the greatest number of initiatives taking place in the 
MNTF (C) area of operations. However, whereas KFOR did not generally engage in 
returns initiatives in the Mitrovia area, KFOR efforts to encourage minority participation 
were a small but constant feature of the sample, with initiatives taking place between 2002 
and 2007, peaking in 2003. Of the 37 participation-related projects identified in the sample, 
13 were delivered in the MNTF (C) area of operations by Finnish, Irish, Swedish and 
Czech CIMIC teams. The Task Forces led by German, French, Spanish and Italian KFOR 
were also prominent averaging five participation related projects during the period. 
Proportionally, these findings correlate with the geographic disposition of minority 
communities and with interviews of KFOR personnel, who agreed that there was a greater 
emphasis on encouraging minority participation on the part of almost all KFOR TCCs, and 
while many efforts were concentrated on the Gracenica/Lipljan area, there was significant 
ongoing activity in all KFOR TF areas of operation.  
The sample also shows that KFOR was more willing to engage on participation 
initiatives unilaterally, with 15 of the 37 projects examined conducted on a unilateral basis. 
However, the interviews also revealed a substantial degree of variation in both the 
ambition and complexity of projects delivered by KFOR, ranging from modest multi-
cultural festivals closely monitored by KFOR security, to more complex socio-economic 
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initiatives often developed and delivered in partnership with local municipalities and 
NGOs. Unilateral projects tended to be less ambitious in their application, though not 
exclusively so. As a result of these features, the quality of compliant outcomes varies 
considerably – two ethnic groups agreeing to share a hall for a cultural event cannot be 
compared to active participation of minorities in all aspects of municipal governance. Of 
the 37 examples of KFOR engagement with participation-related issues, identified, 18 
initiatives produced low to medium levels of compliance, with four producing high levels 
of compliant behaviour. All involved the application of normative pressure, with ten 
incorporating the application of various levels of conditional incentives, predominantly 
linked to financial and technical support. Fifteen initiatives failed to have any impact on 
compliant behaviour.
691
 A trend towards more progressively sophisticated engagement is 
recognisable over time. 
At the outset, CIMIC teams tended to focus on common security concerns, with 
mine awareness training used as an opportunity to bring minorities – particularly children – 
together. While this training was initially delivered by KFOR unilaterally, KFOR’s 
contingent increasingly tried to get participation from elements of the emerging state 
structures. In Lipljan, the Finnish CIMIC team relaunched mine awareness training in 
partnership with the KPS as a means to improve mine awareness but also “to provide 
legitimacy for the role of the KPS in both communities”.692 
Views varied on the value of small-scale CIMIC efforts on participation, such as 
multi-ethnic concerts, children’s sports days etc. One officer dismissed them as being more 
about “KFOR feeling good about itself than for the benefit of the community”.693 This was 
not the generally held view, as more experienced CIMIC officers stated that they often 
provided the foundations for more intensive engagement on more ambitious projects: “the 
inter-ethnic network and dialogue developed for a multi-ethnic sports day can provide the 
basic structure for the development of a returns project or help to encourage some Serbs to 
join the KPS; it all has to start somewhere…”694  
Examples of this logic in practice are evident throughout. Connections developed 
for a Swedish project in Obilic to develop a municipal sports park in a predominantly 
Serbian area were re-engaged on infrastructure projects, where “we had a group of Serbs 
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working together with an Albanian firm”.695 In Pec, the reconstruction of the town’s 
theatre was linked to the signing by all communities of an agreement to share the 
facility.
696
 Similarly, Irish CIMIC teams made some of their larger projects contingent on 
the agreement of all leaders in the locality. One such project involving the refurbishment of 
a number of schools and a “shared sports” facility was successfully delivered, only for a 
dispute to occur among the Albanian and Serbian communities as to when they could use a 
sports complex. In this instance, the Irish commander in the area ordered his troops to 
cover the complex playing area with barbed wire and to lock the gates of the facility until 
the community leaders agreed to honour their initial commitments. Four months later, 
when all sides agreed to implement the original terms, the complex was reopened with an 
inter-ethnic football tournament: the Irish KFOR team was defeated in the first round!
697
 
Significant variation in the types of engagement by KFOR CIMIC teams was 
evident from 2004. Once again, Finnish CIMIC teams engaged Pristina University to 
evaluate the impact of their projects with a view to making them more effective: “since 
2004 over 130 enterprises have received SBE-support through Finnish CIMIC. In 2007 
approximately 100 new jobs were created in small businesses […] We are continuously 
evaluating this concept and with cooperation of Pristina University; we want to develop 
this to be even better and better.”698 The degree to which this partnership produced 
effective outcomes is, however, open to question. Finnish CIMIC officers interviewed 
conceded that though the initiative had its merits the information garnered from the 
University’s analysis probably came too late to have meaningful impact: “had we started 
the partnership two years earlier we would have achieved a lot more”.699 
In MNTF (N) a French-led project to establish a multi-ethnic market “tried every 
trick in the book” in an attempt to encourage Serbs and Albanians to share the facility.700 
The market was eventually established through incentivising the participation of Serbian 
and Albanian companies with significant funding provided by a joint French-Swiss 
initiative. The extent to which the market functioned in any normal sense is open to 
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question, as the security required to allow for its operation was extensive and in the views 
of some of the CIMIC officers interviewed, amounted to little more than a pyrrhic victory. 
During this period, KFOR increasingly focused its effort on improving the quality 
of participation in Kosovo’s emerging institutions. For many CIMIC teams, this entailed 
consciously seeking greater investment by municipalities in participation-related projects. 
During this period, Finnish and Irish teams developed a small number of jointly-funded 
projects. The intent behind such projects was to ‘practice’ municipal staff in identifying 
areas of need and processing requests for projecting funding to the PISG in Pristina for 
approval. CIMIC funds for the projects identified were not released unless the project 
adhered to the terms set by KFOR for minority participation (including for minority input 
to the project planning phase) and until municipal staff had successfully secured funding 
from the relevant Ministry in Pristina. In tandem with this effort, the MNTF (C) 
commander encouraged local political leaders to support the project. These projects were 
found to be “somewhat successful”, though they often took an “inordinate amount of time 
to deliver”, with one Irish-led project taking over three years to complete, during which 
time the expected levels of minority participation failed to materialise.
701
 In a related 
development, staff from the MNTF (C) CIMIC team suggested that the reform of the 
municipality network and the transfer of Serbian villages in their area (Lipljan) to the Serb-
led Gracenica municipality impacted on the representativeness of CIMIC activities in 
Lipljan, which retained only one Serbian village. Concurrent with such activity CIMIC 
teams continued to deliver low-intensity projects based primarily on the application of 
normative pressure. Multi-ethnic children’s camps and concerts were a feature of such 
activity up to and including 2009.  
Though outside of the sample analysed, it is notable that KFOR HQ attempted to 
capture the effort of KFOR CIMIC teams and present it in “soft news” to the children of 
Kosovo through the For You 4U magazine which was distributed to all schools, published 
in multiple languages and consciously sought to project a message of tolerance, inter-
ethnic understanding and cooperation. 
8.32 Liaison and Monitoring Teams 
While LMTs had a limited impact on returns-related issues, they were often at the centre of 
efforts to coordinate minority participation and enhance dialogue, particularly in mixed 
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communities. For example, an Austrian-led LMT in Orahovac specifically targeted the 
“day to day running of the municipality” to “ensure that minority voices were heard”.702 
The Austrians operated an eight-man team based at a “field house” in close proximity to 
the municipal offices. This facility acted as a meeting house, where members of the 
community could bring their issues to KFOR. Over time, it came to be recognised “neutral 
ground”, where issues “too sensitive to bring to the municipality” could be discussed in an 
informal context.
703
  
As a first resort, LMTs always tried to progress issues within the municipality as a 
means of enhancing community confidence in local governance, and to reduce community 
dependence on KFOR support in certain areas. However, as noted above, many KFOR 
LMTs performed a linking role between CIMIC teams, and particular sections of local 
government.
704
 With few exceptions, LMTs were wholly normative in their approach to 
both returns and participation issues. Indeed, some LMT staff interviewed suggested that, 
had they become “involved” in some of the incentivised approaches of CIMIC teams, 
“their neutrality would have been compromised”.705 This position was not required by 
KFOR policy on LMTs, which emphasised the importance of “personal integrity” and 
fairness in dealing with the local community.  
For the LMT staff interviewed, it was reflective of the changing dynamic between 
CIMIC and LMTs, as they redefined their roles to accommodate each other’s presence. 
Once again, allegations that LMTs operated as de facto intelligence cells caused 
difficulties in certain areas. Not helped in one instance by a statement given by 
COMKFOR at a press conference, that LMT’ goal: 
was to liaise closely with the local administrations, KPS, UNMIK, 
community leaders and relevant organizations… as a tool dedicated to 
operate in addition to Intel [intelligence] assets as a force multiplier: 
their situational awareness will provide COMKFOR with early warning 
as well as a real feeling-picture of Kosovo people.
706
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For a number of months following the interview, some LMTs found community interaction 
difficult due to heightened suspicion of their role. 
However, over time, through community dialogue and the promotion of the 
minority participation in the PISG at local levels, LMTs became a valuable means for 
KFOR to test the impact of some of their key “capacity building” initiatives, most notably 
their support for the KPS and the transition from the KPC to the KSF, where adherence to 
the established quotas for minority participation were central components of the policy 
delivered. LMTs collected information on public perceptions as to the success of these 
initiatives, which in turn allowed for KFOR HQ planners to adapt their efforts in an 
attempt to maximise their effect in those areas. Related to this function, and in the absence 
of significant numbers of KFOR personnel on the ground post-2005, LMTs continued as 
key elements in KFOR’s early-warning mechanism, “providing information that would 
help KFOR to avoid another March 2004”.707 
8.33 Key Leader Engagement and the Role of Military Commanders 
All COMKFORs examined applied normative pressure on Kosovo’s political elite 
regarding minority participation throughout the period analysed. For periods, much of this 
effort was lost in the political quagmire associated with the status question, though prior to 
2003, and from 2007, it is notable that the efforts of COMKFOR and various subordinate 
commanders regarding minority participation in key Kosovan institutions did have some 
effect on domestic compliance.  
The earliest COMKFOR interventions on minority participation were in the context 
of Operation Trojan and subsequent CIMIC projects. For the most part, those holding the 
appointment of COMKFOR were content to leave the oversight of CIMIC activities to the 
Task Force Commanders. However, when requested, and where they felt particular value 
could be added by their presence or support, some generals did contribute to selected 
projects. One such initiative involved the visit of General Huber to the mixed 
Albanian/Serbian village of Pones, where a mixed school was looking for KFOR’s support 
to further reconstruction of their facility. Commenting on his visit in the KFOR Chronicle, 
General Huber stated that it was a: 
privilege to talk to the Mayors, the school directors, all the teachers, 
then all the children, the theme that I hit home was, this is the first 
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school I have visited,”  Huber said. “And the reason I am here is 
because this is a great example of the future of Kosovo, where you have 
Serbian and Albanian children in the same building, at the same time, 
albeit in different classrooms, because their curriculum is different. This 
is an example of tolerance. And you have Albanian and Serbian 
professors teaching in the same school.
708
 
 
However, such initiatives were the exception, and the sharing of school facilities remained 
a contentious issues for most of the period analysed. Often such initiatives were reflective 
of an individual commander’s preference to “see for himself”, rather than as part of 
planned effort to illicit a particular response from one community or another. From 2003, it 
was common practice for KFOR commanders to emphasise to politicians their 
responsibilities for ensuring the protection of minorities and their effective participation at 
all levels of the PISG. General Huber specifically targeted municipal leaders: “get the local 
leaders involved-show them the problems and make them responsible for the solutions. In 
the long term, soldiers are never the answer. We have brought Kosovo to a stable state, and 
now, on this stable ground, the local authorities must begin to take responsibilities from us, 
knowing that we are ready and able to assist should the need arise”.709 Frequently, these 
demands were accompanied with the proviso that such behaviour was deemed necessary in 
order to advance EU membership prospects. Similar pressure was exerted on religious 
leaders and media outlets, with the later frequently criticised for only focusing on negative 
stories and not reporting the successes. 
Insofar as KFOR Commanders applied conditional incentives, it tended to be at the 
elite level. Their participation in a number of high-level bodies gave them direct access to 
Kosovo’s political leadership. In particular, the establishment of a trilateral forum between 
the PM of Kosovo, the SRSG and COMKFOR afforded additional opportunities for the 
coordinated application of normative pressure and conditional incentives, including 
membership conditionality. In respect of tentative PISG calls for NATO membership, 
while KFOR and NATO staff were explicit that NATO membership was not an option for 
Kosovo, informally it was emphasised that a positive engagement [by Kosovan authorities] 
in the composition and reform of the KSF would be “viewed in favourable terms in the 
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future”.710  However, to cite this as an example of a conditional incentive would be to 
exaggerate its importance and relevance significantly. 
More than with their engagement with returns, the commanders of KFOR Task 
Forces and their subordinates at Battalion and Company level were involved on a daily 
basis in applying normative pressure related to minority participation. In addition to their 
security tasks, and alongside colleagues from the OSCE, KFOR subordinate commanders 
played a significant role in encouraging all communities to participate fully in elections. As 
noted above, commanders at the Task Force level frequently attempted to leverage the 
prospect of CIMIC projects in order to encourage local progress on minority participation 
– often through specifically tailored key leader engagement processes. Of those 
commanders interviewed, all acknowledged that this was something that emerged as a 
practice rather than as a conscious policy effort on the part of KFOR. One commander 
suggested:  
we knew what we were doing was a little more advanced than simply 
winning hearts and minds but quite often we were making decision 
based on our individual intuition and the limited policy guidance we 
could extract from UN or NGO staff we encountered. The CIMIC team 
staff seemed to get up to speed fairly quickly but as commanders we 
relied heavily on their knowledge. Formal CIMIC training was only just 
emerging as a concept and training on delivering policies for minorities 
was non-existent…”711 
 
By the end of the period examined, evidence was emerging of the further diversification of 
KFOR’s role with the establishment of a joint group – including representatives from 
Kosovo institutions, EULEX, OSCE, the European Bank for Reconstruction, the European 
Commission Liaison office, the International Civilian office, the World Bank, the UNDP 
and US Aid mission in Kosovo – chaired by COMKFOR, to discuss the international 
approach to supporting the Kosovo Development Zone. Though the progress of this group 
lies outside the framework of this study, it is clear that the potential for KFOR’s continued 
involvement in the delivery of incentivised policies on a range of issues including minority 
participation, looked set to continue. 
Regarding their input to institutional capacity building, some junior commanders 
admitted their frustration at the nature of the Kosovan government’s engagement with the 
development of the KSF, and in particular their failure to achieve the agreed level of 
Serbian members. While acknowledging that overcoming Kosovo Serbs’ unwillingness to 
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join was one half of the problem, many suggested that that KFOR and NATO leadership, 
both political and military, were ‘too soft’ with the Kosovan authorities on the issue. 712  
8.34 Institution Building and the Military Role in Police Reform 
KFOR’s contribution to developing institutional capacities within the province was 
impressively diverse. Whether through the absence of alternatives, or the adaptation of 
particular military competence, KFOR personnel made contributions to health care, 
electoral reform, education, sanitation, water and electricity services, infrastructural 
development and economic enterprise, to name but a few. KFOR’s impact in each of these 
areas and the extent to which they projected policy on minority participation, varied 
greatly. Several former KFOR staff, particularly those from CIMIC teams, highlighted the 
role they played in education, citing the provision of language classes, school material and 
instances where they incentivised minority participation though offers of school 
reconstruction or refurbishment. However, it is equally apparent that KFOR were only 
prepared to go so far in their application of conditionality. No evidence was found to 
suggest that KFOR linked incentives to changes to a school’s curriculum, or where schools 
were mixed, that classes should be mixed, with both Albanian and Serbian languages being 
taught. Equally, some KFOR staff acknowledged that once a project was deemed 
complete, follow-up inspections to ensure continued adherence to the standards KFOR set 
were often absent, and towards the latter part of the decade ceased entirely.
713
  
Typically, KFOR engagement in these areas arose from identified operational and 
infrastructural deficits, whereby KFOR helped to address an issue on a temporary basis 
until the necessary civilian capacity could be constituted. Difficulties in constituting 
civilian capacities in certain areas meant that KFOR found themselves dealing with issues 
for longer than they would have liked: for example, engagement in refuse collection in 
certain locations, with numerous examples of local commanders expressing concerns to 
their superiors that their locality was becoming dependent on KFOR’s service provision, 
and were making no effort to provide a civilian solution. While several examples of such 
engagement were identified, KFOR’s development of the KPS, and oversight of the 
transition from the KLA through the KPC to the KSF, were the main areas of institutional 
engagement identified during the period.  
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As noted above, responsibility for the development of Kosovo’s policing capacity 
was divided between the OSCE and the UN. Due in varying degrees to capacity deficits, 
both organisations requested KFOR assistance with various aspects of their roles. KFOR 
was not without competence in policing. Highly qualified military police, many with 
extensive civilian policing experience, proved invaluable to KFOR’s planning in this area. 
Perhaps more importantly, given the degree to which KFOR patrols supported the KPS in 
their daily duty, KFOR military police were tasked to provided “in-theatre” training to 
other military personnel, on “the dos and don’ts of police assistance”.714 In time, this meant 
that KFOR military policing could assume an oversight and coordination role of military 
units working with the KPS. 
As a result, KFOR developed a very clear relationship with the KPS, both on select 
aspects of their training and in the conduct of activities such as joint patrols: for example, 
those involving the traffic-units of Multi-National Military Police (MNMP), UNMIK-P 
and KPS. Such cooperation gave the KPS instant legitimacy, if not credibility, based on an 
effective and efficient overlap of different jurisdictions – UNMIK, KFOR and the KPS.715 
Initially, this entailed the direct support of military police in the conduct of daily patrols 
and checkpoints, but over time, the KPS found themselves engaging with KFOR CIMIC 
teams, LMTs and commanders at all levels. This type of engagement brought questions of 
minority participation in the KPS, and in other agencies they engaged, with (such as 
municipalities and the judiciary) to the fore. 
In contrast to the difficulties in Bosnia, Kosovo’s experience is often identified as 
an example of a successful intervention on policing reform. It is clear, from a comparative 
analysis of their respective progressions on policing reform that Kosovo benefited from 
some of the lessons identified in Bosnia. However, it should be noted that the KPS came 
into being not long after the cessation of conflict in 1999, under the guidance and control 
of the UN and OSCE; and that their respective experiences in terms of the facilitation and 
participation of minorities were quite different, reflecting both the significant 
environmental differences between the two and the differing international approaches.
716
  
That the KPS had time and space to develop can largely be attributed to the fact the 
UNSCR 1244 enabled KFOR to perform a policing role in areas where the UNMIK-P 
lacked capacity. Thus the OSCE, which assumed responsibility for KPS training, was not 
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under pressure to instantly fill vacuums with undertrained police personnel; in turn this 
enabled to the OSCE to develop police training formats that adhered to the standards for 
minority participation. The strategic command structure was also a contributing factor, as 
the KPS came under the full command of the UNMIK-P, thereby placing a layer between 
the police force and the political establishment that was not there in Bosnia. Under these 
support structures, the KPS quickly attained the standards for multi-ethnicity, to the point 
whereby on average 7% of the force was representative of the Kosovo Serbian community, 
with a further 3% representative of other minorities. The application of normative pressure 
was also evident in the training programmes and manuals used by the KPS: as John 
Cockell observed, “… the basic training run by the KPS has provided the basis for an 
apolitical, multi-ethnic police force, in contrast to the continuing politicization of BiH 
police and armed forces (or indeed of the KPC)”.717 This view is supported by an analysis 
of KFOR documentation from the period. As early as 2002, it was noted that an essential 
part of the goal of a community policing model that stresses democratic ideals in all 
aspects of its operations was “ensuring that the student body reflects the overall population 
of Kosovo. Particular emphasis is placed on recruiting women and ethnic minorities such 
as Serbs and Turks as students”.718 
It is evident form the approach taken by the OSCE, in particular, that many of the 
lessons identified in Bosnia were addressed in Kosovo, from the coordination by the main 
international organisations NATO, OSCE and UN, to their respective contributions to the 
design and training of the KPS. However, the scope for conditional incentives linked to 
policing in Kosovo was limited, as the policing structure was placed firmly within the 
sphere and control of international competence, and developed independently of other 
reform streams such as judicial, legislative or civil service, which were more political and 
more problematic. Over time, weaknesses in these areas spilled over to affect police 
performance. For example, almost all persons interviewed for this research emphasised 
that the lack of a successful prosecutions process seriously undermined the credibility of 
KPS investigations– a gap that EULEX sought to address when it deployed in 2008.  
As the KFOR presence on joint patrols reduced, their cooperation with the KPS in 
other areas increased. Reflecting the increased awareness of KFOR personnel on civilian 
approaches to various post-conflict issues, including minority rights, KFOR organised a 
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series of training courses and joint initiatives in order to enhance the KPS’ capacity in 
specific areas. For example, an initiative launched by the Kosovo Women’s Network in 
2004 enlisted the assistance of Irish KFOR, which hosted a series of gender-awareness 
training days for KFOR and KPS personnel. Other similar initiatives were run by the 
Swedish CIMIC team, on issues such as human trafficking and domestic violence. KFOR-
led initiatives included a human rights course launched by MNTF (C) in 2007, which 
incorporated minority rights training. This course was specifically aimed at mid-level 
operational planners, with the intent that the principles identified in the course would then 
be reflected in the operational planning of KFOR, KPS and others thereafter. As a form of 
normative pressure, it is difficult to measure the impact of these initiatives, though they 
undoubtedly contributed to a sustained dialogue on minority and related issues, with 
KFOR at its core. 
While the progress of the KPS is generally viewed favourably in the literature, by 
the end of the period analysed the KPS continued to struggle for acceptance in Serb 
enclaves, particularly in Mitrovica, a situation that deteriorated further with UDI in 
February 2008. 
8.35 Security Reform in Kosovo 
A succession of international reports from the EU, UN and OSCE, including high-profile 
assessments by Kai Eide in 2005, and Maarti Ahtisaari’s proposal for “supervised 
independence” in 2006-2007, served to formalise KFOR’s contribution to the development 
of Kosovo’s “civil defence” capacity. Minority participation was a central component of 
these assessments, with the KFOR POLAD of 2007 noting that Ahtisaari’s: 
… proposal contains a multitude of regulations seeking to accommodate 
the minorities in Kosovo, first of all the Kosovo-Serbs. Thus, the 
comprehensive document contains provisions on the ‘decentralization’ 
(i.e. increased competencies of the municipal level in areas such as 
education and health), the protection of cultural heritage or the political 
representation of minorities in the Parliament. On the other hand the so 
called status package outlines the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection 
Corps and the stand-up of the Kosovo Security Forces, a group of 2,500 
men plus 800 reservists. […] One thing is clear: Kosovo made it back 
on the agenda of the international community and KFOR is part of this 
very important process.
719
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As noted above, KFOR’s initial engagement with the KLA was characterised by mutual 
distrust and intransigence. Following the creation of the KPC, KFOR assumed a mentoring 
role, whereby joint training with the KPC became a frequent feature of KFOR activity 
from 2002. Unlike its interaction with other Kosovan bodies, KFOR did not insist on a 
multi-ethnic balance for the KPC, reflective of a resigned recognition that the KPC was for 
all intents and purposes an Albanian body, and that conditions on Serb participation would 
have amounted to nothing.
720
 
This dynamic started to change from 2006 onwards, with a recognition by KFOR 
(prompted by the efforts of Eide, Ahtisaari and others), that the KPC needed to evolve into 
a more ethnically-inclusive body as part of any long-term settlement. Assessments 
presented to COMKFOR by the KFOR Inspectorate for the KPC – COMKFOR’s Eyes and 
Ears on the KPC
721
 – suggested that changing the ethos of the KPC was a significant task, 
given that, by virtue of its KLA heritage, the KPC was inherently Albanian in practice and 
outlook. 
A Military Civil Advisory Division was established by KFOR in 2008 to examine 
the transitional requirements of a new KPC-type body, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). 
Drawing on the lessons learned with the KPS, special training institutions were established 
to train the new armed force for civilian crisis response and humanitarian tasks, with the 
ethnic balance of the new force stressed from the outset. In defining the nature of the force, 
NATO, UN, EU and other organisations continually emphasised that the KSF was not a 
conventional military force, and should not be viewed as a Kosovo Army or precursor to 
the establishment of same – this position was accepted by the Kosovan government in 
principle, if not in spirit. 
The KSF was officially launched on 21 January 2009, as a new, professional, multi-
ethnic, uniformed and lightly-armed Security Force that is subject to democratic and 
civilian control.
722
 The multi-ethnic element of its mission statement amounted to a 
commitment to retain a “minorities” to ethnic Albanian balance of 10% within the force. 
This figure reached 8% within a year of its establishment, though a closer examination of 
the ethnic minority break down reveals that the Serbian population was wholly under-
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represented, with just 15 personnel, less the 1% of the allotted minority figure.
723
 KFOR 
staff admitted to significant frustration in this regard. Though they ensured strict 
compliance with conditions for the representation and participation of minorities, 
successfully using “socialising” techniques to foster an organisational espirit de corps that 
crossed ethnic lines, including the establishment of the Office for Community Affairs 
(OCA), the key minority group, ethnic Serbs, was largely absent from the process. As 
noted by one officer: “in spite of our achievements, there is a sense of failure due to the 
absence of Serbian personnel”.724 
The same officer suggested that the engagement of the Kosovan government on the 
issue of KSF reform was duplicitous. Referencing a 2010 document that affirmed 
“minority rights within the KSF as a good basis for the individual and collective success of 
units of the KSF”,725 and that provided for the nomination of a second deputy minister for 
minority communities, he suggested that “they say all the right things and organise all the 
right events but their willingness to accommodate minorities in the KSF stops short of the 
Serbian population”.726 
This perspective was reflected to some degree at the higher levels in KFOR and 
NATO. By late 2009, NATO representatives informed the Kosovan government that the 
prospect of membership of PfP was not on the agenda for Kosovo. In considering the 
application of strategic mechanisms by KFOR, in its engagement with the KSF, it is 
noticeable that conditionality and normative pressure were linked to the filling of 
allocations, without due diligence to the actual balance of minorities represented, or the 
quality of the cooperation between different ethnic groups, once established.  
Though outside the period analysed, it is worth noting that incentivised pressure 
was most clearly evident when NATO suspended training of the KSF in March 2010, after 
the KSF performed a military guard of honour at an event dedicated to the KLA – NATO’s 
move was supported by the International Civilian Office of Pieter Feith. In suspending 
training, NATO stated: “This is not in line with the position of the KSF, which does not 
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have a military status. Besides, the NATO flag was displayed during the festivities, which 
is unacceptable, as KFOR is status-neutral”.727   
Many NATO staff interviewed were critical of KFOR leadership in this regard, 
with one officer suggesting that by fostering the creation of an armed force that wore 
military uniforms, had a military command and rank structure, was composed of armed 
brigades, and trained to NATO standards, “nobody should have been surprised that the 
Kosovo government decided to call the duck a duck”.728 In the context of policy behaviour 
and implementation, and in considering these actions and the breakdown of minorities in 
the KSF, it appears that progress on minority participation did not included meaningful 
Serbian participation, and the degree to which Serbian communities were targeted in 
“minorities” recruitment campaigns remains open to question.  
8.4 Conclusion: Policy Outcomes and the Nature of Compliance 
Kosovo presented NATO with a different demographic challenge to that experienced in 
Bosnia. While the Albanian majority population steadfastly pursed their goal of 
independence the needs of the Serbian minority were either continually ignored or 
hindered by emerging domestic institutions, a situation compounded by the kin-state 
dynamic created by Belgrade’s influence on Kosovo’s domestic politics. Both these factors 
combine to explain why in the context of KFORs overall engagement on humanitarian and 
rights based issues, returns initiatives never amounted to more the 10% of KFOR activity. 
Furthermore the costs associated with compliant behaviour for both minority and majority 
communities in the initial years of the mission were high. Kosovo Serbs were slow to trust 
KFOR units, even though those who remained in Kosovo relied entirely on KFOR for their 
security in the early years of the mission. As late as 2007, one Serbian interviewee 
summarised the situation by stating that he was still unsure that KFOR’s actions would 
facilitate his family’s future in Kosovo. 729 
Where military influence on the delivery of returns policy was identified it was 
mostly associated with CIMIC programmes and Key Leader Engagement.  From the 
sample analysed, it was found that aid conditionality or technical support incentives were 
prominent features of the military engagement with returns issues. Where such 
conditionality was applied, there is evidence of partial compliance in some cases, though 
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non-compliant outcomes are more prevalent than in the Bosnian sample, due to a range of 
factors from kin-state influence and persistent security concerns to difficulties in 
incentivising the cooperation of the Kosovo Albanian majority in certain areas. Supporting 
the findings of the sample, interviews with Serbian villagers and some representative 
organisations in Kosovo suggest that those that have settled in Serbia have “no intention of 
returning except maybe to sell their property”.730 For these reasons, compliant behaviour, 
and the implementation of policy on returns, is not expected to improve in the foreseeable 
future. 
Kosovo Albanians interviewed were generally positive about KFOR’s contribution, 
but when questioned on the specifics of minority returns, they tended to point to municipal 
and political leaders as the reasons why more returns had not taken place. It was also 
evident that the uncertainty surrounding the status question had and increasingly 
degenerative impact on KFOR community relations. Additionally, some Albanians 
interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the nature of CIMIC engagement: “different 
guys come here every six months, ask the same questions and then disappear and do 
something somewhere else; why don’t these guys pass on their notes?”731 While the 
rotation of military personnel (generally every six months) impeded the continuity of 
CIMIC teams’ actions, it is equally true to say that village leaders became adept at 
manipulating the rotation for their own gains. For example, the village leader quoted above 
had, within weeks of giving that statement, been present at the opening of a new medical 
facility in his village, organised and funded by the KFOR CIMIC team that had just 
departed. However, as with the Bosnian sample, it is also evident that CIMIC teams in 
Kosovo made promises they were unable to keep, due to lack of training and poor 
planning. With the deployment of LMTs, and the gradual withdrawal of CIMIC teams, 
KFOR’s focus on returns was observed to reduce, with a correlating reduction in returns 
activity and rhetoric at municipal level. While the normative pressure on returns was 
maintained by military actors, it is clear that the focus over time shifted to addressing the 
needs of the minority communities’ resident in Kosovo rather than those who might (but 
were unlikely) to return.  
As revealed by both the sample and the interviews conducted, KFOR was 
significantly more effective in achieving compliance associated with minority 
participation. KFOR activity was characterised by a continuous application of normative 
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pressure on minority participation, and a willingness to experiment with incentives at 
various levels. Once again, demographic disposition is significant as the Serbian 
population outside of Mitrovica (shorn of a land boundary with Serbia) were often left with 
little choice but to engage with the initiatives proposed by the various international actors 
present.  Concomitantly, greatest compliance was identified in areas where CIMIC teams 
were well staffed and resourced, and where there was a willingness to establish 
partnerships with international actors and domestic institutions, especially the municipal 
institutions. While many of the initiatives analysed produced partially compliant outcomes, 
it should be noted that the costs associated with compliance were generally lower for the 
majority Albanian community, with the exception of areas like Mitrovica, where the ethnic 
balance involved was more evenly matched, and where such initiatives were delivered 
alongside significant security operations. Additionally, the ambition of many of KFOR’s 
projects – that involved the promotion of minority participation – was modest; in some 
cases amounting to little more the one-off cultural events. 
Normative pressure is seen to be at its most effective in KFOR’s contribution to 
KPS training and operational conduct, primarily through daily socialisation with KFOR 
personnel. In considering the generally compliant outcomes of the KPS, in terms of 
Serbian participation, it is worth noting that there are geographic as well as structural 
issues explaining compliance, which qualify the extent to which normative pressure and 
incentives worked. In respect of the latter, however, it is clear that the successful 
decoupling of the KPS structure from the political establishment, and the flexibility 
afforded to KFOR in terms of policing support, allowed the time and space for the OSCE 
and UNMIK to develop the KPS in the absence of political and operational pressures. 
Conversely, such pressures were manifest in the case of the KSF, where the more 
definite application of incentives, along with normative pressure, did not produce the 
intended results. The extent to which the Serbian community was engaged in this process 
is also questionable, and it is a feature of KFOR’s engagement in security reform, though 
the period, that the needs of the Serbian community were often assumed, rather than 
assured. Drawing on the findings presented in the previous chapter, the argument can also 
be made that the failure of the international community, led by the SRSG, to uphold the 
‘Standards for Kosovo’ process devalued subsequent applications of conditional 
incentives, which struggled to gain credibility with both communities. 
Finally, the application of conditionality and normative pressure was generally not a 
feature of military humanitarian assistance. Though Kosovo did provide examples of 
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instances when humanitarian aid was conditionally linked to returns or the participation of 
ethnic minorities in emerging state structures, such activities were the exception to the rule, 
often stimulated by an individual rather than KFOR or TCC policy. Overall, the findings 
suggest that KFOR adapted its planning processes and capacity to meet the specific 
requirements of their operational environment. Through the activities of CIMIC teams, 
LMTs and military commanders’, it is evident that in many cases KFOR was able to 
achieve compliant outcomes, however the nature of those outcomes was in many cases too 
modest to have a sustainable impact on minority returns and participation during the period 
analysed. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion 
9.1 Overview of the Dissertation 
In the entrance to the main briefing room in KFOR HQ, Pristina, there hangs a painting 
depicting a scene from when the first COMKFOR, Gen. Sir Mike Jackson, negotiated with 
the KLA and Kosovo Albanian leadership regarding the terms upon which NATO would 
establish control in the province.
732
 The dramatic painting captures Jackson, 
characteristically forthright in delivering terms to the KLA leaders, Agim Çeku and 
Hashim Taçi. Çeku, leaning forward, is defiantly focused on Jackson, while Taçi reclines 
stoically – interaction between international and domestic actors in post-conflict contexts is 
never straightforward. The painting aptly captures the political nature of military 
intervention, often underestimated or missed in analysis of the military role. In spite of the 
ambiguity of UNSCR 1244, a commitment to guarantee the protection of the minority 
Serbian population in Kosovo was central to the terms delivered by Jackson: one of many 
such commitments sought by the international organisations involved in the post-conflict 
effort.  
This thesis set out to enhance understanding of the military contribution to the 
delivery of rights-based policies in post-conflict territories, focusing on ethnic minority 
returns and participation. In answering the questions posed, it considered: the contribution 
and focus of relevant literature (Chapter 2); the external influences and internal dynamics 
of engagement by international civil-military actors (Chapters 3 and 4); and the specific 
scope and influence of military forces on ethnic minority issues in Bosnia and Kosovo 
(chapters 5 to 8). Presenting the main findings of the research, this final chapter 
summarises the range and purchase of military engagement with rights-based issues, and 
the practical and theoretical challenges it presents. It shall also consider the contribution of 
this thesis to relevant academic literature, and the potential for future research. 
9.11 Evaluating the Military Contribution  
Adapted from scholarship on the delivery of rights-based policy in CEEC, the research 
framework accommodated the examination of the military component, the experimental 
nature of international effort during the period, and the purchase of evolving ideas on: 
                                                 
732
 See illustration, p. 15. 
250 
 
minority rights, civil-military relations, international administrations, peacebuilding, 
peacekeeping and SSR. The framework also recognised the context within which ideas and 
policies on minority rights emerged, and the scope for variation in means of delivery. 
Beyond ad hoc assumptions, the military were not found to be developing a “military 
approach” to minority issues per se, but exposure to minority rights ideas, through 
international rhetoric and interaction with international civilian actors, provided the basis 
for collective and unilateral engagement with specific minority issues.  
The selection of minority returns and participation reflected both the prominent 
rhetorical importance attached to those issues throughout the period analysed, and their 
particular significance following a conflict defined by inter-ethnic hostility. Recognising 
the complexity of the military role, the choice of independent variables allowed for a 
comprehensive analysis of the means of military engagement. The decision to separate the 
closely-related mechanisms of conditional incentives and normative pressure was based on 
an adoption of the approach developed by Ikenberry and Kupchan (normative persuasion) 
and Kelley (normative pressure), which recognised that the hegemonic presence of 
international organisations lent itself to the application of conditional incentives, and also 
recognised that the actors within that framework were attempting to encourage compliant 
outcomes without resorting to “material sanctions and inducements”.733  This approach was 
deemed appropriate in order to explore military activity in situations where linkage to 
incentives was tenuous, or simply not an option. For example, while it was important to 
consider the enlargement perspective (given its prominence in discourse linked to minority 
issues, and its potential as a source for conditional incentives), beyond providing a 
normative framework it did not emerge as a significant reference point for the application 
of incentives by military actors. 
Intended to capture the multi-level interaction aspect of engagement, the dependent 
variables allowed for the consideration of macro- and micro-level compliance and non-
compliance. The decision to expand the analytical framework to include policy 
implementation, as opposed to policy adoption, was based on the assumption that where 
international administrations are present, compliant policy on various rights-based issues 
became an axiomatic part of post-conflict demi-constitutional frameworks. A flexible 
consideration of implementation (including the potential for behavioural change) was 
therefore necessary to gain an understanding of the extent to which compliant outcomes 
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were genuine rather than externally imposed. Regarding the specific contribution of the 
military, this accommodated examination of CIMIC and similar activities where limited 
quantitative analysis was possible.  
Restricted access to military, particularly NATO documentation, meant that the 
samples compiled relied for the most part on open sources – predominantly the in-house 
magazines of IFOR/SFOR and KFOR respectively. However, by crosschecking the 
findings of the projects sample with interviewees, there was consensus among those 
interviewed that the findings were reasonably representative of military activity in Bosnia 
and Kosovo during the periods analysed. Full access to NATO-restricted and confidential 
documents, and related records retained by TCCs, would allow for a more comprehensive 
analysis of the military role. 
9.2 Emerging Themes of Military Engagement on Rights-based Issues  
That the military can act as agents delivering policy on a variety of issues through 
conditional incentives and normative pressure is for the most part not a feature of literature 
on the military role. The existing literature has tended to address minority issues from a 
civilian perspective referring, in the main, to the efforts of organisations such as the 
UNHCR, or the specific contributions of the many NGOs to emerge over the past 20 years. 
Insofar as the literature considered focused on the military contribution in post-conflict 
intervention, it understandably prioritised the security paradigm. Where the civil-military 
relationship was examined, it tended to be on the basis of a clear division of labour, with 
the military generally understood as providing security and occasionally logistic support to 
civilian actors in the course of their activities. The extent to which the military assumed 
civilian-type roles in post-conflict contexts was generally not considered beyond a 
discussion of the military’s role in delivering humanitarian aid. Similarly, the role of the 
military within the collective effort on minority issues is understudied. This research 
begins to address the deficit. 
Substantive evidence was identified to support the four arguments regarding 
military engagement identified in Chapter 1. In the first instance, the research confirmed 
that military actors from various TCCs were formally and informally engaged with ethnic 
minority issues at multiple levels throughout the periods analysed. Second, it is apparent 
that military actors adapted civilian techniques for engagement and policy projection, 
ranging from the flexible application of existing military planning tools and the 
development of CIMIC and liaison processes, to the application of solely civilian processes 
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in cooperation with NGOs and IOs, such as DFID or Irish Aid. Third, through these means 
of interaction, the military demonstrated a capacity for achieving compliant outcomes. The 
nature of outcomes achieved – whilst modest in many cases – is nonetheless observed to 
evolve as military engagement became more formalised and sophisticated. It is clear that 
the sum of the military contribution to returns and participation processes went beyond the 
simple provision of secure space. Fourth, and in a different way from existing literature on 
the subject of military interventions identified in Chapter 2, the findings of this research 
raise further questions on the appropriateness of military engagement in a specific rights-
based context, juxtaposed with the obvious contribution that militaries can make in post-
conflict circumstances. Though this thesis did not seek to engage that debate, and 
acknowledging that there are those (humanitarian and military thinkers) who will remain 
fundamentally opposed to such activity being carried out by military actors, the narrative is 
evolving. Approaches such as SSR appear to be positioning themselves to accommodate 
the idea of more expansive contributions by military forces, based on an understanding of 
security that recognises both state and human security needs, with the latter arguably 
allowing for engagement with rights-based issues. 
In addition to these areas, two other themes emerged during the research process. In 
considering the evolution of debate on minority rights, considered in Chapter 2, the 
findings suggest that the military contribution highlighted here creates the space for more 
nuanced policy and approaches to emerge on ethnic minority issues in post-conflict 
territories.  Civil-military cooperation on ethnic minority issues demonstrated a capacity 
for effective engagement, often extending the reach of NGOs and IOs; who continually 
struggled on account of diminishing resources. Military engagement also demonstrated the 
potential to add a new dimension to international engagement with minority issues that 
often struggled to move beyond legalistic discussions of legislative compliance. As one 
OSCE interviewee put it, “the military can engage on levels that we could never reach; 
they have the numbers. It is certainly an area worthy of more thought…”734 
Finally, in considering similar research concerned with the nature of compliance in 
CEEC, this research did not find notably different outcomes, where they were observed. 
Unsurprisingly, rationalist logic underpinned by nationalist sentiment held sway, though 
what the research captured that differs from literature on conditionality and the logics of 
outcomes, is that post-conflict territories allow for a much more intensive projection of 
                                                 
734
 Interview No. 43. Former OSCE staff officer, Brussels, February, 2014. This quote was in response to a 
question on whether the military has a role in delivering policy on minority issues. 
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norms, sustained by constitutional structures designed to facilitate conditionality, and 
further strengthened by a degree of socialisation that goes far beyond that observed in 
CEEC. Post-conflict territories are more challenging, of course, but nothing observed in 
this research suggested that the applications of models examining the nature of compliant 
or non-complaint outcomes was inappropriate. With better access to databases and 
domestic sources there appears to be significant scope for further application.  
9.3 Explaining Military Engagement and Impact 
In seeking to address the first research question of why military actors engaged in activities 
relating to ethnic minority issues, Chapters 3 outlined the external ‘push factors’ that 
compelled engagement in the territories and prioritised minority issues in particular. 
Chapter 4 identified the importance of military progression through phases of post-conflict 
engagement highlighting both the opportunities and challenges that military units 
encountered in their attempts to delivery policy and fulfil their mandate. Together they 
underlined the fact that military units and their leaders could act as agents capable of 
utilising conditional incentives and normative pressure at multiple levels in respect of 
rights-based (ethnic minority) issues. From this, a number of specific features were 
identified that address the second question posed as to why they [the military] were 
successful or unsuccessful in achieving compliance with policies for ethnic minority issues 
in the post-conflict territories of Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo; both unilaterally and 
within the wider context of civil-military engagement with domestic communities. 
9.31 Reasons for Military Engagement 
While there was relatively little evidence to suggest that militaries’ formally engaged in a 
discussion of minority rights policy, they were undoubtedly influenced by the debate 
associated with minority rights policy development. As Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted, the 
concept of minority rights evolved considerably immediately prior to, and during, conflict. 
The inter-ethnic character of the conflict, and the intense media focus, helped to give a 
profile to minority issues – sustained by strong rhetoric from international (mainly 
western) political leaders – ensuring that an emphasis on addressing minority issues would 
figure prominently in any post-conflict settlement. That intent was reflected in the 
construct of Dayton and, to a lesser extent, UNSCR 1244, and was carried through 
initiatives such as the Standards for Kosovo and the respective constitutional frameworks 
for Bosnia and Kosovo. Therefore, policy aimed at ethnic minorities was an important 
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component of the respective mandates under which international military deployed. 
Furthermore, in considering why the military became involved in these areas, the initial 
sections of both case studies highlight that military activity was stitched into the civilian 
fabric of post-conflict intervention through formal and informal interaction with 
international administrations, international organisations and NGOs. This intensive and 
sustained exposure to ideas on ethnic minority issues informed much of the military 
activity observed in the analysis of military engagement with returns and participation at 
various levels. 
Military commanders attempted to address minority issues for a number of reasons. 
For some it was felt “the right thing to do”. In many cases it reflected an approach to 
mission analysis that allowed for the delivery of soft non-coercive measures to achieve 
their mission. While the practical application of this perspective was initially ad hoc in 
nature, it was eventually consolidated through the development of CIMIC, KLE and the 
later development of LOTs and LMTs. In some cases, the personalities of individual 
commanders, and their knowledge of minority rights issues, was a stimulating factor for 
engagement. This aspect of military engagement grew more pronounced as civil-military 
relations on minority issues evolved, particularly that of cooperation with NGOs. It was 
also noticeable that in many instances, direction regarding engagement with minority 
issues – notably where CIMIC teams were funded by their own state resources – came 
from individual TCC capitals. 
Military engagement can also be explained by the fact that military representatives 
were afforded access to, and often direct participation in, many of the international civilian 
structures established to address post-conflict issues. Additionally, it appears that the 
military leaders concurred with a general consensus that engagement with ethnic minority 
issues was essential to the peacebuilding effort. In both cases, NATO forces were 
incorporated in the activity of the temporary commissions and other bodies established to 
address minority property rights issues. For example the “Housing and Property 
Directorate”, established by UNMIK, was mandated to keep KFOR informed of “specific 
issues relating to property rights”.735 In Bosnia, the OHR worked closely with IFOR and 
SFOR, through various commissions and bodies such as the Freedom of Movement Task 
Force. Though that interaction was at times modest, the associated impact of such 
                                                 
735
 “The Establishment of the Housing and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims 
Commission”, UNMIK, (1999), http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg23-99.htm (accessed 14 
September 2015). UNMIK/REG/1999/23, 15 November 1999  
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initiatives on military planning and engagement elsewhere was significant, as it often 
informed the context within which military endeavours succeeded or failed.  
9.32 Means of Military Engagement 
Chapter 1 identified five means through which incentives linked to minority policy were 
delivered in post-conflict Bosnia and Kosovo: humanitarian aid, development finance, 
transfer of power, capacity building and technical support, and membership incentives. 
Utilising humanitarian assistance, CIMIC, KLE, and SSR projects, military actors were 
engaged in activities in all of these areas, with the purchase of incentives and the extent of 
military participation changing through the phases of post-conflict intervention. 
Underlining the importance of the relationship between available means and the 
application of conditional incentives and normative pressure, the samples compiled show 
that the military did apply conditional incentives linked to policy compliance on returns 
and participation. The range of application was found to vary between 9% and 47%, 
depending on the issue, time of delivery and capacity of the military unit in question, 
CIMIC or otherwise. In most cases, incentives were delivered through projects involving 
development aid or SSR capacity building and technical support.  
Where the military were involved in delivering financial aid for humanitarian 
purposes – generally related to infrastructure and reconstruction projects – with very few 
exceptions, no conditions were attached. That dynamic changed with the transition to state 
and nation-building, and the emergence of military CIMIC operations where the provision 
of financial aid was linked to compliance on a range of policies, including on minority 
returns and participation. The purchase of financial aid linked to military activity is seen to 
evolve and decline during the state- and nation-building phase. As key reconstruction 
targets were met, authority for domestic issues was increasingly transferred to domestic-led 
institutions: capacity building and technical support became the preferred means of 
engagement. It should also be noted that the scope for military interaction decreased 
continuously as troops were withdrawn, and operational tasks became increasingly 
restricted.
 
 
The scale and ambition of military projects varied considerably from one-off events 
in small schools to ambitious and multi-phased reconstruction projects and business 
incentives schemes. The application of ‘transfer of power’ incentives was identified in 
some projects where municipal cooperation was required, and where there was strong input 
from international administrations or NGOs. In considering these findings, it is worth 
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highlighting lacunae between civilian and military understanding of their respective roles. 
For many civilian and some military staff interviewed, CIMIC was seen as simply a 
coordination mechanism. However, CIMIC, as understood by most military practitioners, 
is designed to assist the commander in fulfilling his/her mission (to generate an effect), and 
is therefore inherently conditional in both concept and application. In considering the 
opportunities presented by post-conflict environments, there was evidence to show the 
effectiveness of military CIMIC and civilian agencies combining: the OBNOVA fund in 
Bosnia was one such example of effective cooperation. The potential of such cooperation 
was seen to evolve over time in both cases – it was not there from the start in either case. 
Responding to formal and informal pressure to act, the military were found to have applied 
normative pressure relating to returns and participation at all levels, from the elite level 
engagement of the force commanders, to interaction with political leaders at municipal 
levels, down to the village leaders. Once again, this form of interaction became semi-
formalised by development of concepts such as “key leader engagement”. 
From the military perspective, the contribution to defence, and to a lesser extent 
policing reform, provided the primary context for the application of incentives linked to the 
transfer of power. The insistence on minority representation and participation in post-
conflict security structures was partially successful in both Bosnia and Kosovo. In 
developing incentives linked to minority participation, NATO leveraged a range of 
technical support and policy options, such as offers to participate in training programmes, 
or the potential to contribute to peacekeeping or other international security operations.
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Conversely, NATO’s frustration with the nature of compliance on Serbian participation in 
the KSF, and the abuse of ceremonial privileges, led to certain capacity programmes being 
suspended.  
While the military application of normative pressure regarding membership 
conditionality was a feature of interaction, with the exception of defence reform initiatives, 
the author found little evidence of military application of incentives linked to membership. 
Incentives linked to membership were confined to NATO’s linkage of defence reform in 
Bosnia to membership of the PfP and progression towards an MAP. For the most part, 
beyond a continuation of normative rhetoric through key leader engagement, membership 
incentives were predominantly delivered by civilian means. While the military were found 
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 One former OSCE officer commenting on his Bosnian experience noted that such was the attractiveness 
of some courses that some people continuously registered for courses they had already completed: a practice 
that was eventually phased out. Interview No. 41. Senior staff member of the OSCE, Sarajevo, July 2013. 
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to be capable of participating in the delivery of incentives linked to membership of NATO 
and EU, the potential of a military contribution was generally not considered. Additionally, 
as membership processes gathered pace in the latter part of the periods examined, military 
capacity to contribute was limited by reduced troop numbers and restricted mandates. 
9.33 The Military Effect on Compliance: Successes and Failures 
Acknowledging the particular challenges of measuring outcomes in post-conflict contexts, 
the information compiled for this research allows for a number of conclusions to be 
presented. To varying degrees, both Dayton and UNSCR 1244 provided the standard for 
policy on minority issues, including returns and participation. Through the OHR and 
UNMIK, policy relating to ethnic minority issues became a de facto part of the interim 
administration of each territory. Though institutions of self-governance and detailed 
policies on returns and minority participation emerged in the new indigenous frameworks, 
formal and informal international influence remained a pronounced feature of the 
governance environment. While Dayton and UNSCR 1244 set the standard, the case 
studies demonstrate that civil-military actors had significant scope to experiment with a 
variety of means intended to address returns and participation issues. As noted in Chapters 
3, 4, 5 and 7, the factors influencing that dynamic came from numerous external and 
internal sources. 
In explaining why the military were successful or unsuccessful in delivery policy 
on ethnic minority issues, and achieving compliant outcomes, and testing the hypothesis 
outlined in Chapter 1, this research identified five overlapping features. In the first 
instance, military engagement with ethnic issues was stimulated by an emerging 
international discourse (predominantly western) on minority rights that focused on the 
need to address the ethnic aspects of conflict in the Western Balkans. That discourse, 
reinforced through the media, and to varying degrees enshrined in Dayton and UNSCR 
1244, served to influence military planning and decision-making processes as they 
identified ethnic issues as key “tasks” to be addressed.  Furthermore, military engagement 
with ethnic minority issues was facilitated by post-conflict civil-military structures that 
allowed for military representation at almost all levels, including civil bodies intended to 
address minority issues. While the initial logic for military representation was to address 
and coordinate the security aspects of ethnic issues, over time these bodies served to 
facilitate the diversification of military engagement, including facilitating joint civil-
military projects with both international and domestic NGOs and domestic institutions. It is 
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clear that exposure to domestic political leadership and ideas on minority rights 
engagement further influenced the application of CIMIC projects by some military actors. 
Accordingly, the structural and conceptual environment identified in Chapters 3 and 4, was 
observed to be conducive to military engagement with ethnic issues. 
Second, the sheer scale of military deployment in Kosovo and Bosnia afforded 
military actors the reach and presence that allowed for multi-level interaction. 
Additionally, NATO forces were often tasked to cover gaps in civilian capacity, including 
policing or information gathering, thereby bringing military actors further into the civilian 
apparatus of post-conflict engagement. NATO’s conceptualisation of that engagement was 
tenuous, and while doctrine on areas such as CIMIC and defence reform emerged, it was 
deliberately vague, necessarily accommodating the divergent views of TCCs and, to an 
extent, civilian partners (IOs and NGOs) as to what amounted to appropriate engagement. 
Chapters 6 and 8 demonstrate clearly that military engagement with ethnic minority issues, 
and the success or otherwise of that engagement, depended greatly on the TCC involved, 
ranging from the highly progressive and evolving (Finnish military) to the consciously 
limited (US military). 
Third, responding to the demands for action outlined above, military actors adapted 
their planning processes to engage on ethnic minority issues. This was most apparent in 
CIMIC projects, and through the various means of coordination and liaison, such as KLE, 
PSYOPS, LMTs and LOTs. These means often facilitated the application of conditional 
incentives and normative pressure, and were observed to evolve in complexity and scale 
over time. While that willingness to experiment was laudable, in many ways it also 
exposed gaps in military knowledge of ethnic minority issues, manifested in poorly 
devised projects, unfulfilled promises, and deficiencies in coordination with international 
and domestic partners. Similar to humanitarian assistance, military engagement in these 
areas was not always appreciated or welcomed, particularly by some NGOs. 
Fourth, the military role in defence and policing reform facilitated opportunities for 
the application of incentives and normative pressure through intensive socialisation – 
training, policy guidance, etc.  Linkage to membership conditionality was found to be most 
pronounced in defence reform initiatives. However, despite the generally accepted progress 
in constituting the KSF and Bosnian Armed Forces, linkage to policy on participation often 
fell short of the targets set. By the end of the period analysed, the successfully-integrated 
headquarters elements of the Bosnian Armed Forces remained in command of mono-ethnic 
battalions. While that outcome can be considered as partially compliant, Serbian 
259 
 
participation in the KSF was found to be all but non-existent, in spite of persistent civil-
military pressure for more progressive engagement by the PISG, and later the Government 
of Kosovo. That this weakness was observed in turn points to deficiencies in the political 
process that saw the credibility of international administrations increasingly questioned 
over time. 
Fifth, though the military were not impervious to questions concerning their 
credibility as actors in Kosovo and Bosnia, they did not appear to incur the same degree of 
dissatisfaction as the civilian elements of international administration. The separation of 
military and civilian roles identified in Dayton, and the pillar structure designed to 
implement UNSCR 1244, gave a certain freedom to military actors. Though military 
contributions to elite level discussions of ethnic minority issues were observed, there is 
little evidence to show that it was a significant contributory factor encouraging compliant 
outcomes. With relatively few exceptions – the actions of certain NATO commanders – the 
military effort was not prominent at elite levels on minority issues, apart from areas 
relating to defence reform. However the localised nature of military engagement did 
facilitate compliant outcomes at municipal and sub-municipal levels, even as the wider 
processes of international engagement (such as the Standards for Kosovo process) were 
observed to flounder. Admittedly, many of the compliant outcomes identified in Chapters 6 
and 8 were either modest in ambition and reach or short-lived, their sustainability 
undermined as they eventually succumbed to the wider dynamics of inter-ethnic politics. 
Additionally, within the timeframe applied, initially compliant outcomes unravelled where 
the international civilian and military presence withdrew, or where nationalistic traits in 
local political behaviour became more pronounced. This was also representative, in both 
territories, of an increasing reluctance by military and many civilian actors to apply 
incentives to minority issues. Regardless of the combined civilian and military effort – 
over a decade of interaction between international organisations and multiple actors in each 
of the territories assessed – and the clear commitments outlined in treaty documents and 
UNSCRs, towards the end of the period reviewed the situation of significant numbers of 
displaced minority families remained unresolved.
737
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 After the re-registration process conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2007, it was found that 10,000 
refugees and 135,000 IDPs remained to return. At the same time, Serbia had 98,500 refugees and 207,000 
IDPs (including those who fled conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo); and Kosovo had 21,000 IDPs. See 
“Situation of Longstanding Refugees and Displaced Persons in South Eastern Europe”, Council of Europe, 
(2007), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/465c42092.pdf (accessed 14 September 2015).  
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Finally, regarding the utility of the military application of conditional incentives 
and normative pressure, no evidence was found that normative pressure alone resulted in 
compliant outcomes, though in many cases intensive periods of normative pressure often 
went together with the offer of specific incentives; increasing the likelihood of compliant 
outcomes. Full compliance with the conditions set by the military on a specific policy 
identified during interaction was only identified in small-scale projects related to 
participation, which tended to have a short-term impact. Partially compliant outcomes were 
found in a range of 10% to 40% of cases analysed, once again depending on the issue, time 
of delivery, military capacity applied and domestic capacity to respond. In considering the 
nature of these outcomes it is notable that they were almost always associated with the 
provision of financial incentives which as the post-conflict effort transitioned were 
increasingly complemented by incentives based on technical support and transfers of 
power. Though membership incentives were referenced in the context of the SAA and PfP 
processes in Bosnia and the STM process in Kosovo, the findings suggest that it was only 
in the context of Bosnian defence reform that they had traction; the extent of which was 
difficult to quantify. Interviews with domestic and international staff alike revealed that the 
strength of incentives and normative pressure applied were often countered by strong kin-
state direction, prevailing mono-ethnic/nationalistic discourse, security concerns, local 
political dynamics, and in many cases a limited (or non-existent) capacity to deliver or 
sustain compliant outcomes.  
In considering the nature of compliance, for both returns and participation, there 
was only modest evidence to show that anything other than rationalist bargaining logic 
prevailed – exceptions were groups such as the Coalition for Return, which arguably 
exhibited lesson-drawing characteristics. On returns, the change in civilian approach over 
time, from one of actively encouraging and incentivising returns, to one of sustainable 
outcomes, reflected the fact that many potential returnees were increasingly inclined to 
turn their back on returns processes. As a result, military engagement with returns was 
found to decrease significantly after five years in both cases. Behavioural change was 
identified in only a handful of cases, and was often as attributable to geographic and local 
cultural ties as to the impact of normative pressure and incentives delivered by military 
personnel. 
Other factors identified lay beyond the military sphere of influence. For example, 
domestic implementation of policy was often compounded by the absence of impartial 
dispute resolution mechanisms, be they judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Pre-
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conflict legacy issues, in particular ambiguous questions of ownership, also impacted at 
various times on the success of international engagement. For example, UNMIK was 
initially focused on dealing with institutionalised, even societal, amnesia relating to 
property transactions: a legacy from Serbian governance in Kosovo.
738
 Similar, trends were 
observed in Bosnia. Over time, this evolved into various types of domestic institutional 
intransigence, or obstruction of initiatives intended to address the aspects of minority 
returns:  Republika Srpska’s subversive law on Use of Abandoned Property 1996;739 or the 
planning decisions and deficits in oversight of illegal construction by Kosovo-Albanian 
dominated municipalities identified in Chapter 8. 
In spite of new ideas and methods, an inability to fully implement international 
policy initiatives exposed the credibility of the civil-military effort. Though it was common 
practice to link minority returns and participation to various policies, and more generally to 
the transfer of power, most interviewees admitted that incentives lacked determinacy and 
were often delivered in the absence of the required compliance, in order to “keep the 
process moving”.740 The Standards before Status process in Kosovo was particularly 
criticised in this regard.
741
 Policies such as the opening of trade, IPAP or STM talks, 
capacity and technical support through organisations such as the EAR, or through twining 
initiatives, but most particularly the transfer of power or authority, were in most cases 
delivered without gaining compliance related to minority issues.  
Inter-state kin-state influence was not found to be a significant factor in Bosnia, 
beyond the first phase of intervention, though the Federation and Republika Srpska both 
attempted to influence the progress of policy regarding “their” minority group presence in 
each other’s territories. Kin-state influence was found to be a significant factor for Serbian 
communities in Kosovo. While evidence of change was found with the gradual increase of 
partially-compliant outcomes in the Gracenica municipality, the predominance of kin-state 
influence in Mitrovica persisted throughout the period analysed, with the effect that though 
compliant outcomes were achieved by civilian and military means, they were almost 
always limited in terms of scale, impact and sustainability.  
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 Ibid. 
739
 Leckie, (2005), p. 13. Pressure exerted by UNHCR, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and 
others (primarily the OSCE), led to the repeal of this and other discriminatory laws. 
740
 Interview No. 8. Former staff member of EU Mission to Kosovo, Brussels, February 2014. 
741
 Ibid. “it was a complete charade designed to buy time while the main powers decided what to do about 
status”. 
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9.4 Research Contribution: A military ‘Right’ of Passage? 
The findings identified in this research address gaps in the literature concerning the 
military role in delivering rights-based policies, and afford new insight into the purchase of 
conditional incentives and normative pressure, in post-conflict contexts. Military forces 
were engaged in delivering policy on ethnic minority issues, with both successful and 
unsuccessful outcomes. The findings also provide an alternative perspective from which to 
consider the application of normative pressure related to enlargement policy – with the 
potential (though unproven in this case) for membership incentives to be applied by 
military actors. They also offer a perspective of domestic compliance with policy on ethnic 
minority issues at all levels. By considering the potential for compliance through phases of 
post-conflict interaction alongside a focus on policy implementation at municipal and sub-
municipal levels, the findings add depth to the literature on minority rights in general, and 
post-conflict minority rights development in particular.  
Additionally, the methodological process applied, highlights the adaptability of 
methods developed for analysis in CEEC, both in terms of their application in a post-
conflict context and their compatibility with other analytical tools, particularly those 
emerging from SSR literature. The outcomes identified reinforce arguments developed in 
CEEC regarding the purchase of rationalist, cost-benefits perspectives among domestic 
actors on minority issues. Additionally, the research recognised that policy linked to 
conditional incentives at local levels could achieve compliant outcomes, even if the 
sustainability of those outcomes was open to question. A domestic willingness to be 
pragmatic – on basic issues linked to housing, services and security etc. – particularly 
during the stabilisation and reconstruction phase, suggests an openness to policy on ethnic 
minority issues that was perhaps surprising, given the recent memory of ethnic conflict. 
The membership perspective, though ever-present in international and domestic discourse, 
did not emerge as a significant option for conditional application until the latter part of 
each case study; and even then in a limited capacity. 
Though the military role in delivering policy on ethnic minority issues was modest 
in the broader context of international engagement, the fact that it was a role that militaries 
assumed raises questions of appropriateness that adds a further layer to the already 
complex debate on the role of the military in the humanitarian sphere. This feature was 
compounded still further by the finding that the reduction of international presence (and 
therefore records) was not necessarily matched by an increase in domestic records on the 
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medium- to long-term effectiveness of the projects delivered by military actors, and the 
related compliance with policy on returns and participation.  
Overall, the research sheds light on the nature of multi-level interaction in post-
conflict territories recognising that military units can play an often key and innovative role 
in the collective international effort on rights-based issues.
742
 It has found that minority 
rights policy, such as it existed at the time, had not yet been adapted for delivery in post-
conflict situations, instead emerging in an ad hoc fashion through treaty agreements, policy 
initiatives and even in military planning processes. In different ways the findings also serve 
to reinforce concerns evident in minority rights literature about the securitisation of 
minority narratives; an area worthy of further consideration. Nonetheless, it is evident that 
post-conflict environments greatly expanded the opportunities for the application of 
conditionality and normative pressure, including the potential for compliant outcomes on 
ethnic minority issues. While an assessment of the sustainability of outcomes was beyond 
the means of this research, its consideration would add depth to future research in the area. 
9.5 Future Research  
In spite of the legitimacy debate regarding the military role in “civil” areas, the military is, 
and is likely to remain, an active player on humanitarian and rights-based issues. 
Recognising the fact that the military frequently find themselves with a role to play on 
rights-based issues, there is merit in exploring the nature and scope of military activity 
beyond questions concerned with legitimacy and appropriateness. Chapter 2 highlighted 
significant scope for such research, to analyse what happens, not just whether it should 
happen.  
While this research focused on specific ethnic minority issues, the approach taken 
could be adapted for other rights-based issues in post-conflict environments. The author is 
aware of recent doctrinal development
743
 and military engagement across a spectrum of 
human rights issues in a variety of operational contexts, to which a similar approach could 
provide valuable insight into a novel and still relatively new feature of military 
engagement. 
A multi-case study analysis of military engagement in various different theatres 
would add weight to the findings produced here – including a broader consideration of the 
                                                 
742
 Current military revaluations of CIMIC – following Iraq and Afghanistan – risks endangering some of the 
means of engagement developed in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
743
 For example UK stabilisation doctrine (JDP 3-40) published in April 2010.  
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importance, or otherwise, of the enlargement perspective and context. Building on 
peacebuilding and SSR scholarship of the last ten years, an investigation of the 
sustainability of the outcomes achieved by military engagement in minority and related 
issues would be beneficial both in terms of intellectual consideration of the role played by 
military force, and the extent to which it could inform policy development in military and 
civilian planning. While this research focused on the military role within a broad civilian 
context, a more direct comparison of military and civilian means on minority issues could 
consider the potential of civil-military cooperation in post-conflict environments, while 
also informing the substance of future collaborative actions. From a military perspective, 
the findings could be used as the basis for future analysis of the roles and function of 
military forces in post-conflict operations. The question as to whether the military activity 
analysed is an appropriate role for modern military forces remains to be addressed by the 
literature.  
The importance of future research relating to minorities in the region is underlined 
by the findings of a UNHCR report on Bosnia, published in 2012, that stated:  
In theory, refugees have access to education, health care, employment 
and social welfare services under the same conditions as nationals, but 
in reality such access is limited. Refugees who wish to integrate locally 
find it extremely difficult to obtain residence permits.744 
As minority rights literature and practitioners increasingly focus on implementation 
strategies, this research should serve as a useful standing point for consideration of some of 
the options for delivering effective policy on minority issues in complex post-conflict 
environments. This thesis has demonstrated that military actors – for many reasons – can 
and do play a substantive role in delivering rights-based policies in post-conflict areas. 
Moving beyond consideration of military assistance in delivering humanitarian aid and 
abstract ideas of “winning hearts and minds”, both case studies provided sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that over time military actors have become increasingly aware of 
their capacity for engaging in activities beyond their traditional core competences – in this 
instance, directly engaging in encouraging and incentivising compliance with policy on 
ethnic minority issues. That the military can and do assume this role is clear: whether they 
should, is perhaps the key question for future research. 
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 UNHCR, (2012), p. 249. http://www.unhcr.org/4ec23109a.pdf (accessed 14 September 2015). 
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Appendices 
Appendix I – Membership Aspirations and Progress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 EU NATO OSCE CE 
Kosovo STM – 
Application 
pending 
Application pending Application 
pending 
Application 
pending 
BiH   SAA – 
June 2008 
Application pending 
PfP 2006; IPAP 2008 + 
Intensified Dialogue 
 
Member 1992 Member 2002 
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Appendix II – Operationalising Independent Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mechanism 
Delivery 
(Conditionality & 
Normative 
Pressure) 
Mechanism 
Reception 
Outcome 
Observation (Policy 
Behaviour & 
Implementation) 
Military Actor Humanitarian Aid 
Incentives 
Development 
Incentives 
Membership 
Incentives 
Power Incentives 
Capacity & 
Technical Support 
Credibility 
Temporal Resilience 
Cost/benefit 
assessment 
Appropriateness 
Returns 
Political & 
Institutional 
Participation 
Domestic Factors International 
Administration 
NGOs 
Identification with 
International 
Organisation or 
military actor 
Institutional 
Capacity  
Returns 
Political & 
Institutional 
Participation 
External Factors Discourse & 
experimentation 
Personalities 
Media discourse and 
agenda setting 
Kinstate 
Articulation of 
norms during 
conflict 
Post-conflict 
mandates 
 
Returns 
Political & 
Institutional 
Participation 
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Appendix III – Operationalisation of Compliant policy behaviour and 
Implementation 
Returns Compliant Policy Behaviour (Response to 
military incentives and normative pressure) 
Policy Implementation (Programmes, activities 
and outcomes) 
Compliant Full agreement with the conditions outlined by 
military actors at the point of engagement. 
(Agreement to facilitate returns) 
Open collaboration with military actors in 
delivering on the terms of an agreement. 
(Evidence of work towards facilitating returns) 
Implementation of the terms of the agreement* 
within the agreed timeframe. (Evidence of 
returns) 
Sustainment of the agreement following the 
departure of the military. (Evidence of 
sustainable returns) 
Partially 
compliant 
Partial agreement with the conditions outlined by 
military actors at the point of engagement. 
(Limited agreement to facilitate returns) 
Limited collaboration with military actors in 
delivering on the terms of an agreement. 
(Evidence of work towards facilitating returns) 
Partial implementation of the terms of the 
agreement within the agreed timeframe. 
(Evidence of returns) 
Sustainment of the agreement following the 
departure of the military. (Evidence of 
sustainable returns) 
Non-
compliant 
No agreement with the conditions outlined by 
military actors at the point of engagement. 
(Refusal to facilitate returns) 
No collaboration with military actors in delivering 
on the terms of an agreement. (Evidence of 
refusal to work towards facilitating returns) 
Obstruction of military efforts to encourage 
returns. (Evidence of obstruction) 
Sustained obstruction of military efforts to 
encourage returns (Evidence of sustained 
obstruction) 
Ethnic 
minority 
participation 
Compliant Policy Behaviour (Response to 
military incentives and normative pressure) 
Policy Implementation (Programmes, activities 
and outcomes) 
Compliant Full agreement with the conditions outlined by 
military actors at the point of engagement. 
(Agreement to facilitate participation) 
Open collaboration with military actors in 
delivering on the terms of an agreement. 
(Evidence of work towards facilitating 
participation) 
Implementation of the terms of the agreement 
within the agreed timeframe. (Evidence of 
participation) 
Sustainment of the agreement following the 
departure of the military. (Evidence of sustained 
participation) 
Partially 
compliant 
Partial agreement with the conditions outlined by 
military actors at the point of engagement. 
(Limited agreement to facilitate participation) 
Limited collaboration with military actors in 
delivering on the terms of an agreement. 
(Evidence of work towards facilitating 
participation) 
Partial implementation of the terms of the 
agreement within the agreed timeframe. 
(Evidence of participation) 
Sustainment of the agreement following the 
departure of the military. (Evidence of 
sustainable participation) 
Non-
compliant 
No agreement with the conditions outlined by 
military actors at the point of engagement. 
(Refusal to facilitate participation) 
No collaboration with military actors. (Evidence 
of refusal to facilitate participation) 
Obstruction of military efforts to encourage 
participation. (Evidence of obstruction) 
Sustained obstruction of military efforts to 
encourage participation. (Evidence of sustained 
obstruction) 
*Reference to an ‘agreement’ includes military reference to policy on returns and 
participation developed by relevant international organisations and local policy 
arrangements where the military often in collaboration with NGOs presented their own 
version of returns policy for compliance. 
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Appendix V – Kosovo Sample 
Ser. No. Date TCC Lead & 
Activity 
KFOR 
Classification 
Conditional 
Incentives 
Normative  
Pressure 
Compliance Remarks 
1 SEPT 99 Turkish medical 
support and 
refuse collection 
HA    N    Y – minority 
participation 
N Multiple 
locations 
2 OCT 99 Spanish 
winterization 
programme 
HA N N N/A Multiple 
locations 
3 OCT 99 Dutch water 
provision 
HA N N N/A Orahovac 
4 NOV 99 UK winterisation 
programme 
HA N N N/A Pristina 
5 NOV 99 UK winterisation 
programme 
HA N N N/A Potoc 
6 NOV 99 French 
winterisation 
programme 
HA N N N/A Vidishiq. In 
cooperation with 
World Vision 
7 NOV99 Swedish 
provision of 
tented shelter 
HA    N    N N/A Keqekolla 
8 NOV99 German clothing 
provision 
HA N N N/A Leskovac 
9 NOV 99 Irish 
winterisation 
programme 
HA N N N/A Multiple 
locations. In 
cooperation with 
UNHCR. 
10 DEC 99 UK winterization 
programme 
HA N N N/A Potoc 
11 DEC 99 KFOR Road 
reconstruction 
CS N N N/A Multiple 
locations 
12 DEC 99 Belgian medical 
support 
HA N N N/A Podujevo 
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13 DEC 99 Electricity 
supply project 
CS Y – technical 
support 
contingent on 
Albanian and 
Serbs working 
together to 
support the 
project 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – Low levels of 
cooperation from 
both sides within 
ad hoc structures 
created by KFOR 
to oversee the 
project 
Mitrovica. Short 
term project with 
no long term 
impact regarding 
minority 
participation 
14 DEC 99 German support 
for orphanage 
HA N N N/A Pristina 
15 DEC 99 KFOR Medical 
support 
HA N N N/A Susica. Medical 
teams from 
various TCCs 
16 DEC 99 French Mine 
awareness 
education 
HA N N N/A Banja 
17 DEC 99 Norwegian 
school 
reconstruction 
CS N N N/A Plementina. 
Ethnic-Albanian 
school. 
18 JAN 00 KFOR support 
for University of 
Pristina medical 
training unit 
CS N N N/A Pristina 
19 JAN 00 German clothing 
project 
HA N N N/A Pristina 
20 JAN 00 Irish clothing 
project 
HA N N N/A Stimlje 
21 MAR 00 Irish clothing 
project 
HA N N N/A Stimlje 
22 APR 00 Italian inter-
community 
liaison initiative 
N/S N Y – minority 
participation 
P – limited 
participation 
from both 
Vasiljka. Project 
not sustained 
beyond 2000 
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ethnicities. 
23 MAY 00 Finnish school 
assistance 
HA N Y – minority 
participation 
N/A – School in 
question was 
already 
multiethnic in 
composition 
Janjevo. 
Predominantly 
Croat and 
Albanian in 
ethnicity with 
very small 
Serbian, 
Egyptian and 
Ashkali 
population 
24 APR 00 US trade project. 
Serb produce to 
Albanian 
markets 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – Vitina Co-op 
agreed to 
purchase Serb 
potatoes through 
US mediation.  
Vitina in 
cooperation with 
Vitina co-op. 
Serb minority 
relations with the 
co-op were 
maintained. 
25 AUG 00 German schools 
supplies 
HA N N N/A Kosta Racin 
26 OCT 00 Norwegian 
medical centre 
CS N Y – minority 
participation. 
 N – Serbian 
returns did not 
occur to facilitate 
participation 
Gllanaselle. In 
cooperation with 
Norwegian Aid 
Committee  
27 OCT 00 Greek agriculture 
project 
CS N N N/A Urosevac/Ferizaj 
28 MAR 01 German clothing 
provision 
HA N N N/A Pristina 
29 APR 01 Greek 
humanitarian 
supplies 
HA N N N/A Urosevac/Ferizaj 
        
30 JUL 01 German water 
supplies 
HA N N N/A Pristina 
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31 NOV 01 Spanish returns 
project 
CIMIC Y – financial 
incentives and 
reconstruction 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participation 
P – 145 Serb 
returns out of a 
pre-war 
population of 
1850 
Osojane. Project 
initiated by the 
CIMIC team. 
Later supported 
by International 
Organisation for 
Migration 
32 SEPT 01 Norwegian 
democratization 
project. 
CS N Y – minority 
participation 
P- minorities 
engaged in ad 
hoc forum 
established by 
Norwegian 
KFOR 
Pristina. Project 
was not 
sustained beyond 
2001 
33 NOV 01 Norwegian 
municipal returns 
project 
CS Y – provision of 
funds and 
reconstruction 
related 
employment 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – Serb 
minority engaged 
in ‘go and see’ 
visits. Some gave 
commitments to 
return 
Stimlje. In 
cooperation with 
Norwegian 
Refugee Council. 
34 DEC 01 Italian school 
provisions and 
twining project 
HA N N N/A Vok 
 
35 DEC 01 Finnish road 
reconstruction 
CS N N N/A Lipljan 
36 FEB 02 French children’s 
clothing 
provision 
HA N N N/A Tusilje 
37 FEB 02 Spanish 
childrens 
education 
programmes 
CS N N N/A Istok 
38 FEB 02 Spanish 
reconstruction 
for returns 
HA N Y – minority 
returns. 
P – Serbian 
families 
participation in 
Istok – No data 
found on 
whether returns 
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‘go and see’ 
visits. Five 
Serbian persons 
returned to 
oversee the 
reconstruction of 
their property 
were sustained 
39 FEB 02 USA clothing 
programme 
HA N N N/A Feriza/ Urosevac 
40 FEB 02 French support 
for multi-ethnic 
school 
HA Y – support 
contingent on 
agreement to 
share facilities 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – Ethnicities 
agreed to share 
facilities 
Ponesh/Pones 
41 MAR 02 Moroccan 
medical support 
HA N N N/A Mitrovica. 
Maternity 
facilities. 
42 MAR 02 KFOR medical 
support 
HA N N N/A Laplje Selo. 
Multiple TCCs 
involved. 
43 MAR 02 German schools 
(kindergarden) 
assistance 
CIMIC Y – financial and 
technical 
assistance 
contingent on 
both minorities 
sharing the 
facility 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – Ethnicities 
agreed to share 
facilities. 
Facilities were 
initially shared 
Prizren. Serbian 
participation in 
the kindergarden 
was not 
sustained beyond 
2002 
44 MAR 02 German water 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Lubizdha. In 
cooperation with 
Oxfam. 
45 APR 02 Finnish 
education 
initiative 
CIMIC Y – financial and 
technical 
assistance 
contingent on 
participation of 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – project 
supported by 
Albanian and 
Serb members of 
the KPS. 
Lipljan. In 
cooperation with 
KPS. Project was 
not sustained 
beyond the 
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both 
communities 
Representatives 
of both 
communities also 
participated 
during the 
initiation of the 
project 
rotation of the 
Finish contingent 
in Lipljan 
46 APR 02 German aid 
packages 
CIMIC N N N/A Prizren 
47 MAY 02 Norwegian 
sports park 
construction 
CIMIC Y – construction 
contingent on 
agreement from 
both ethnicities 
to share facility 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – initial 
agreement was 
secured from 
both ethnicities 
to share facilities 
Obilic. No data 
found on 
whether 
agreement was 
sustained beyond 
2002. 
48 MAY 02 German 
reconstruction of 
electricity 
transformer 
CS N N N/A Prizren 
49 MAY 02 Spanish returns 
project 
CIMIC Y- financial 
support 
contingent on 
agreement from 
both sides to 
support the 
initiative 
Y – minority 
returns. 
P - Serbian 
families 
participation in 
‘go and see’ 
visits. Eight 
Serbian persons 
returned to 
oversee the 
reconstruction of 
their property 
Osojane valley: 
villages of 
Zveccam, 
Osojane, 
Prepanie, Tucep 
and Salinovica. 
Interviews 
indicated the 
some returns 
(unspecified) 
were sustained in 
these areas 
50 MAY 02 Spanish support 
for university  
microbiology 
CS N N N/A University of 
Pristina. In 
cooperation with 
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laboratory Institute Joan 
Lluis Vives 
51 MAY 02 French 
promotion of 
multi-ethnic 
market place 
CIMIC Y – financial 
support for 
operation of 
market 
contingent on 
agreement from 
both ethnicities 
to share the 
facility 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – participation 
from Albanian 
and Serbian 
traders 
Mitrovica. 
Market required 
high levels of 
security. 
Initiative was not 
sustained for a 
number of 
months 
52 JUN 02 Italian bridge 
reconstruction 
CS N N N/A Gorni Petric 
53 JUL 02 USA school 
support 
HA N N N/A Bordhosh 
54 JUL 02 German support 
of library 
CS/CIMIC N N N/A Urosevac 
55 JUL 02 Italian children’s 
toy project 
CIMIC N N N/A Djakovica 
56 AUG 02 UK community 
sale 
CIMIC Y – financial 
support 
contingent on 
both sides 
participating 
Y – minority 
participation 
Y – both 
communities 
participated in 
sale as vendors 
and purchasers 
Devet Jugovica. 
Not sustained, 
one off event. 
57 AUG 02 USA School 
supplies 
HA N N N/A Brod 
58 AUG 02 German School 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Krushë e Vogel. 
In partnership 
with German 
Rotary Club 
59 AUG 02 Moroccan 
medical support 
HA N N N/A Grace. Provision 
of vaccinations.  
60 AUG 02 Polish medical 
supplies 
HA N N N/A Urosevac, 
Ferizaj, Kacanik 
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61 AUG 02 Spanish multi-
ethnic markets 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – participation 
of Serbian 
women in 
markets. 
Pec, Decane and 
Djakovica. 
Interviews 
indicated that 
participation was 
sustained at 
modest levels 
62 SEPT 02 German flood 
relief 
HA N N N/A Prizren 
63 NOV 02 Italian support 
for multi-ethnic 
radio service 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – Initial 
agreement by 
both ethnicities 
to support the 
service 
Various 
locations. Serb 
participation was 
not sustained in 
majority 
Albanian areas 
64 NOV 02 Italian multi-
ethnic market 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – small 
numbers of Serbs 
attended the 
market 
Klina. Modest 
Serbian 
participation was 
maintained. 
65 DEC 02 French children’s 
supplies 
CIMIC N N N/A Mitrovica 
66 DEC 02 Moroccan 
medical support 
HA N N N/A Mitrovica 
67 FEB 03 USA multi-
ethnic volley ball 
tournament 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – two Serbian 
teams 
participated in 
event 
Pristina – one off 
event. Not 
sustained 
68 APR 03 French Aid to 
Roma 
community 
CIMIC N N N/A Priluzje 
69 MAY 03 French multi-
ethnic concert 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – both 
ethnicities 
attended concert 
in good numbers  
Mitrovica. 
Concert stage 
was on the 
bridge over the 
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but viewed from 
either side of the 
Ibar river 
Ibar. One off 
event 
70 MAY 03 Moroccan 
medical support 
HA N N N/A Various 
locations. 
71 MAY 03 Finnish road 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Lipljan 
72 JUN 03 KFOR 
multinational 
school supplies 
(Multiple TCCs) 
CS N N N/A Various 
73 JUN 03 French support 
for local NGOs 
CIMIC Y- construction 
of two social 
centres 
contingent on 
minority 
participation in 
NGOs 
Y – minority 
participation 
N – No evidence 
of minority 
participation in 
the facilities 
Mitrovica. 
Centres located 
on either side of 
river Ibar in Serb 
and Albanian 
majority areas 
74 JUN 03 German water 
works 
CIMIC N N N/A Dobrodeljane 
75 JUN 03 Danish road 
works 
CIMIC N N N/A Mitrovica. 
Funded by 
Danish NGOs 
76 JUL 03 French multi-
ethnic market 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – limited 
participation by 
Serbian minority. 
Mitrovica. 
Opertiona of 
market heavily 
dependent on 
KFOR security. 
Interviews 
suggest that 
modest 
participation was 
sustained until 
spring 2004 
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77 JUL 03 Italian 
reconciliation 
meeting between 
Serbian 
monastery and 
municipality of 
Decani regarding 
plans for 
municipal 
construction in 
the area. In 
particular 
permission to do 
road works 
adjacent to the 
monastery 
CIMIC N Y- minority 
participation 
P – Serbian 
representatives 
participated in 
this and 
subsequent 
meetings. 
Agreement was 
reached to allow 
work to proceed. 
Decani. In 
cooperation with 
UNMIK 
78 JUL 03 Spanish returns 
house 
reconstruction 
CIMIC Y – 
reconstruction 
and funding 
contingent on 
ethnicities 
support for 
returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – 12 Serbian 
families returns 
during 
reconstruction 
Osojane and 
Dubrava. 
Interviews 
suggest that a 
small number of 
returns were 
sustained 
79 SEPT 03 French clothing 
aid  
CIMIC N N N/A Mitrovica 
80 SEPT 03 Italian school 
supplies 
CIMIC N N N/A Laplje Selo 
81 SEPT 03 USA inter-ethnic 
soccer 
tournament 
CIMIC N Y- minority 
participation 
P – minority 
teams did 
participate. 
Upper 
Malishevo. One 
off event. 
82 NOV 03 German Returns 
project 
CIMIC Y – various 
financial and 
technical 
incentives 
Y- minority 
returns and 
participation 
P – 19 Serbian 
men returned in 
initial phase. 
Novo Selo. 
Interviews 
suggest that 
some elderly 
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returns were 
sustained 
83 DEC 03 USA  
School supplies 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N Babin Most, 
Plemetina and 
Obilic. 
84 JAN 04 USA clothing CIMIC N N N/A Klina 
85 FEB 04 Czech Medical 
centre 
CIMIC N Y- minority 
participation 
P- minorities 
used the facility 
in small numbers 
Podujevo 
86 APR 04 USA supplies for 
handicapped 
shelter 
CIMIC N N N/A Gracenica 
87 APR 04 Finnish  Fire 
engines 
CIMIC N N N/A Kosovo Polje 
88 SEPT 04 Irish multi-ethnic 
soccer 
tournament 
CIMIC Y – access to 
facilities 
refurbished by 
Irish KFOR 
contingent on 
minority 
participation and 
shared use 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – Serbian 
teams 
participated in 
tournament 
Robovce. 
Facilities were 
closed shortly 
after as 
ethnicities could 
not agree to 
shared use. Irish 
mediated 
discussions to 
agree new terms. 
In cooperation 
with Irish Aid 
89 OCT 04 Irish multi-ethnic 
school  
CIMIC Y – financial 
support provided 
for purchase of 
school supplies 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – school was 
already 
multiethnic in 
composition 
Janjevo. In 
cooperation with 
Irish Aid 
90 OCT 04 Italian 
multicultural 
event 
CIMIC N – financial and 
technical support 
for organization 
of events 
Y – Minority 
participation 
P – minorities 
were represented 
at all meetings 
prior to the 
Gorazdevac. In 
cooperation with 
domestic NGO  
‘Youth Network’  
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hosting of three 
cultural events 
which were 
attended by 
members of both 
ethnicities. 
91 OCT 04 Finnish 
enterprise 
projects 
CIMIC Y – financial 
incentives 
contingent on 
minority 
participation 
Y- minority 
participation 
P – evidence of 
minority 
employment and 
start-up business. 
Kosovo Polje. 
Interviews 
suggest that most 
start-ups 
survived the first 
year of trading. 
92 NOV 04 Irish 
School 
renovation 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – Roma 
communities 
attended the 
school once 
constructed 
Gornje Gadimlje 
No Serbs 
resident in the 
area. In 
cooperation with 
Irish Aid 
93 JUN 05 Finish Hospital 
supplies 
CIMIC N N N/A Podjuevo 
94 AUG 05 Ukrainian 
humanitarian 
supplies 
CIMIC N N N/A Strpce 
95 SEPT 05  Ukrainian 
Children’s 
village project 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – small 
numbers of 
Serbian children 
did participate 
Pristina. One off 
project. Not 
sustained. 
96 JUN 05 Finnish Mine 
awareness 
CS N N N/A Stimlje 
97 JUL 05 Italian medical 
support 
CS N N N/A  
98 JUL 05  Swedish medical 
support 
CS N N N/A Podujevo 
99 SEPT 05 Ukrainian CIMIC N N N/A Devic 
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Monastery 
reconstruction 
100 SEPT 05 Ukrainian school 
materials 
HA N N N/A Strpce 
101 SEPT 05 Finnish Support 
for a children’s 
house 
CIMIC N N N/A Gracenica 
(CIMIC) 
102 FEB 07 Swiss 
multicultural 
event 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N Suva Reka 
103 MAR 07 Italian medical 
facilities 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N Pec 
104 MAR 07 Italian Dialysis 
equipment 
CIMIC N Y- minority 
participation 
N Djakovica 
105 MAR 07 Italian 
Ambulance 
equipment 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N DEcani 
106 MAR 07  Finnish 
School facilities 
CIMIC N Y- minority 
participation 
N Suvi Do 
107 JUN 07 USA Sports 
facilities 
CIMIC N N N/A Mitrovica 
108 JUL 07 Spanish 
Children’s 
supplies 
CIMIC N Y- minority 
participation 
N Kos 
109 JUL 07 French road 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Borcan 
110 JUL 07  Ukrainian 
medical support 
CIMIC N N N/A Strpce 
111 OCT 07 Finnish Water 
Truck 
CIMIC N N N/A Lipljan 
112 JAN 08 French School 
cultural events 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N Gracenica 
113 FEB 08 Austrian road 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Suva Reka 
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114 FEB 08 Austrian Agri 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Suva Reka 
115 FEB 08 German  School 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Tumicina 
116 FEB 08  Austrian School 
project 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – Serbian 
families attended 
the open day. 
Attendance 
rabidly declined 
thereafter and 
eventually 
stopped 
Velica Hoca 
117 MAR 08 French  heating 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Pristina 
118 MAR 08  Irish School 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N Stimlje. In 
cooperation with 
municipality and 
Irish Aid. 
119 MAR 08 Irish 
House 
reconstruction 
CIMIC Y – financial 
incentives for 
house 
reconstruction 
Y – minority 
returns 
N Stimlje. In 
cooperation with 
municipality and 
Irish Aid. 
120 APR 08  Czech school 
support 
CIMIC Y – limited 
financial 
assistance and 
technical support 
Y – minority 
participation and 
returns 
P – Initially 
small numbers of 
Serbian children 
attended the 
school. 
Klina. In 
cooperation with 
municipality 
targeting Serb 
returns. 
Interviews 
suggest 
attendance was 
not sustained 
121 APR 08 Finnish  
enterprise project 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N Lipljan. Finnish 
applied 
incentives in 
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previous such 
cases. No 
evidence of why 
incentivised 
approach was 
dropped in this 
instance 
122 APR 08 German  road 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Pleneja 
123 MAY 08 German  multi 
ethnic children’s 
camp 
CIMIC Y – small 
financial 
incentives related 
to the 
organization of 
the camp 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – minorities 
did participate 
but no Serbs 
Dragas. One off 
event 
124 JUN 08 French multi-
ethnic children’s 
camp 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – a small 
number of 
Serbian children 
participated 
Pristina. One off 
event. 
125 JUL 08 Swedish medical 
support 
CIMIC N N N/A Slatina 
126 OCT 08 Italian 
playground 
CIMIC N N N/A Pristina 
127 OCT 08 Finnish 
playground 
CIMIC N N N/A Pristina 
128 JAN 09 Portuguese 
School supplies 
CIMIC N N N/A Pristina 
129 JAN 09  Irish fire-fighting 
equipment 
LMT N N N/A Lipljan 
130 JAN 09  Turkish  sewage 
works 
CIMIC N N N/A Prizren 
131 FEB 09 German  multi 
ethnic soccer 
tournament 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – Serb teams 
did participate 
Pec. One off 
event. Not 
sustained 
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132 FEB 09 Czech  School 
supplies 
LMT N N N/A Podujevo 
133 NOV 09  USA  School 
supplies 
CIMIC N N N/A Mogila 
        
        
Totals    18 (R6 P12) 50 (R6 P44) 32 (R6 P26)  
Legend: HA – Humanitarian Aid; CS – Civil Support; N/S – Non-specified; CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation; LMT – Liaison and Monitoring Team; N/S 
– Non-specified; Y – Yes; N – No; P – Partial; N/A – Non-applicable; R – Returns; P – Participation. 
Sources: KFOR Chronicle; Irish Defence Forces files. 
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Appendix VI – Bosnia & Herzegovina Sample 
Ser. No. Date TCC Lead & 
Activity 
KFOR 
Classification 
Conditional 
Incentives 
Normative  
Pressure 
Compliance Remarks 
1 DEC 97 SFOR liaison 
with Croatian 
government 
officials 
addressing 
policy 
development, re-
deployment co-
ordination, 
preparation of 
technical 
arrangements 
affecting returns 
and 
participation. 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation and 
returns 
P – progress was 
made in all areas 
identified. 
Though not at 
the pace and 
quantity desired 
by SFOR 
Zagreb 
2 DEC 97 Austrian SFOR 
‘Peace’ and 
humanitarian 
village initiative 
HA N Y – minority 
participation 
P – both 
ethnicities 
signalled a 
willingness to 
cooperate with 
the initiative 
Fojnica. Aid 
assistance was 
supplied in advance. 
Bosniak/ Croatian 
relations were 
promoted under the 
guise of the ‘peace 
village’ concept. 
3 MAR 98 Norwegian 
demining and 
water restoration 
project  
CIMIC N N N/A Sarajevo. In 
cooperation with 
Norwegian Peoples 
Aid 
4 MAR 98 Italian CIMIC 
organisation and 
distribution of 
HA N N N/A Sokolac Refugee 
Centre. Aid was 
organised by Italian 
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food aid. troops. 
5 APR 98 Egyptian SFOR. 
Medical support 
HA N N N/A Sarajevo 
6 MAY 98 SFOR Task 
Force. 
Reconstruction 
Oil Refinery 
Project 
CIMIC N N N/A Srpski Brod. In 
cooperation with 
municipality 
7 OCT 98 SFOR Task 
Force. Sarajevo 
waste water 
project 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – Serbs and 
Bosniaks 
participated in 
ad hoc 
discussions with 
SFOR and 
associated 
bodies 
Rajlovac. In 
conjunction with 
JICA (Japanese 
International Co-
operation Agency) 
and the International 
Management Group. 
8 OCT 98 German Kresevo 
School 
reconstruction 
and supplies. 
CIMIC Y – financial 
and technical 
support 
contingent on 
agreement to 
share facility  
Y – minority 
participation 
P – multi-ethnic 
participation 
achieved with 
internal 
segregation 
Direct engagement 
with mayor and 
local election 
authorities 
9 OCT 98 SFOR functional 
Team 
(Engineers) 
Vehicle 
maintenance 
programme. 
CIMIC N/A N/A N/A Nationwide in 
conjunction with the 
International 
Management Group  
10 DEC 98 Belgian 
Agriculture 
assistance 
CIMIC N/A N/A N/A Tomislavgrad. 
In cooperation with 
World Bank. 
11 DEC 98 Belgian Bridge 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N/A N/A N/A Fojnica 
12 DEC 98 Spanish SFOR HA N N N/A Bacevici. 40 Serbian 
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reconstruction of 
minority Serbian 
housing. 
men returned (to 
assist 
reconstruction) out 
of a pre-war 
population of 500. 
13 DEC 98 Canadian SFOR 
food kitchen 
HA N N N/A Jahorina 
14 MAR 99 US Agri-training 
scheme 
CIMIC N N N/A Sarajevo/Nationwide 
In conjunction with 
US Dept. of 
Agriculture and 
various secondary 
schools 
15 MAR 99 UK enterprise 
project linked to 
participation and 
returns 
CIMIC Y – financial 
and employment 
incentives 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participation 
N – 
commitments to 
participation 
were contingent 
on returns which 
did not happen 
Prozor in 
cooperation with 
Women’s 
Association in Exile. 
DFID funds through 
UK military 
16 APR 99 Belgium-
Luxembourg 
Battle Group. 
Support for 
returns 
CIMIC Y – incentives 
linked to 
installation of 
electricity 
connectors 
Y – minority 
returns 
Y – Initial target 
of ten family 
returns attained 
Blagaj. SFOR 
negotiation with 
local municipalities 
to encourage returns. 
Initial phase 
complete. Electricity 
connectors installed 
17 APR 99 Belgium-
Luxembourg 
Battle Group. 
Support for 
returns 
CIMIC Y – directly 
linked to 
municipal 
processing of 
property register 
and related 
financial support 
for returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – Initial phase 
not completed. 
23 persons 
returned. Further 
returns did not 
materialise 
Glomac. SFOR 
negotiation with 
local municipalities 
to encourage returns.  
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18 JUL 99 French Mono-
ethnic returns 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Stup. In cooperation 
with Solidarité NGO 
19 SEPT 99 Spanish and 
French 
humanitarian aid 
and 
reconstruction 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Gacko In 
conjunction with 
VRS 
20 SEPT 99 German School 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Hasanovici and 
Bulatovici 
21 SEPT 99 UK SFOR 
Dental treatment 
HA N N N/A Banja Luka 
22 OCT 99 Norwegian 
SFOR school 
refurbishment 
HA N Y – minority 
participation 
N Modrica. 
Refurbishment 
initiated in response 
to clashes between 
Serbs and Bosniaks 
as a means of ‘soft 
stabilisation’ 
23 OCT 99 UK SFOR. 
Construction of 
IDP support 
centre 
HA N N N/A Blagaj. In 
cooperation with 
‘Holy Ground 
Mission in Faith’ 
NGO 
24 OCT 99 German launch 
of micro-project 
programme 
CIMIC Y – stipulation 
of project 
development and 
support was that 
they must 
support minority 
returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – interviews 
suggest that 
compliant 
outcomes were 
achieved but 
numbers 
returning fell 
short of targets 
Various locations In 
conjunction with EC 
OBNOVA 
programme 
25 OCT 99 Italian micro- CIMIC Y – financial Y – minority P – minority Pale. In conjunction 
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project to 
support returns 
and technical 
incentives 
contingent on 
support for 
returns 
returns and 
participation 
participation 
recorded. No 
data on returns. 
with EC OBNOVA 
programme 
26 NOV 99 Spanish SFOR. 
Minority returns 
project involving 
liaison, security 
and 
reconstruction 
CIMIC Y Y P  
27 NOV 99 SFOR Task 
Force 
Conference on 
economic 
development 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N Sarajevo. 
28 DEC 99 Civil Affairs 
Tactical 
Planning Team. 
Humanitarian 
assistance and 
returns planning 
and support 
CS N Y N Bijeljine 
29 DEC 99 Italian. 
Application of 
EU legislation to 
building projects 
in order to 
access EC 
funding for local 
contractors. 
CIMIC N N N/A Supported by EC 
30 FEB 00 Italian school 
rebuilding 
micro- project 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N Hadzici. In 
conjunction with EU 
OBNOVA 
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programme 
31 FEB 00 German 
construction of 
therapy centre 
CIMIC N N N/A Kresevo. 
Incorporating local 
construction firms 
32 FEB 00 SFOR HQ 
initiative on 
health reform. 
Health system 
divided along 
entity lines 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N Sarajevo. Liaison 
with political leaders 
in cooperation with 
World Bank 
33 FEB 00 German 
reconstruction 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Breza. In 
cooperation with 
Inter Mission 
Munich and 
CARITAS NGO. 
34 FEB 00 SFOR Law 
Enforcement 
Support Team. 
Interethnic 
participation 
CS N Y – minority 
participation 
P – all 
ethnicities 
represented. 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of Canton of 
Sarajevo 
35 FEB 00 SFOR HQ 
House 
Reconstruction 
for returns 
CIMIC N N N/A Stap II plan with 
Solidarité. No 
minorities involved. 
36 FEB 00 Norwegian 
SFOR donation 
of containers.  
CIMIC N N N/A Modrica 
37 MAR 00 German 
engagement with 
local politicians 
and leaders on 
return and 
participation 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation and 
returns 
P – minority 
representatives 
participated in 
discussions 
Foca 
38 MAR 00 Czech SFOR HA N Y – minority P – existing Bosanski Krupa. 
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support for 
kinder garden 
participation minority 
participation in 
the school 
reinforced. 
School was multi-
ethnic before the 
project started 
39 MAR 00 Nordic/Polish 
CIMIC House 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N – facility had 
just opened. 
Brod. In conjunction 
with OSCE and 
UNHCR. 
40 MAR 00 Italian school 
reconstruction 
contingent on 
support of 
minority returns 
CIMIC Y- financial 
incentives linked 
to support for 
minority returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – majority 
population 
signalled 
willingness to 
engage 
constructively 
but no returns 
recorded at that 
time. 
Kalinovik 
41 APR 00 Canadian small 
business projects 
linked to returns 
support 
CIMIC Y – financial 
support 
conditional on 
commitment to 
employ 
minorities. 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – four 
individuals from 
ethnic minority 
employed. 
Srpska Kostajnica. 
In cooperation with 
DFID 
42 MAY 00 Italian school 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Miljevina 
43 JUN 00 USA CIMIC 
House  
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N – facility had 
just opened. 
Tuzla 
44 JUN 00 Nordic/Polish 
CIMIC centre 
and 
reconstruction 
efforts 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P  - CIMIC team 
negotiated 
access to 
farming land for 
minority. 
Majority agreed. 
Doboj 
45 JUN 00 French SFOR 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Borovcici 
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support 
46 JUN 00  Nordic/ Polish 
returns and 
reconciliation 
cell in 
conjunction with 
CIMIC houses 
CIMIC Y – financial 
and technical 
support linked to 
returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – reports 247 
minority returns 
out of 1,345 
IDPs 
Doboj area. In 
cooperation with 
UNHCR 
47 JUN 00 French Foreign 
Legion returns 
support. Tented 
accommodation 
during 
reconstruction of 
property 
HA N Y – minority 
returns 
P – facilitated 
returnees input 
to reconstruction 
effort 
Borovcici 
48 JUL 00 Italian SFOR 
support for 
hospital 
HA N N N/A Sarajevo 
49 AUG 00  Turkish 
reconstruction 
for returns 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
returns 
N Zenica 
50 AUG 00 Turkish school 
and house 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation and 
returns 
P – minorities 
did attend local 
school at 
separate times 
Zenica 
51 AUG 00 German 
Playground 
CIMIC N N N/A Foca 
52 SEPT 00 Italian SFOR. 
Infrastructure 
support 
CS N N N/A Sarajevo 
53 SEPT 00 Canadian/UK 
school 
reconstruction 
project 
CIMIC N Y- minority 
returns 
N – returns were 
anticipated. 
Glamoc In 
cooperation with 
Canadian and UK 
governments. 
54 SEPT 00 USA CS N N N/A Srebrenica in 
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winterisation 
programme 
cooperation with 
Red Cross 
55 OCT 00 French SFOR. 
Bridge 
reconstruction 
  CS N N N/A Seljani. French 
Foreign Legion 
56 OCT 00 Turkish SFOR. 
Computers for 
school 
HA N N N/A Zenica. In 
cooperation with 
local municipality. 
57 OCT 00 Finnish road 
reconstruction 
linked to returns 
CIMIC Y – road used to 
incentivise 48 
families to 
return. 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – minorities 
participated in 
‘go and see’ 
visits. 
Korace 
58 NOV 00 German/Irish 
SFOR. Support 
for Institute for 
Special 
Education for 
Children in 
Mjedenica 
HA N Y – minority 
participation 
N/A Sarajevo. School 
already catered for 
children from 
different ethnic 
background. German 
intention was to 
reinforce idea of 
inter-ethnic 
cooperation. 
59 NOV 00 Spanish 
humanitarian aid 
and 
reconstruction 
linked to returns. 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
returns and 
participation 
P – engagement 
by some 
minority persons 
recorded 
Stolac 
60 NOV 00 Canadian and 
UK 
reconstruction 
and business 
projects linked 
to returns 
CIMIC Y –  projects to 
address 
electricity and 
minority 
employment in 
order to 
incentivise 
returns 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participations 
N – project just 
initiated 
Halapic. In 
cooperation with 
DFID 
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61 DEC 00 Canadian SFOR. 
Humanitarian 
Aid to support 
returns 
CIMIC N N N/A Glamoc. Aid given 
to returning majority 
population 
62 DEC 00 Dutch 
engagement with 
municipal 
authorities 
CIMIC Y – insistence 
that all 
municipal plans 
should address 
minority 
participation. 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – initial 
commitments 
given by 
municipalities. 
Novi Travnik area. 
In cooperation with 
UNHCR and OSCE. 
63 DEC 00 French SFOR. 
Infrastructure 
assistance. 
CS N N N/A Prozor 
64 JAN 01 Nordic/Polish 
SFOR bridge 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – political 
leaders from 
both ethnicities 
engaged in the 
project 
Mircina 
65 FEB 01 Scandinavian 
projects 
CIMIC N N N/A Doboj. Incorporating 
EU funding 
66 FEB 01 Electricity 
projects linked 
to the facilitation 
of returns 
CIMIC Y –restoration of 
electricity in 
order to 
incentivise 
returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
N Prijedor. In 
partnership with 
DFID 
67 FEB 01 USA economic 
forums 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N – no record of 
ethnicity of 
attendees 
Zenica 
68 FEB 01 UK round table 
discussion of 
CIMIC projects 
CIMIC N Y – Emphasis on 
minority 
participation and 
local ownership 
N – no record of 
ethnicity of 
attendees 
Sipovo 
69 MAR 01 Dutch 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Bugojno 
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programme in 
part linked to 
returns 
70 MAR 01 UK Quick 
Impact Project. 
Support for 
sawmill linked 
to returnee 
support 
CIMIC Y – financial 
support 
conditioned  on 
provision of 
wood to support 
returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – precise 
figures not 
referenced. 
Gornji Vakuf. In 
cooperation with 
DFID. 
71 MAR 01 Turkish 
environmental 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Zenica. 
72 MAR 01 Polish returns 
support 
CIMIC Y – linked to 
implementation 
of Property 
Legislation 
Implementation 
plan 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – Bosniak 
families initially 
returned to 18 
houses 
Bocinja Donja. In 
cooperation with 
UNHCR 
73 MAR 01 UK business 
project linked to 
returns 
CIMIC Y – funding 
linked to 
employment of 
returnees and 
support for 
reconstruction 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participation 
P – two minority 
returnees 
employed 
Prijedor. In 
cooperation with 
DFID 
74 MAR 01 Swiss 
humanitarian 
support for IDPs 
CIMIC N N N/A Doboj. In 
cooperation with 
UNHCR 
75 MAR 01 Swiss temporary 
accommodation 
to facilitate 
returns 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
returns. 
P – returnees 
were assisting in 
the 
reconstruction of 
their properties 
Foca 
76 APR 01 Czech 
reconstruction 
CIMIC Y – financial 
support for  
Y – minority 
returns and 
P – 4 minority 
Bosniaks 
Prijedor. Supported 
by Canadian CIDA 
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project to 
support returns 
business projects 
linked to returns 
participation. employed. and DFID 
77 APR 01 Spanish school 
supplies 
CIMIC N N N/A Ljubinje 
78 APR 01 UK business 
project 
CIMIC Y – funding 
linked to 
employment of 
returnees 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participation. 
P – six returnees 
employed 
Bosanski Novi/Novi 
Gad. In cooperation 
with DFID 
79 APR 01 Italian  medical 
supplies 
HA N N N/A Sokolac 
80 MAY 01 Italian school 
refurbishment. 
CIMIC N N N/A Sarajevo. 
81 MAY 01 USA support for 
‘go and see’ visit 
CIMIC Y – support 
conditional on 
minority 
commitment to 
returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – 250 people 
participated in 
visit 
Potocari/Srebenica. 
In partnership with 
NGOs and UNHCR 
82 MAY 01 Norwegian 
SFOR furniture 
distribution 
HA N N N/A Zenica 
83 MAY 01 Canadian SFOR 
coordination of 
‘go and see’ visit 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
returns 
P – 150 Bosnian 
Serbs attended 
the visit 
Glamoc. In 
cooperations with 
UNHCR. 
84 MAY 01 UK 
environmental 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Sipovo 
 
85 MAY 01 UK electricity 
project 
CIMIC Y – funding 
linked to 
progression of 
returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – 60 minority 
returns recorded 
as part of wider 
project 
Prijedor. In 
cooperation with 
DFID 
86 MAY 01 Finnish returns 
project. 
Logistical 
support 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
returns 
P – minority 
expressions of 
interest in 
returning 
Drina Valley. In 
cooperation with 
UNHCR. 
297 
 
87 JUN 01 French SFOR 
clothing supplies  
CIMIC N N N/A Sarajevo. 
88 JUN 01 Dutch project 
(IDEA) 
Integrated 
Development 
Entrepreneurial 
Assistance 
CIMIC Y – support 
linked to 
minority 
employment. 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – companies 
willing to 
employ 
minorities 
engaged in the 
process 
Travnik plus five 
canton areas. In 
cooperation with 
Dutch Chamber of 
Commerce.  
89 JUN 01 UK business 
project linked to 
returns support. 
CIMIC Y – funding 
conditional on 
returnees 
employment 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participation 
P – unspecified 
numbers of 
minorities 
employed. 
Sipovo. In 
cooperation with 
DFID. 
90 JUL 01 Italian medical 
supplies 
CIMIC N N N/A Sokolac 
91 JUL 01 Finnish returns 
resolution and 
reconstruction 
assistance 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
returns 
N – Early stage 
of project 
Cavljina. In 
cooperation with 
NGOs and UNHCR. 
92 JUL 01 Finish mobile 
CIMIC house 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – facilitating 
inter-ethnic 
dialogue 
Bijeljina 
93 JUL 01 Spanish 
helicopter 
assistance 
Supplies to local 
authorities 
CS N N N/A Trebinje. In support 
to local authorities 
94 AUG 01 Spanish medical 
assistance 
CIMIC N N N/A Bacevici 
95 AUG 01 German returns 
project. House 
reconstruction 
CIMIC Y – local 
support linked to 
agreement to 
source materials 
locally 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – minorities 
returned to 26 
houses 
Turovi. Funded by 
the EU in 
partnership with 
local municipality 
96 AUG 01 Swedish returns CIMIC Y – economic Y – minority P – returnees Foca. In conjunction 
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project including 
reconstruction 
and business 
projects 
stimulus linked 
to returns 
support  
returns received 
assistance to 
allow them a 
livelihood 
following return 
with SIDA, Swedish 
development 
cooperation in the 
Balkans 
97 AUG 01 German 
reconstruction 
project 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N – Early stage 
of project 
Rajlovac 
98 AUG 01 Italian demining 
for returns and 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Gorazde 
99 SEPT 01 Finnish local 
government 
dialogue 
initiative 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation. 
P – minority 
politicians did 
participate 
Tuzla/Zvornik. In 
cooperation with 
local municipalities 
100 SEPT 01 French SFOR 
clothing supplies 
HA N N N/A Sarajevo 
101 SEPT 01 SFOR CIMIC 
training. 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation. 
N/A Sarajevo. 
102 OCT 01 UK and 
Canadian returns 
and participation 
projects 
CIMIC Y – linked to 
OHR policy 
Y – minority 
returns 
N – early stages 
of project 
Banja Luka. 
Partnership between 
MND-SW and 
Canadian 
International 
Development 
Agency 
103 OCT 01 Turkish returns 
project 
CIMIC N Y- minority 
returns 
P – difficulties 
with 
implementation 
of property laws. 
Up to 892 family 
returns recorded 
with varying 
degrees of 
Zenica/Teslic. In 
cooperation with 
USAID 
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sustainability 
104 OCT 01 French water 
works project 
CIMIC N N N/A Lastavica 
105 OCT 01 UK Quick 
Impact Project 
CIMIC Y – linked to 
returnee 
employment and 
reconstruction of 
reconstruction 
effort 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participation 
P – no record of 
minority 
employment. 
Companies gave 
commitment to 
employ 
minorities  
Sipova. In 
cooperation with 
DFID 
106 OCT 01 Italian demining 
and road 
building 
CIMIC N N N/A Novo Srpsko 
107 OCT 01 Dutch returns 
project 
CIMIC Y – provision of 
community 
centre linked to 
returns 
compliance 
Y – minority 
returns 
 P – 500 families 
had registered 
for return 
Cipuljic 
108 NOV 01 SFOR CIMIC 
Training 
CIMIC N Y – Enhancing 
awareness of 
CIMIC 
principles linked 
to minority and 
other policies 
N/A Sarajevo.  
109 NOV 01 UK joint 
Schools project 
CIMIC Y – funding 
linked to returns 
and participation 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participation 
P – multi-ethnic 
school. 
Bosnaska Gradiska. 
In cooperation with 
CIDA (Canada). 
110 NOV 01 ÙK medical 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Slatina. In 
cooperation with 
CIDA (Canada). 
111 NOV 01 Turkish bridge 
reconstruction 
linked to returns 
CIMIC N N N – majority 
returns only 
Tomici 
112 DEC 01 Polish Bosniak CIMIC Y – finance and Y – minority P – record of 16 Rjecica & Johovac 
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returns to B-
Serb areas 
technical support 
linked to 
majority and 
minority support 
for the project 
returns families 
returning in 
Rjecic while 
negotiations 
ongoing with 
VRS with regard 
to facilitating 
further returns 
113 DEC 01 Polish 
reconstruction 
project 
CIMIC Y – engagement 
with local 
leadership linked 
to returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
N – no record of 
impact. 
Suko Polje 
114 JAN 02 MND-SW 
Electricity 
project. 
CIMIC N  Y – minority 
returns. 
Dialogue with 
local 
municipality 
‘removing 
excuses’ 
regarding returns 
N – early stage 
of project 
Prijedor. In 
cooperation with 
CIDA 
115 JAN 02 Finnish 
engagement with 
minority 
communities 
CIMIC Y – targeting of 
administrative 
obstacles to 
incentivise 
returns 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participation. 
P – “Of the 
250,000 who 
have claimed 
their pre-war 
property only 
37% have 
effectively 
returned…” 
Ugljevik & Janjari 
116 JAN 02 Czech Quick 
Impact Projects 
CIMIC Y – finance 
linked to returns 
and participation 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participation. 
N – no record of 
returns. 
Prijedor. In 
cooperation with 
local municipality 
and NGOs. 
117 JAN 02 Finnish project 
to manage the 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – 
predominantly 
Bijeljina 
301 
 
impact of 
Bosniak returns 
on minority Serb 
community 
dealing with 
evection issues 
118 FEB 02 UK 
winterisation 
project 
HA N N N/A Banja Luka 
119 MAR 02 SFOR CIMIC 
training for BiH 
AF 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N/A Sarajevo. 
120 MAR 02 Polish youth 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Derventa 
121 MAR 02 Dutch SFOR 
humanitarian 
assistance 
CIMIC N N N/A Bugojno 
122 MAR 02 Dutch SFOR 
assistance with 
returns 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
returns 
P – returnees 
were facilitated 
by SFOR 
logistics support. 
Zepa. In cooperation 
with the UNHCR 
123 APR 02 Finish/Russian 
reconstruction 
and returns 
project 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
returns 
P – 34 families 
returned ‘of their 
own accord’ 
Zaljova. 
Demographics in 
this area were not 
contentious due to 
its isolated location 
124 APR 02 French bridge 
reconstruction 
and school 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Djajici 
125 MAY 02 Finnish road 
reconstruction 
linked to returns 
CIMIC Y - 
reconstruction 
linked to 
economic 
stimulus for both 
communities 
Y – minority 
returns 
P – some returns 
occurred. No 
figures given 
Bratunac. In 
cooperation with 
UNHCR 
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126 MAY 02 Turkish post-
returns security 
and school 
support 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N  Zenica 
127 MAY 02 Turkish 
healthcare 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Zenica 
128 MAY 02 HQ SFOR 
school support 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Olovo 
129 JUN 02 Spanish mixed 
school support 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – low. 
Separate floors 
for ethnic groups 
Stolac 
130 JUN 02 SFOR CIMIC 
course for BiH 
AF 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N/A Sarajevo 
131 JUL 02 Portuguese 
school 
Playground 
CIMIC N N N/A Buci 
132 JUL 02 Turkish 
reconstruction 
project. 
CIMIC N N N/A Kovaci 
133 AUG 02 Russian SFOR 
peace building 
camp 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – children 
from all 
ethnicities 
attended camp 
Brezovo Polje. In 
cooperation with 
World vision 
Internaitonal. One 
off event 
134 AUG 02 Spanish bridge 
reconstruction 
CIMIC Y – to 
incentivise local 
community to 
facilitate returns 
Y – minority 
returns 
N – early stage 
in project 
Dindo. In 
cooperation with EU 
and UNHCR 
135 AUG 02 Spanish inter-
ethnic dialogue 
project 
CIMIC Y – linked to 
awards scheme 
for tolerance to 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – minority 
groups did 
participate 
Berkovici 
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other ethnic 
groups 
136 SEPT 02 USA dialogue 
project 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
P – affected by 
limited resources 
Suceska 
137 SEPT 02 UK joint bridge 
project 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N – no returns 
recorded. Bridge 
only just 
completed 
Sipovo. In 
cooperation with 
Dutch government 
138 SEPT 02 SFOR CIMIC 
course 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
plus guidance on 
EU funding 
criteria 
N/A Sarajevo 
139 SEPT 02 Italian school 
renovation 
CIMIC N N N/A Pale 
140 OCT 02 Spanish bridge 
project  
CIMIC Y – EU 
Commission 
funding linked 
to returns. 
Y – minority 
returns 
N – project just 
completed 
Dindo. In 
cooperation with EU 
and local 
municipalities. 
141 NOV 02 Dutch/Finnish 
returns projects 
revaluation 
CIMIC Y – funding 
contingent on 
access for 
returns 
Y – minority 
participation 
N – no early 
returns recorded 
Novi Grad & Odzak 
142 NOV 02 Portuguese 
water and 
reconstruction 
CIMIC N N N/A Dubrave 
143 DEC 02 SFOR CIMIC 
Course 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N/A Sarajevo. In 
cooperation with 
BiH Armed forces. 
144 DEC 02 Morocco SFOR 
food distribution 
CIMIC N N N/A Vrapici 
145 DEC 02 Italian road 
reconstruction 
CIMIC Y – funding 
linked to 
employment 
Y – minority 
participation 
N- no returns 
recorded. Bridge 
just completed 
Kukavice. In 
cooperation with 
European 
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participation of 
Bosniaks in RS 
area.  
Commission 
146 FEB 02 Greek food and 
clothing supplies 
HA N N N/A Sarajevo 
147 JAN 03 USA 
environment 
project. 
CIMIC N N N/A Brcko 
148 JAN 03 Norwegian 
winterisation 
CIMIC N N N/A Doboj 
149 JAN 03 Dutch business 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Jajce 
150 JAN 03 French returns 
project 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
returns 
P – project 
aimed at 
sustaining 
returns where 
they had already 
occurred 
Nevesinje 
151 FEB 03 German returns 
project 
CIMIC N N N/A Foca 
152 FEB 03 Italian school 
refurbishment 
CIMIC N N N/A Dragoradi. In 
cooperation with 
UNHCR 
153 MAR 03 Italian schools 
and employment 
projects 
CIMIC Y – provision of 
facilities 
intended to 
incentivise 
returns 
Y – minority 
returns linked to 
employment 
opportunities 
N – projects 
intended to 
incentivize 
future returns 
Cajnice 
154 APR 03 SFOR CIMIC 
course for BiH 
AF 
CIMIC N Y – minority 
participation 
N/A Sarajevo. In 
cooperation with 
BiH Armed Forces 
155 APR 03 USA agriculture 
project 
CIMIC Y – project 
funding linked 
to participation 
Y – minority 
participation 
P – One Serb 
participated 
Modrica 
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156 JUN 03 Italian aid for 
IDPs 
HA N N N/A Moscanica 
157 JUL 03 Finnish 
agriculture 
project linked to 
returns and 
participation 
CIMIC Y – Financial 
support 
contingent on 
participation in 
Economic 
Action Group 
connecting 
returnees to 
local business 
and municipality 
Y – minority 
returns and 
participation 
P – project 
focused on 
sustainability of 
existing returns 
and participation 
Kamenica Gornja 
Total    44 (R30 P16)* 94 (R48 P52)* 49 (R25 P26)*  
Legend: HA – Humanitarian Aid; CS – Civil Support; N/S – Non-specified; CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation; LOT – Liaison and Observation Team; 
N/S – Non-specified; Y – Yes; N – No; P – Partial; N/A – Non-applicable; R – Returns; P – Participation; * - some projects involved both returns and 
participation.. Sources: SFOR Informer; Irish Defence Forces files.  
 
306 
 
References 
 
Books 
 
Andrić, Ivo (1959) The bridge over the Drina. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 
 
Ankersen, Christopher (2008) “Introduction: interrogating civil-military cooperation” in 
Christopher Ankersen ed.  Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations. 
Emerging Theory and Practice. Routledge, pp. 1-12. 
 
Beate, Jahn (2009) “The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy”, in David Chandler ed., 
Statebuilding and Intervention: Policies, Practices and Paradigms. London: 
Routledge, pp. 210-230. 
 
Bieber, Florian (2004) “Power Sharing as Ethnic Representation in Post-conflict societies: 
The case of Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo” in Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ivan 
Krastev, eds. Nationalism and Communism: Lessons Learned. Central European 
University. 
 
Bildt, Carl (1998) Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia. London: Orion. 
 
Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse (2003) “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of 
Europe”, in Kevin Featherston and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of 
Europeanization. Oxford University Press. 
 
Bose, Sumantra (2002) Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International 
Intervention. Oxford University Press. 
 
Brusis, Martin (2000) “Internal Problems of the EU that Might Obstruct an Enlargement 
towards the East”, in Helena Tang ed., Winners and Losers of EU Integration: 
Policy Issues for Central and Eastern Europe (Washington D.C., 2000). pp. 265-
289. 
 
Burg, Steven L and Paul S. Shoup (1999) The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict 
and International Intervention. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Caplan, Richard (2005) Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Caplan, Richard (2005) International Governance of War Torn Territories: Rules and 
reconstruction. Oxford University Press. 
 
Cox, Marcus (2008) “Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Limits of Liberal Imperialism”, in 
Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth, eds., Building States to Build Peace.  
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 249-270. 
 
Davies, Norman (1997) Europe: A History. London: Pimlico. 
 
Forman, Shepard and Stewart Patrick (2000) Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-
conflict Recovery. London: Lynne Rienner. 
307 
 
 
Gow, James (2003) The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes. 
London: Hurst. 
 
Grabbe, Heather (2005) The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through 
Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Hethy, L.  (2003) “Tackling the Employment Crisis in a Post-conflict Country: The Case 
of Kosovo”, in Eugenia Date-Bah, ed., Jobs after the War: A Critical Challenge in 
the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle. Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 
pp. 401-428. 
 
Hettne, Björn (2003) “Security Regionalism in Europe and South Asia, in James J. Hentz 
and Morten Bøås eds., New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the 
Nation State. Ashgate, pp. 149-166. 
 
Hill, Christopher (2003) The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. MacMillan. 
 
Hill, Christopher and Karen E. Smith (2000) “Section 4: Major Policy Developments” in 
Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith eds. European Foreign Policy: Key 
Documents. London: Routledge. pp. 254-449. 
 
Holbrooke, Richard (1998) To End a War. New York: Modem. 
 
Ignatieff, Michael (2003) Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan. London: Random House. 
 
Jackson, Gen. Sir Mike (2007) Soldier: The Autobiography. London: Bantam. 
 
Jackson-Preece, Jennifer (2005) Minority rights: between diversity and community. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Kelley, Judith G. (2004) The Power of Norms and Incentives: Ethnic Politics in Europe. 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Keohane, Robert, Joseph Nye and Stanley Hoffmann, eds. (1993) After the Cold War: 
International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989 – 1991. Harvard 
University Press. 
 
King, Iain, and Whit Mason (2006) Peace at any price: how the world failed Kosovo. 
Cornell University Press. 
 
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994) Designing social inquiry: 
Scientific inference in qualitative research. Princeton University Press. 
 
Kymlicka, Will (2008) “The Evolving Basis of European Norms of Minority Rights: 
Rights to Culture, Participation and Autonomy” in Marc Weller, Denika Blacklock 
and Katherine Nobbs eds. The Protection of Minorities in the Wider Europe. 
Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 11-41. 
 
308 
 
Law, David (2007b) “Conclusion: Security Sector (Re)construction in post-conflict 
settings” in Michael Brzoska and David Law, eds. Security Sector Reconstruction 
and Reform in Peace Support Operations. Routledge, pp. 101-114. 
 
Malloy, Tove H. (2008) “Forging Territorial Cohesion in Diversity” in Marc Weller, 
Denika Blacklock and Katherine Nobbs eds. The Protection of Minorities in the 
Wider Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. pp.54-94. 
 
March, James and Johan Olsen (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational 
Basis of Politics. New York, Free Press. 
 
Mayall,  James (2007) “Introduction” in Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides eds. United 
Nations Interventionism 1991-2004. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-31. 
 
Mayall, James (1996) The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations experience in 
Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Minear, Larry (2002) The humanitarian enterprise: dilemmas and discoveries. Bloomfield, 
CT: Kumarian Press. 
 
Nobbs, Katherine (2008) “The Effective Protection of Minorities in the Wider Europe: 
Counterbalancing the Security Track” in Marc Weller, Denika Blacklock and 
Katherine Nobbs eds. The Protection of Minorities in the Wider Europe. Palgrave 
Macmillan. pp. 276-288. 
 
Paris, Roland (2004) At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Patrick, Stewart (2001) “The Evolution of International Norms: Choice Learning, Power 
and Identity” in William R. Thompson ed. World Politics: Evolutionary 
Interpretations, New York, 2001. Pp. 133-175. 
 
Patten, Chris (2006) Not quite the diplomat: home truths about world affairs. UK: Penguin. 
 
Pugh, Michael (2013) “Peace Operations” in Paul Williams ed. Security Studies, 2nd 
edition, pp. 393-408. 
 
Rana, Raj (2008) “At the Cross Road or at the End?” in Christopher Ankersen ed. Civil-
Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations. Emerging Theory and Practice. 
Routledge, pp. 225-239. 
 
Richmond, Oliver P. and Jason Franks (2009) Liberal Peace Transitions: Between 
Statebuilding and Peacebuilding. Edinburgh University Press. 
 
Rosamond. Ben (2000) Theories of European Integration. Palgrave. 
 
Rose, Gen. Sir Michael (1999) Fighting for Peace: Lessons from Bosnia. London: Warner. 
 
Rose, Michael (1998) Fighting for Peace, Bosnia 1994. Vintage. 
 
309 
 
Rukavishnikov, V.O. and Michael Pugh (2006) “Civil-military relations” in Giuseppe 
Caforio ed. Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. New York: Springer 
 
Sampson, Steven (2002) “Beyond Transition: Rethinking Elite Configurations in the 
Balkans” in Christopher M. Hann ed. Post Socialism: Ideals, Ideologies and 
Practices in Eurasia. London: Routledge. 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier eds. (2005) The Europeanization of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Cornell University Press. 
 
Schmitter, Philippe C. (1996) “The Influence of the International context upon the Choice 
of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies” in Laurence Whitehead 
ed. The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Seybolt, Taylor B. (2007) Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success 
and Failure. Oxford University Press. 
 
Simms, Brendan (2002) Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia. London: 
Penguin. 
 
Sisk, Timothy D. (1996) Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. 
Washington: United States Institute for Peace. 
 
Sjursen, Helene and Karen E. Smith (2004) “Justifying EU Foreign Policy: the Logics 
Underpinning EU Enlargement” in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen eds. 
Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. Manchester University Press, pp. 126-
141. 
 
Smith, Karen E. (2003) European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
 
Smith, Karen E. (2005) “Enlargement and European Order”, in Christopher Hill and 
Michael Smith eds. International Relations and the European Union. Oxford, pp. 
299-323. 
 
Smith, Michael (1996) “The EU as an international actor” in Jeremy Richardson ed. 
European Union: power and policy-making. London: Routledge. 
 
Stromseth, Jane, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks (2006) Can Might Make Rights? 
Building the Rule of Law after Military Operations. Cambridge University Press, 
New York. 
 
Stubbs, Paul (1996a) “Which Side are We on? Researchers’ Contributions to Improved 
Shelter Provisions for Refugees and Displaced Persons in the post-Yugoslav 
Countries”, in S. Barakar and S. Ellis eds., Towards Improved Shelter and 
Environment for Refugees and Displaced Persons within the Post- Yugoslav 
Countries. York: PRDU. 
 
310 
 
Van Evera, Stephen (1997) Guide to methods for students of political science. Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Voget, Bernhard G. (2008) “Civil Military Cooperation of the German Armed Forces: 
Theoretical Approach and Contemporary Practice in Kosovo” in Christopher 
Ankersen ed. Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations. Emerging 
Theory and Practice. Routledge, pp. 143-172. 
 
Von Frentz, Christian Raitz (1999) A Lesson Forgotten: Minority Protection under the 
League of Nations. The Case of the German Minority in Poland, 1920-1934. 
Hamburg: LIT. 
 
Weller Marc (2008) “Introduction: The Outlook for the Protection of Minorities in the 
Wider Europe” in in Marc Weller, Denika Blacklock and Katherine Nobbs eds. The 
Protection of Minorities in the Wider Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 1-10. 
 
Weller, Marc (1999) Peace Lost: The Failure of Conflict Prevention in Kosovo. Leiden: 
Brill. 
 
Journals, articles & reports. 
 
Ackerman, Will (2003) “NATO Secretary General makes final visit to KFOR, Kosovo”, in 
KFOR Chronicle, No. 11, 1 December 2003, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2003/chronicle_11/11.htm (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Adams, Tim (2000) “CIMIC House opens in Brod” in SFOR Informer, No. 84, 29 March 
2000, Sarajevo.  http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/84/cimicho/t000326a.htm. 
(accessed 9 September 2015). 
 
Adams, Tim (2000) “Small business openings” in SFOR Informer, No. 85, 12 April 2000, 
Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/85/busines/t000414c.htm. (accessed 15 
September 2015).  
 
Ágh, Attila (1999) “Processes of Democratization in the East Central European and Balkan 
States: Sovereignty-related Conflicts in the Context of Europeanization”, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32, 1999, pp. 263-279. 
 
Asmus, Ronald D. Richard L. Kugler
 
and F. Stephen Larrabee (1996) 
“
What will NATO 
enlargement cost?”, Survival, Volume 38, Issue 3, Autumn, 1996, pp.5-26. 
 
Asmus, Ronald, D. and Robert C. Nurick (1996) “NATO Enlargement and the Baltic 
States”, Survival, Vol. 38, Issue 2, Summer, 1996, pp.121-142. 
 
Autti, Mikko (2007), “Helping people help themselves”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 9, 1 
October 2007, Pristina. 
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/site7423/General/Chronicle%20Archive/2007/ch
ronicle_10.pdf (accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
311 
 
Aybet Gülnur, and Florian Bieber (2011) “From Dayton to Brussels: The Impact of EU 
and NATO Conditionality on State-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No. 10, December 2011, pp. 1911-1937. 
 
Ayoob, Mohammed (2002) “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty”, The 
International Journal of Human Rights, 6: 1, 2002, pp. 81-102. 
 
Barber, Luis (2000) “Joint Military Commission at Camp Butmir” in SFOR Informer, No. 
92, 19 July 2000, Sarajevo. 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/92/butmir/t000719b.htm. (accessed 12 September 
2015). 
 
BBC News (13 October 1998) “Why Russia Opposes Intervention in Kosovo”, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/111585.stm  (accessed 17 November 2013). 
 
Berdal, Mats and Richard Caplan (2004) “The Politics of International Administration”, 
Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 
Vol. 10, January-March 2004, No. 1, pp. 1-6. 
 
Bergner, Gilles (1998) “A Presentation of CIMIC” in SFOR Informer, No. 31, 11 March 
1998, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/cimic/introduction/cimic.htm. (accessed 7 
September 2015). 
 
Betts, Wendy S., Scott N. Carlson and Gregory Gisvold (2001) “The Post-Conflict 
Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the Lessons Learned in Efforts to 
Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 22, Part 3, 2001, pp. 371-390 
 
Bieber, Florian (2002/2003) “Balancing Political Participation and Minority Rights” 
Report for the European Centre for Minority Issues. Central European University. 
 
Bieber, Florian (2011) “Building Impossible States? State-building Strategies and EU 
Membership in the Western Balkans”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No. 10, pp. 
1783-1802. 
 
Bieber, Florian and Sören Keil (2009) “Power-Sharing Revisited: Lessons Learned in the 
Balkans”, Review of Central and East European Law. Vol. 34, Issue 4, 2009, pp. 
337-360. 
 
Bijleveld, Anne Willem (2006) “Towards More Predictable Humanitarian Responses – 
Inter-agency Cluster Approach to IDPs”, Refugee Quarterly Survey. Vol. 25, Issue 
4, 2006, pp. 141-153. 
 
Bildt, HR Carl (1996) “Response to Dr. Henry Kissenger’s Article of 8 September”. 
Washington Post, 14 September 1996. 
 
Björkdahl, Annika (2007) “Constructing a Swedish Conflict Prevention Policy Based on a 
Powerful Idea and Successful Practice”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 42 No. 2, 
June 2007, pp. 169-185.  
 
312 
 
Black, Richard and Saskia Gent (2006) “Sustainable Return in Post-Conflict Contexts”, 
International Migration, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2006, pp.15-38. 
 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992) “Empowering the United Nations: Historic Opportunities to 
Strengthen World Body” Foreign Affairs”, Vol.71, No. 5, Winter 1992, pp. 89-102. 
 
Boy, Alain (1998) “Revival of a ghost Village” in SFOR Informer, No. 50, 9 December 
1998, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/humanitarian/ghostvil/ghostvil.htm. 
(accessed 1 September 2015). 
 
Boyce, James K. (2002a) “Chapter 5: Obstacles to peace conditionality”, The Adelphi 
Papers, Special Issue: Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars. 
Vol. 42, Issue 351 pp. 61-72. 
 
Boyce, James K. (2002b) “Chapter 5: Conclusion”, The Adelphi Papers, Special Issue: 
Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars. Vol. 42, Issue 351 pp. 
73-76. 
 
Brown, Jamie (2002), “MNB-E Commander visits Elementary School”, in KFOR 
Chronicle, No. 5, 11 March 2002, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_05/09.htm  (accessed 14 
September 2015). 
 
Buchanan, Allen (1999) “The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention”, The 
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1999, pp. 71-87. 
 
Caplan, Richard (2001) “A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-
torn Territories”, Adelphi Paper, 341, Oxford: Routledge. 
 
Caspersen, Nina (2003) “Thorny Issue of Ethnic Autonomy in Croatia: Serb Leaders and 
Proposals for Autonomy, The Reconceptualising Autonomy in Post-Communist 
Europe”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minorities in Europe, JEME, Issue 3/2003. 
 
Chandler, David (2001) “The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights 
NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda”,  Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 23, 
No. 3, Aug., 2001, pp. 678-700. 
 
Chandler, David (2006) “State-building in Bosnia: The Limits of ‘Informal Trusteeship’”, 
International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol.11, No.1, pp. 17-38. 
 
Chesterman, Simon (2001) Kosovo in Limbo: State-building and Substantial Autonomy, 
International Peace Academy Report. New York. 
 
Clement, Alexis (2000) “The 2nd CIMIC Centre of the NPBG” in SFOR Informer, No. 89, 
7 June 2000, Sarajevo. 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/89/cimcenter/t000608d.htm. (accessed 9 
September 2014). 
 
313 
 
Cockell, John G. (2002) “Civil-Military Responses to Security Challenges in Peace 
Operations: Ten Lessons from Kosovo”, in Global Governance. Vol. 8, 2002, pp. 
483-502. 
 
Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler (2004). "Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies," 
European Economic Review. Elsevier, Vol. 48(5), October, pp. 1125-1145. 
 
Craig, Russell (2002) “No problem too small” in SFOR Informer, No. 137, 25 April 2002, 
Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/137/p10a/t02p10a.htm (accessed 12 
September 2015). 
 
Cronin, Bruce (2002) “Creating Stability in the New Europe: The OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities and the Socialization of Risky States”, 
Security Studies, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 132-163. 
 
Crouch, William (1997) “IFOR becomes SFOR” in SFOR Informer, No. 1, 8 January 
1997, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/historic-moments/ifor-to-sfor/ifor-
sfor.htm. Viewed 7 September 2015.  
 
Cutillo, Alberto (2006) International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflict: A 
Review of Fifteen Years of Interventions and the Future of Peacebuilding. Policy 
Paper. New York. International Peace Academy. 
 
Cutts, Mark (1999) The humanitarian operation in Bosnia, 1992-95: dilemmas of 
negotiating humanitarian access. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees: Centre for Documentation and Research. 
 
Dahlman, Carl and Gearóid Ó Tuathail (2005) “Broken Bosnia: The Localized Geopolitics 
of Displacement and Return in Two Bosnian Places”, Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, Vol. 95, Issue 3, August, 2005, pp. 644-662. 
 
Dahlman, Carl and Gearóid O’Tuathail (2005) “The Legacy of Ethnic Cleansing: The 
International Community and the Returns Process in Post-Dayton Bosnia–
Herzegovina”, Political Geography, Vol. 4. Issue 5, June 2005, pp. 569-599. 
 
Dannreuther, Roland (2006) “Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European 
Neighbourhood Policy”, European Foreign Affairs Review. Vol. 11, 2006, pp. 183-
201. 
 
Deardorff, Alan V. (2010) Glossary of international economics. University of Michigan. 
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/p.html. (accessed 23 August 
2015). 
 
Development Researcher’s Network Consortium (2004) Evaluation of the Implementation 
of Council Regulation 2667/2000 on the European Agency for Reconstruction. 
Synthesis Report, Volume 1, June 2004. Development Researcher’s Network: 
Rome. p. 46-47. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ear/publications/main/documents/Evaluati
on_on_the_work_of_EAR_June2004.pdf. (accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
314 
 
Economides, Spyros and Ker-Lindsay, James (2015) 'Pre-accession Europeanization': the 
case of Serbia and Kosovo. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 53 (5). pp. 
1027-1044. 
 
Edmunds, Timothy (2003) “Perspective: Political Conditionality and Security Sector 
Reform in Post-communist Europe, Conflict, Security & Development, 3:1, April 
2003, pp. 139-144. 
 
Edmunds, Timothy (2006) “What are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military 
Roles in Europe,  International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 
1944-), Vol. 82, No. 6, November 2006, pp. 1059-1075. 
 
Edwards, Tom (2001), “UK BG: making a difference in the community”, in SFOR 
Informer, No. 127, 28 November 2001, 
Sarajevo.http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/127/p07a/t0107a.htm. (accessed 11 
September 2015). 
 
Egeberg, Kristoffer (2001) “United we Stand” in SFOR Informer, No. 105, 24 January 
2001, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm. (accessed 7 September 2015). 
 
Egeberg, Kristoffer (2001) “When words can’t describe” in SFOR Informer, No. 114, 30 
May 2001, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/114/p05a/t0105a.htm. 
(accessed 10 September 2014). 
 
Englbrecht, Walpurga (2004) “Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo: Voluntary 
Return in Safety and Dignity”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2004. 
UNHCR, pp. 100-148. 
 
European Stability Initiative (2003) Recommendations of first Meeting of the Stabilisation 
and Association Process Tracking Mechanism for Kosovo, 13 March 2003. 
European Stability Initiative. http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/kosovo/15/1.pdf. 
(accessed 9 September 2015). 
 
Falk, Richard A. (1999) “Kosovo, World Order and the Future of International Law”, The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 4, October, 1999, pp. 847-
857. 
 
Finnemore, Martha (2000) Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention. Paper presented at a 
Symposium on norms and ethics of humanitarian intervention at the Centre for 
Global Peace and Conflict Studies, University of California, April, 2000 and 
revised September 2000. 
 
Fitzgerald, Peter (2001) “New funding source for MND-SW CIMIC projects” in SFOR 
Informer, No. 123, 3 October 2001, 
Sarajevo.http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/123/p05a/t0105a.htm. (accessed 10 
September 2014). 
 
Fitzgerald, Peter (2001), “The Dutch approach to CIMIC” in SFOR Informer, No. 125, 31 
October 2015, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/125/p15a/t0115a.htm. 
(accessed 11 September 2015). 
315 
 
 
Freyburg, Tina and Solveig Richter (2010) “National Identity Matters: the Limited Impact 
of EU Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 17, Issue 2, March, 2010, pp. 263-281. 
 
Gal, Kinga (2000) “The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities and its Impact on Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Policies in Europe. Issue 1 (2000), pp. 1-17.  
 
Garlick, Madeline (2000) “Protection for Property Rights: A Partial Solution? The 
Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC) 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol.19, No. 3, 2000, pp. 
65-85. 
 
Gheciu, Alexandra (2011) “Divided Partners: The Challenges of NATO-NGO Cooperation 
in Peacebuilding Operations.”, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism 
and International Organizations, Vol. 17, No.1, pp. 95-113. 
 
Gheciu, Alexandra (2005) “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 
‘New Europe’”, International Organization, 59, pp. 973–1012. 
 
Gilbert, Geoff (1996) “Council of Europe and Minority Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, 
Vol. 18, No. 1, February, 1996, pp. 160-189. 
 
González, Antonio Ruiz (2002), “Aid to Stolac’s school” in SFOR Informer, No. 140, 6 
June 2002, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/140/p03a/t02p03a.htm. 
(accessed 11 September 2015). 
 
Gordon, Stuart (2006) “Exploring the Civil–Military Interface and its Impact on European 
Strategic and Operational Personalities: ‘Civilianisation’ and Limiting Military 
Roles in Stabilisation Operations?”, in European Security, Vol. 15, Issue 3 (2006), 
pp. 339-361. 
 
Granatstein, Gabriel (2007) “Making a Difference?”, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 8, 
No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 84-85. 
 
Gresh, Alain and  Emmanuelle Pauly, Peggy Pierrot, Philippe Rivière, Catherine Samary, 
Florence Touret, Dominique Vidal (2006) “As seen as told, part two, 14 june-31 
october  1999” in Le Monde Diplomatique, 1 January 2006.http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/cahier/kosovo/oscepart2-en. (accessed 12 September 2015). 
 
Grzyb, Rebecca (2002), “Patrol helps kids safely go to school”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 
12, 27 July 2002, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_12/06.htm (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Harvey, Joanna (2006) “Return Dynamics in BiH and Croatia: A Comparative Analysis”, 
International Migration, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2006, pp.89-114. 
 
316 
 
Haugsboe, Haakon (1999) “What is KFOR for?” in KFOR Chronicle, No. 1, 27 September 
1999, Pristina. http://nato.int/KFOR/chronicle/1999/chronicle_199901/p03.htm 
(accessed 12 September 2015). 
 
Haugsboe, Haakon (1999a) “A growing trust in KFOR”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 2, 
October 1999, Pristina. 
http://nato.int/KFOR/chronicle/1999/chronicle_199902/p13.htm  (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Haugsboe, Haakon (1999b) “Protecting Minorities”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 2, October 
1999, Pristina. http://nato.int/KFOR/chronicle/1999/chronicle_199902/p12.htm 
(accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
Haugsboe, Haakon (1999c) “Never touch!” in KFOR Chronicle, No. 4, December 1999, 
Pristina. http://nato.int/KFOR/chronicle/1999/chronicle_199904/p14.htm (accessed 
13 September 2015). 
 
Heck, Doris (2008) “RLMTs of MNTF (S) We feel the pulse of Kosovo”, in KFOR 
Chronicle, No. 10, 31 October 2008, Pristina. 
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/site7423/General/Chronicle%20Archive/2008/ch
ronicle_10.pdf (accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
Heikkila, Jaakko (2008) “Finish KFOR members assist small businesses (in Task Force 
Centre)”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 4, 30 April 2008, Pristina. 
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/site7423/General/Chronicle%20Archive/2008/ch
ronicle_04.pdf (accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
Heimerl, Daniela (2005) “The Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: From 
Coercion to Sustainability?”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 12, Issue 3, 2005, 
pp. 377-390. 
 
Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas & Igor Grebenschikov (2006) “Security governance by 
internationals: The case of Kosovo”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 
pp. 43-59, 
 
Hilaj, Arjan (1998) “Initiative gains more than expected” in SFOR Informer, No. 31, 11 
March 1998, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/humanitarian/italian-
init/italianini.htm (accessed 7 September 2015). 
 
Hochschild, Fabrizio (2004) “‘It is Better to Leave, We Can’t Protect You’: Flight in the 
First Months of United Nations Transitional Administrations in Kosovo and East 
Timor” in The Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2004, pp. 286-300. 
 
Huma, Haider (2010) “The Politisiation of Humanitarian Assistance: Refugee and IDP 
Policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. 26 
April 2010, https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/700 (accessed 9 August 2015). 
 
Human Rights Watch (1997) “Bosnian & Herzegovina” in Human Rights Watch World 
Report 1997.  New York: Human Rights 
317 
 
Watch.http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/HELSINKI-03.htm#P176_58205 
(accessed 3 September 2015).  
 
 
Human Rights Watch (1998) “Bosnian & Herzegovina: Politically Backed Violence” in 
Human Rights Watch World Report 1998.  New York: Human Rights 
Watch.http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Helsinki-05.htm#P357_89852 
(accessed 3 September 2015).  
 
Human Rights Watch (1999) “Bosnian & Herzegovina: Human Rights Developments – 
Political Developments” in Human Rights Watch World Report 1999.  New York: 
Human Rights Watch. 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/europe/bosnia.html (accessed 3 
September 2015).  
 
Human Rights Watch (1999) “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” in Human Rights Watch 
World Report 1999.  New York: Human Rights 
Watch.http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Eca-26.htm (accessed 12 September 
2015). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2000) “Bosnian & Herzegovina: Human Rights Developments – 
Political Developments” in Human Rights Watch World Report 2000.  New York: 
Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Eca-04.htm (accessed 3 
September 2015). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2001) “Bosnian & Herzegovina: Human Rights Developments” in 
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001.  New York: Human Rights 
Watch.http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/europe/bosnia.html (accessed 6 
September 2015). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2002) “Bosnian & Herzegovina: Human Rights Developments” in 
Human Rights Watch World Report 2002.  New York: Human Rights 
Watch.http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k2/europe5.html (accessed 6 September 
2015). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2003) “Bosnian & Herzegovina: Human Rights Developments” in 
Human Rights Watch World Report 2003.  New York: Human Rights 
Watch.http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k3/europe5.html (accessed 6 September 
2015). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2003a) “Kosovo: Human Rights Developments” in Human Rights 
Watch World Report 2003.  New York: Human Rights 
Watch.https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k3/europe17.html#Kdevelopments 
(accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2005) “Serbia and Montenegro” in Human Rights Watch World 
Report 2005.  New York: Human Rights Watch. pp. 412-
422.https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/pdf/serbia.pdf (accessed 13 September 
2015).  
 
318 
 
Human Rights Watch (2006) “Serbia and Montenegro” in Human Rights Watch World 
Report 2006.  New York: Human Rights Watch.   pp. 388-
398.http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k6/wr2006.pdf (accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2007) “Serbia” in Human Rights Watch World Report 2007.  New 
York: Human Rights Watch.  http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k7/wr2007master.pdf 
(accessed 13 September 2015).  pp. 411-419. 
 
Human Rights Watch (2008) “Serbia” in Human Rights Watch World Report 2008.  New 
York: Human Rights Watch. pp. 421-
430.http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k8/pdfs/wr2k8_web.pdf (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2010) “Serbia” in Human Rights Watch World Report 2010.  New 
York: Human Rights Watch. pp. 439-
449.http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2010.pdf (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Human Rights Watch, (2001a) “Kosovo: Human Rights Developments” in Human Rights 
Watch World Report 2001.  New York: Human Rights 
Watch.http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/europe/yugoslavia-kosovo.html (accessed 
13 September 2015). 
 
Hussmann, Karen, Martin Tisné and  Harald Mathise (2009) Integrity in Statebuilding: 
Ikenberry, John and Charles Kupchan (1990) “Socialisation and Hegemonic 
Power”, International Organization, Vol. 44, Issue 3, pp. 283-315. 
 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2011) “Bosnian village in Line for Tolerance award 
following story” in Global Voices Balkans, 22 May 2011. http://iwpr.net/report-
news/bosnian-village-line-tolerance-award-following-story (accessed 4 July 2015). 
 
Ivanisevic, Bogdan (2004) “Legacy of War: Minority Returns in the Balkans” in World 
Report 2004: Human Rights and Armed Conflict. Human Rights Watch, pp. 351-
375. 
 
Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (2000) “Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media 
Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect”, The Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 37, no. 2, 2000, pp. 131-143. 
 
Jazbec, Milan (2005) Defence Reform in the Western Balkans: The Way Ahead. Policy 
Paper, April 2005, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 
Geneva. 
 
Jeffrey, Alex (2006) “Building State Capacity in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
The Case of Brčko District”, Political Geography, Vol. 25, Issue 2, February, 
2006, pp. 203-227. 
   
Judah, Tim (2009) Yugoslavia is dead: long live the Yugosphere good news from the 
Western Balkans. LSEE paper on South Eastern Europe, London, 2009. 
 
319 
 
Kammerhoff, Holger (2004) “With hard work at all levels the path to Europe will be open 
to Kosovo”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 1, January 2004, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2004/chronicle_01/03.htm (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener (1999) “Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO 
Enlargement.”  Journal of European Public Policy, 5, pp. 721-742. 
 
Kaufmann, Chaim D. (1998) “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and 
Partitions in the Twentieth Century”, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 
120-156. 
 
Keene, Tony (2004) “A whole lot of changes going on” in SFOR Informer, No. 172, 
August 2004, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/172/p04a/t02p04a.htm 
(accessed 11 September 2015). 
 
Ker-Lindsay, James (2012) “The UN and the Post-intervention Stabilization of Kosovo” in 
Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 392-
405. 
 
Kipp, Jacob W. et al. (2000) Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR 
Operations and Prospects for a Future Combined Security System: The Peace and 
Stability of Europe after IFOR. Joint US/Russian Research Project – Foreign 
Military Studies office (FMSO), Center for Army Lessons Learned, U. S. Army 
Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and the Center for Military-
Strategic Studies (CMSS), General Staff of the Armed Forces, Moscow, Russia. 2
nd
  
 Edition, November 2000. 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/IFOR/English.pdf (accessed 6 
September 2015).  
 
Knaus, Gerald and Marcus Cox (2005) “Building Democracy after Conflict: The Helsinki 
Moment in Southeastern Europe”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 39-
53. 
 
Korhonen, Outi (2001) “International Governance in Post-conflict Situations”, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 2001, pp. 495-529. 
 
Kostovicova Denisa (2008) “Legitimacy and International Administration: The Ahtisaari 
Settlement for Kosovo from a Human Security Perspective”, International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, Issue 5 November 2008, pp. 631-647. 
 
Kostovicova, Denisa and Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović, (2006) “Europeanizing the Balkans: 
Rethinking the Post-communist and Post-conflict Transition”, Ethnopolitics, 
Volume 5, Issue 3, September, 2006, pp. 223-241. 
 
Kovacs, Petra (2002) “Who Benefits? Ethnic Bias and Equity in Access of Ethnic 
Minorities to Locally Provided Public Services in CEE”. Paper Delivered at the 
10
th
 NISPAcee Annual Conference: Delivering Public Services in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Krakow. 
 
320 
 
Krajc, Branislav (2004) “Group CIMIC 4th CZ/SK BG”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 1, 
January 2004, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2004/chronicle_01/05.htm (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Kuçi, Hajredin (2004) “Barriers on the Road to Standards” in ASI Newsletter No. 12, July 
2004. pp. 6-7.   
 
Kymlicka, Will (2002) “Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: West and East” in Journal 
of Ethno Politics and Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 4: Special Issue - Will 
Kymlicka and Exporting Liberal Pluralism: Western Political Theory and Ethnic 
Relations in Eastern Europe. 
 
Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild (1996) “Containing Fear: The Origins and 
Management of Ethnic Conflict”, International Security, Vol. 21, No.2, Autumn, 
1996, pp 41-75. 
 
Lavigne, Jean-Philippe  (2001) “No mans land” in SFOR Informer, No. 120, 22 August 
2001, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/120/p04a/t0104a.htm (accessed 
10 September 2014). 
 
Law, David (2007a) Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform, Report 
for Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Geneva. 
 
Leckie, Scott (2005) “Housing Land and Property Rights in Post-conflict Societies: 
Proposals for a New United Nations Institutional and Policy Framework”, 
Department of International Protections, PPLA/2005/01, Geneva: UNHCR. 
 
Lehmann, Christophe (1999) “SFOR micro-projects programs” in SFOR Informer, No. 73, 
27 October 1999, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/cimic/obnova/t991115e.htm. 
(accessed 9 September 2014). 
 
Lijphart, Arend (2004) “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies”, Journal for 
Democracy, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2004, pp. 96-109. 
 
Luttenberg, Matthais (2007), “Kosovo’s Future Status”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 4, 30 
April 2007, Pristina. 
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/site7423/General/Chronicle%20Archive/2007/ch
ronicle_04.pdf  (accessed 14 September 2015). 
 
Lynch, Dov (2009) “ESDP and the OSCE” in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel 
Keohane. eds. European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999-
2009). Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.  
 
Maddox, Michael (2000), “Turkish CIMIC team visit” in SFOR Informer, No. 93, 2 
August 2000, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/93/turkcim/t000730g.htm 
(accessed 10 September 2014). 
 
Manning, Carrie (2004) “Elections and Political Change in Post-War Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” in Democratization, Vol. 11, No. 2, August 2004, pp. 60-86. 
321 
 
 
March, James and Johan Olsen (2004) The Logic of Appropriateness. Arena Working 
Papers, WP 04/09, University of Oslo. 
 
Martin, Eric C. and Judith L. Miller (2003) “NGOs and the Development of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Understanding Large-scale Interorganizational Systems”, Voluntas: 
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 14, No. 2, 
(2003), pp. 145-166. 
 
Marzouk, Lawrence (2010) “Kosovo President: ‘Bumpy road to the EU and NATO’” 
Balking Insight, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-president-bumpy-
road-to-eu-and-nato (accessed 3 January 2014). 
 
Mazower, Mark (1997) “Ethnicity and War in the Balkans” 
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/publications/hongkong/mazower.htm (accessed 
4 Sept 2013). 
 
McDougall, Gay (2006) “Preface” in Clive Baldwin Minority Rights in Kosovo Under 
International Rule. Report for Minority Rights Group International . p. 6. 
 
McSweeney, Dan (2002) “Building Democracy: The Kosovo Police Service School in 
Vushtrri”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 19, December 2002, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_19/17.htm (accessed 14 
September 2015). 
 
Mearsheimer, John J. (1990) “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War” 
in International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer, 1990, pp. 5-56. 
 
Mini, Fabio (2002), “COMKFOR’s Editorial”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 19, December 
2002, Pristina.  http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_19/02.htm 
(accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
Mini, Fabio (2003), “COMKFOR Chronicle Editorial”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 2, 28 
February 2003, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2003/chronicle_01/00.htm  (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina (2003) “Of Dark Sides and Twilight Zones: Enlarging to the 
Balkans” in East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2003, pp, 83-90. 
 
Nielsen, Thomas (2002), “Joint Patrol”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 7, 26 April 2002, 
Pristina. http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_07/08.htm (accessed 
14 September 2015). 
 
Noutcheva,  Gergana (2009) “Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: the Limits of the 
EU's Normative Power in the Western Balkans, Journal of European Public Policy, 
Vol. 16, Issue 7, Sept. 2009, pp. 1065-1084. 
 
Noutcheva, Gergana (21-23 September,2006) EU Conditionality, State Sovereignty and the 
Compliance Patterns of Balkan States. Paper Prepared for the 3
rd
 Pan-European 
322 
 
Conference on EU Politics, European Consortium for Political Research, Bilgi 
University, Istanbul. 
 
O’Neill, William G. (2005) Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What we Know and 
What We Still Need to Know. Policy Paper, International Peace Academy: New 
York. 
 
O'Sullivan, Chris (2001) “The news media and the resolution of ethnic conflict: Ready for 
the next steps?”, Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, Issue 2, pp. 54-66. 
 
OECD (2008) “Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings”, OECD Report, 
Paris. 
 
OECD, London School of Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2009) 
Statebuilding in fragile situations – How can donors ‘do no harm’ and maximise 
their positive impact? Country case study – Afghanistan. OECD Report, Paris. 
 
OSCE Seminar (1997) Co-operation Among International Organizations and Institutions: 
Experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Consolidated Summary). Portoro., 29-30 
September 1997. http://www.osce.org/ec/42187?download=true (accessed 22 
August 2015).  
 
Peshkopia, Ridvan (2005) “The limits of conditionality” in Southeast European Politics, 
Vol. IV, No. 1, pp. 44-55. 
 
Petrenko, Petro (2002) “Returning home at last”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 08, 11 May 
2002, Pristina. http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_08/10.htm 
(accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
Pickering, Paula M. (2011) “The Constraints on European Institutions’ Conditionality in 
the Western Balkans”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63. No. 10, pp. 1939-1944. 
 
Pina, Juan A. (2000) “Changing the Guard at the Inspectorate General” in SFOR Informer, 
No. 89, 7 June, 2000, Sarajevo. 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/89/change/t000608c.htm (accessed 12 September 
2015). 
 
Pina, Juan A. (2000) “Interview with Lt. Gen. Sir. Michael A. Wilcocks” in SFOR 
Informer, No. 82, March 2000, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/coms-
sfor/wilcocks/t000302a.htm (accessed 13 March 2015).   
 
Pina, Juan A. (2000) “Lt. Gen. Charles-Henri de Monchy,  
Deputy Commander SFOR” in SFOR Informer, No. 89, 7 June 2000, Sarajevo. 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/89/cominter/t000608f.htm (accessed 12 
September 2015). 
 
Pouligny, Béatrice (2005) “Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peace Building: Ambiguities of 
International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies, Security Dialogue. 
Vol 36 (2005), p. 495-510. 
 
323 
 
Puetger, Thorsten (2002), “Prizren KFOR Office helps more than 80,000 people” in KFOR 
Chronicle, No. 10, 19 June 2002, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_10/13.htm  (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Ramaga, Philip Vcuiri (1993) “The Group Concept in Minority Protection”, Human Rights 
Quarterly, Issue 3 (1993), p. 575-588. 
 
Ratner Steven, (2000) “Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?”, 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 32, Issue 3. 
pp. 591-698. 
 
Rieff, David (2002) “Humanitarianism in Crisis”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6, 
November-December, pp. 111-121. 
 
Rollins, J.W. (2001) “Civil‐military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Crisis Response Operations: 
The implications for NATO”, International Peacekeeping, 8:1, 2001, 122-129. 
 
Rupnik, Jacques (2000) “Eastern Europe: The International Context”, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 2, April, 2000, pp. 115-129. 
 
Sadakata, Mamoru (2006) “The Balkans between the EU and NATO: Focusing on the 
former Yugoslavia” in Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2006, 
pp. 38-45. 
 
Sasse, Gwendolyn (2005) “Securitization or Securing Rights? Exploring the Conceptual 
Foundations of Policies towards Minorities and Migrants in Europe”, in JCMS, 
Vol. 43, No. 4, 2005. pp. 673-93. 
 
Sasse, Gwendolyn and Eiko Thielemann (2006) “A Research Agenda for the Study of 
Migrants and Minorities in Europe”, JCMS, Vol. 43, No. 4 (2005). pp. 655-71. 
 
Sater, Richard C. (2001) “Make yourself at home” in SFOR Informer, No. 121, 5 
September 2001, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/121/p10b/t0110b.htm 
(accessed 11 September 2015). 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank (2005) “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern 
Europe: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis”, Centre for European Studies, 
Central and Eastern Europe, Working Paper, No. 61. 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank (2007) “European Regional Organizations, Political 
Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe, East European 
Politics and Societies, vol. 21, no. 1, February, 2007, pp. 126-141. 
 
Scott-Flynn, Nick (1999) “Coordination in Kosovo: the Challenge for the NGO Sector”, 
Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 15, November, 1999, pp. 7-9. 
 
Simonsen, Sven Gunnar (2005) “Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-conflict Institution 
Building: Lessons from Recent Cases”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 36. No. 3, 2005, 
pp. 297-318. 
324 
 
 
Slim, Hugo (2001) “Military Intervention to Protect Human Rights: The Humanitarian 
Agency Perspective”. Background Paper: Meeting on Military Intervention and 
Human Rights, Prepared for the International Council on Human Rights Policy, 
March, 2001. 
 
Smith, Chris (2001) “Security-sector Reform: Development Breakthrough or Institutional 
Engineering?”, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 1, Issue 1, April, 2001, pp. 
5-20. 
 
Smith, Karen E. (2005) “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4, Britain and Europe: Continuity and Change, 
Jul., pp. 757-773. 
 
Smith, Karen E. (2008) The EU in the world: future research agendas. European Foreign 
Policy Unit working Paper No. 2008/1. London School of Economics and Political 
Science. 
 
Solana, Javier (1999) ”NATO’s Success in Kosovo”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6, 
November-December, 1999, pp. 114-120. 
 
Somin, IIya (24 March 2014) “Why the Kosovo ‘Precedent’ Does not Justify Russia’s 
Annexation of Crimea”, Washington Post. 
 
Stoddard, Abby (2003) “Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends”, in Joanna Macrea 
and Adele Harmer eds., Humanitarian Action and the ‘Global War on Terror’, 
Humanitarian Policy Group, Report No. 14, July, 2003, pp. 25-36. 
 
Stubbs, Paul (1996) “Nationalisms, Globalization and Civil Society in Croatia and 
Slovenia”, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Vol. 19, pp. 1-26. 
 
Sullivan, Chris O’ (2001) “The News media and the resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Ready 
for the Next Steps?”, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2001, pp. 
54-66. 
 
Sylvester Lt. Gen. John B. (2002) “COMSFOR answers to SFOR Informer” in SFOR 
Informer, No. 148, 26 September, 2002, Sarajevo. 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/148/p12a/t02p12a.htm (accessed 12 September 
2015). 
 
Tahiri, Ramush (2003) “Negotiations between Equals” in ASI Newsletter, No. 8, 8 October 
2003, p. 9. http://www.osce.org/kosovo/15294?download=true (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Thomas, David (2000) “New Dutch CIMIC Strategy” in SFOR Informer, No. 103, 20 
December 2000, Sarajevo. 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/103/s103p03b/t0012203b.htm (15 September 
2015). 
 
325 
 
Thussu, Daya Kishan (2000) “Legitimizing ‘Humanitarian Intervention’? CNN, NATO 
and the Kosovo Crisis”, European Journal of Communication, Vol 53, 2000, pp. 
345-361. 
 
 
 
Tuhkanen, Markku (2004) “New Entrepreneurs Start With a Little Help From Friends”, in 
KFOR Chronicle, No. 10, October 2004, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2004/chronicle_10/06.htm  (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Uvin, Peter (2007) “From the Right to Development to the Rights-based Approach: How 
‘Human Rights’ Entered Development”, Development in Practice, Vol. 17, Issue 4-
5, 2007, pp. 596-606. 
 
Valentin, Marcel (2002) “Message from COMKFOR”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 4, 18 
February 2002, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_04/07.htm  (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Vand de Poele, Patrick (1999) “A Velika Operation” in SFOR Informer, No. 72, 13 
October 1999, Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/cimic/velika-ops/t991017f.htm 
(accessed 15 September 2015).  
 
Vasilev, George (2011) “EU Conditionality and Ethnic Coexistence in the Balkans: 
Macedonia and Bosnia in a Comparative Perspective”, Ethnopolitics: Formerly 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 10:1 (2011), pp. 51-76. 
 
VeneKlasen, Lisa, Valerie Miller, Cindy Clark and Molly Reilly (2004) Rights-based 
Approaches and Beyond: Challenges of Linking Rights and Participation. IDS 
Working Paper 235, University of Sussex. 
 
Vetschera, Heinz and Matthieu Damian (2006) “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: The role of the International Community, International 
Peacekeeping, 13:1, 2006, pp. 28-42. 
 
Von Hippel, Karin (2000) “Democracy by force: A renewed Commitment to Nation 
Building”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, Issue 1, Winter, 2000, pp. 95-112. 
 
Walla, H. (2002), “KFOR soldiers help cleaning a multi-ethnic area to help Serbs and 
Albanians to live together”, in KFOR Chronicle, No. 8, 11 May 2002, Pristina.  
http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_08/01.htm  (accessed 12 
September 2015). 
 
Wallander, Celeste A. (2000) “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold 
War”, International Organization, 54, 4, Autumn, 2000, pp. 705-735. 
 
Weiss, Thomas G. (1999) “Principles, Politics and Humanitarian Action”, Ethics and 
International Affairs, Vol. 13, Issue 1, March, 1999, pp. 1-22. 
 
326 
 
Weller, Marc (1999) “The Rambouillet Conference in Kosovo”, in International Affairs, 
Vol. 75, Issue 2, April 1999, pp. 211-251. 
 
Weller, Marc and Stefan Wolff (2006) “Bosnia and Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: 
Lessons for Internationalized State Building”, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2006, 
pp. 1-13. 
 
Wheeler, Victoria and Sue Graves and Michael Wesley, (2006) “From Crisis Response to 
State-building: Services and Stability in Conflict Affected Contexts”. Discussion 
Paper for the Humanitarian Policy Group. London: Overseas Development 
Institute. 
 
Wilczewski, William (2000), “German CIMIC Round Table Session” in SFOR Informer, 
No. 83, 15 March 2000, Sarajevo. 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/83/roundtab/t000317b.htm (accessed 11 
September 201). 
 
Wilde, Ralph (2004) “Representing International Territorial Administration: A Critique of 
Some Approaches”, European Journal of International Law. Vol. 15, No. 1, 2004, 
pp. 71-96. 
 
Williams, Rhodri C. (2006) “The Significance of Property Restitution to Sustainable 
Return” BiH in International Migration, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2006, pp.40-61. 
 
Wisler, Dominique, (2007) “The International Civilian Police Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: From Democratization to Nation‐Building”, in Police Practice and 
Research, Vol. 8, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 253-268. 
 
Wolfrum, Rüdiger ( 2005) “International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by the 
United Nations and Other International Actors”,  Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law, Vol. 9, 2005, pp. 649-696.   
 
Wulf, Herbert (2004) Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries, 
Report for Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management. Berlin. 
 
Yannis, Alexandros (2001) “Kosovo under international administration”, Survival, Global 
Politics and Strategy, Vol. 43, Issue 2, pp. 31-48. 
 
“Commander KFOR Press Conference”, (2005), in KFOR Chronicle, No. 6, 30 June 2005, 
Pristina. 
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/site7423/General/Chronicle%20Archive/2005/ch
ronicle_06.pdf (accessed 14 September 2015). 
 
“Finnish battalion goes to school”, (2002), in KFOR Chronicle, No. 7, 26 April 2002, 
Pristina. http://www.nato.int/Kfor/chronicle/2002/chronicle_07/01.htm (accessed 
13 September 2015). 
 
“KIKPC-KPC: Together for a better Kosovo”, (2006), in KFOR Chronicle, No. 2, 28 
February 2006, Pristina. 
327 
 
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/site7423/General/Chronicle%20Archive/2006/ch
ronicle_02.pdf  (accessed 14 September 2015). 
 
“Returns Project to NOVO SELO”, Editorial, (2003), in KFOR Chronicle, No. 10, 1 
November 2003, Pristina.  
http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2003/chronicle_10/14.htm  (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
“Welcome home”, (2003), in KFOR Chronicle,   No. 7, August 2003, Pristina. 
http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2003/chronicle_07/08.htm  (accessed 14 
September 2015). 
 
Official sources 
 
“UNHCR Representative Speaking at the OSCE Seminar on Co-Operation among 
International Organisations and Institutions: Experience in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (Portoro, 29-30 September 1997), p. 11. 
 
Ashdown, Paddy (2003) 24
th
 Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the 
Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 13 
October 2003, Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo. 
http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=31003 (accessed 6 
September 2015). 
 
Ashdown, Paddy (2005), Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special 
Representative for BiH: January-June 2005. EU Special Representative in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: Sarajevo. http://europa.ba/?p=12939 (accessed 12 September 
2015).  
 
Bildt, Carl (1996a) 1
st
 Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the 
Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary General of the United Nations. 14 
March 1996, Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo.http://www.ohr.int/other-
doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=3661#1.0 (accessed 5 August 2015). 
 
Bildt, Carl (1996b) 2
nd
 Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the 
Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary General of the United Nations. 10 July 
1996, Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo.http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-
reports/default.asp?content_id=3664 (accessed 5 August 2015). 
328 
 
Bildt, Carl (1996c) 3rd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the 
Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 1 
October 1996, Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo. 
http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hrreports/default.asp?content_id=3666 (accessed 1 
September 2015). 
Bildt, Carl (1996d) 4th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the 
Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 10 
December 1996, Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo. 
http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=3667 (accessed 1 
September 2015). 
 
Bildt, Carl (1996e) Report by the High Representative on Compliance with the Peace 
Agreement. OHR, 23 March 1996, Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo.  
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:iCP09BQEiOwJ:www.ohr
.int/other-doc/hr-
reports/default.asp%3Fcontent_id%3D3663+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk 
(accessed 5 September 2015). 
 
Bildt, Carl (1997) 5
th
 Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian 
Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 16 April 1997, 
Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo. http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-
reports/default.asp?content_id=3668 (accessed 10 September 2015). 
 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1996) Letter Dated 13 March 1996 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council. New York: United 
Nations.http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u960314b.htm (accessed 06 September 2015). 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2003) Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament: The Western Balkans and European 
Integration. COM 2003, 285 final, 21 May 
2003,Brussels.http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114088.
pdf (accessed 5 August 2015). 
 
Council of Europe (2004)  “Opinion of the Advisory Committee on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, adopted on 27 May 2004”, Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. CM(2004)143 23 July 2004,  
para. 59.https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=763541&Site=COE (accessed 06 
September 2015). 
 
Council of Europe, (2007), Situation of Longstanding Refugees and Displaced Persons in 
South Eastern Europe. Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 11289, 24 May 2007, 
Strasbourg. http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/465c42092.pdf (accessed 14 September 
2015).  
 
CSCE (1975) Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act. 1 August 
1975, Helsinki. 
 
CSCE (1990) The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris: CSCE, 21 November 1990 
 
329 
 
CSCE (1992) “Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, CSCE”, Helsinki, July 
1992. 
 
EAR (2001) “Reconstruction Programme in Kosovo” in European Agency for 
Reconstruction Annual Report 2000. 28 February 2001, EAR: Brussels. pp. 11-
25.http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ear/publications/main/documents/EAR
AnnualReport2000.pdf (accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
EC (1991) “Declaration on Yugoslavia”, European Political Cooperation Extraordinary 
Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991. 
 
EC (1991) The Treaty on European Union, 92/C 191/01, Art. J. 1, (7 February 1991). 
 
EC (1992) “Section II – Framework” in Report to the European Council on the Likely 
Developments of the CFSP with a View to Identifying Areas open to Joint Actions 
vis-a-vis Particular Countries or Groups of Countries. Lisbon, 26 27 June 1992. 
 
EPC (1991) “Declaration on Yugoslavia”, European Political Cooperation Extraordinary 
Ministerial Meeting, The Hague, 19 September 1991. 
 
EU (1998) “Statement by the European Council on Kosovo”, Cardiff, 15 June 1998. 
 
EU (1999) “Conclusions of the European Council Meeting in Berlin”, Berlin, 24-25 March 
1999. 
 
EU (2000) “Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000 on Assistance for 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1628/96 and Amending Regulations (EEC) No 3906/89 and (EEC) No 1360/90 and 
Decisions 97/256/EC and 1999/311/EC”. Brussels, p. L 306/3. 
 
EU (2003) Thessaloniki Declaration. C/03/163, Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003. 10229/03 
(Presse 163). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm (accessed 
22 May 2014). 
 
EU Office Européen de Lutte Antifraude (2003) “OLAF investigation concerning EU funds 
in Kosovo, former United Nations official jailed for embezzlement”, Brussels 17 
June 2003. http://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/media-corner/press-releases/olaf-
investigation-concerning-eu-funds-kosovo-former-united-nations_en (accessed on 
5 June 2016). 
 
European Council in Copenhagen (21-22 June 1993), “Conclusions of the Presidency”, SN 
180/93. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf (accessed 
10 April 2013). 
 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2000) Kosovo/Kosova: Return, Reconstruction, 
Respect (Conference Report), 28 
January2000.http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6684.html (accessed 20 July 
2015).  
 
330 
 
European Parliament (2003) Information Note on The Political and Economic Situation of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its Relations with the European Union. 8 
January 2003, European Parliament: Luxembourg. 
www.europarl.europa.eu/.../04A-POLI_INF(2002)080060_EN.doc (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005) Defence White Paper of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sarajevo. 
 
Government of Croatia (1995) “Law on the Temporary Take-over of Specified Property” 
Narodne novine. No. 73/1995, 27 September 1995. 
IFOR Press Briefing (1996) “Transcript from IFOR press briefing, 1 January 1996”, IFOR 
AFSOUTH TRANSCRIPT 1996.01.01.  
http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960101a.htm (accessed 04 September 2015). 
 
Locher III, James R. et al (2003) The Path to Partnership for Peace: Report of the Defence 
Reform Commission. Defence Reform Commission: Sarajevo. 
 
Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force (2010) Stand-up, Challenges and Success. Govt. of 
Kosovo:Pristina.http://www.mksfks.org/repository/docs/Broshura%20ANGLISHT
%20%20-%20finale%207.02.2011.PDF (accessed 14 September 2015). 
 
Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011) Brochure of the 
Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. April 2011, 
Public Affairs Office, BiH Ministry of Defence: Sarajevo. 
 
NATO (1991) “NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe”. Press Communiqué 
M-1(91)44 North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial Session Copenhagen 6th-
7
th
 June 1991. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910607b.htm. (accessed 8 
March 2014). 
 
NATO (1991) “Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”. Statement 
by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen 6-7 
June 1991. 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2VeVjdP9Yp4J:www.nato
.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910607d.htm+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk (accessed 8 
March 2014). 
 
NATO (1991) “Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation”. Press Communiqué S-
1(91)86 Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council in Rome 8th Nov. 1991. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm (accessed 8 March 2014). 
 
NATO (1991) “The Situation in Yugoslavia”. Press Release S-1(98)88 Statement issued by 
the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council Rome, 1-8 Nov 1991. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-
95/c911108b.htm (accessed 9 March 2014). 
 
331 
 
NATO (1999) An Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-governance in Kosovo, 
“Rambouillet Accords”. 23 February 1999, Rambouillet, France. http://www.alb-
net.com/kcc/interim.htm (accessed 1 August 2015). 
 
NATO (2003) AJP-9 NATO Operational CIMIC, Belgium: NATO SHAPE 
NATO Press Release (24 Apr. 1999), “Membership Action Plan (MAP)”. NAC-
S(99)66http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm (accessed 12 March 2013). 
 
NATO Press Release (3 April 2008), “Bucharest Summit Declaration”. 
2008/049http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed 12 
March 2013).  
 
OHCHR (2006) Frequently Asked Questions on the Human Rights Based Approach to 
Development Cooperation. New York and Geneva. 
 
OHR (1997) Reconstruction and Returns Task Force Report 1997, 30 April 1997. Office of 
the High Representative: Sarajevo. http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rrtf/key-
docs/reports/default.asp?content_id=5574 (accessed 29 August 2015). 
 
OHR (1998) Sarajevo Declaration. 5 February 1998. Office of the High Representative: 
Sarajevo. http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rrtf/key-docs/sa-
docs/default.asp?content_id=5453 (accessed 10 December 2014).  
 
OHR (2015) “Government and Parliamentary Section”, Political Department, 
OHR.http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/pol/ (accessed 06 September 2015). 
 
OSCE & UNHCR (2000) Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo: 
November 2000 to September 2000. OSCE & UNHCR: 
Pristina.http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13304?download=true (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
OSCE & UNHCR (2000a) Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo: 
November 1999 to January 2000. OSCE & UNHCR: 
Pristina.http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13308?download=true (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
OSCE & UNHCR (2001) Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo: 
October 2000 to February 2001. OSCE & UNHCR: 
Pristina.http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13301?download=true (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
OSCE & UNHCR (2002) Ninth Assessment of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo: September 
2001 to April 2002. OSCE & UNHCR: 
Pristina.http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13289?download=true (accessed 5 September 
2015). 
 
OSCE (1999) Annual Report 1999 on OSCE Activities: 1 December 1998-31 October 
1999. 17 November 1999. Vienna: OSCE. 
http://www.osce.org/secretariat/14539?download=true (accessed 27 July 2015). 
332 
 
 
OSCE (2002) Mission in Kosovo: Institution-Building Pillar’s Mission Statement on 
Kosovo’s Communities. May 2002, OSCE: 
Pristina.http://www.osce.org/kosovo/37677?download=true (accessed 12 
September 2015).  
 
OSCE (2002b) Mission in Kosovo: Supporting Democracy in Kosovo. June 2002, OSCE: 
Pristina. http://www.osce.org/kosovo/37661?download=true (accessed 12 
September 2015). 
 
OSCE (2002c) Mission in Kosovo: The OSCE and Residential Property Rights. July 2002, 
OSCE: Pristina. http://www.osce.org/kosovo/37648?download=true (accessed 12 
September 2015). 
 
OSCE (2003) Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2002. 23 March 2003. Vienna: 
OSCE.http://www.osce.org/secretariat/13603?download=true (accessed 27 July 
2015).  
 
OSCE (2005) Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2004. 6 May 2005. Vienna: 
OSCE.http://www.osce.org/secretariat/14430?download=true (accessed 27 July 
2015).  
 
OSCE (2007) Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2006. 23 April 2007. Vienna: 
OSCE.http://www.osce.org/secretariat/24692?download=true (accessed 28 July 
2015).  
 
OSCE Mission in Kosovo, (2000), The Impending Property Crisis in Kosovo. Background 
Report, 25 September 2000, OSCE: Pristina. 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13065?download=true (accessed 13 September 2014). 
 
OSCE, Provisional Electoral Commission, (1996) “Rules and Regulations”, Provisional 
Electoral Commission, 6 July 1996. pp. 5-
8.http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:TFf284jpR3IJ:www.gen
eseo.edu/~iompress/Archive/BiH_Provisional_Election_Commission.pdf+&cd=1&
hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk (accessed 9 September 2015). 
 
Petritsch, Wolfgang  (2000) 16
th
 Report the High Representative for Implementation of the 
Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 3 May 
2000, Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo. http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-
reports/default.asp?content_id=3658 (accessed 6 September 2015). 
 
Petritsch, Wolfgang  (2002) 21
st
 Report the High Representative for Implementation of the 
Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 5 March 
2002, Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo. http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-
reports/default.asp?content_id=7025 (accessed 6 September 2015).  
 
PIC (1996) “Chapter 4: Refugees and Displaced Persons” in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
1997: Making Peace Work. Peace Implementation Conference: London, 5 
December 1996. http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5175#D (accessed 
1 September 2015). 
333 
 
 
Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo, (1999) 
S/1999/779.http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/779&re
ferer=http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/reports.shtml&Lang=E 
(accessed 5 August 2015). 
 
SFOR (2004) “Liaison and Observation Teams of SFOR”, SFOR Fact Sheet. SFOR: 
Sarajevo. http://www.nato.int/sfor/factsheet/lot/t040909a.htm (accessed 11 
September 2015). 
 
UN (1945) The Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, United Nations: San Francisco. 
 
UN (1995) Basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium, “Erdut Agreement.” A/50/757, S/1995/951, United Nations: New York. 
 
UN (1995) The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
“Dayton Agreement”. A/50/790, S/1995/999, 14 December 1995, United Nations: 
New York. 
 
UN (1995) UNSCR 1031. S/RES/1031, 1995, 15 December 1995. United Nations Security 
Council: New York. 
 
UN (1999) “Report by UN Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Mission in 
Kosovo”, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999. United Nations: New York. 
 
UN (1999) UNSCR 1244. S/RES/1244, 1999, 10 June 1999. United Nations Security 
Council: New York. 
 
UN Security Council (2000) Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations 
Interim Mission in Kosovo. S/2000/1196, 15 December 2000, United Nations: New 
York.http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2000/1196 
(accessed 12 September 2015). 
 
UN Security Council (2001) Report of the Security Council Mission on the Implementation 
of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). S/2001/600, 19 June 2001, United 
Nations: New York. 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2001/600 (accessed 12 
September 2015). 
 
UNHCR (1999) “UNHCR Global Report 1999: Kosovo Emergency” 
http://www.unhcr.org/3e2d4d5f7.html (accessed 22 August 2015). 
 
UNHCR (2000) “Country Operation: Bosnia and Herzegovina at a Glance” in The Global 
Report 1999. UNHCR Fundraising Reports, 30 June 2000. Geneva: UNHCR. pp. 
326-331.http://www.unhcr.org/3e2d4d51a.html (accessed 11 August 2015). 
 
UNHCR (2000a) “Kosovo Emergency” in UNHCR Global Report 1999. UNHCR 
Fundraising Reports, 30 June 2000. Geneva: UNHCR. pp. 345-
347.http://www.unhcr.org/3e2d4d51a.html (accessed 11 August 2015). 
334 
 
 
UNHCR (2001) “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” in UNHCR Global Report 2000. 
UNHCR Fundraising Reports, 30 June 2001. Geneva: UNHCR. pp. 399-
408.http://www.unhcr.org/3e23eb747.html (accessed 12 September 2015). 
 
UNHCR (2002) “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” in UNHCR Global Report 2001. 
UNHCR Fundraising Reports, 30 June 2002. Geneva: UNHCR. pp. 362-
269.http://www.unhcr.org/3dafdd04d.html (accessed 12 September 2015).  
 
UNHCR (2003) “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia including Kosovo” in UNHCR Global 
Report 2002. UNHCR Fundraising Reports, 30 June 2003. Geneva: UNHCR. pp. 
376-385.http://www.unhcr.org/3edf4ffc0.html (accessed 12 September 2015).  
 
UNHCR (2005) “Serbia and Montenegro” in UNHCR Global Report 2004. UNHCR 
Fundraising Reports, 30 June 2005. Geneva: UNHCR. pp. 427-
437.http://www.unhcr.org/42ad4dbe0.html (accessed 12 September 2015). 
 
UNHCR (2006) “Bosnia and Herzegovina” in UNHCR Global Report 2005. UNHCR 
Fundraising Reports, 30 June 2006. Geneva: UNHCR. pp. 373-
378.http://www.unhcr.org/449267580.html (accessed 11 August 2015). 
 
UNHCR (2006) “Serbia and Montenegro” in UNHCR Global Report 2005. UNHCR 
Fundraising Reports, 30 June 2006. Geneva: UNHCR. pp. 379-
387.http://www.unhcr.org/4492678d0.html (accessed 12 September 2015). 
 
UNHCR (2009) “Serbia” in UNHCR Global Report 2008. UNHCR Fundraising Reports, 
30 June 2009. Geneva: UNHCR. pp. 249-256. 
http://www.unhcr.org/4a2e14ee2.html (accessed 12 September 2015). 
UNHCR (2010) “Article 1, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” in 
Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugee. Geneva: UNHCR. 
 
UNHCR (2012) “Serbia (and Kosovo: SC Res. 1244)” in Global Appeal 2012-13, UNHCR 
Fundraising Reports, Geneva: UNHCR. pp. 252-257. 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ec2310915.pdf (accessed 12 September 2015). 
 
UNMIK & PISG (2003) Standards for Kosovo. 10 December 2003. UNMIK & PISG: 
Pristina. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20Standards.pdf (accessed 12 September 2015).  
 
UNMIK (1999) On the Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps. Regulation No. 
1999/8, UNMIK Official Gazette, 20 September 1999, UNMIK: 
Kosovo.http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E1999reg
s/RE1999_08.htm (accessed 12 September 2015). 
 
UNMIK (2001) A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-government in Kosovo. 
Regulation No. 2001/9, UNMIK Official Gazette, 15 May 2001, UNMIK: 
Kosovo.http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2001reg
s/RE2001_09.pdf (accessed 12 September 2015). 
 
335 
 
UNMIK, (1999), The Establishment of the Housing and Property Directorate and the 
Housing and Property Claims Commission, UNMIK/REG/1999/23, 15 November 
1999, Pristina. http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg23-99.htm 
(accessed 14 September 2015).  
 
UNOCHA (29 January, 2003), “Guiding principles on Internal Displacement” 
http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I266EN.pdf (accessed 22 July 2015). 
 
Westendorp, Carlos  (1997a) 6
th
 Report Report of the High Representative for 
Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, 11 July 1997. Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo. 
http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=3669 (accessed 15 
August 2015). 
 
 
 
Westendorp, Carlos  (1997b) 7
th
 Report Report of the High Representative for 
Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, 16 October 1997. Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo. 
http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=3670 (accessed 15 
August 2015). 
 
Westendorp, Carlos  (1998) 10
th
 Report Report of the High Representative for 
Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, 14 July 1998. Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo. 
http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=3673 (accessed 3 
September 2015). 
 
Westendorp, Carlos  (1999) 13
th
 Report Report of the High Representative for 
Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, 7 May 1999. Office of the High Representative: Sarajevo. 
http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=3677 (accessed 3 
September 2015). 
 
 
Speeches & Statements 
 
 
Bildt, Carl (1997) Remarks to the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the Peace 
Implementation Council ,Geneva, 23 April 1997. http://www.ohr.int/ohr-
dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=3294 (accessed 07 September 2015).  
 
Bildt, Carl (1997) Speech at the Donors Information Meeting, Brussels, 9 January 
1997.http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=3291 
(accessed 14 September 2014). 
 
Delors, President Jaques (1992). Speech of at the Special Session of the European 
Parliament Committees on the Former Yugoslavia, Brussels, 10 August 
1992.http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-92-77_en.htm (accessed 20 
February 2013). 
336 
 
 
Ogata, Sadago (1995) Statement by Mrs. Sadago Ogata, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. Peace Implementation Conference for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: London, 9 December 1995. http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68fbe28.html 
(accessed 9 September 2015).  
 
Owen CH, RH Lord David (2011) “Constrained Intervention”. Speech at the Institute of 
International and European Affairs, Dublin, 5 October 
2011.http://www.iiea.com/events/constrained-intervention (accessed 12 February 
2013). 
 
Patten, Chris (2003), Speech to the Assembly of Kosovo. 11 September 2003. 
http://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/speech-assembly-kosovo-commissioner-chris-
patten (accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
Patten, Chris (2004) Kosovo. Plenary European Parliament (Strasbourg), 30 March 
2004.http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-166_en.htm (accessed 13 
September 2015). 
 
Rehn, Olli (2005) EU enlargement under stress – the policy of consolidation, 
conditionality and communication, Institute for European Policy, Berlin, 12 July 
2005.http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ear/news/news.htm (accessed 9 
September 2015). 
 
SFOR (2003) Mission Statement, SFOR: Sarajevo. 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm (accessed 7 September 2015).   
 
Steiner, Michael (2003) Taking Responsibility for 2003. Television address to Kosovo, 20 
January 2003. UNMIK UNMIK/PR/907, Press Release: Pristina. 
 
UN (2015) “UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo”, 
UN.http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/background.shtml 
(accessed 12 September 2015). 
 
 
Miscellaneous Sources 
 
 
European Union Office in Kosovo, (2015),   Political and Economic Relations.      
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations/index_en.ht
m (accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
Govt. of Norway (2001) “Norway’s role as lead nation”, KFOR (5) – Norway’s Role as 
Lead Nation, 5 April 2001, Oslo. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/documents/Handbooks-and-
brochures/2001/KFOR-5---Norways-role-as-Lead-Nation-text-ed.html?id=419335 
(accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
337 
 
Ministry for the Kosovo Security Services (2010) “On the Recruitment of Minorities and 
Gender Issues in MKSF”. Seminar, 13 January 2010, Pristina. http://mksf-
ks.org/?page=2,24,114#.VfYfrMvouM8 (accessed 14 September 2015). 
 
NATO (2015) NATO’s role in Kosovo. http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor/about-us/natos-role-
in-kosovo.aspx (accessed 13 September 2015). 
 
OHR (1998-205) High Representatives Decisions by 
Topic,http://www.ohr.int/decisions/plipdec/archive.asp?m=&yr=2015 (accessed 1 
September 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviews 
 
1. Former French EUFOR staff officer, Sarajevo, July 2013. 
2. NATO officer, Sarajevo, July 2013. 
3. Former Irish Company Commander A from MNTF (C), Dublin, April 2013. 
4. Bosniak politician, Sarajevo, July 2013. 
5. Bosnian government defence official, Sarajevo, July 2013. 
6. Bosnian Serb political party official, Sarajevo, July 2013. 
7. Former Irish KFOR CIMIC Officer, Dublin, March 2013. 
8. Former staff member of EU Mission to Kosovo staff officer, Brussels, February 
2014. 
9. Finnish KFOR CIMIC officer A, Lipljan, September 2007. 
10. Finnish KFOR CIMIC officer B, Lipljan, September 2007. 
11. Former UNMIK civilian staff officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, September 2012. 
12. Former Austrian KFOR LMT officer, Kildare, November 2013. 
13. Former Irish Commander B from MNTF (C), Dublin, November, 2013. 
14. Former Irish KFOR KSF liaison officer, Kildare, March 2013. 
15. Former New Zealand LOT House officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, September, 2012. 
338 
 
16. Former EUFOR staff officer, Dublin April 2014. 
17. Follow – on interview with Former Finnish CIMIC officer A, Brussels, February, 
2013. 
18. Former French KFOR CIMIC officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, June 2012. 
19. Former German KFOR officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, September 2012. 
20. Former Irish IFOR staff officer A, Dublin, April 2013. 
21. Former Irish IFOR staff officer B, Kildare, January 2013. 
22. Former UK IFOR & SFOR senior staff officer, London, December 2013. 
23. Former Irish SFOR staff officer, Dublin, April 2013. 
24. Former Irish Company Commander B, MNTF (C), Dublin, May 2013. 
25. Former Irish KFOR (KPC training officer), Kildare, March 2013. 
26. German KFOR HQ staff officer, Pristina, September 2007. 
27. Former Irish KFOR KSF trainer and PSYOPS office, Athlone, March 2013. 
28. Former Irish KFOR military police officer, Dublin, April 2013. 
29. Former German KFOR officer involved in support the function of the JCR, 
Naqoura, Lebanon, March 2012. 
30. Former UK KFOR officer, London, December, 2013. 
31. Former Spanish KFOR officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, March 2012. 
32. Former Irish KFOR platoon commander, Dublin, July 2013. 
33. Kosovo Albanian politician A, Belgrade, September 2013. 
34. Kosovo Albanian politician B, Pristina, September 2007. 
35. Former Kosovo Albanian politician, Pristina, September 2007. 
36. Former Irish LMT officer, Kildare, April 2013. 
37. Former US member of COMKFOR staff, London, December 2013. 
38. Former Swedish KFOR LMT officer, Dublin, March 2013. 
339 
 
39. Former member of Norwegian KFOR, Naqoura, Lebanon April, 2013.  
40. Former member of the OHR, Sarajevo, July 2013. 
41. Senior staff member, OSCE, Sarajevo, July 2013. 
42. Former senior staff member, OHR, Sarajevo, July 2013. 
43. Former OSCE staff member, Brussels, February 2014. 
44. Former UK OSCE staff, Mission in Kosovo, Sarajevo, July 2013. 
45. Former UK senior IFOR officer, London, December 2013. 
46. Former Italian senior officer of KFOR HQ staff, Naqoura, Lebanon September 
2012. 
47. Finnish senior staff officer of MNTF (C), Camp Vielle, Lipljan, Kosovo, 
September 2007. 
48. Former Italian KFOR CIMIC officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, March 2012. 
49. Former Italian SFOR commander, Naqoura, Lebanon August 2012. 
50. Former Italian SFOR HQ staff officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, September 2012. 
51. Former Canadian SFOR LOT House officer Naqoura, Lebanon, September 2012. 
52. Former UK SFOR MND commander, London, December 2013. 
53. Former Spanish SFOR officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, June 2012.  
54. Former Swedish SFOR staff officer for MND-N, Naqoura, Lebanon September 
2012. 
55. Former Spanish KFOR CIMIC officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, September 2012. 
56. Former staff member of the OHR, London, March 2013. 
57. Former Finnish staff officer of MNTF (C), Naqoura, Lebanon, July 2012. 
58. Former UK SFOR Company commander, London, December, 2013.  
59. Former UNMIK international staff member, Naqoura, Lebanon, March 2012. 
60. Former UNMIK international staff officer A, Dublin, May 2013. 
340 
 
61. Former UNMIK international staff officer B, Dublin, April 2013. 
62. UNMIK official, Pristina, September 2007. 
63. German CIMIC officer, Pristina, September 2007.  
64. Kosovo Albanian village leader, Slovinje, Kosovo in September 2004. 
65. Kosovo Serb representative, Gracenica, September 2007. 
66. Kosovo Serb village leader, Lipljan municipality, September 2007. 
67. Kosovo Serbian politician, Belgrade, September 2013. 
68. Member of EU Office in Kosovo, September 2007. 
69. Retired Kosovo Albanian politician, Belgrade, September 2013. 
70. Former UK senior KFOR planner, London, December 2013. 
71. Serbian village leader Donja Gusterica, Lipljan municipality, September 2007. 
72. Serbian village leader of Dobrotin, Lipljan municipality, September 2007. 
73. Follow-on interview with UNHCR staff member A Geneva, February 2013. 
74. UNHCR staff member A, Lipljan, Kosovo, September 2007. 
75. UNHCR staff member B, Lipljan, Kosovo, September 2007. 
76. UNMIK official, Pristina, September 2007. 
77. Kosovo Croatian village leader in Janjevo, September 2007. 
78. Former Finnish battalion commander from MNTF (C) Naqoura, Lebanon March 
2012. 
79. Former Swedish battalion commander from MNTF (C) Dublin, April 2013. 
80. Former French SFOR CIMIC Officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, March 2012. 
 
 
 
 
341 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
342 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
